Cuellar v. Davis et al

I Ill
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JAIME J\1ENDEZ CUELLAR,
(TDCJ # 00854843),
§
§
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
vs.
ERIC GUERRERO, et al.,
Defendants.
§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. H-26-790
§
§
§
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Jaime Mendez Cuellar (TDCJ #00854843), is currently in the
custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions
Division. Proceedingpro se and informa pauperis, he filed a civil-rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Eric Guerrero, as Executive Director ofTDCJ-CID; 1
Grady Wallace, as Warden _of the Jester III Unit; Major Alyce E. Hooper of the Jester
III Unit; Captain Jounissia N. Josian of the Jester III Unit; and Sargeant James I.
Ekpo of the Jester III Unit. 	(Dkt. 1). 	He contends that the defendants are illegally
keeping him imprisoned and that they have failed or refused to properly process his
grievances. (Id. at 3-4).
1
Cuellar's complaint identifies Lori Davis as the Executive Director ofTDCJ-CID.
Eric Guerrero has since been named Executive Director ofTDCJ-CID. Under Rule 25(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Guerrero is automatically substituted as a party.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 05, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Because Cuellar is proceeding informa pauperis, the Court must examine his
claims and dismiss his complaint, in whole or in part, if it determines that the action
is (1) "frivolous or malicious," (2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted," or (3) "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). After considering Cuellar's complaint, the Court
concludes that this case must be dismissed for the reasons explained below.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In February 2026, Cuellar filed a civil-rights complaint alleging that his
federal and state constitutional rights are being violated because he is illegally
imprisoned in a case of mistaken identity. (Dkt. 1). He contends that by using his
name in uppercase letters rather than a combination of uppercase and lowercase
letters, the defendants have misidentified him and are "stealing my capital interest."
(Id. at 4).
Cuellar has attached to his complaint copies of grievances that he alleges he
filed with TDCJ. 	(Dkt. 1-1, pp. 3-9). 	In these grievances, he alleges that he is a
"natural born private man" who has not entered into a contract with either the United
States or the State of Texas and therefore is not subject to their laws. 	(Id.). 	He
contends 	that the 	defendants 	have 	either failed 	or refused to 	process 	these
grievances. 	(Id. at 1). 	He does not identify a specific constitutional provision or
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federal statute that has been violated by the failure to process his grievances, nor
does he identify any harm that he has suffered as a result.
As relief, he seeks his release from prison and money damages. 	(Dkt. 1, p.
4).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Cuellar brings his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	"Section 1983 does not
create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for
violations of statutory and constitutional rights." Lafleur v. Texas Dep 't of Health,
126 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). 	To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez
v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). 	The first element
recognizes that "state tort claims are not actionable under federal law; a plaintiff
·under[§] 1983 must show deprivation of a federal right." 	Nesmith v. Taylor, 715
F.2d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 	The second element means that
generally only state actors-not private parties-can be liable for violations of civil
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rights. See Frazier v. Bd. of Tr. ofNw. Miss. Reg'! Med. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278, 1283
(5th Cir. 1985).
B. 	The Prison Litigation Reform Act
Cuellar's action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, (PLRA).
The PLRA requires the Court to examine the legal and factual basis of a prisoner's
complaint and dismiss the case if it determines that the complaint "(i) is frivolous or
malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
A complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." 	Geiger
v. 	Jowers, 	404 F.3d 371, 373 	(5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1992)). 	"A complaint lacks an arguable basis in
law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint
alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." 	Siglar v.
Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319,327 (1989)). "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the·
plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged
are clearly baseless." 	Rogers v. 	Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013)
(cleaned up). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if
it does not contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
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reliefthat is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678
(2009)).
In conducting its screening review, the Court must construe all allegations
"liberally in favor of the plaintiff' and must consider whether "with every doubt
resolved on [the plaintiffs] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief."
Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 	Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up). 	But if the complaint does not state a claim for relief, it may be
dismissed, even before service on the defendants. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d
1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).
C. 	Pro Se Pleadings
Cuellar is proceeding prose in this action. Courts construe pleadings filed by
prose litigants under a less stringent standard of review. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Under this standard, "[a] document filed prose
is 'to be liberally construed.'" 	Erickson v. Pardus,- 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even under this
liberal standard, pro se litigants must still "abide by the rules that govern the federal
courts." 	E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475,484 (5th Cir. 2014). 	They must
"properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim
to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary judgment
evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal." Id. (cleaned up).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Sovereign Citizen Claims
To 	the 	extent 	that 	Cuellar 	1s 	claiming 	that 	his 	imprisonment 	is
unconstitutional because it is 	based on mistaken identity, his 	allegations 	are
frivolous and fail to state a claim for relief.
Cuellar's claims are based on the tenets of sovereign citizens. 	Sovereign
citizens are "a loose grouping of litigants, commentators, and tax protesters who
often take the position that they are not subject to state or federal statutes and
proceedings." 	United States v. 	Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 746 n.5 (5th Cir. 2016).
"Although no two pseudolegal practitioners are identical, they tend to share several
common beliefs, including that principles of contract law can be used to either
escape punishment for offenses or to generate unlimited fiscal liability in others."
Samuel Barrows, Sovereigns, Freemen, and Desperate Souls: Towards A Rigorous
Understanding ofPseudolitigation Tactics in United States Courts, 62 B.C. L. Rev.
