Maceda Jimenez v. Thompson et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ARQUIMEDES MACEDA
JIMENEZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
RAYMOND THOMPSON,
et al,
Respondents.
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CIVIL ACTION NO
4:25-cv-05026
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Arquimedes Maceda Jimenez is a citizen of
Mexico who has lived in the United States without lawful
permission for twenty-five years. Dkt 1 at ¶¶2, 22. He was
taken into custody by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement in September 2025, where he currently
remains. Id at ¶4. Respondents are sued in their official
capacity as officers or employees of the United States and
are collectively referred to as the Government.
Pending is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, by
which Petitioner challenges his detention without a bond
hearing. Dkt 1. He asserts that he’s entitled to such a
hearing under 8 USC §1226(a), which provides for
discretionary detention during removal proceedings.
Pending also is a motion by the Government for
summary judgment. Dkt 5. It contends that no detention
hearing is required because Petitioner is an “applicant for
admission” under 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A), which provides for
mandatory detention during removal proceedings.
This action thus presents the same issue of textual
interpretation recently addressed and resolved by the
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 24, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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undersigned in Montoya Cabanas v Bondi, 2025 WL
3171331, (SD Tex). That ruling and its analysis is adopted
here in its entirety.
In short, the text of §1225(b)(2)(A) supports the
Government’s position. As such, with respect to statutory
reliance by the Government upon §1225(b)(2)(A), the
motion for summary judgment by the Government will be
granted, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be
denied. Dkts 1 & 5.
The related claim by Petitioner for violation of his right
to due process in the main repeats similar argument as to
the relevant and applicable statute to apply. See Dkts 1 at
¶¶60–62. That has been resolved above. But he further
contends that detention is unjustified in light of the twin
goals of immigration detention, being the prevention of
flight and the mitigation of danger to the community. See
Dkts 1 at ¶59 & 7 at 15, citing Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US
678, 690 (2001). Said differently, he appears to contend
that continued detention without a bond hearing would
itself violate substantive due process.
The Supreme Court states, “It is well established that
the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law
in deportation proceedings.” Demore v Kim, 538 US 510,
523 (2003), quoting Reno v Flores, 507 US 292, 306 (1993).
But it further observes, “In the exercise of its broad power
over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens.” Demore, 538 US at 521, quoting Mathews v Diaz,
426 US 67, 79–80 (1976). It’s thus the “longstanding view”
of the Supreme Court that “the Government may
constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the
limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.”
Demore, 538 US at 526.
Petitioner provides no persuasive argument or decision
to suggest that §1225(b)(2)(A), as applied to him, violates
his due process rights. He does cite Zadvydas v Davis for
its proposition stating, “Freedom from imprisonment—
from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
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Due Process] Clause protects.” 533 US at 690. But the
Supreme Court in Zadvydas explicitly distinguished post-
removal-period detention (which has no obvious
termination point, thus requiring a constitutional
constraint on unbounded detention) from “detention
pending a determination of removability.” Id at 697; see
also Demore, 538 US at 523 (recognizing such distinction
in Zadvydas). Zadvydas thus doesn’t suggest that
detention during removal proceedings itself violates due
process. Instead, as the Supreme Court in Demore later
stated, “Detention during removal proceedings is a
constitutionally permissible part of that process.” 538 US
at 531. And in any event, no detention approaching the six-
month presumption in Zadvydas is yet at issue here.
As such, as to the claim with respect to violation of
substantive due process, the motion for summary judgment
by the Government will be granted, and the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus will be denied. Dkts 1 & 5.
* * *
In so concluding, respectful acknowledgement is given
to the five other district court judges in the Houston
Division who have also recently reached the statutory issue
presented in this case. Each has determined under similar
circumstances in favor of §1226 over §1225. For example,
see Ortega-Aguirre v Noem, 4:25-cv-04332 (SD Tex, Oct 10,
2025) (Bennett, J); Hernandez Lucero v Noem, 4:25-cv-
03981 (SD Tex, Oct 23, 2025) (Ellison, J); Aslamov v
Bradford, 4:25-cv-04299 (SD Tex, Oct 30, 2025) (Hanks, J);
Mejia Juarez v Bondi, 4:25-cv-03937 (SD Tex, Oct 27, 2025)
(Hoyt, J); Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 2025 WL 2886346,
(SD Tex) (Rosenthal, J). Another five judges in this
Division haven’t reached decision, but four have it
currently pending before them. For example, see Romero
Moreno v Tate, 4:25-cv-04903 (SD Tex) (Hanen, J);
Espinoza Andres v Noem, 4:25-cv-05128 (SD Tex) (Hittner,
J); Reyes-Lopez v Noem, 4:25-cv-04629 (SD Tex) (Lake, J);
Martinez-Sarres v Warden, 4:25-cv-05273 (SD Tex)
(Werlein, J).
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It’s also noted that at least two cases from the Southern
District of Texas are currently pending before the Fifth
Circuit on this issue. See Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 25-
20496 (cited above, per Rosenthal, J); Covarrubias v
Vergara, 25-40701 (per Kazen, J, SD Tex, Laredo Division).
Three are also pending from the Western District of
Louisiana. See Kostak v Trump, 25-30620; Ventura
Martinez v Trump, 25-30621; and Lopez-Santos v Noem,
25-30656. And a motion is pending in at least one of these
actions to consolidate certain aspects for expedited
consideration. See Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 25-20496,
Dkt 10.
If decision from the Fifth Circuit enters that is contrary
to the ruling here and in Montoya Cabanas v Bondi, 2025
WL 3171331, (SD Tex), Petitioner is granted leave to file a
motion for reconsideration on an expedited basis to the
extent that effective relief could still be afforded on this
issue.
* * *
The petition for writ of habeas corpus by Petitioner
Arquimedes Maceda Jimenez is DENIED. Dkt 1.
The motion for summary judgment by the Government
is GRANTED. Dkt 5.
A final judgment will enter separately.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on November 24, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Hon Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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