Rice et al v. City of Fort Worth, Texas et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Tara Michelle Rice, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
City of Fort Worth, Texas, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:26-cv-00052
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
On January 5, 2026, Plaintiff Tara Michelle Rice, in her individual
capacity and as next friend of her three disabled adult children, Jaylen Micah
Rice, Jahvier Malik Rice, Xzavier Malaki Rice, and two minor children, Z.W.
and J.W., filed a motion requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
Dkt. 2. 	After carefully considering the application, the pleadings, and the
applicable law, it is ordered that Rice’s IFP application is granted, but it is
recommended 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	be 	dismissed 	under 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Background
The 	complaint 	makes 	sweeping 	accusations 	that 	“Defendants”
collectively engaged in a “coordinated, multi-year campaign of retaliation,
extortion, fraud, malicious prosecution, child exploitation, attempted murder,
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 25, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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murder-for-hire, obstruction of justice, and abuse of process” from 2020 to the
present. 	Dkt. 1 at 1. 	Rice lodges those accusations at the State of Texas; the
City of Fort Worth, Texas; Tarrant, Harris, Collin, and Fort Bend Counties;
and Katy Independent School District. 	Dkt. 1 at 1. 	She also alludes to
unidentified 	judges; 	“prosecutors; 	law 	enforcement 	officers; 	clerks; 	school
administrators; social services personnel; private corporations; attorneys; and
DOES 1-100.” Id. at 3.
The only defendant-specific allegation accuses Katy Independent School
District and its counsel of “knowingly fil[ing] false pleadings, misrepresent[ing]
McKinney-Vento compliance, and us[ing] litigation for improper purposes.” Id.
No 	other 	particulars 	are 	provided. 	The 	remaining 	allegations 	do 	not
differentiate between the many named “Defendants.”
According to Rice, from 2020 through 2022, she and her children were
subject to “persistent surveillance, intimidation, malicious reporting, benefit
interference, and repeated disruptions of schooling and housing stability.” Id.
at 5. 	Unidentified law enforcement officers allegedly stopped and harassed
Jaylen 	Micah 	Rice 	and 	other 	family 	members; 	social 	service 	agencies
purportedly acted on false referrals when attempting to remove her children;
and 	Defendants 	allegedly 	“attempted 	to 	traffic” 	Rice’s 	minor 	children 	in
January 2023. Id.
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Rice further alleges that “Defendants” impersonated federal agents to
intimidate and surveil her, and that “Defendants coordinated unlawful arrests
and detentions, fabricated evidence, suppressed exculpatory material, and
initiated malicious prosecutions ….” 	Id. 	Rice also asserts that Defendants
“engaged in unmarked-vehicle surveillance, stalking, and luring tactics” to
“isolate Jaylen Micah Rice in hostile jurisdictions.” Id. And after Rice filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 7, Defendants allegedly violated the automatic stay
by pursuing unidentified “collections, litigation, and administrative actions ....”
Id. 	Rice further accuses Defendants of using mail, wire, and electronic
communications to “extort, threaten, and obstruct Plaintiffs’ access to benefits
and courts.” Id.
Rice brings seventeen causes of action. 	See Dkt. 1 at 6-8. 	Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, Rice invokes the First and Fourth Amendments, due process,
equal protection, and accuses Defendants of state-created danger, obstructing
court access, fabricating and suppressing evidence, and malicious prosecution.
Id. 	Other federal claims assert a conspiracy to violate civil rights, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985; violation of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962; disability discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.; attempted murder and murder-for-hire under
18 U.S.C. § 1958; child trafficking and exploitation under 18 U.S.C. § 1591;
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violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400, et seq., and the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987,
42 U.S.C. § 11301, et seq.; and violations of a bankruptcy stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362.
Id. She also pleads various state law claims. Id.
Rice moved to proceed IFP on January 5, 2026. 	Dkt. 2. 	This case was
referred to the undersigned on January 26, 2026. 	Dkt. 4. 	The motion is ripe
for resolution.
