Clark v. U.S. Department of Justice

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
LaShawn Doree Clark,
Plaintiff,
v.
United States Department of
Justice, Office of the Inspector
General and the United States
Marshal Service,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 4:26-cv-02539
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
On March 30, 2026, Plaintiff LaShawn Doree Clark filed a motion
requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. 2. After carefully
considering the application, the pleadings, and the applicable law, it is ordered
that Plaintiff’s IFP application be granted, but it is recommended that all
claims be dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Background
The complaint, though captioned by this Court as asserting claims
against the U.S. Department of Justice, is actually a “dossier” containing a
litany of accusations that Plaintiff submitted to the U.S. Attorney’s Office,
apparently in the hopes of prompting an investigation. 	See generally Dkt. 1;
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 18, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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see also id. at 30-31 (requesting “Immediate action” from “Investigators and
Attorneys”). 	The 	67-page 	submission 	is 	disjointed, 	mostly 	lacks 	factual
particulars, and is peppered with cryptic references to the Masons 1 and the
occult, 2 	grievances 	against 	Plaintiff’s 	family 	members, 3 	and 	allusions 	to
threats 4 and danger.
1 See, e.g., id. at 5 (citing as “Evidence immediately available” photos of “Masonic
tattoos”), at 34 (alerting “the Maryland Court system that an entire terrorist gang of
Masons—operating under the guise of family, federal law enforcement, and the legal
profession—has been using their resources, power, and positions within the court
system to torture, defraud, extort, and attempt to murder their client: me”), at 35
(accusing attorney James Roberson of “Masonic ritual exposure” by taking “client to
horror film”), at 36 (accusing attorneys of being “part of a larger network—a terrorist
gang of Masons using their badges, gavels, and professional licenses to: Protect
abusers within the fraternal order,” “Silence victims through legal weaponization,”
and “Eliminate those who threaten exposure”), at 37 (describing “Howard University”
as where “multiple co-conspirators graduated” and is located “blocks from Masonic
headquarters”), at 48 (describing “51-year, multi-generational” enterprise as “classic
Masonic dagger walking—a highly specific form of ritualistic torture and annihilation
for 	coin 	and 	clout”), 	at 	53-54 	(explaining 	“WHAT 	IS 	MASONIC 	DAGGER
WALKING?”).
2 See, e.g., id. at 5 (citing photos of “occult library”), at 25 (accusing mother of
“ritualistic incantations consistent with occult practices”), at 26 (“Occult Network”
and accusing Posey Teresa O’Reilly—Plaintiff’s “best friend since 1987,” of being an
“Occult advisor” with “amnesia” and whose role was “child abandonment”), at 32
(“Occult Network: Posey O’Reilly (Crowly/Blavatsky/Pike library); Vivian Clark
(“bending 	children’s 	fingers 	back”)), 	at 	33 	(mentioning 	without 	explanation,
photographs of “tattoos, occult library, severed bed”).
3 See, e.g., id. at 14-22 (“Affidavit Regarding Family Pathology” complaining about
family members, from characterizing her mother as a “narcissist” who forced her to
care for her siblings, deriding her siblings as taking “the role of flying monkeys” whom
her mother employed to “[t]orment and extract pain” from her); id. at 26 (noting that
parents “had her burial paid for and planned for decades” and “read obituaries daily”
which is “consistent with insurance fraud patterns”), at 54 (describing her family as
a “DEATH CULT” and her parents as the “HIGH COMMAND”).
4 Dkt. 1 at 24 (noting “Key Evidence” as “Six death threats: Mother screamed ‘I WISH
YOU WERE DEAD’ THREE TIMES—twice,” and “2,300+ relatives weaponized; 5+
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Construed most generously, the document makes sweeping allegations
against 	a 	long 	list 	of 	individuals 	and 	governmental 	entities—including
Montgomery County, Judge Gerald I. Fisher, the District of Columbia Probate
Court, 	employees 	of 	the 	Federal 	Bureau 	of 	Investigation 	and 	State
Department, Maryland Police Department, several attorneys, family members,
and 	unnamed 	members 	of 	an 	“occult 	network”—engaged 	in 	a 	criminal
enterprise. See id. at 26-27, 34, 44. This “enterprise” ostensibly existed for 51
years—the entirety of Plaintiff’s lifespan. Id. at 4, 24.
Plaintiff alleges that this enterprise is responsible for a laundry list of
crimes, including bank and wire fraud, extortion, murder-for-hire, witness
tampering, and burglary. See, e.g., id. at 5. Most of these are simply listed in
bullet form, accusing various persons—largely her own family members—of
committing a combination of those offenses. See, e.g., id. at 57. Her complaint
also alludes to an “attorney conspiracy” designed “to destroy” her. 	See id. at
26, 37, 59.
