Rangel Pernia v. Martin Frink

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
KARINA EUGENIA RANGEL PERNIA, §
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Petitioner,
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-1060
WARDEN, HOUSTON CONTRACT
DETENTION FACILITY, et al.
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Karina Eugenia Rangel Pernia is detained in the custody of officials with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Proceeding pro se, the petitioner filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1). The respondents filed
a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 6).
The petition, motion, and supporting documents state that the petitioner is a national
of Venezuela; that she entered the United States on or about March 11, 2024; that
immigration officials then inspected and released her; that she applied for political asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention against Torture; that ICE
detained her on or about August 18, 2025, and denied her request for a bond hearing; that
on November 21, 2025, an immigration judge ordered her removed to Venezuela; and that
she appealed to the BIA and her appeal remains pending (Dkt. 1; Dkt. 6-1; Dkt. 6-2; Dkt.
6-3; see EOIR Automated Case Information, available at https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 02, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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(last visited June 1, 2026). The petitioner brings claims under the Due Process Clause and
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), among others. She seeks immediate release from
custody or, in the alternative, an individualized custody hearing.
The federal respondents oppose habeas relief, arguing that the petitioner is subject
to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and that her due-process claims fail.
They did not respond to the petitioner’s APA claim.
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit held in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166
F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), that two petitioners who has been present in the United States
for many years, and who had not been apprehended by immigration officials before the
detention at issue in the case, were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). The Court does not base this opinion on the statutory text but instead turns
to the petitioner’s claim that her current detention violates her rights under the Due Process
Clause. The Court has previously addressed due-process claims in the context of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See, e.g., Avila Perez v. Warden, Civil Action No. 4:26-957 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28,
2026); Gonzalez Monrreal v. Warden, Civil Action No. 4:26-925 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27,
2026); Barrera Leon v. Warden, Civil Action No. 4:26-1341 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026);
Gallegos Perez v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:26-351 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Cruz Osorio
v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:25-6390 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Rozo-Teran v. Bondi, Civil
Action No. 4:26-243 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2026); Navarette-Garcia v. Bradford, Civil
Action No. 4:26-1503 (S.D. Tex. Mar, 16, 2026); Delgado-Rodriguez v. Tate, Civil Action
No. 4:26-650, 2026 WL 517983 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026).
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The Constitution guarantees due process of law to every person in the United States,
regardless of the person’s immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)
(the Due Process Clause “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”); see A.A.R.P. v
Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025) (procedural due process protections apply to removal
proceedings for persons detained under the Alien Enemies Act).
The Court notes at the outset that the petitioner in this case challenges only her
detention, and not her right to relief from deportation or removal. Courts across the country
have recognized that as-applied due process challenges to detention without an
individualized hearing are not foreclosed by Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103 (2020), or other Supreme Court precedent.1 Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, ___
F.4th ___, 2026 WL 1283891, at *11-13 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026); Vieira v. De Anda-
Ybarra, 806 F. Supp. 3d 690, 697-700 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 801 F.
Supp. 3d 668, 681-85 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Bonilla Chicas v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-00131,
2026 WL 539475, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); Castro Coneo v. Almodovar, No. 25-
CV-09850 (NSR), 2025 WL 3754079, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2025); Destino v. FCI
1 In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court held that a noncitizen seeking “initial entry”
to the United States enjoys only the rights provided by statute because the “power to admit
or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative” over which the political branches have plenary
authority. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139-40 (cleaned up) (considering case regarding
noncitizen detained 25 yards from the border and for whom immigration officials rejected
his “credible fear” claim for purposes of political asylum). However, a challenge to
detention, rather than to immigration proceedings, does not implicate the “sovereign
prerogative” on which Thuraissigiam relies. See Rincon v. Hyde, No. CV 25-12633-BEM,
2025 WL 3122784, at *5-*6 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2025) (discussing “entry fiction” doctrine
and its purposes).
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Berlin, Warden, No. 1:25-CV-374-SE-AJ, 2025 WL 4010424, at *4 n.6 (D.N.H. Dec. 24,
2025) (noting a “growing consensus” among district courts and collecting cases); Rincon,
2025 WL 3122784, at *5-*7. Many cases cited above also distinguish Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), from the
detention challenge at issue in this case. See, e.g., Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at
*12-13; Rodriguez v. Frink, ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___, No. 4:26-CV-00798, 2026 WL 709487,
at *2-4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2026); Bonillas Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at *7-*9; Destino,
2025 WL 4010424, at *3-*8; Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *4-*8.2 The Court agrees with
this consensus and thus proceeds to review the petitioner’s constitutional claim.3
When adjudicating a procedural due-process claim from a civil detainee, courts
apply the three-part test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing and balancing the following
factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
2 In Demore, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),
a statutory provision that provides for mandatory detention of non-citizens who have been
convicted of certain crimes, and held that the facial challenge failed. In so holding, the
Court discussed extensively the fact that Congress enacted § 1226(c) based on evidence of
increasing criminal activity by criminal aliens, as well as high rates of recidivism and flight.