Legal standard
Rice’s application is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). 	Section 1915
provides 	that 	“[a]ny 	court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	may 	authorize 	the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action, or proceeding, civil
or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor”
upon a showing that “the person is unable to pay such fees or give security
therefor.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). 	This statute applies both to prisoner and
non-prisoner cases. See Hayes v. Scott, 116 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1997).
But the right to proceed in forma pauperis is not absolute. 	“Under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), the district court is required to dismiss an IFP case ‘at any
time’ if it determines that the case is ‘frivolous or malicious’ or ‘fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.’” 	Doe v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 131
F.4th 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii)).
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A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Diamond v. City of Rayville, 127 F.4th 935, 938 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “A complaint lacks an arguable
basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if
the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not
exist.” 	Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013). 	“[A] court may
dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly
baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and
delusional.” 	Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (quotations and
citations omitted).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it
alleges insufficient facts, when taken as true, to state a basis for relief that is
plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also, e.g., Amrhein v. United States, 740 F. App’x
65, 66 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Iqbal for the legal standard governing
a court’s sua sponte dismissal of a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. 	Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d
287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
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(per curiam)). 	But “regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or
is 	represented 	by 	counsel, 	conclusory 	allegations 	or 	legal 	conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to
dismiss.” 	Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Tex., 73 F.4th 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)); see
also Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (“[P]ro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the
right to relief above the speculative level.”).
Analysis
Rice’s financial circumstances merit allowing her to proceed without
prepaying costs. 	But for multiple reasons, Rice has not stated a cognizable
basis for relief. 	She has not shown that that can proceed pro se on her
children’s behalf. 	She also fails to plausibly allege her federal claims. 	And
without 	a 	viable 	federal 	question, 	this 	Court 	should 	decline 	to 	exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Rice’s state-law claims. 	Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), this case should be dismissed.
I. 	Rice’s IFP application is granted.
Rice filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
which would allow her to proceed with this case without prepaying fees or
costs. Dkt. 2. To proceed without paying the filing fee, an applicant must show
that she is financially “unable to pay such fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Although
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an applicant need not “be absolutely destitute,” she still must show by affidavit
that her financial condition renders her unable to “pay or give security for the
costs … and still be able to provide [herself] and [her] dependents with the
necessities of life.” Adkins v. DuPont Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).
After reviewing Rice’s application, the Court finds that her financial
resources render her unable to afford the costs of this litigation. 	She is
financially eligible to proceed IFP.
II. 	Rice has not pleaded viable claims.
A. 	Rice has not shown that she can represent her children.
Rice attempts to proceed pro se in both her individual capacity and as
next friend of three disabled adult children and two minor children. 	See Dkt.
1 at 1. 	“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct
their own cases personally or by counsel.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1654. 	Under that
language, a party “cannot be represented by a nonlawyer” because Section
1654 “does not include the phrase, ‘or by a nonlawyer.’” 	Raskin ex rel. JD v.
Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 69 F.4th 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gonzales v.
Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d
511, 514 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[I]ndividuals not licensed to practice law by the state
may not use the ‘next friend’ device as an artifice for the unauthorized practice
of law.”).
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The foregoing limitation means that a parent cannot bring a pro se suit
on a child’s behalf unless the claim belongs to the parent. See Raskin, 69 F.4th
at 284-87. 	Unless a pro se parent shows that “federal or state law authorizes
her to proceed pro se on behalf of her children,” see id. at 287, the claims
seeking recovery for the children must be dismissed, see Clark v. City of
Pasadena, 2024 WL 4354819, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2024) (dismissing for
lack of standing a pro se plaintiff’s Fourth and Sixth Amendment claims that
assert violations of his son’s rights); see also, e.g., J.F. v. Ventura, 2025 WL
2881576, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025) (dismissing ADA claim because “J.F.
has not established that she is able to proceed pro se on behalf of her mother
or children under 28 U.S.C. § 1654”), adopted by 2025 WL 2880805 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 9, 2025).
Rice pleads no facts suggesting that she is a lawyer. Nor has she alleged
any facts or identified any state or federal law that would allow her to vindicate
her children’s rights. 	As a result, Rice has not shown “that under § 1654,
federal or state law authorizes her to proceed pro se on behalf of her children.”
