Argueta Bardales v. Frink, et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
KENNER MICHAEL ARGUETA
BARDALES,
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Petitioner,
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-3944
WARDEN, HOUSTON CONTRACT
DETENTION FACILITY, et al.
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Kenner Michael Argueta Bardales is detained in the custody of officials
with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Proceeding pro se, the petitioner filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1).
The petition and supporting documents state that the petitioner is a national and
citizen of Honduras; that he entered the United States in July 2019 and received
humanitarian parole status; that he applied for political asylum; that he has no criminal
record; and that he is not a flight risk or danger to the community. He has family ties in the
country and presents letters of support from the community. On or about March 22, 2026,
the petitioner was detained at a traffic stop and taken into immigration custody. He is
pursuing relief from removal before the BIA. He brings a claim for relief under the Due
Process Clause, among others, and seeks release from custody.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
October 09, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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The federal respondents filed a response (Dkt. 7) on July 9, 2026, relying on the
panel opinion in Sosnava Rodriguez, which later was vacated by the full Fifth Circuit. See
Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega, 180 F.4th 702 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 181 F.4th 608 (5th Cir. 2026). The respondents argue that he is subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) but do not otherwise oppose his habeas
claims. They do not contest the material facts recited by the petitioner. The petitioner
replied (Dkt. 8).
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit held in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166
F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), that two petitioners who has been present in the United States
for many years, and who had not been apprehended by immigration officials before the
detention at issue in the case, were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). The Court does not base this opinion on the statutory text but instead turns
to the petitioner’s claim that his current detention violates her rights under the Due Process
Clause.
The Court previously addressed due-process claims in the context of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See, e.g., Vilar Ruiz v. Warden, Montgomery Proc. Ctr., No. 4:26-cv-1307, 2026
WL 1707199 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2026); Valdes Soria v. Warden, Houston Cont. Det.
Facility, No. 4:26-cv-1272, 2026 WL 1658536 (S.D. Tex. June 8, 2026); Chowdhury v.
Warden, No. 26-cv-1126 (Dkt. 18) (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2026); Avila Perez v. Warden, Civil
Action No. 4:26-957 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2026); Gonzalez Monrreal v. Warden, Civil
Action No. 4:26-925 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2026); Barrera Leon v. Warden, Civil Action No.
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4:26-1341 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Gallegos Perez v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:26-351
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Cruz Osorio v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:25-6390 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 2, 2026); Rozo-Teran v. Bondi, Civil Action No. 4:26-243 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2026);
Navarette-Garcia v. Bradford, Civil Action No. 4:26-1503 (S.D. Tex. Mar, 16, 2026);
Delgado-Rodriguez v. Tate, Civil Action No. 4:26-650 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026). All of
these opinions applied the three-part test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing and
balancing the following factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, (3)
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
For the reasons stated in the Court’s opinions cited above, and based on all
authorities cited in those opinions, the Court determines that the petitioner in this case is
detained without due process of law. He has been present in the country for approximately
seven years, was previously released on parole, has no criminal history, has family and
community ties in the country, and is pursuing relief from removal. He has a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the respondents do not argue that flight
risk, danger to the community, or other weighty government interest justifies his detention.
Additionally, the respondents identify no procedures available to the petitioner to provide
notice, an opportunity to be heard, or any individualized determination regarding the reason
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for his current detention. Therefore, all three Mathews factors weigh in the petitioner’s
favor.
The Court concludes, in accordance with numerous other courts considering the
question, that detention under § 1225(b)(2) as applied to this petitioner, without an
individualized assessment or any notice or opportunity to be heard, violates the petitioner’s
right to procedural due process. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be granted. 28
U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 128 (2022)
(“federal courts may grant habeas relief as law and justice require”) (cleaned up).
“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The remedy for unlawful detention “is, of course, release.” Id.;
see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (based on statutory language of 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and the common-law history of the writ, “the essence of habeas corpus
is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”). Because the respondents do
not acknowledge any process available to the petitioner, “there is no process to await.” See
Aroca v. Mason, 819 F. Supp. 3d 517, 548 (S.D.W. Va. 2026) (cleaned up) (collecting
cases).1 After reviewing the authorities and all matters of record, the Court determines that
release is the appropriate habeas relief for the unlawful detention in this case.
The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:
1 In light of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Buenrostro-Mendez, and because the respondents
do not argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies, the Court does not order a bond hearing under
§ 1226(a). See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D.
Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (collecting cases).
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1. The petitioner’s petition for habeas relief (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED in part.
2. The respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE the petitioner from custody to a
public location, under conditions of release no more restrictive than those in
place prior to the detention at issue in this case, within 48 hours of this order.
3. The respondents are further ORDERED to inform the petitioner of the time
and location of release at least 12 hours before the release. Because the
petitioner proceeds pro se, the respondents are additionally ORDERED as
follows:
a. To notify any and all persons in their records as contacts for the
petitioner, including immigration counsel and/or family members and
friends of the petitioner, of the time and location of release at least 12
hours before the release;
b. To facilitate the petitioner’s communication with family, friends, or
other parties able to assist with safe transit upon release;
c. To work with the petitioner’s contacts to ensure safe transit upon
release; and,
d. Not to impede the petitioner’s efforts or ability to secure safe transit
upon release.
4. The respondents are further ORDERED to return to the petitioner, at the time
of release from custody, any and all identification documents taken from the
petitioner at the time of or during detention.
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5. Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of the petitioner under this
present detention is PROHIBITED and ENJOINED.
6. The respondents may not re-detain the petitioner during the pendency of the
petitioner’s removal proceedings absent a pre-detention hearing before an
immigration judge at which the government demonstrates, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the
community. See Giri v. Lyons, No. 5:26-CV-00149, ___ F. Supp. 3d _____,
2026 WL 1361557, at *13 (S.D. Tex. May 12, 2026) (collecting authorities).
7. The respondents are further ORDERED to file a status report updating the Court
within 72 hours of this order.
8. All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on , 2026.
__________________________________
GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
October 9
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