Rylander v. Frazier et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Yucob Rylander,
Plaintiff,
v.
Mart Elizondo Frazier, et al.,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-05323
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
Plaintiff Yucob Rylander, who is pro se, filed this action, claiming that
various attorneys, law firms, and others created or proffered false judicial
records and used those records against him. 	Rylander has filed multiple
pending 	motions: 	(1) two 	motions 	to 	proceed 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	(“IFP”),
Dkts. 2, 15; (2) a motion to reassign this case to a different U.S. District Judge,
Dkt. 10; (3) two requests for access to electronic filing, Dkts. 17, 22; (4) a motion
to consolidate this case with another federal case, Dkt. 9, and (5) a motion to
stay deadlines and for leave to amend, Dkt. 27.
In addition, Defendant Brent Coon & Associates filed a motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and 41(b). Dkt. 20. 	Because Rylander failed to
respond, the motion is deemed unopposed. S.D. Tex. L.R. 7.4.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 11, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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As concluded below, Rylander’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis and
for reassignment (Dkts. 2, 15, 10) are moot, and his requests for e-filing
privileges (Dkts. 17, 22) are denied. 	Brent Coon & Associates’s motion to
dismiss (Dkt. 20) for lack of service should be granted in part, and Rylander’s
claims against it should be dismissed without prejudice. 	Relatedly, the same
lack 	of 	service 	merits 	dismissing 	Rylander’s 	claims 	against 	all 	other
defendants. 	And that disposition moots Rylander’s motion to consolidate
(Dkt. 9) and request for leave to amend (Dkt. 27) his complaint. 	Rylander’s
further request to stay service-related deadlines (Dkt. 27) is denied.
Analysis
Rylander 	filed 	this 	suit 	in 	the 	Southern 	District 	of 	New 	York 	on
October 22, 2025. 	Dkt. 1 (complaint). 	He also moved to proceed in forma
pauperis. 	Dkt. 2. 	The case was then transferred to this district. 	Dkts. 5, 6.
Rylander moved to consolidate this action with another case and to reassign
the case from U.S. District Judge Andrew S. Hanen to a different District
Judge. Dkts. 9, 10. The case was reassigned to U.S. District Judge Alfred H.
Bennett by agreement between those judges. Dkt. 11.
Rylander filed a “Statement of inability to afford payment of court costs
or an appeal bond” and then another IFP motion. 	Dkts. 15, 16. 	The Court
granted the motion (Dkt. 16), but on the condition that Rylander ensure that
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the summons is properly issued and served “within 90 days of the filing” of his
complaint. Dkt. 19 (order). To date, none of the defendants has been served.
Defendant Brent Coone & Associates filed a motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and 41(b). Dkt. 20. Rylander did not respond.
On March 12, 2026, the case was reassigned to U.S. District Judge
Nicholas J. Ganjei. 	Dkt. 21. 	Rylander filed a motion to waive PACER fees,
including unpaid fees he has already incurred. 	Dkt. 22. 	The case was then
referred to the undersigned judge. 	Dkt. 25. 	After that, Rylander filed an
“emergency” motion to stay service-related deadlines and for leave to amend
his complaint. Dkt. 27. The foregoing motions are addressed below.
I. 	Several of the motions are moot.
Several of Rylander’s motions are now moot. 	They include Rylander’s
serial IFP applications. See Dkt. 2; Dkt. 15 (“statement of inability to afford
payment or court costs or appeal bond”); Brooks v. Jail, 2020 WL 5982265, at
*1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2020) (construing similar statement as an IFP
application); Dkt. 16. The order (Dkt. 19) conditionally granting one of the
requests to proceed IFP (Dkt. 16) mooted those other requests (Dkts. 2, 15).
Rylander’s motion requesting recusal and reassignment of the case to a
different district judge (Dkt. 10) is also moot. The case was twice reassigned,
Dkts. 11, 21, and the new presiding District Judge has referred it to the
undersigned judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Dkt. 29.
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II. 	Rylander’s requests related to electronic filing are denied.
Rylander filed a motion requesting permission to e-file documents as a
pro se litigant and for access to the Court’s electronic filing portal—CM/ECF.
Dkt. 17. He later filed a motion again requesting access to CM/ECF and for a
waiver of outstanding PACER fees. Dkt. 22.
