Chenault v. Collins et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
GWENDOLYN MARIE
CHENAULT,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-cv-969
DENISE COLLINS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
Pending before the Court 1 are Defendant Carl A. Moore II’s (“Moore”)
Motions 	to 	Dismiss 	(ECF 	Nos. 	23–24), 	Defendant 	Judge 	Denise 	Collins’
(“Judge Collins”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 32), Defendants Sean Teare
(“Teare”) and Cristina Platter’s (“Platter”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33), and
Defendant Nathan Ochsner’s (“Ochsner”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34).
Based on a review of the motion, arguments, and relevant law, the Court
RECOMMENDS 	Moore’s 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss 	(ECF 	Nos. 	23–24), 	Judge
Collins’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 32), Teare and Platter’s Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 33), and Ochsner’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34) be GRANTED.
1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 35).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 07, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. 	Background
The case stems from a criminal case against Plaintiff in the 179th
District Court of Harris County, Texas. 	(See ECF No. 1-2 at 37–39; ECF No.
29 at 2).
On February 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant case against (1) Judge
Collins, the judge presiding over Plaintiff’s state court criminal case; (2) Teare,
the Harris County District Attorney; (3) Platter, an Assistant District Attorney
with the Harris County District Attorney’s Office; (4) Moore, the attorney who
represented Plaintiff in the criminal case; and (5) Ochsner, the Clerk of Court
for the Southern District of Texas. 	(See ECF No. 1 at 2). 	Plaintiff’s original
Complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. 	(See id. at
3–4).
On February 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
but named only Judge Collins as a defendant. 	(ECF No. 29 at 2). 	Plaintiff’s
FAC asserts three causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 4–5).
II. 	Legal Standard
a. Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge the exercise of the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. 	FED. R. C IV . P. 12(b)(1). 	Whether a federal court has
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jurisdiction must “be established as a threshold matter” and “is inflexible and
without exception.” 	Webb v. Davis, 940 F.3d 892, 896 (5th Cir. 2019). 	The
party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof for a 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss. 	Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). 	The
Court generally will accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true
and construe those allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kumar
v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist., 443 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777–78 (E.D. Tex. 2020).
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12
motions, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
b. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of an action for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	FED. R. C IV . P. 12(b)(6). 	When
considering a motion to dismiss, a court should construe the allegations in the
complaint favorably to the pleader and accept as true all well-pleaded facts.
Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010). 	In the Fifth
Circuit, motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor and
rarely granted. 	Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir.
2009). 	To survive dismissal, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
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U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
However, a court is not bound to accept legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Although all
reasonable inferences will be resolved in favor of a plaintiff, a plaintiff must
plead “specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.” 	Tuchman v. DSC
Commc’ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Firefighters’ Ret.
Sys. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 894 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Although a
complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, the allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”) (internal
quotations omitted)). “‘Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’” 	Firefighters’ Ret.
Sys., 894 F.3d at 669 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 	“The court is not
required to conjure up unpled allegations or construe elaborately arcane
scripts to save a complaint.” Santerre v. Agip Petroleum Co., Inc., 45 F. Supp.
2d 558, 568 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).
To determine whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may only
look to allegations in a complaint to determine their sufficiency. 	Id.; Atwater
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Partners of Tex. LLC v. AT & T, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-175, 2011 WL 1004880, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2011). 	“A court may, however, also consider matters
outside the four corners of a complaint if they are incorporated by reference,
items 	subject 	to 	judicial 	notice, 	matters 	of 	public 	record, 	orders, 	items
appearing in the record of a case, and exhibits attached to a complaint whose
authenticity is unquestioned.” Joubert on Behalf of Joubert v. City of Houston,
No. 4:22-cv-3750, 2024 WL 1560015, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2024). 	“A
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also FED. R. C IV .
P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice”).
III. 	Discussion
a. Moore’s Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 23–24)
Moore filed two Motions to Dismiss. 	In the first, he argues Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims against Moore should be dismissed because he is a private citizen
and Plaintiff failed to plead Moore acted under color of state law. (ECF No. 23
at 2). 	In the second, Moore argues that, should the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims, the Court should then dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 24 at 1–2).
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As an initial matter, Plaintiff dropped Moore as a named defendant in
the FAC, which effectively serves as a voluntary dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims
against Moore. 	Thibideaux v. Gregg Cnty. Jail, No. 6:23-cv-125, 2024 WL
6473081, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2024), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 6:23-cv-125, 2025 WL 2160147 (E.D. Tex. July 30, 2025) (citing Spivey v.
