Mejia Giron v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
WILKINS DANIEL MEJIA
GIRON,
Petitioner,
versus
KRISTI NOEM, et al,
Respondents.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:26-cv-00086
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
Petitioner Wilkins Daniel Mejia Giron is a citizen of El
Salvador who entered the United States without lawful
permission in September 2025. Dkt 1 at ¶1. He was taken
into custody by ICE on November 5, 2025. Ibid. He was
then placed in removal proceedings. Id at ¶2. He is
currently being held at the Joe Corley Processing Center in
Conroe, Texas. Ibid. Respondents are sued in their official
capacity as officers or employees of the United States and
are collectively referred to as the Government.
Pending is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, by
which Petitioner challenges his detention without a bond
hearing. Dkt 1. He asserts that he’s entitled to a bond
hearing under 8 USC §1226(a), which provides for
discretionary detention during removal proceedings. See id
at ¶¶30–33. He also contends that his detention violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id at
¶¶27–29.
Also pending is a motion by the Government for
summary judgment. Dkt 8. It contends that no detention
hearing is required because Petitioner is an “applicant for
admission” under 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A), which provides for
mandatory detention during removal proceedings. Id at 7.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 30, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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As noted in prior order, this action presents the same
issue of textual interpretation recently addressed and
resolved by the undersigned in Montoya Cabanas v Bondi,
2025 WL 3171331 (SD Tex); Maceda Jimenez v Thompson,
2025 WL 3265493 (SD Tex); see also Montelongo Zuniga v
Lyons, 2025 WL 3755126 (ND Tex) (Hendrix, J). Counsel
for Petitioner was so advised and responded to the Montoya
Cabanas decision, in addition to other novel arguments not
considered there. Dkt 9 (Petitioner response).
Upon due consideration, the undersigned maintains
the ruling in Montoya Cabanas. The construction given
8 USC §§1225 and 1226 in that case thus controls here.
Petitioner maintains that because “mandatory
detention without bond has historically applied to arriving
aliens,” “Congress’s decision to define ‘applicant for
admission’ broadly does not mean that every individual
falling within that definition is subject . . . to §1225(b).”
Dkt 9 at 4 (emphasis added). The argument in this regard
depends upon assertion that §1225(b) is applicable only to
arriving aliens “encountered at or immediately after a port
of entry.” Dkt 9 at 4. The position by Petitioner is thus
rooted in the practice and priorities of past
Administrations—not in the statutory text of
§1225(b)(2)(A) itself. While “longstanding agency practice
might have the ‘power to persuade,’ [ ] it has never had the
‘power to control.’” Restaurant Law Center v United States
Department of Labor, 120 F4th 163, 174 (5th Cir 2024).
Agency practice can’t “defeat a statute’s text by ‘adverse
possession.’” Ibid, citing Airlines for America v Department
of Transportation, 110 F4th 672, 676 (5th Cir 2024).
As noted in Montoya Cabanas, if Congress wanted to
apply the mandatory-detention regime of §1225(b)(2)(A)
only to arriving aliens, it could have said so, as it did with
other closely related subsections. See §1225(a)(2) (“arriving
alien who is a stowaway” isn’t eligible to apply for
admission); §1225(c)(1) (referring to situation where
immigration officer or immigration judge “suspects that an
arriving alien may be admissible”); §1225(d)(2) (titled with
respect to authority “to order detention and delivery of
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arriving aliens”). Instead, Congress chose to broadly define
“applicant for admission” in §1225(a)(1), while providing
that such individuals are subject to mandatory detention
in §1225(b)(2)(A).
