O'Bryant Sr v. Williford Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CORY VONDRA O'BRYANT, SR.,
(Inmate# 15850),
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN W. WILLIFORD, JR.,
Defendant.
§
§
§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. H-26-1915
§.
§
§
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Cory Vondra O'Bryant, Sr. (Inmate # 15850), is currently
detained in the Walker County Jail. 	Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, he
filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that court-appointed
counsel John W. Williford, Jr., is neglecting his case and violating his civil rights
in connection with 	his 	ongoing 	state-court criminal proceedings. 	(Dkt. 	1).
O'Bryant's action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which
requires the Court to screen complaints filed by prisoners proceeding in forma
pauperis as soon as feasible after docketing and dismiss any claims that are
frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
that seek money damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28
U.S.C. 	§ 1915(e). 	Having 	conducte4 the 	required 	screening 	of O'Bryant's
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 03, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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-complaint, the Court dismisses this action fo,r the reasons explained below.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Publicly available records show that O'Bryant is currently in jail awaiting 	c__.
trial on several state criminal charges relating t<? the possession and delivery of
controlled 	substances. 	See 	Court 	Records 	Search, 	https://portal-
txwalker.tylertech.cloud/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2026). 	Trial is currently set to begin
on April 28, 2025. Id.
On March 9, 2026, O'Bryant filed a civil-rights complaint, naming his court-
appointed counsel, John W. Williford, Jr., as the sole defendant. 	(Dkt. 1, p. 3).
O'Bryant alleges that Williford is neglecting his case and refusing to protect his
constitutional rights. 	(Id. 	at 4 ). 	He also alleges that Williford is guilty of
"intentional misrepresentation" and that Williford knows "of the wrongs conspired
to be done." (Id.). 	As relief, O'Bryant seek.s compensation for the violation of his
rights, as well as for his emotional distress. (Id.).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
O'Bryant brings his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 does not
create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for
violations of statutory and constitutirnal rights." Lafleur v. Texas Dep 't ofHealth,
126 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) (!Per curiam); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443
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U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). 	To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez
v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). 	The first element
recognizes that "state tort claims are not actionable under federal law; a plaintiff
under[§] 1983 must show deprivation of a federal right." 	Nesmith v. Taylor, 715
F.2d 194, 	195 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 	The second element means that
generally only state actors-not private parties---can be liable for violations of civil
rights. See Frazier v. Bd. of Tr. ofNw. Miss. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278, 1283
(5th Cir. 1985).
B. 	The Prison Litigation Reform Act
The PLRA, which governs O'Bryant's action, requires the Court to examine
the legal and factual basis of a prisoner's complaint and dismiss the case if it
determines that the complaint "(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief." 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
A complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." 	Geiger
v. 	Jowers, 	404 F.3d 371, 373 	(5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Denton v.
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Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1992)). 	"A complaint lacks an arguable basis in
law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint
alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." 	Siglar v.
Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319,327 (1989)). "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the
plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged
are clearly baseless." 	Rogers v. 	Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013)
(cleaned up). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if
it does not contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)).
In conducting its screening review, the Court must construe all allegations
"liberally in favor of the plaintiff'' and consider whether "with every doubt resolved
on 	[the 	plaintiff's] 	behalf, 	the 	complaint states 	any 	valid 	claim 	for 	relief."
Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 	Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up). 	But if the complaint does not state a claim for relief, it may be
dismissed, even before service on the defendants. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d
1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).
C. 	Pro Se Pleadings
0 'Bryant is proceeding pro se in this action. Courts construe pleadings filed
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by pro se litigants under a less stringent standard of review. 	See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Under this standard, "[a] document filed pro
se is 'to be liberally construed."' 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even under this
liberal standard,pro se.litigants must still "abide by the rules that govern the federal
courts." 	E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014). 	They must
"properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim
to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary judgment
evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal." Id. ( cleaned up).
They must also still allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. 	See Taylor v.
Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Toole v. Peak, 361 F.
App'x 621, 621 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (a self-represented litigant "still must
argue something that is susceptible to liberal construction").
III. 	DISCUSSION
The only defendant in this action is Attorney Williford, who O'Bryant
contends is acting negligently and in violation of O'Bryant's constitutional rights.
But court-appointed defense counsel may not be sued under § 1983 for actions taken
in defending an individual charged with criminal acts.
To be liable under § 1983, the defendant must be acting under color of state
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law in taking the challenged actions. 1 	Neither public defenders nor appointed or
retained private defense attorneys act under color of state law when performing a
lawyer's traditional functions in representing a criminal defendant because, in that
capacity, he or she is acting on behalf of the defendant rather than on behalf of the
State. See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,318, 324-25 (1981); Mills v.
Crim. Dist. Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that "private
attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally
are not subject to suit under section 1983"); Amir-Sharif v. Dallas Cnty. Public
Defender's Office, 233 F. App'x 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (dismissing
claims against a county's public defenders "because they are not state actors for
§ 1983 purposes").
In his capacity as court-appointed defense counsel for O'Bryant, Williford is
not acting "under color of state law" while taking actions to 	represent him.
O'Bryant's 	disagreements 	with 	Williford's 	trial 	strategy may give 	rise 	to 	a
malpractice action, but they do not support a claim for a violation of constitutional
1
Limited exceptions to this general rule exist when the plaintiff can show that the
private actor was implementing an official government policy or when the private actor's
actions are fairly attributable to the government. 	See Rundus v. City of Dallas, Tex., 634
F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2011). A private party who conspires with state actors to deprive
another of his constitutional rights may also be considered a state actor. 	See Priester v.
Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414,421 (5th Cir. 2004). O'Bryant's complaint does not allege
facts showing that any of these exceptions apply to his case.
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rights under § 1983. 	Further, claims of negligence are not sufficient to state a
constitutional violation. See Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973,977 (5th
Cir. 1995). O'Bryant's claims against Attorney Willford must be dismissed under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	O'Bryant's civil,.rights action against Attorney John W. Williford, Jr., (Dkt.
1), is DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot.
3. Final judgment will be separately entered.
4. 	This dismissal will count as a "strike" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The Clerk shall send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the
plaintiff. The Clerk shall also send a copy of this dismissal to the Three-Strikes List
Manager at the following email: Three _Strikes@txs.usrourtY?o..,y.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on 	~ " ~ •• •• -- ·"' 	, 2026.--·- 	. 	--- 	. 	~----
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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