Only a few assertions include enough factual particulars to even discern
their premise. Those include a September 22, 2022 raid of Plaintiff’s home by
the Montgomery County Police Department. Id. at 25. According to Plaintiff,
suspicious deaths”); at 30 (asserting that Plaintiff and her son “remain in imminent
danger” because “[t]he threat is ongoing: Eugene Isaac remains free” and “the
command structure remains intact”).
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this raid was “weaponized through [her] husband.” Id. at 25. Plaintiff alleges
that officers stole money from her “magic book,” staged false evidence, and used
excessive force by “deploy[ing] a military-grade three-man pyramid hold on a
housewife preparing dinner.” See id. at 25, 39, 42, 45.
Another allegation, although facially unrelated, concerns a purported
“Murder Attempt” on June 5, 2024, wherein Plaintiff asserts that her own
parents directed Eugene Dennis Isaac, a State Department employee, to kill
her. 	See id. at 25. 	Plaintiff claims that she met Isaac in a parking lot and,
when attempting to hug him, felt that he was “wearing a wire and carrying a
firearm.” See id. She suggests that Issac is related to the occult. See, e.g., id.
at 37 (describing Isaac’s tattoos as having “Egyptian death cult imagery—the
hitman’s uniform”). She further claims that her parents arranged for her “pre-
paid burial.” Id. at 26.
Plaintiff filed this suit on March 30, 2026. Dkt. 1. She primarily asserts
a violation of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),
18 U.S.C. § 1962. Plaintiff also brings claims against Montgomery County and
several 	Montgomery 	County 	Police 	Department 	officers 	under 	42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the officers violated her rights under the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See Dkt. 1 at 30, 43-46. She also invokes
various 	criminal 	statutes, 	including 	attempted 	murder-for-hire 	under
18 U.S.C. § 1958, bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and mail fraud under
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18 U.S.C. § 1341. And she mentions—with no factual particulars—a few state
tort law claims. See Dkt. 1 at 44.
Contemporaneously with the complaint, Plaintiff filed an application to
proceed 	IFP. 	Dkt. 	2. 	Plaintiff 	then 	filed 	several 	“emergency” 	motions
requesting a protective order, mandamus relief, witness protection, financial
provisions, an asset freeze on all Defendants, that certain Defendants be
arrested, and a status hearing. 	Dkts. 4, 5, 6. 	This case was then referred to
the undersigned. 	Dkt. 7. 	Plaintiff also filed an emergency motion for a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against Eugene Dennis Isaac, mentioning
the June 5, 2024 encounter where she maintains that Isaac “attempted to
murder” her and demanding that the Court “[d]irect U.S. Marshal Service to
provide [her] immediate protection ....” 	Dkt. 8. 	All her motions are ripe for
resolution.
Legal standard
Plaintiff’s IFP application is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Section
1915 provides that “[a]ny court of the United States may authorize the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil
or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor”
upon a showing that “the person is unable to pay such fees or give security
therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
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But the right to proceed in forma pauperis is not absolute. 	“Under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), the district court is required to dismiss an IFP case ‘at any
time’ if it determines that the case is ‘frivolous or malicious’ or ‘fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” 	Doe v. Charter Commc’ns, L.L.C., 131
F.4th 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii)). 	This
limitation applies equally to prisoner and non-prisoner cases. See Newsome v.
E.E.O.C., 301 F.3d 227, 231-33 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (affirming district
court’s 	dismissal 	of 	former 	employee’s 	federal 	claims 	under 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) that were both frivolous and “fail[ed] to state a claim”); Walters v.
Scott, 2014 WL 5878494, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2014) (citing Newsome for
this principle).
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” 	Diamond v. City of Rayville, 127 F.4th 935, 938 (5th Cir. 2025) (per
curiam) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “A complaint
lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which
clearly does not exist.” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013).
“[A] court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged
are clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are fanciful,
fantastic, and delusional.” 	Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)
(quotations and citations omitted).
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A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it
alleges insufficient facts, when taken as true, to state a basis for relief that is
plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also, e.g., Amrhein v. United States, 740 F. App’x
65, 66 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Iqbal for the legal standard governing
a court’s sua sponte dismissal of a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. 	Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d
287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
(per curiam)). 	But “regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or
is 	represented 	by 	counsel, 	conclusory 	allegations 	or 	legal 	conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to
dismiss.” 	Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Tex., 73 F.4th 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)); see
also Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (“[P]ro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the
right to relief above the speculative level.”).
