Despaigne v. Thompson, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ROBERT CARLOS CAMAJUANI
DESPAIGNE,
Petitioner,
v.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-2 5305
RAYMOND THOMPSON, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Carlos Camaj Despaigne ("Petitioner"), a citizen of
Cuba, entered the United States without inspection in June 2022.1
On June 29, 2022, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear,
charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i),
"as an ien present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place
other than as designated by the Attorney General."2 On June 12,
2025, Pet ioner was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement
custody. 3
Petitioner's
That same day an immigration judge dismissed
removal proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §
239.2(a) {7), which permits an officer to cancel a notice to appear
1Habeas Corpus Petition Pro Se Submission ("Habeas
Petition"), Docket Entry No. 1, p. 3; Amended Response to the
Petition Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Respondents' Amended MSJ"),
Docket Entry No. 23, p. 2. For purposes of identification, all
page numbers refer to the pagination imprinted at the top of the
page by the court's Electronic Case Filing system.
2Respondents' Amended MSJ, Docket Entry No. 23, p. 2.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 17, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:25-cv-05305 Document 26 Filed 07/17/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 5

prior to jurisdiction vesting with immigration judge.4
Petitioner appealed that decision, arguing that "administrative
closure of his case [was] appropriate to low him to pursue his
pending application for adjustment of status under the [Cuban
Adjustment Act] with the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services. 115 On December 19, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals
affirmed the immigration judge's decision to dismiss Petitioner's
removal proceedings.6 Despite the fact his removal proceedings
were dismissed, Petitioner remained in immigration custody.7
On April 15, 2026, Pet ioner was served with a new Notice to
Appear, charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(A)(i), "as an alien present in the United States without
being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at
any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General," and under 8 U.S.C. § 1182{a)(7)(A)(i){I), "as an alien
who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa,
reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document
required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other
suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality
4Order of the Immigration Judge, Exhibit 2 to Respondents'
Amended MSJ, Docket Entry No. 23-2, p. 1.
5Board of Immigration Appeals Order, Exhibit 4 to Respondents'
Amended MSJ, Docket Entry No. 23-4, p. 3.
6..IJ;;L_ at 4.
7 Respondents' Amended MSJ, Docket
{"Petitioner has been detained since . . .
-2-
Entry No. 23, p. 2
June 12, 2025.").
Case 4:25-cv-05305 Document 26 Filed 07/17/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 5

as required under the regulation issued by the Attorney General."8
No final order of removal has been entered and Petitioner remains
in immigration custody.9
Pending before the court is Petitioner's Habeas Petition
(Docket Entry No. 1). Petitioner argues that Respondents detained
him from December 19, 2025, to April 15, 2026, without legal
authority to do so.10 Also pending before the court is
Respondents' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No.
23). Respondents argue that Petitioner is legally detained under
§ 1225 (b) (2) because he is an applicant for admission.11 Petitioner
has filed a reply. 12
"In determining whether" Petitioner "is entitled to be
released, the [c]ourt must determine whether his detention now is
in violation of the constitution." Nguyen v. Noem, 797
F.Supp.3d 651, 669 (N.D. Tex. 2025). "[T] he great and central
office of the writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of the
prisoner's current detention." Walker v. Wainwright, 88 s. ct.
962, 963 (1968) (emphasis added). Because Petitioner was served
with a Notice to Appear on April 15, 2026, charging him with
8Id. at 3.
9Id, at 4.
10 Petitioner's Reply to Amended Response, Docket Entry No. 24,
p. 1.
11Respondents' Amended MSJ, Docket Entry No. 23, pp. 1-2.
12 Petitioner's Reply to Amended Response, Docket Entry No. 24.
-3-
Case 4:25-cv-05305 Document 26 Filed 07/17/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 5

removability under 8 u.s.c. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and
1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), Petitioner is currently subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2). Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166
F.4th 494, 498, 502 (5th Cir. 2026). Although the record indicates
that Respondents detained Petitioner from December 19, 2025, to
April 15, 2026, despite the fact he was not in active removal
proceedings, that is "irrelevant to [the] resolution of the
legality of [Petitioner's] current detention."
F.Supp.3d at 670 (emphasis added).
Nguyen, 797
Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner is asserting his
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) violates due process, that
claim is without merit. As explained in Garcia De La Cruz v.
Bondi, Civil Action No. H-25-5577, 2026 WL 309939 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
5, 2026), the Supreme Court has made clear that "' [d] etention
during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part
of that process.'" ,lg_,_ at *2 (quoting Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct.
1708, 1721-22 (2003)). Moreover, as explained in Jacobo-Ventura v.
Dickey, Civil Action No. H-25-6117 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2026),
because Petitioner only has those rights regarding admission that
Congress has provided by statute, and because § 1225(b)(2) mandates
detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings
have concluded, Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing as a
matter of procedural due process.
Finally, although Petitioner has filed a Motion for
Appointment of Counsel (Docket Entry No. 18), there is generally no
-4-·
Case 4:25-cv-05305 Document 26 Filed 07/17/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 5

constitutional right to the assistance of counsel on habeas review.
� Fairman y. Anderson, 188 F.3d 635, 642 (5th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that "there is no constitutional right to counsel on
habeas review"). The issues presented in the Habeas Petition do
not present any extraordinary circumstances, and there is no basis
for appointment of counsel in this case.
Motion will therefore be denied.
Petitioner's Counsel
For the reasons explained above, Respondents' Amended Response
to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket Entry No. 23)
GRANTED, and Petitioner's Habeas Corpus Petition Pro Se
Submission (Docket Entry No. 1) and Motion for Appointment of
Counsel (Docket Entry No. 18) are DENIED.
The court will enter a final judgment in favor of Respondents.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 17th day of July, 2026.
SIM LAKE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-5-
Case 4:25-cv-05305 Document 26 Filed 07/17/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 5