Rincones Escalante v. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
KEVIN JOSE RINCONES
ESCALANTE,
Petitioner,
versus
RAYMOND THOMPSON,
Respondent.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:26-cv-03710
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
Petitioner Kevin Jose Rincones Escalante filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC §2241 on
May 6, 2026. Dkt 1. He proceeds here pro se. He
acknowledges illegal entry into the United States on a prior
date but nonetheless asserts that his present detention
under 8 USC §1225(b) is unlawful as a violation of his due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id at 6.
A prior order noted the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 166 F4th 494, 502–08 (5th Cir
2026), which held that 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) subjects
anyone present in the United States without legal
admission to mandatory detention as an “applicant for
admission” deemed to be “seeking admission.” See Dkt 8
at 2. That order also conveyed a number of previous
decisions by the undersigned resolving several closely
related issues. Id at 2–6.
Initial screening of the petition determined that the
arguments presented raised only issues resolved in those
decisions. But Petitioner was granted an opportunity to
specify individual circumstances or additional arguments
supporting a different result. Id at 6.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 04, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Petitioner responded. Dkt 10. He recognizes the
decision in Buenrostro-Mendez, but he nevertheless
contends it doesn’t apply to him because (i) he surrendered
to authorities upon entry and was released under an order
of supervision, (ii) he has no criminal history and isn’t a
danger to the community, (iii) his immigration proceedings
are pending, and (iv) detention is causing him significant
physical and emotional harm. See id at 1–3.
As to any statutory claim, Petitioner expresses his
disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s determination in
Buenrostro-Mendez that individuals like himself, present
in the United States without legal admission, are subject
to detention under §1225(b)(2)(A). But the undersigned
previously reached the same conclusion based on the plain
language of the statute. See Montoya Cabanas v Bondi,
2025 WL 3171331 (SD Tex); Herrera Naranjo v Uhls,
2025 WL 3771447 (SD Tex). And even if inclined to
reconsider, the undersigned couldn’t grant Petitioner relief
contrary to Buenrostro-Mendez because a district court “is
bound by a circuit decision unless or until it is overturned
by an en banc decision of the circuit court or a decision of
the Supreme Court.” La Unión del Pueblo Entero v Abbott,
614 F Supp 3d 509, 525 (WD Tex 2022), quoting Perez v
Abbott, 250 F Supp 3d 123, 139 (WD Tex 2017). Petitioner’s
disagreement with prior decisions and binding Fifth
Circuit precedent isn’t a basis for habeas corpus relief.
As to the claim based on prior release, Petitioner
essentially seeks to bind the current Administration to
decisions made previously regarding the enforcement of a
statute clearly applicable to him. The Fifth Circuit notes
that courts are “exceedingly reluctant to grant equitable
estoppel against the government.” Robertson-Dewar v
Holder, 646 F3d 226, 229 (5th Cir 2011). As the Supreme
Court observes, “When the Government is unable to
enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given
rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole
in obedience to the rule of law is undermined.” Heckler v
Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc,
467 US 51, 60 (1984). “In addition, the government should
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not be unduly hindered from changing its position if that
shift is the result of a change in public policy.” United
States v Owens, 54 F3d 271, 275 (6th Cir 1995).
Such concerns are certainly present here. The Supreme
Court has recognized that “the Government may
constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the
limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.”
Maceda Jimenez v Thompson, 2025 WL 3265493, *1
(SD Tex), quoting Demore v Kim, 538 US 510, 526 (2003).
The decision of prior Administrations to decline to enforce
§1225(b)(2)(A) against individuals like Petitioner neither
changes the plain statutory text nor otherwise abrogates
the Government’s authority to lawfully detain him pending
his removal. As recently explained by Judge Fernando
Rodriguez:
Petitioner enjoyed liberty within the
United States for some years when past
administrations exercised their discretion
to forgo applying [§]1225 to him. But no
statutory or regulatory provision, and no
Constitutional principle, requires Respond-
ents to follow specific procedural steps
before exercising their authority to the
fullest under [§]1225.
Makhmudov v Lyons, 2026 WL 879392, *1 (SD Tex).
As to the due process claims, due process arguments
similar to those raised by Petitioner were rejected by the
undersigned in Penafiel Clavijo v Thompson, 2026 WL
923310 (SD Tex), which held that procedural due process
doesn’t require an individualized custody determination
beyond the mandate of 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A). The
undersigned later found that pre-removal-order detention
authorized by 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) doesn’t violate
substantive due process while deportation proceedings are
pending even when it exceeds the six-month period set out
in Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678 (2001), as to post-
removal-order detention. See Herrera Estrada v
Thompson, 4:26-cv-01238 (SD Tex, April 27, 2026). Finally,
the petition and its attachments make clear that
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Petitioner’s removal order is not yet final, so the
presumptively constitutional six-month post-final-order
detention period provided by Zadvydas hasn’t yet begun.
Petitioner’s contentions concerning his surrender to
authorities, lack of criminal history, pending asylum claim,
and compliance with earlier immigration orders may bear
on the question of whether he should ultimately be
removed. But they don’t bear on the question of whether he
may be detained during the pendency of such removal
proceedings. As such, he hasn’t shown that his current
detention violates his rights under the Due Process Clause.
And as to his claims of physical and emotional injury,
they aren’t properly raised in this habeas corpus action.
Solano-Hurtado v Garcia, 2026 WL 916966, *3 (SD Tex):
“Conditions-of-confinement claims improperly raised in a
habeas corpus petition must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.” Any such claims must instead be raised in a
civil rights action. See Melot v Bergami, 970 F3d 596, 599
(5th Cir 2020).
* * *
Because Petitioner hasn’t established that his
detention violates either the Constitution or federal law, he
isn’t entitled to relief on habeas corpus in this action.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus by Petitioner
Kevin Jose Rincones Escalante is DENIED. Dkt 1.
This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The motion by Petitioner to correct a clerical error in
his petition is GRANTED. Dkt 9.
All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
A certificate of appealability is DENIED as unnecessary.
Final judgment will enter separately.
The Clerk will mail this Order to Petitioner and email
this Order to USATXS.CivilNotice@usdoj.gov to provide
notice of this disposition to Respondents.
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SO ORDERED.
Signed on June 2, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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