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Analysis
Plaintiff moved to proceed IFP. 	Dkt. 2. 	Her financial circumstances
merit allowing her to proceed without prepaying costs. But this case is clearly
frivolous, fails to state a plausible basis for relief, and should be dismissed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I. 	The IFP application is granted.
Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, which would allow her to proceed with this case without prepaying fees
or costs. 	Dkt. 2. 	To proceed without paying the filing fee, an applicant must
show that she is financially “unable to pay such fees.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Although an applicant need not “be absolutely destitute,” she still must
demonstrate by affidavit that her financial condition renders her unable to
“pay or give security for the costs … and still be able to provide [herself] and
[her] dependents with the necessities of life.” 	Adkins v. DuPont Co., 335 U.S.
331, 339 (1948).
After reviewing the application, Dkt. 2, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
financial resources render her unable to afford the costs of this litigation. She
is financially eligible to proceed IFP.
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II. 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	should 	be 	dismissed 	as 	frivolous 	and
implausible.
Plaintiff’s “complaint”—which she labels as “a comprehensive RICO
prosecution 	dossier,” 	see 	Dkt. 	1 	at 	4—contains 	a 	string 	of 	implausible,
disjointed allegations. 	Its fantastical RICO theory about Plaintiff’s family
members conspiring with scores of government employees and officials is
wholly frivolous. There is equally no basis for Plaintiff to seek direct recovery
under the multiple criminal statutes she cites. 	And none of Plaintiff’s other
allegations states a viable claim for relief. 	This suit should be dismissed as
frivolous and implausible.
A. 	Plaintiff’s claims lack any arguable basis in law or fact.
Plaintiff’s claims are replete with fantastical and delusional assertions.
Others are plainly barred as a matter of law. They merit dismissal under the
IFP statute.
A 	complaint 	must 	be 	dismissed 	as 	frivolous 	under 	Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if “it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact.” 	Samford v.
Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). “A
complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact when the facts alleged are fantastic
or delusional scenarios or the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is
indisputably meritless.” 	Id. (quotation omitted); see also Denton, 504 U.S. at
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32 (authorizing dismissal of claims that are “clearly baseless,” such as “claims
describing fantastic or delusional scenarios”).
“Courts 	in 	the 	Fifth 	Circuit 	have 	found 	dismissal 	of 	RICO 	claims
appropriate where those claims amount only to fantastic or delusional tales of
conspiracy.” Burgess v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2017 WL 9250317, at *9 (E.D. Tex.
Apr. 21, 2017) (collecting cases), adopted by 2017 WL 2625315 (E.D. Tex. June
19, 2017); see, e.g., Curtis v. Kunz-Freed, 2017 WL 7371194, at *1, 4 (S.D. Tex.
May 16, 2017) (“fantastical allegations” that over fifteen defendants, including
lawyers, judges, and a court reporter, are members of a secret society to
“hijack” “familial wealth” were “clearly frivolous”), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 223 (5th
Cir. 2018) (per curiam). That aptly describes Plaintiff’s RICO claim.
Plaintiff 	describes 	a 	far-fetched 	“multi-generational, 	multi-agency”
scheme involving the “systematic extraction of unpaid labor, financial fraud,
psychological torture, and ultimately, the ritualistic sacrifice of” her and her
son. 	Dkt. 1 at 48-49. 	She claims that this enterprise participates in “classic
masonic dagger walking,” which Plaintiff describes as a “HIGHLY SPECIFIC
form of ritualistic torture and annihilation practiced by certain occult fraternal
orders ….” 	Id. at 48, 53. 	This enterprise has allegedly existed for Plaintiff’s
whole life. Id. at 24 (“I am a 51-year-old ….”), 48.
Indeed, the allegations are so fantastical and disparate that it is unclear
how to caption the case. 	The purported defendants seemingly range from
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government employees and lawyers to Plaintiff’s own family members. 	The
pleadings even accuse Plaintiff’s friend of participating in a “humiliation
ritual” that consisted of asking about her Thanksgiving plans. Id. at 62-63.
Much of the complaint amounts to a tirade about Plaintiff’s family, which
she describes as a “death cult.” Id. at 54 (“THIS IS NOT A FAMILY. THIS IS
A 	DEATH 	CULT.”). 	Plaintiff 	refers 	to 	her 	own 	parents 	as 	the 	“High
Command” who have committed a laundry list of criminal offenses that include
murder 	for 	hire, 	threats, 	and 	involuntary 	servitude. 	Id. 	at 	54-55. 	As
“evidence” of her theory that her parents hired a state department employee
to murder her, Plaintiff cites Isaac’s “Egyptian Death Tattoo.” Id. at 57. 	These
facially fantastical and delusional assertions should be dismissed.