Petitioner also argues that the interpretation by the
Government produces “absurd and unconstitutional
results.” Dkt 9 at 5. This is so, he says, because “a
noncitizen apprehended years after entry” may be
subjected to mandatory detention without a bond hearing
under §1225(b)(2)(A), while noncitizens detained under
§1226(c), some of whom have criminal convictions, are
“entitled to individualized bond hearings after prolonged
detention.” Id at 5. But it is incorrect that aliens subject to
detention under §1226(c) are entitled to individualized
bond hearings, given that the text doesn’t authorize bond
at all. Instead, Ҥ1226(c) mandates detention of any alien
falling within its scope and [ ] detention may end prior to
the conclusion of removal proceedings ‘only if’ the alien is
released for witness-protection purposes.” Jennings v
Rodriguez, 583 US 281, 305–06 (2018) (emphasis added).
Regardless, the contention doesn’t address, much less
discount, applicability of the text of §1225(b)(2)(A) to the
facts of Petitioner’s situation. And notably in that regard,
Petitioner wasn’t “apprehended years after entry.” See Dkt
9 at 5. Even on his own telling, he entered in September
2025 without inspection. Dkt 1 at ¶1.
The due-process claim by Petitioner also fails. He
contends that his detention without bond redetermination
violates due process. Dkt 1 at ¶¶27–29. The Supreme Court
has stated, “Detention during removal proceedings is a
constitutionally permissible part of that process.” Demore
v Kim, 538 US 510, 531 (2003) (citations omitted). As such,
“the Government may constitutionally detain deportable
aliens during the limited period necessary for their
removal proceedings.” Id at 526. Petitioner’s detention
thus doesn’t violate due process.
As such, the motion for summary judgment will be
granted and the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be
denied. Dkts 1 (petition) & 8 (motion).
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* * *
In so concluding, respectful acknowledgement is given
to the six other district court judges in the Houston
Division who have also recently reached the statutory issue
presented in this case and determined under similar
circumstances in favor of §1226 over §1225. For example,
see Ortega-Aguirre v Noem, 2025 WL 3684697 (SD Tex)
(Bennett, J); Hernandez Lucero v Noem, 4:25-cv-03981 (SD
Tex, Oct 23, 2025) (Ellison, J); Aslamov v Bradford, 4:25-
cv-04299 (SD Tex, Oct 30, 2025) (Hanks, J); Mejia Juarez v
Bondi, 2025 WL 3684693 (SD Tex) (Hoyt, J); Buenrostro-
Mendez v Bondi, 2025 WL 2886346, (SD Tex) (Rosenthal,
J); Espinoza Andres v Noem, 2025 WL 3458893 (SD Tex)
(Hittner, J). One other judge in the Houston Division has
determined in favor of §1225. See Villeda Cabriales v
Noem, 4:25-cv-04908 (SD Tex, Jan 22, 2026) (Lake, J).
Another three judges in this Division haven’t reached
decision, but two have it currently pending before them.
For example, see Romero Moreno v Tate, 4:25-cv-04903
(SD Tex) (Hanen, J); Martinez-Sarres v Warden, 4:25-cv-
05273 (SD Tex) (Werlein, J).
That said, until the Fifth Circuit gives a definitive
interpretation, it is simply up to each district court judge
to give the text his or her own best reading. And in that
regard, it’s also noted that the Fifth Circuit has granted a
motion to consider this issue on an expedited basis. See
Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 25-20496 (cited above, per
Rosenthal, J), Dkt 80-2 at 2; see also Covarrubias v
Vergara, 25-40701 (per Kazen, J, SD Tex, Laredo Division),
Dkt 83-2 at 2.
If decision from the Fifth Circuit enters that is contrary
to the ruling here and in Montoya Cabanas v Bondi, 2025
WL 3171331, (SD Tex), Petitioner may freely seek leave to
file a motion for reconsideration on an expedited basis, if
desired. Or he may initiate a separate petition.
* * *
The motion by the Government for summary judgment
is GRANTED. Dkt 8.
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The petition for a writ of habeas corpus by Petitioner
Wilkins Daniel Mejia Giron is DENIED. Dkt 1.
This action is DISMISSED.
This is a FINAL JUDGMENT.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on January 28, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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