See Raskin, 69 F.4th at 287. All claims challenging acts toward Rice’s children
should be dismissed without prejudice.
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B. 	The federal claims are inadequately pleaded or otherwise
barred.
Rice’s federal claims are wholly deficient. Her complaint is replete with
conclusory allegations that fail to identify specific wrongdoing by a particular
defendant. 	Her claims against the State of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are
barred by sovereign immunity. And her federal claims against all Defendants
do not adequately allege a basis for relief. All of them should be dismissed.
1. 	Rice’s shotgun pleading fails to state a plausible basis for
relief.
Most 	broadly, 	Rice’s 	complaint 	fails 	to 	satisfy 	basic 	pleading
requirements. 	At a minimum, pleadings must include a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 	But group pleadings, or shotgun pleadings, “fall short of the
requisite pleading requirements.” See Bellard v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
2010 WL 1960079, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2010). Shotgun pleadings are those
asserting “multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying
which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which
of the defendants the claims is brought against.” 	Jones v. Grapeland Indep.
Sch. Dist., 2024 WL 4490604, at *1 n.1 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2024) (per curiam)
(quoting Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323
(11th Cir. 2015)). 	That lack of specificity “frustrate[s] the purpose of notice
pleading and impair[s] a defendant’s ability to respond to an asserted claim.”
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Salazar v. Shell Offshore, 2023 WL 11987797, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2023)
(quotation omitted).
Almost none of Rice’s factual allegations distinguish which defendant did
what. Yet she lodges her causes of action against all “Defendants.” 	See id. at
6-8. 	Rice fails to “explain what role each Defendant played” and instead
improperly “group[s] them together at all times” 	See Del Castillo v. PMI
Holdings N. Am. Inc., 2015 WL 3833447, at *6 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2010). Her
global allegations against all Defendants are inadequate.
Although Rice purports to sue unidentified judges, prosecutors, law
enforcement officers, clerks, school administrators, social services personnel,
private corporations, attorneys, and DOES 1-100, see Dkt. 1 at 3, she makes no
individualized factual allegations against any of them. See Dkt. 1 at 3. 	When
“a plaintiff merely lists an individual as a defendant but makes no factual
allegations against him or her, no cognizable claim has been stated against
that defendant.” 	Collins v. Terrebonne Par. Crim. Just. Complex, 2025 WL
3001929, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2025), adopted by 2025 WL 2997476 E.D. La.
Oct. 24, 2025). None of the claims adequately states a basis for relief.
2. 	The claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 are inadequately pleaded.
Rice asserts numerous claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) First
Amendment retaliation; (2) Fourth Amendment violations; (3) due process and
family integrity; (4) equal protection; (5) municipal liability; (6) civil rights
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conspiracy; 	(7) 	state-created 	danger; 	(8) 	obstruction 	of 	court 	access;
(9) evidence 	fabrication 	and 	suppression; 	(10) 	malicious 	prosecution;
(11) attempted murder and murder-for-hire; and (12) child trafficking and
exploitation. 	Dkt. 1 at 6-8. 	Rice also alleges that Defendants violated the
McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, which claims she attempts
to assert under Section 1983. 	See Does v. Klein v. Ind. Sch. Dist., 2025 WL
1476548, at *6 (S.D. Tex. May 22, 2025). None of those claims can proceed.
i. 	The State of Texas is immune from suit.
Rice cannot obtain relief against the State of Texas on her Section 1983
claim, whether for damages or declaratory or injunctive relief. “The Eleventh
Amendment bars an individual from suing a state in federal court unless the
state consents to suit or Congress has clearly and validly abrogated the state’s
sovereign immunity.” 	Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326
(5th Cir. 2002). “This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the
relief sought.” 	Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldermann, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984); see also Lewis v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625,
630 (5th Cir. 2011) (suits against the state for prospective relief are barred by
sovereign 	immunity). 	The 	State 	of 	Texas 	has 	not 	waived 	its 	sovereign
immunity, and Section 1983 does not abrogate that immunity. 	See NiGen
Biotech, LLC v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2015). 	Rice’s Section
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1983 theories against Texas are therefore barred. 	See Richardson v. Texas,
2024 WL 913380, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2024) (dismissing similar claims).
ii. 	Rice does not adequately allege an official policy or
custom.
