Harper v. Hidalgo et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MAMIE L. HARPER,
Plaintiff,
versus
LINA HIDALGO, et al,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:25-cv-06380
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
ORDER ADOPTING
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This action was filed on behalf of Mamie L. Harper,
who is deceased, alleging that Defendants “all played a
part in extorting state property taxes” from her. Dkt 1 at 3.
The complaint was filed and signed by Darrell J. Harper.
The matter was referred for disposition to Magistrate
Judge Yvonne Y. Ho. Dkt 5.
Prior order adopted Judge Ho’s recommendation that
the complaint be stricken and the action be dismissed
because Darrell J. Harper (i) isn’t a licensed attorney and
thus cannot represent the decedent, and (ii) is a vexatious
litigant subject to a preclusion order that bars him for filing
lawsuits in this district without prior permission. Dkt 9;
see Dkt 7 at 4 (preclusion order).
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, along with a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Dkts 11 & 12. He also
filed an “objection” to the order adopting Memorandum and
Recommendation. Dkt 13.
Judge Ho recommends that the motion to proceed IFP
on appeal be denied because Harper’s appeal is frivolous in
light of the preclusion order. Dkt 17 at 1–2. And, construing
the objection to the prior order as a motion under Rule
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 28, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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59(e), she recommends that it be denied for failure to
identify any error law or fact or newly discovered evidence.
Id at 2–3.
Harper filed objections. Dkt 18. Among other things, he
contends that the Memorandum and Recommendation (i)
doesn’t adequately address his right to due process and
petition the government, and (ii) that the preclusion order
shouldn’t be treated as conclusive. Dkt 18.
The district court reviews de novo those conclusions of
a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically
objected. See FRCP 72(b)(3) & 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(C); see
also United States v Wilson, 864 F2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir
1989, per curiam). The district court may accept any other
portions to which there’s no objection if satisfied that no
clear error appears on the face of the record. See Guillory v
PPG Industries Inc, 434 F3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing
Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F3d
1415, 1430 (5th Cir 1996, en banc); see also FRCP 72(b)
advisory committee note (1983).
Upon de novo review and determination, Harper’s
objections lack merit.
The objections don’t contest the existence of the
preclusion order or that Harper failed to receive permission
before filing this action. The Magistrate Judge thus
appropriately determined that any appeal “is not taken in
good faith” and thus, doesn’t warrant IFP status. The
objection to the prior order adopting M&R is also frivolous
and fails to identify any legal or factual error. Dkt 13.
The objections to the Memorandum and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are OVERRULED.
Dkt 18.
No clear error otherwise appears upon review and
consideration of the Memorandum and Recommendation,
the record, and the applicable law.
The Memorandum and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Memorandum and
Order of this Court. Dkt 17.
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The motions by Darrell Harper to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal are DENIED. Dkts 12 & 19.
Construing Darrell J. Harper’s objection as to the order
of dismissal was a motion under Rule 59(e), the motion is
DENIED. Dkt 13.
A final judgment has already entered in this action.
Dkt 10.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on _______________, at Houston, Texas.
___________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
July 27, 2026
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