Apart from RICO, Plaintiff appears to seek recovery under multiple
criminal-law statutes peppered throughout the complaint. 	But she has no
private right of action to enforce the lion’s share of those statutes. See, e.g., id.
at 55 (“Murder-for-Hire 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (ordered hit on daughter)”). “[T]here
is no general right to bring a private action under federal criminal statutes.”
Tummel v. Milane, 2019 WL 366708, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2019) (citing
Pierre v. Guidry, 75 F. App’x 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)), aff’d, 787
F. App’x 226 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83,
86 (1981) (per curiam) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest
in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” 	(quotation omitted)). 	And
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the only criminal statute invoked that does provide a private cause of action—
18 U.S.C. § 1584—is clearly frivolous. 	See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (allowing
“victim[s] of a violation of this chapter [to] bring a civil action against the
perpetrator”). 	That 	theory 	is 	lodged 	against 	Plaintiff’s 	own 	parents 	for
purportedly subjecting her to 22 years of “unpaid labor.” Dkt. 1 at 32 (“Parents
22 years unpaid labor—$30.36 million 18 U.S.C. § 1584”). 	From what the
Court can decipher, this claim refers to Plaintiff’s responsibilities caring for
her siblings as a child. 	See, e.g., id. at 16-17 (“Affidavit regarding family
pathology” complaining that Plaintiff was “responsible for all of the childcare,
cooking, cleaning, safety, and education needs of” her siblings). 	Such a claim
is frivolous on its face.
The Court cannot reasonably interpret Plaintiff’s allegations as anything
but fantastical and delusional. 	As this Court has aptly put, “[a]lthough these
matters are real to Plaintiff, the allegations are so fanciful that a reasonable
person would find them irrational and completely lacking any factual basis.”
Lopez v. Trump, 2025 WL 2933081, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2025) (dismissing
as frivolous where plaintiff alleged that various world leaders and the United
States Army defamed her, participated in sex trafficking, violated her rights,
and withheld her inheritance), adopted by 2025 WL 2930300 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
15, 2025). The suit should be dismissed as frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2).
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B. 	The Section 1983 claims concerning a raid in 2022 are time-
barred.
The closest this complaint approaches to a logical narrative concerns
Plaintiff’s allegations that several Montgomery County Police Department
officers violated her constitutional rights during a September 22, 2022 raid on
her home. See Dkt. 1 at 25, 43-44. But among other deficiencies, these claims
are barred by the statute of limitations.
“Although the defense of limitations is an affirmative defense, which
usually must be raised by the defendants in the district court, this court has
held that the district court may raise the defense sua sponte in an action
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” See Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256
(5th Cir. 1993); see also Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1019, 1022 (5th Cir.
1998) (affirming dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because suit was
barred by statute of limitations). 	Because federal law does not supply a
limitations period for Section 1983 claims, courts apply the forum state’s
statute of limitations for personal injury suits. 	See Edmonds v. Oktibbeha
Cnty., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012) (Section 1983). 	In Texas, personal
injury suits have a two-year limitations period. 	See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code § 16.003. 	Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are thus subject to a two-year
limitations period.
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Plaintiff filed this suit on March 30, 2026—far more than two years after
the raid allegedly occurred. See Dkt. 1 at 25. Her Section 1983 claims are thus
time-barred, as a matter of law, and should be dismissed.
C. 	The state law claims should also be dismissed.
The complaint mentions certain state-law claims—but no more than
that. It lists several “state tort claims”—“false imprisonment, assault, battery,
conversion”—without explanation. 	Id. at 44, 46. 	And it embeds a bare
assertion that Montgomery County could be liable under unspecified “State
tort claims” for “Loss of Use of Home.” 	Id. at 44. 	These claims are utterly
devoid of factual support—let alone factual or legal plausibility. 	They should
likewise be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
III. 	All pending motions are denied as moot.
Since bringing this suit, Plaintiff has filed (1) a motion for a protective
order and mandamus relief, Dkt. 4; (2) a motion requesting witness protection,
“Emergency Financial Provisions” of $4.1 million for “51 years of unpaid labor,”
a freeze of assets of “All named perpetrators,” and “priority arrests” of various
persons, Dkt. 5; (3) a request for an emergency status hearing, Dkt. 6; and (4) a
motion for an emergency TRO, Dkt. 8. Because this suit should be dismissed,
those remaining motions should be denied as moot.
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Order and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff LaShawn
Doree Clark’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 2) be GRANTED.
It is RECOMMENDED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) that Plaintiff’s
claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failure to
state a claim.
It is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s multiple motions for
emergency relief and motion for status hearing (Dkts. 4, 5, 6, 8) be DENIED
AS MOOT.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on May 18, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_____________________________________
Yvoon	n	nn	ne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
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