Rice’s Section 1983 claims against the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant,
Harris, Collin, and Fort Bend Counties, and the Katy Independent School
District fare no better. Her allegations come nowhere close to satisfying Monell
v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and
its progeny.
As Monell makes clear, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor ….” 436 U.S. at 691. Instead, “[u]nder § 1983,
a municipality or local government entity such as an independent school
district may be held liable only for acts for which it is actually responsible.”
Doe on Behalf of Doe v. Dall. Ind. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998)
(citing 	Pembaur 	v. 	City 	of 	Cincinnati, 	475 	U.S. 	469, 	480 	(1986)).
“Consequently, the unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to
the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated
unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger
liability.” Piotrowski v. City of Hou., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (footnote
omitted). 	To recover, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: “(1) an official
policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force
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behind the violation of a constitutional right.” 	Martinez v. City of Rosenberg,
Tex., 123 F.4th 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 2025
WL 1727389 (U.S. June 23, 2025).
At most, Rice’s complaint declares that “[c]onstitutional violations were
caused by official policies, customs, failures to train, and ratification.” See Dkt.
1 at 6. But “[t]o proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint’s ‘description
of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional
violation ... cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.’” Pena v. City
of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Spiller v. City of
Tex. City, Police Dep’t., 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)). 	Rice’s failure to
include the necessary factual particulars defeats her Section 1983 claims.
3. 	The RICO claim is barred.
The complaint also asserts a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) and
(c), but the allegations are hopelessly conclusory. That alone merits dismissal.
“Regardless of subsection, RICO claims under § 1962 have three common
elements: (1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity,
(3) connected 	to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, 	or control 	of 	an
enterprise.” 	Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation
omitted). 	To satisfy the third requirement, there must be “an association-in-
fact,” which “includes a group of persons associated together for a common
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct ....” Crosswell v. Martinez, 120 F.4th
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177, 185 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). 	The association-in-fact “must
exist for purposes other than just to commit [RICO] predicate acts.” Walker v.
Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 738 (5th Cir. 2019).
A 	RICO 	plaintiff 	“must 	plead 	specific 	facts, 	not 	mere 	conclusory
allegations, which establish the enterprise.” 	Crosswell, 120 F.4th at 184
(quoting Montesano v. Seafirst Com. Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1987)).
And “the plaintiff must plead the specified facts as to each defendant. It cannot
... lump[ ] together the defendants.” Id. (quoting Walker, 938 F.3d at 738).
Rice fails to clear those hurdles. 	Her complaint merely states, in
formulaic fashion, that “Defendants” have an association-in-fact enterprise
with the “common purposes” of “retaliation against Plaintiffs, concealment of
misconduct, and preservation of power and financial interests.” 	Dkt. 1 at 4.
That is not enough. 	At best, the factual allegations detail “an isolated set of
events directed to” Rice or her family members. See Croswell, 120 F.4th at 187.
Conspicuously lacking are any factual allegations linking Defendants “to any
other continuing set of relationships or a course of activity that would entail
an association operating the background ....” Id. (affirming dismissal of RICO
claim). Nor does the complaint differentiate between the various Defendants,
as it needed to do. The RICO claim should be dismissed.
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4. 	The claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is inadequately pleaded.
Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Rice alleges that Defendants conspired to
deprive her federal constitutional rights and access to the courts. Dkt. 1 at 7.
Although not asserted specifically, Rice’s factual allegations implicate Sections
1985(2) and (3). Section 1985(2) addresses conspiracies that interfere with the
administration of justice in state and federal court proceedings. 	See Kush v.
Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983). Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies “for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons 	of 	the 	equal 	protection 	of 	the 	laws, 	or 	of 	equal 	privileges 	and
immunities under the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
“To 	state 	a 	plausible 	claim 	under 	either 	provision, 	plaintiff 	must
sufficiently allege a conspiracy.” 	Lewis v. Friedman, , at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 23,
2026). 	Rice’s assertion that “Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of
federal rights and court access,” Dkt. 1 at 6, is “nothing more than a threadbare
recital of the conspiracy element of a § 1985 claim, which is not entitled to a
presumption of truth.” 	See Lewis, 2026 WL 496637, at *2 (citing Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678). “Bald allegations that a conspiracy existed are insufficient.”
Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1370 (5th Cir. 1987); see also, e.g.,
Gonzalez v. Gillis, 2022 WL 1164806, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2022) (rejecting
“conclusory 	allegations 	of 	an 	agreement” 	that 	“do 	not 	state 	a 	plausible
conspiracy claim” under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). This claim fails.
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5. 	Rice has not alleged a viable disability discrimination claim.
Rice also alleges that Defendants “denied accommodations, services, and
protections” 	in 	violation 	of 	Title 	II 	of 	the 	ADA 	and 	Section 	504 	of 	the
Rehabilitation Act. 	Dkt. 1 at 7. 	She further alleges that Defendants violated
the IDEA. Id. at 8. It is unclear whether Rice is asserting these claims on her
own behalf, as opposed to doing so for her children. 	Either way, the claims
should be dismissed.
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “no otherwise qualified individual
with a disability … shall … be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance …” 29 U.S.C. § 794.
“[T]he rights and remedies afforded plaintiffs under Title II of the ADA
are 	almost 	entirely 	duplicative 	of 	those 	provided 	under 	§ 	504 	of 	the
Rehabilitation Act.” 	Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454
(5th Cir. 2005). 	Both statutes recognize that “a public entity’s failure [to]
reasonably accommodate the known limitations of persons with disabilities can
… constitute disability discrimination.” 	See Windham v. Harris Cnty., Tex.,
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875 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2017) (Title II); Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d
717, 723 (5th Cir. 2020) (Rehabilitation Act). A failure-to-accommodate claim
requires the plaintiff to prove: “(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability;
(2) the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the [public]
entity; 	and 	(3) 	the 	entity 	failed 	to 	make 	reasonable 	accommodations.”
Windham, 875 F.3d at 236 n.8 (quotation omitted).
Rice has not asserted that she is a qualified individual with a disability,
that the disability and its consequential limitations were known by any
defendant, nor that any defendant failed to make reasonable accommodations.
And other than describing her three adult children as disabled with some type
of impairments, the complaint does not allege that those limitations were
known to any particular defendant, that any specific accommodation was
sought, or that a requested accommodation was denied. 	She has not stated a
cognizable ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim.
With respect to the IDEA claim, the complaint merely asserts that
Defendants collectively violated the statute in some unspecified way. 	That is
insufficient to state a plausible basis for relief. See Dkt. 1 at 8. All disability-
related claims should be dismissed.
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6. 	Conclusory 	allegations 	about 	the 	bankruptcy 	stay 	are
insufficient.
Rice alleges that Defendants willfully violated an automatic stay in her
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. 	Dkt. 1 at 5, 8. 	“Section 362(k) creates a
private right of action for a debtor to bring an action against a person who
willfully violates the automatic stay to the injury of the debtor.” Bunkers Int’l
Co. v. M/V Wuchow, 2016 WL 1168483, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2016) (citing
In re Repine, 536 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2008)). 	To recover, (1) the creditor
must have known the existence of the stay; (2) the creditor’s acts must have
been intentional; and (3) these acts must have violated the stay. Id.
Rice’s claim is conclusory. She does not allege which defendant violated
an alleged stay. Nor does she allege what that defendant did that violated the
stay. 	She does not even specify which bankruptcy stay is at issue. 1 	She has
not stated a plausible basis for relief under Section 362(k).
1 	Judicially 	noticeable 	records 	indicate 	that 	Plaintiff 	has 	filed 	at 	least 	three
bankruptcy petitions. 	See Petition, In re Rice, No. 25-36821 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov.