Wilson, No. 5:17-cv-94, 2019 WL 5089683, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2019)).
However, even if Plaintiff had maintained Moore as a defendant in the
FAC, Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed. 	Plaintiff’s original Complaint
asserts a § 1983 claim for “Conspiracy/Joint Action” against Moore. (ECF No.
1 at 4). Plaintiff also asserts “in the alternative” the following state law claims:
“breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, fraud/fee forfeiture, and
breach of contract (as applicable).” (Id.).
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she has
been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United
States and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. 	See Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999).
“Private individuals generally are not considered to act under color of law, i.e.,
are not considered state actors . . . .” 	Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 518 (5th
Cir. 2005). 	“However, it is possible, in limited circumstances, for a private
individual to be considered a state actor.” 	Ross v. Bailey-Christian, No. 3:25-
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cv-356, 	2025 WL 	2304786, 	at *2 (S.D. Miss. July 24, 	2025), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:25-cv-356, 2025 WL 2298652 (S.D. Miss. Aug.
8, 2025) (citing Ballard, 413 F.3d at 518).
Here, Plaintiff appears to concede that Moore is a private individual but
argues that his conduct can be fairly attributable to the State through the
“joint action test.” (See ECF No. 1 at 4). “[U]nder the ‘joint action test’, private
actors will be considered state actors where they are ‘willful participant[s] in
joint action with the State or its agents.’” 	Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402
F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)).
To maintain a claim that a private citizen is liable under § 1983 based on joint
action with state officials, Plaintiff “must allege facts showing an agreement
or meeting of the minds between the state actor and the private actor to engage
in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, and that the
private actor was a willing participant in joint activity with the state or its
agents.” Pikaluk v. Horseshoe Ent., L.P., 810 F. App’x 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations against Moore in the original Complaint do
not plausibly establish that Moore acted under color of state law. 	In the
original 	Complaint, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Moore 	facilitated 	“privilege
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compromise,” failed to file defensive motions, missed settings, and assisted the
State’s “coercive plea posture.” (ECF No. 1 at 4).
This assertion is conclusory and lacks the factual specificity required to
state a plausible claim. The original Complaint does not allege particular facts
showing the existence of an agreement between Moore and any state actor to
violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim under § 1983 against Moore, and that claim should be dismissed.
See Alcantara v. Pacillas, No. 3:25-cv-438, 2026 WL 1223107, at *7 (W.D. Tex.
Apr. 13, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 25-cv-438, 2026 WL
1213822 (W.D. Tex. May 4, 2026) (finding a plaintiff failed to establish a
private individual acted under color of state law where the plaintiff simply
described the individual as using state processes instead of engaging in actions
attributable to the State itself).
As to the state law claims, Plaintiff’s Complaint “consists of little more
than a laundry list of naming causes of action without any factual support and
therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Foreman v.
City of Tyler, Tex., No. 6:24-cv-278, 2024 WL 4728910, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 5,
2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Foreman v. City of Tyler,
Tex., Water Utilities, No. 6:24-cv-278, 2024 WL 4533557 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 21,
2024); see also Adams v. City of Taft, No. 2:22-cv-218, 2023 WL 2695398, at *7
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(S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-cv-218,
2023 WL 2695118 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2023) (“Plaintiff lists causes of action
and conclusory [sic] asserts he was discriminated and retaliated against and
harassed. . . . It is clear Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient
allegations but instead alleges certain causes of action in a conclusory fashion
which is insufficient to survive the pending Motion.”).
Because 	Plaintiff’s 	FAC 	shows 	no 	mention 	of 	Moore, 	the 	Court
recommends Moore’s Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 23–24) be granted and
Plaintiff’s claims against Moore be dismissed without prejudice. 	See Spivey,
2019 WL 5089683, at *2 (dismissing claims without prejudice where the
operative complaint does not mention a party that was named in an earlier
complaint).
b. Judge Collins’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 32)
Judge Collins argues Plaintiff’s claims against her should be dismissed
because (1) Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims against Judge Collins; (2)
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by judicial immunity; (3) Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the Younger Abstention doctrine; and (4) Plaintiff fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. (ECF No. 32 at 2).
The Court must address standing before evaluating any argument on the
merits or any attack on the complaint’s sufficiency. 	See Lujan v. Defs. of
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Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992); United States v. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th 807,
811 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Standing is a matter of jurisdiction, and courts must
assess their jurisdiction before turning to the merits.”). 	Thus, the Court first
considers whether Plaintiff has standing to bring her claims against Judge
Collins. To satisfy Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) injury in fact;
(2) causation; and (3) redressability. 	U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also
Yan v. Texas, No. 4:24-cv-579, 2025 WL 726582, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2025),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:24-cv-579, 2025 WL 725267 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 6, 2025).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Collins denied Plaintiff access to court
by not ruling on Plaintiff’s pro se motions while she was represented by an
attorney. 	(ECF No. 29 at 4–5). 	Plaintiff also alleges Judge Collins refused to
“provide hearings and rulings necessary to access the court.” (Id.).
Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	Judge 	Collins 	fail 	to 	satisfy 	the 	case 	or
controversy requirement of Article III. 	“The case or controversy requirement
of Article III of the Constitution requires a plaintiff to show that he and the
defendants have adverse legal interests,” and the “requirement of a justiciable
controversy is not satisfied where a judge acts in his adjudicatory capacity.”
Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 359 (5th Cir. 2003). Here, the conduct described
by Plaintiff falls within the scope of Judge Collins’ adjudicatory capacity.
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“Without 	a 	case 	or 	controversy 	there 	is 	no 	standing, 	and 	without
standing, no subject matter jurisdiction.” Machetta v. Moren, 726 F. App’x 219,
220 (5th Cir. 2018). 	As such, the Court recommends Judge Collins’ Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 32) be granted and Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Collins
be dismissed without prejudice. 2 See Ehm v. San Antonio City Council, 269 F.
App’x 375, 376 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal without prejudice a pro se
plaintiff for lack of standing).
c. 	Teare and Platter’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33)
Teare and Platter argue Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because
(1) it is insufficiently plead under Rule 8(a)(2); (2) Plaintiff’s claims are barred
by 	prosecutorial 	immunity; 	and 	(3) 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	are 	barred 	by 	the
Eleventh Amendment. (ECF No. 33 at 5–11).
As with Moore, Plaintiff dropped Teare and Platter as named defendants
in the FAC, which effectively serves as a voluntary dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims against Teare and Platter. Thibideaux, 2024 WL 6473081, at *5 (citing
Spivey, 2019 WL 5089683, at *1–2). However, even if Plaintiff had maintained
2 Even if Plaintiff had standing to bring her claims against Judge Collins, dismissal is
proper because she enjoys judicial immunity from civil actions for any judicial act over which
her court has jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). While Plaintiff
alleges she is suing Judge Collins for “non-judicial” conduct (ECF No. 29 at 5), it is clear that
the complained-of conduct by Judge Collins was judicial in nature and was undertaken
pursuant to the jurisdiction of her court. See Yan, 2025 WL 726582, at *7.
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Teare and Platter as defendants in the FAC, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by
prosecutorial immunity.
Under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, a prosecutor is absolutely
immune in a civil rights lawsuit for any action taken in connection with a
judicial 	proceeding. 	Buckley 	v. 	Fitzsimmons, 	509 	U.S. 	259, 	273 	(1993).
“Prosecutorial immunity applies to the prosecutor’s actions in initiating the
prosecution and in carrying the case through the judicial process.” 	Fennell v.
Hernandez, No. 22-cv-948, 2022 WL 18460769, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2022),
aff’d, No. 23-50055, 2023 WL 4421382 (5th Cir. July 10, 2023) (citing Boyd v.
Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Plaintiff sues Teare and Platter
for actions within the scope of their prosecutorial function. (See ECF No. 1 at
3–4 (alleging that Teare and Platter participated in the court’s “refusal” to hear
certain motions and refused to produce discovery)). 	Consequently, Teare and
Platter’s absolute prosecutorial immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims. 	See King v.
Callaghan, No. 4:22-cv-006, 2022 WL 2056276, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 16, 2022),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:22-cv-006, 2022 WL 2053170 (N.D.
Tex. June 7, 2022) (citing Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273).
Because Plaintiff’s FAC shows no mention of Teare and Platter, the
Court recommends Teare and Platter’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33) be
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granted and Plaintiff’s claims against Teare and Platter be dismissed without
prejudice. 	See Spivey, 2019 WL 5089683, at *2 (dismissing claims without
prejudice where the operative complaint does not mention a party that was
named in an earlier complaint).
d. Ochsner’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34)
Ochsner argues Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because (1) the
facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint are conclusory and (2) Ochsner is entitled
to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 34 at 4).
As with a few of the other defendants, Plaintiff dropped Ochsner as a
named defendant in the FAC, which effectively serves as a voluntary dismissal
of Plaintiff’s claims against Ochsner. 	Thibideaux, 2024 WL 6473081, at *5
(citing Spivey, 2019 WL 5089683, at *1–2). 	However, even if Plaintiff had
maintained Ochsner as a defendant in the FAC, Plaintiff’s claims are barred
by qualified immunity.