Rylander’s request for permission to e-file on CM/ECF is denied. 	It is
not customary to allow pro se parties to e-file. Nor has Rylander demonstrated
that an exception is warranted in his case.
Further, Rylander has not shown that this Court’s power to exempt the
PACER user access fee permits it to waive Rylander’s $140 balance of unpaid
fees 	that 	he 	accrued 	when 	accessing 	unspecified 	documents 	at 	some
unspecified 	time. 	See 	U.S. 	Cts., 	Electronic 	Public 	Access 	Fee 	Schedule,
https://perma.cc/WSS3-D7J3 (last visited May 8, 2026) (fee exemptions “should
be granted for a definite period of time” and “should be limited in scope”). Both
motions (Dkts. 17, 22) are denied.
III. 	Rylander failed to timely effectuate service.
A. 	Rylander’s failure to serve any of the Defendants merits
dismissal of all claims.
Brent Coon & Associates appeared for the limited purpose of filing a
motion to dismiss, contending that Rylander failed to timely serve it. Dkt. 20.
The motion should be granted, and all claims against Brent Coon & Associates
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should be dismissed. 	But Rylander’s claims against the other defendants 1
should likewise be dismissed for lack of timely service.
A defendant must be served with process within 90 days of filing suit.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). “A litigant’s pro se status neither excuses his failure
to effect service nor excuses him for lack of knowledge of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.” 	Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 2013)
(internal citations omitted). 	Without proper service, a federal court cannot
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See Omni Cap. Int’l, Ltd. v.
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
Ryland did not serve Brent Coone & Associates within the 90-day
window. See Dkt. 1 (complaint filed October 22, 2025). Nor did he respond to
the motion to dismiss or otherwise articulate good cause for failing to timely
effectuate service. See Sys. Signs Supplies v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 903 F.2d 1011,
1013 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (“When service of process is challenged, the
serving party bears the burden of proving its validity or good cause for failure
to effect timely service.”).
Instead, on May 7, 2026—almost four months after the service deadline
expired, and nearly two months after briefing on the motion to dismiss had
1 Those other defendants are Mary Elizondo Frazier, Archer Systems LLC, Legacy
Community Health Service, Inc., Katelin Cardenas, Spencer Fane LLP, Colin Peter
Goodman, 	Elizabeth 	Dale 	Burrus, 	John 	Does 	1-10, 	Ross 	Sears, 	II, 	and
Intercontinental Terminals Company LLC.
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closed, Rylander filed a motion requesting a “stay” of all service deadlines.
Dkt. 27. 	But the motion merely invokes Rylander’s pro se status and claims
that the complexity of the case necessitates additional time for service. See id.
at 2. 	Neither contention excuses the lack of timely service. 	And Rylander’s
conclusory statement that he has acted diligently is facially inadequate and
belied by the record, which shows a wholly unjustified delay. All claims against
Brent Coon & Associates should be dismissed.
Rylander’s failure to serve the remaining Defendants merits dismissing
his claims against them, too. “If a defendant is not served within 90 days after
the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the
plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or
order that service be made within a specified time.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)
(emphasis added). 	District courts have “broad discretion” in making this
determination. 	See Topstone Commc’ns, Inc. v. Xu, 603 F. Supp. 3d 493, 497
(S.D. Tex. 2022) (citing Brown v. Miss. Coop. Extension Serv., 89 F. App’x 437,
439 (5th Cir. 2004)). 	Here, the Court warned Rylander that it “may dismiss
the case” if he did “not have summons issued and served within 90 days of the
filing of [his] complaint.” Dkt. 19. Rylander did not heed that warning.
Rylander’s failure to comply with the Court’s directive reinforces that
dismissal is merited. Rule 41(b) authorizes the Court to dismiss an action “[i]f
the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with [the Federal Rules] or a court
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order .…” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 	This dismissal may be done sua sponte. 	See
Maxey v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of Lubbock, Tex., 459 F.2d 56, 57 (5th Cir. 1972)
(affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute where plaintiff failed to
respond to show cause order); see also Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 798,
800 (5th Cir. 2021) (“It is well established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal
not only on motion of the defendant, but also on the court’s own motion.”);
Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for principle that “a district court may dismiss an
action sua sponte if the plaintiff fails to comply with court orders”).