12, 2025), Dkt. 1; Petition, In re Rice, No. 25-30189 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2025),
Dkt. 1; Petition, In re Rice, No. 23-34095 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2023), Dkt. 1. All
those petitions were dismissed. 	See Order Dismissing Debtor for Deficiencies, In re
Rice, No. 25-26821 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2025), Dkt. 14; Order Dismissing Debtor
for Deficiencies, In re Rice, No. 25-cv-30189 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2025), Dkt. 13;
Order Dismissing Debtor for Deficiencies, In re Rice, No. 23-34095 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9,
2023), Dkt. 11.
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7. 	The claims premised on criminal statutes are insufficient.
Rice 	alleges 	that 	“Defendants” 	committed 	attempted 	murder 	and
murder-for-hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 and child trafficking and exploitation
under 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Dkt. 1 at 7. All these claims fail.
The murder-related claims are barred as a matter of law and therefore
frivolous. 	“Title 18 is a federal criminal statute and generally provides no
private right of action.” 	Sierra v. Dall. Cnty. Dist. Att’y Office, 2023 WL
7285930, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2023), adopted by 2023 WL 7283925 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 3, 2023); see also Jones v. Greenville Police Dep’t, 2025 WL 1749986,
at *2 (N.D. Miss. June 2, 2025) (recommending dismissal of claim brought
under federal criminal statute that “generally provides no private right of
action”), adopted by 2025 WL 1749670 (N.D. Miss. June 24, 2025). 	Without a
private right of action, Rice cannot obtain relief.
Moreover, the complaint provides no factual support, whether regarding
the supposed “attempted murder and murder-for-hire” or child trafficking.
Rice merely declares, in sweeping fashion, that “Defendants orchestrated or
facilitated murder-for-hire schemes against Plaintiffs” and that “Defendants
attempted or facilitated trafficking and exploitation of minors.” 	Dkt. 1 at 7.
Her conclusory assertions fail to state a basis for relief.
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III. 	The Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Rice’s state-law claims.
Rice’s remaining claims are governed by state law. There is no indication
that this Court could exercise jurisdiction over those claims based on diversity
jurisdiction. See Dkt. 1 at 3 (Rice’s assertion that she is a Texas resident suing
Texas entities); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (requirements for diversity jurisdiction). And
if 	this 	Court 	concludes 	that 	the 	federal 	claims 	should 	be 	dismissed—as
recommended above—it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining state claims. 	28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Brookshire Bros.
Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The
general 	rule 	is 	that 	a 	court 	should 	decline 	to 	exercise 	jurisdiction 	over
remaining state-law claims when all the federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial ….”); Grant v. Saucedo, 2022 WL 2834757, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 19,
2022) 	(declining 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	state-law 	claims 	when
dismissing 	federal 	claim 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1915(e)); 	Clay 	v. 	Freebird
Publishers, 2020 WL 529707, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2020) (same). 	That is
the proper result here.
No federal interest is served by adjudicating Rice’s state-law claims, and
the Court has not expended significant resources on their consideration. 	See
Enochs v. Lampass Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 2011) (judicial economy,
convenience, 	fairness, 	and 	comity 	factors 	inform 	whether 	to 	retain
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supplemental jurisdiction). 	The appropriate course is to dismiss those state-
law claims without prejudice to bringing them in state court.
Order and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Tara Michelle
Rice’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 2) be GRANTED.
It is RECOMMENDED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) that
x 	Jaylen Micah Rice’s, Jahvier Malik Rice’s, Xzavier Malaki Rice’s,
Z.W.’s, and J.W.’s claims against all Defendants be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE because Tara Michelle Rice has not
shown that she is entitled to assert those claims on her children’s
behalf;
x 	Tara Michelle Rice’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the State of
Texas be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as barred by
sovereign immunity; and
x 	Tara 	Michelle 	Rice’s 	remaining 	federal 	claims 	against 	all
Defendants be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to
state a claim.
It is further RECOMMENDED that this Court decline supplemental
jurisdiction 	over 	Rice’s 	state-law 	claims 	and 	order 	that 	those 	claims 	be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
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plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on March 25, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_______________________________________
Y	Y	Yvvooonne Y. H	H	Hooo
United States Magistrate Judge
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