Ochsner currently serves as the Clerk of Court for the Southern District
of Texas. 	Ochsner, as a court clerk, has “qualified immunity for . . . routine
duties 	not 	explicitly 	commanded 	by 	a 	court 	decree 	or 	by 	the 	judge’s
instructions.” Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiff
alleges Ochsner refused “to accept and file removal-related documents” and
“obstructed Plaintiff’s access to federal court.” (ECF No. 1 at 4). The conduct
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described by Plaintiff falls within the scope of performing routine functions of
a court clerk. 	As such, Plaintiff’s claims against Ochsner are barred by
qualified immunity. See Pellegrin v. Brewster, No. 26-cv-391, 2026 WL 827720,
at *2–3 (E.D. La. Mar. 9, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 26-
cv-391, 2026 WL 822502 (E.D. La. Mar. 25, 2026) (collecting cases).
Because 	Plaintiff’s 	FAC 	shows 	no 	mention 	of 	Ochsner, 	the 	Court
recommends 	Ochsner’s Motion 	to Dismiss (ECF 	No. 	34) 	be granted 	and
Plaintiff’s claims against Ochsner be dismissed without prejudice. See Spivey,
2019 WL 5089683, at *2 (dismissing claims without prejudice where the
operative complaint does not mention a party that was named in an earlier
complaint).
e. 	Other Pending Motions
Also 	pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Teare 	and 	Platter’s 	Motion 	for
Extension of Time (ECF No. 20), Plaintiff’s Motion for Clerk’s Entry of Default
(ECF No. 21), Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration Order Setting Aside
Default (ECF No. 28), Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Moore’s Motions to Dismiss
(ECF No. 30), Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Answer (ECF No. 31), Plaintiff’s
Second Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 40), Plaintiff’s Second
Motion to Strike Answer (ECF No. 41), Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate or Limit
Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 45), and Plaintiff’s Motion
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for 	Leave 	to 	file 	Sur 	Reply 	(ECF 	No. 	47). 	In 	light 	of 	the 	Court’s
recommendations, the Court DENIES AS MOOT each of these motions (ECF
Nos. 20–21, 28, 30–31, 40–41, 45, 47).
IV. 	Leave to Amend
“[D]istrict courts often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure
pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects
are incurable or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are unwilling or
unable to amend in a manner which will avoid dismissal.” Great Plains Tr. Co.
v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). 	The
decision to allow amendment of a party’s pleadings is within the sound
discretion of the district court. 	Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021
(5th Cir. 1994); Avatar Expl., Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 320
(5th Cir. 1991).
“Although leave to amend should not be automatically granted, ‘[a]
district court must possess a substantial reason to deny a request for leave to
amend[.]’” Tucker Energy Servs., USA, Inc. v. Ricoh Americas Corp., No. 4:12-
cv-0417, 2012 WL 2403513, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 2012) (quoting Jones v.
Robinson Prop. Group, L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)). 	Under Rule
15(a), “[d]enial of leave to amend may be warranted for undue delay, bad faith
or 	dilatory 	motive 	on 	the 	part 	of 	the 	movant, 	repeated 	failure 	to 	cure
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deficiencies, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of a proposed
amendment.”
Here, Plaintiff’s FAC only asserts claims as to Judge Collins. 	Allowing
Plaintiff leave to amend would be futile because Judge Collins has judicial
immunity. Further, while not named in the FAC, Teare, Platter, and Ochsner
are also immune from Plaintiff’s claims.
While Moore is not immune to Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff has essentially
dismissed her claims against Moore by not including him as a defendant in her
FAC. 	Further, in response to Moore’s Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff has not
presented argument as to how she would amend her complaint a second time
to overcome the deficiencies identified above. (See ECF Nos. 30, 40, 42).
As such, the Court finds that any further amendment would be futile.
See Franklin v. City of Paris Police Dep’t, No. 4:22-cv-161, 2023 WL 5734935,
at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:22-
cv-161, 2023 WL 5725520 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 5, 2023) (finding amendment would
be futile when plaintiff cannot overcome an immunity argument).
V. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Moore’s Motions to
Dismiss (ECF Nos. 23–24), Judge Collins’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 32),
Teare and Platter’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33), and Ochsner’s Motion to
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Dismiss (ECF No. 34) be GRANTED. The Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s
FAC (ECF No. 29) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Court DENIES AS MOOT all other pending motions (ECF Nos. 20–
21, 28, 30–31, 40–41, 45, 47).
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on July 7, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
7, 2026.
_____________________________
Richard W. Bennett
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