Rylander’s IFP grant was conditioned upon the timely completion of
service. 	Dkt. 19. 	Since then, months have passed, but Rylander has neither
served the Defendants nor paid the filing fee. 	This constitutes a failure to
comply with the Court’s order. 	Rylander’s claims against the remaining
Defendants should be dismissed as well. 2
B. 	Dismissal should be without prejudice.
Brent Coon & Associates further argues that aggravating factors favor
dismissal of this action with prejudice under Rule 41(b). Dkt. 20 at 4-5. It has
not shown that such an extreme sanction is merited.
2 While a stricter standard for dismissal on failure to serve grounds exists when the
limitations 	period 	would 	bar 	future 	litigation, 	Thrasher, 	709 	F.3d 	at 	512-13,
Rylander’s pleadings are so non-specific about the timing of the alleged events that
the Court cannot conclude that a stricter standard should apply.
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“Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice is ‘a severe sanction’ that requires
(1) ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff[;]’ and (2) an
express finding that ‘lesser sanctions would not prompt diligent prosecution,
or the record shows that the district court employed lesser sanctions that
proved to be futile.’” 	Ratcliff v. EKRE of TX, LLC, 2025 WL 3657315, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2025) (quoting Campbell, 988 F.3d at 801-02), adopted by
2025 WL 3655196 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2025). 	The Fifth Circuit also generally
requires “at least one of three aggravating factors: (1) delay caused by [the]
plaintiff himself and not his attorney; (2) actual prejudice to the defendant; or
(3) delay caused by intentional conduct.” 	Campbell, 988 F.3d at 802 (quoting
Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992)). “
Brent Coon & Associates contends that this test is satisfied because
(1) Rylander intentionally caused delay by “failing to take any action” since
this 	case 	was 	transferred, 	(2) 	Defendants 	suffered 	actual 	prejudice 	by
remaining 	“subject 	to 	unresolved 	legal 	proceedings,” 	and 	(3) 	Rylander’s
disregard for the Court’s warning (Dkt. 19) indicates that lesser sanctions
would not be effective. See Dkt. 20 at 4-5. The Court disagrees.
Rylander’s several months’ delay in service, though inexcusable, does not
equate to a clear record of delay meriting dismissal with prejudice. 	Rather,
courts require “‘significant periods of total inactivity’ that persist ‘for longer
than just a few months.’” 	Springboards to Educ., Inc. v. Kipp Found., 325 F.
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Supp. 3d 704, 710 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (quoting Millan v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co.,
546 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2008)). That is not the case here because Rylander
has filed numerous motions during the pendency of this suit. Cf. Ratcliff, 2025
WL 3657315, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2025) (dismissing with prejudice where
plaintiff failed to “take[] any action in this case”).
Nor is Rylander’s failure to comply with the Court’s order (Dkt. 19)
sufficient to show “contumacious conduct.” 	“Generally, where a plaintiff has
failed only to comply with a few court orders or rules, [the Fifth Circuit has]
held that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the suit with
prejudice.” 	Berry, 975 F.2d at 1191 n.6 (collecting cases). 	Accordingly,
Rylander’s claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
Dismissal of all claims would moot Rylander’s motions for leave to amend
and to consolidate this case with another federal suit. Dkts. 9, 27. Those other
motions should be denied.
Order and Recommendation
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	it 	is 	ORDERED 	that 	Plaintiff 	Yucob
Rylander’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkts. 2, 15) and to reassign
the presiding district judge (Dkt. 10) be DENIED as moot.
It is further ORDERED that Rylander’s requests for e-filing privileges
and PACER fee waivers (Dkts. 17, 22) be DENIED.
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It is RECOMMENDED that Defendant Brent Coon & Associates’s
motion to dismiss (Dkt. 20) be GRANTED IN PART, and that all claims
against 	it 	be 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE, 	but 	DENIED 	IN
PART with respect to the request to dismiss those claims with prejudice.
It is further RECOMMENDED that Rylander’s claims against all other
defendants be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of service and
for failure to comply with this Court’s order (Dkt. 19), and that Rylander’s
motion to consolidate (Dkt. 9) and motion for leave to amend (Dkt. 27) be
DENIED as moot.
It is ORDERED that Rylander’s motion to stay deadlines (Dkt. 27) be
DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on May 11, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
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