Demore, 538 U.S. at 518-19. The Court also relied on the fact that a detainee under §
1226(c) was a “criminal alien” who was detained for “the limited period of his removal
proceedings.” Id. at 531; see id. at 529-31 (citing facts in the record showing that detention
under § 1226(c) lasted for an average of 47 days, and that 100% of the detentions lasted
five months or less). Finally, the Court noted that the detainee in Demore had been afforded
procedural protections, including “the full procedural protections our criminal justice
system offers” for his prior convictions and the opportunity for a “Joseph hearing” at which
he would have been entitled to raise any non-frivolous argument to demonstrate that he
was not properly included in the mandatory detention category. Id. at 513-14 & n.3.
3 See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304–05 (2001) (“a serious Suspension
Clause issue would be presented” if a statute deprived federal courts of habeas jurisdiction
to review “pure questions of law”).
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erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, (3) the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
Regarding the first Mathews factor, the petitioner has a liberty interest that the Due
Process Clause protects. Freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
A noncitizen who has lived for years in the interior of the United States and established
connections in the country acquires a protectible liberty interest. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
at 107 (“aliens who have established connections in this country have due process rights in
deportation proceedings”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(“aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country”); Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (noncitizen has a “weighty” interest in his or her right
“to stay and live and work in this land of freedom” and to “rejoin . . . immediate family”).
As stated above, the petitioner has lived in the United States since early 2024, was
released by immigration officials, lived in the community for over a year before her
detention in August 2025, and is pursuing relief from removal. The respondents do not
point to any criminal history, condition of release she violated, or other changed
circumstance justifying her current detention. Therefore, the petitioner acquired a
protected liberty interest before the detention challenged in this case. See Thuraissigiam,
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591 U.S. at 107; Vieira, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 700; Gunaydin v. Trump, 784 F.Supp.3d 1175,
1187 (D. Minn. 2025); Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d. at 685-86; Destino, 2025 WL
4010424, at *12; Barros v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-488-KC, 2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 10, 2025). The first factor weighs heavily in the petitioner’s favor.
The second Mathews factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the petitioner’s
liberty interest by the procedures used for her current detention, as well as the probable
value of additional safeguards. “Once it is determined that due process applies, the
question remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Due process requires adequate procedural protections to weigh the governmental interest
against that of the individual. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“[G]overnment detention
violates [the Due Process] Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding
with adequate procedural protections or, in certain special and narrow[,] nonpunitive
circumstances where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness,
outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint”) (cleaned up). “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (cleaned up). Immigrant
detainees “are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the
case.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (cleaned up); see Lopez-Campos, 2026
WL 1283891, at *11 (“The hallmark of procedural due process is notice and an opportunity
to be heard”) (cleaned up).
The respondents argue that the petitioner’s claim should be denied based on
Demore, 538 U.S. 510, which rejected a facial due-process challenge to a different statute,
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8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). However, the Court does not consider in this case whether
§ 1225(b)(2) is facially unconstitutional, that is, “unconstitutional in all of its applications.”
See United States v. Morgan, 147 F.4th 522, 526 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6677,
2026 WL 568341 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026) (cleaned up); Bonillas Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at
*6. Instead, the Court considers whether § 1225(b)(2), “though constitutional in some
circumstances,” has been unconstitutionally applied to the petitioner. See Morgan, 147
F.4th at 526.4
Civil detention can be permissible based on the government’s showing that the
person is a danger to the community. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
746, 748-49 (1987) (the government’s regulatory interest in community safety can
outweigh an individual’s liberty interest in avoiding pre-trial detention if the person poses
a danger) (collecting cases). In such cases, the civil detention must be “limited” and
“subject to strong procedural protections.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see Kansas v.
4 Apart from the fact that it decided a facial challenge, Demore is distinguishable for
additional reasons. First, the statute at issue in Demore applied to a specific subset of non-citizens
convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). In contrast, § 1225(b)(2) is a broad, “catch-
all” provision. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 499 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287); see id. at
505 (holding that, although “[i]t is true that § 1226 applies to aliens in the United States,” the
application of § 1226 “does not preclude § 1225 from also applying to such aliens” because “the
two provisions overlap”). Moreover, as stated above, the Demore petitioners had received criminal
procedural protections, as well as the opportunity for a Joseph hearing, and were detained for an
average of 47 days. In the case at bar, however, the petitioner has received no procedures to protect
the liberty interest impacted by her current detention, and nothing in the record suggests that the
length of detention will be limited. Finally, unlike in Demore, nothing in the record in this case
suggests that the petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) is justified by evidence of danger to the
community. For all of these reasons, Demore does not foreclose the petitioner’s as-applied
challenge. See Bonilla Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at *7-*9 (distinguishing Demore); Destino, 2025
WL 4010424, at *8-*9 (distinguishing Demore); Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *7-*8
(distinguishing Demore).