905, 907 n.13 (2021) (cleaned up). Sovereign citizens often take the position that a
secret United States Treasury account was set up for each person at birth, that a
large sum of money was placed into it from some unidentified source, and that
"freemen" can pay their debts, including their debt to society from a criminal
conviction, by transferring the debt to this fictitious bond. See UNC School of
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Government, A Quick Guide to Sovereign Citizens, available at www.sog.unc.edu
(visited March 2, 2026).
But all of the courts that have addressed such claims have rejected them. See,
e.g., 	Watson v. 	Texas State Univ., 829 F. App'x 686, 686 (5th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) (denying relief on claims based on the "meritless legal theories associated
with the sovereign citizen movement"); United States v. Williams, 29 F.4th 1306,
1308 (11th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts have "repeatedly rejected" sovereign
citizens' "theories of individual sovereignty, immunity. from prosecution, and their
ilk") (quoting United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 766-67 (7th Cir. 2011));
United States v. 	Coleman, 871 	F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2017) (describing the
arguments of sovereign citizens as "meritless rhetoric"); United States v. Schmitt,
784 F.2d 880, 882 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting as "entirely frivolous" claims that the
courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant because he was a "Natural
Freeman" not subject to the law); Mason v. Anderson, Civil No. H-15-2952, 2016
WL 4398680, 	at 	*2 	(S.D. Tex. Aug. 	18, 	2016) ("[C]ourts routinely dismiss
sovereign citizen claims."); Stone v. Birmingham, No. 3:20-cv-2494-D (BT), 2021
WL 6802921, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021) (collecting cases and noting that the
claims of sovereign citizens are routinely dismissed as "frivolous and without
merit"), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 326565 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3,
2022). As a result of this uniform rejection, "[t]hese [sovereign citizen] teachings
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have never worked in a court of law-not a single time." 	Wirsche v. Bank of Am.,
NA., No. 7:13-cv-528, 2013 WL 6564657, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2013).
Cuellar' s complaint alleges that his imprisonment is based on mistaken
identity. (Dkt. 1, p. 4). He alleges that by keeping him imprisoned, the defendants
are "stealing my capital and interest" from a "constructive trust" that was created
when he was born. 	(Id.). 	His grievances cite to state and federal constitutions,
various state and federal statutes, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and an
unidentified Restatement. 	But neither the complaint nor its attachments identify
any violation of the Constitution or any federal law relevant to his claim that the
defendants have violated his civil rights. (Dkt. 1-1 ).
Cuellar' s allegations of mistaken identity are patently frivolous, and his claim
that he is falsely imprisoned is meritless. 	To the extent that he contends that the
defendants have violated his civil rights under the sovereign citizen theories of
liability, his action is dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
B. 	Grievance Processing Claim
Cuellar's complaint could also be construed as asserting a claim that the
defendants have violated his civil rights by failing to process his grievances
concerning his allegedly illegal imprisonment. 	These allegations fail to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
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A prisoner "has no right to either the adequacy or the result of prison
administrative grievance procedures." Jones v. Lumpkin, No. 23-40612, 2024 WL
1994279, at *2 (5th Cir. May 6, 2024) (per curiam). 	That a grievance was not
investigated 	or 	resolved 	to 	an 	inmate's 	satisfaction 	does 	not 	implicate
constitutionally protected rights. 	See Schwarzer v. Wainright, 810 F. App'x 358,
360 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing Sandin v. 	Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995)); Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374 (holding that prisoners do not have a federally
protected liberty interest in having grievances resolved to their satisfaction);
Alexander v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Just., 951 F.3d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) 	(affirming the trial 	court's 	dismissal 	of an 	inmate's 	claim that his
grievances were mishandled or improperly denied because prisoners have no due-
process rights in the inmate grievance process); Grogan v. Kumar, 873 F.3d 273,
280 (5th Cir. 2017) ("[I]t is well established that prisoners have no due process
rights in the inmate grievance process."); Mahogany v. Miller, 252 F. App'x 593,
595 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that a plaintiff had no actionable § 1983
claim based on prison officials' failure to process· his grievances); Edmond v.
Martin, 100 F.3d 952, 1996 WL 625331, at *1 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding
that an inmate's claim that the defendant's failure to investigate his grievance
"raises no constitutional issue"). 	Further, the failure of prison officials to follow
prison policies or rules does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 	See
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McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 579 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Jackson v. Cain,
864 F.2d 1235, 1251-52 (5th Cir. 1989)); Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 779
(5th Cir. 2000) ("[A] violation of prison.regulations in itself is not a constitutional
violation."). 	Courts have therefore repeatedly dismissed lawsuits brought by
prisoners to challenge TDCJ' s administration of its grievance procedures, including
prison officials' alleged failures to comply with TDCJ's policies and procedures
when processing grievances. See, e.g., Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
To the extent that Cuellar's complaint can be construed as claiming that the
handling of his grievances violated his civil rights, he does not allege a violation of
federal law. His action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and
will be dismissed.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. The 	civil-rights 	action 	filed 	by 	Jaime 	Mendez 	Cuellar, 	(Dkt. 	1), 	is
DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
2. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot.
3. Final judgment will be separately entered.
4. This dismissal counts as a strike for purposes of28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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The Clerk shall send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the
plaintiff. The Clerk shall also send a copy of this dismissal to the Three-Strikes List
Manager at the following email: Three Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on---~	.............___.:;_:,~~·.....~..;;;...__ 	_,, 2026.
DAVID HITTNER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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