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Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357(1997) (“We have consistently upheld [forcible civil
detainment of persons who pose a danger to public health and safety] provided the
confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards”);
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (upholding bail reform statute which required the government,
“[i]n a full-blown adversary hearing,” to “convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and
convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person”).
Here, the petitioner has been detained for over nine months and the respondents
provide no information about when the detention will end. Moreover, the respondents have
made no showing that the petitioner’s current civil detention is justified by her danger to
the community, flight risk, or any other weighty government interest. Rather, they argue
that danger and flight risk are irrelevant under the plain language of § 1225(b)(2), thus
ending the inquiry (Dkt. 6, at 5-7 (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1
(2003)). However, the question of whether procedural safeguards for the petitioner’s
liberty interest are adequate is a constitutional question, not a statutory one, and a statute
may not deprive a person of rights that are constitutionally guaranteed. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Palm Valley Health Care, Inc. v. Azar, 947
F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (“the Constitution, not statutes, determine the minimum
procedures that due process requires”).5 The respondents identify no procedures afforded
5 Moreover, Doe is distinguishable on several grounds. The plaintiff in Doe challenged a
Connecticut statute that mandated registry of sex offenders based only on the person’s past
conviction for a sex offense, arguing that the registry requirement without a hearing to show he
was currently dangerous violated his procedural due process rights. The Supreme Court held that,
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to the petitioner to provide notice, an opportunity to be heard, or any individualized
determination regarding her current detention. To the extent they might rely on any
procedures at her initial entry in 2024, those procedures are inadequate to address the
liberty interest she has acquired since that time based on established connections in the
United States. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271;
Landon, 459 U.S. at 34. They also do not demonstrate that she was afforded notice and an
opportunity to be heard as to the justification for the current detention beginning in August
2025. See J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 673 (immigrant detainees “are entitled to notice and
opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the case”) (cleaned up); Lopez-Campos,
2026 WL 1283891, at *11.
because current dangerousness was irrelevant under the statute, the plaintiff had no procedural due
process right to a hearing. The Court joins other courts in holding that Doe is distinguishable from
the facts and issues in this case. See, e.g., Aliaga Zamora v. Bondi, No. SA-26-CA-00447-XR,
2026 WL 693054, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2026); Betancourth v. Tate, No. 4:26-CV-01169,
2026 WL 638482, at *2 & n.4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2026); Noyola v. Bondi, No. 1:26-CV-405-RP,
2026 WL 607266, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2026); Diaz Yanez v. Bondi, No. EP-26-CV-00486-
DB, 2026 WL 690005, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2026); Villegas Angel v. Noem, No. 1:26-CV-
00384-DAE, 2026 WL 594368, at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2026). First, the petitioner in this case
does not challenge a registry requirement, which the Doe Court assumed arguendo implicated a
liberty interest, but rather freedom from physical detention, “the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. Second, civil immigration detention is constitutional only
when it is justified by a sufficient, non-punitive purpose. Foucha v. La., 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992);
Betancourth, 2026 WL 638482, at *2 n.4; Diaz Yanez, 2026 WL 690005, at *2. Once a protected
interest is implicated, “the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.” Aliaga Zamora, 2026
WL 693054, at *5 (citing, inter alia, Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972)); Villegas
Angel, 2026 WL 594368, at *3. Third, the statutory language indicates that flight risk and danger
are not irrelevant to detention under § 1225(b), given that “noncitizens who are detained under
§ 1225(b) may be released on parole for humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, so long
as they present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.” Noyola, 2026 WL 607266, at *3
(cleaned up) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)); Aguilar v. Bondi, No. 5:25-
CV-01453-JKP, 2025 WL 3471417, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025).
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In the absence of any available procedure to require the respondents to demonstrate
danger or another adequate justification for detention, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of the petitioner’s liberty interest is high. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70 & n.7 (“When
protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount”)
(citing, inter alia, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 542 (1971)). When “the only mechanism Petitioner has to test the propriety of
his detention is DHS’s discretionary authority,” that is “no real test at all.” Tenemasa-
Lema v. Hyde, No. CV 25-13029-BEM, 2025 WL 3280555, at *9 (D. Mass. Nov. 25,
2025); see Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *13 (noting that the risk is heightened by the
likelihood of lengthy delays in removal proceedings). This risk of deprivation could be
addressed through an individualized assessment such as the bond hearings that
respondents, until late 2025, routinely provided to assess a petitioner’s danger to
community and flight risk. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (courts should assess whether
“additional or substitute procedural safeguards” would have “probable value”); Lopez-
Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (an individualized hearing would provide an opportunity
to be heard and a meaningful assessment of the petitioner’s dangerousness and flight risk,
and thus would “greatly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty”); Barros,
2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (risk of erroneous deprivation “can be easily ameliorated through
a bond hearing”). The Court concludes that the second Mathews factor weighs in the
petitioner’s favor.
The third Mathews factor is the respondents’ interest in the petitioner’s mandatory,
unreviewable detention at issue here. The respondents have not addressed this factor and
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do not argue their interest in detaining the petitioner under § 1225(b). To the extent the
respondents rely on their general interest in enforcing the statute, their interest is
insufficient to extinguish the petitioner’s right to due process. See Loudermill, 470 U.S.
at 541; Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *6 (“legislation cannot detract from the privilege
afforded by the constitution”) (cleaned up) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 565 (1892), overruled on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972)). Although courts have recognized a legitimate governmental interest in preventing
a detainee’s flight and in protecting the community from any danger posed by the detainee,
see, e.g., Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1189, these interests could be addressed by
providing individualized hearings, as discussed above.6 Moreover, to the extent the purpose
of the detention is punitive, the purpose is impermissible in the context of civil immigration
proceedings. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. The third factor therefore weighs in the
petitioner’s favor.
6 Courts “generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively
minimal.” Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 1158841, at *9 (E.D.
Cal. Apr. 21, 2025); see Tenemasa-Lema, 2025 WL 3280555, at *10. Additionally, courts
have recognized that detention itself imposes significant costs and burdens. See
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting the “substantial social
costs” of detention that separates families and removes breadwinners, caregivers, parents,
siblings, and employees from the community); Rodriguez, 2026 WL 709487, at *10
(“Indeed, given the high costs of detention and the potential for removal proceedings to
last multiple years, the Government would reduce its overall fiscal and administrative
burden by detaining only those people who have been determined to pose a danger or flight
risk”) (citing Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 154 (2d Cir. 2024); Sampiao v. Hyde, 799
F. Supp. 3d 14, 34 (D. Mass. 2025) (noting that detention of those who have been denied
release on bond or the opportunity to seek release “requires the government to continue
funding and overseeing [the petitioner’s] detention”).
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Because all three Mathews factors weigh in the petitioner’s favor, she is detained
without due process of law. The Court concludes, in accordance with numerous other
courts considering the question, that detention under § 1225(b)(2) as applied to this
petitioner, without an individualized assessment or any notice or opportunity to be heard,
violates the petitioner’s right to procedural due process. The petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see Brown v. Davenport, 596
U.S. 118, 128 (2022) (“federal courts may grant habeas relief as law and justice require”)
(cleaned up).
“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The remedy for unlawful detention “is, of course, release.” Id.;
see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (based on statutory language of 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and the common-law history of the writ, “the essence of habeas corpus
is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”). Because the respondents do
not acknowledge any process available to the petitioner, “there is no process to await.” See
Aroca v. Mason, No. 2:26-CV-00057, 2026 WL 357872, at *19 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 9, 2026)
(cleaned up) (collecting cases).7 After reviewing the authorities and all matters of record,
the Court determines that release is the appropriate habeas relief for the unlawful detention
in this case.
7 In light of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Buenrostro-Mendez, and because the
respondents do not argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies, the Court does not order a bond
hearing under § 1226(a). See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL
25627, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (collecting cases).
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The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:
1. The respondents’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 6) is DENIED.
2. The petitioner’s petition for habeas relief (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED in part.
3. The respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE the petitioner from custody to a
public location, under conditions of release no more restrictive than those in
place prior to the detention at issue in this case, within 48 hours of this order.
4. The respondents are further ORDERED to inform the petitioner of the time and
location of release at least three hours before the release. Because the
petitioner proceeds pro se, the respondents are ORDERED to also notify any
and all persons in their records as contacts for the petitioner, including
immigration counsel and/or family members and friends of the petitioner, of the
time and location of release at least three hours before the release.
5. The respondents are further ORDERED to return to the petitioner, at the time
of her release from custody, any and all identification documents taken from her
at the time of or during her detention.
6. Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of the petitioner under this
present detention is PROHIBITED and ENJOINED.
7. The respondents may not re-detain the petitioner during the pendency of her
removal proceedings absent a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge
at which the government demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that
she is a flight risk or a danger to the community.
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8. The respondents are further ORDERED to file a status report updating the Court
within 72 hours of this order.
9. All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on , 2026.
__________________________________
GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
June 2
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