Bowman v. 1933 Argo Rd, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Dana Bowman,
Plaintiff,
v.
1933 Argo Rd, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action H-25-4356
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate
judge 	pursuant 	to 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	ECF No. 40. 	Pending
before 	the 	court 	is 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	or, 	in 	the
Alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement. ECF No. 39.
The court recommends that the Motion be DENIED.
1. Background Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff Dana Bowman is an advocate for disabled veterans.
Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3. He is, himself, a disabled veteran. Id.
While 	in 	the 	U.S. 	Army, 	Bowman 	suffered 	a 	service-related
parachuting injury, which led to the loss of the lower half of both
of his legs. Id. He now uses prosthetic legs, wheelchairs, and other
assistive 	devices 	for 	mobility. 	Id. 	Bowman 	states 	that 	as 	a
handicapped individual, he is generally concerned about whether
apartments are accessible and usable for people with disabilities.
Id. at 8.
On 	September 	12, 	2025, 	Bowman 	filed 	suit 	against
1933 	Argo 	Rd, 	LLC; 	Argo 	60, 	LLC; 	Kraned 	Structures, 	Inc.;
and Vladimir Kamyshin (Defendants) under the Fair Housing
Amendments 	Act 	of 	1988 	(FHA), 	42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 06, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Compl. at 1. Defendants are, respectively, the owner, manager,
construction 	company, 	and 	developer 	of 	the 	Argo 	Pointe
Apartments, 1933 Argo Road, Conroe, TX 77301 (Property). Id.
at 3–4. According to Bowman, each Defendant participated in the
design and construction of the Property. Id. Bowman alleges that
the Property “lack[s] various mandatory elements required by the
FHA,” which are “necessary to make the [Property] accessible and
usable for people with disabilities.” Id. at 7. He asserts that by
failing 	to design 	and construct 	the 	Property 	in an accessible
manner, Defendants violated Section 3906 of the FHA. Id. at 1,
8–9, 11–12.
Bowman’s Complaint describes his “recent”1 visit to and tour
of the Property, including its public and common areas and one or
more units. Compl. at 7–8. Bowman states that he observed and
encountered structural accessibility barriers at the Property that
would 	affect 	his 	ability 	to 	access 	and 	independently 	use 	its
facilities and features. Id. He asserts that while he was offered a
unit at the Property for rent, the Property’s accessibility barriers
were 	a 	deterrent 	to 	disabled 	persons, 	like 	him, 	renting 	an
apartment. Id. at 7. He alleges that the accessibility barriers that
he 	encountered 	caused 	him 	to 	suffer 	injuries, 	“including
frustration, 	physical 	difficulty, 	indignation, 	and 	emotional
distress.” Id. at 8. For the alleged violations and resulting harm,
Bowman seeks declaratory, monetary (compensatory damages,
including 	costs 	and 	fees, 	as 	well 	as 	punitive 	damages), 	and
injunctive relief. 	Id. at 1, 12–13. Specifically, Bowman seeks a
declaration that the Property violates the FHA and an injunction
1 In response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 39, Bowman provided
evidence demonstrating that the date of his visit and tour was August 27, 2025.
ECF Nos. 41 at 10, 41-1. 	However, 	for 	the 	purposes 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation, 	the 	court 	does 	not 	consider 	evidence 	outside 	of 	Bowman’s
Complaint.
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requiring Defendants to comply with the FHA’s requirements.
Id. at 4.
2. Bowman’s Claims Under the Fair Housing Act
Bowman alleges that Defendants violated three provisions
of Section 3906 of the FHA. Compl. at 1, 8– 9, 11–12. Section 3604
describes actions that are discriminatory, and thereby unlawful, in
the “sale or rental of housing.” Subsection (3)(C) identifies the
requirements for design and construction of multifamily dwellings
first occupied after March 13, 1991. It specifies that “covered
multifamily dwellings” must be designed and constructed such
that:
(i) the public use and common use portions of such
dwellings 	are 	readily 	accessible 	to 	and 	usable 	by
handicapped persons;
(ii) all the doors designed to allow passage into and
within 	all 	premises 	within 	such 	dwellings 	are
sufficiently 	wide 	to 	allow 	passage 	by 	handicapped
persons in wheelchairs; and
(iii) all premises within such dwellings contain the
following features of adaptive design:
(I) an 	accessible 	route 	into 	and 	through 	the
dwelling;
(II) light switches, electrical outlets, thermostats,
and 	other 	environmental 	controls 	in 	accessible
locations;
(III) reinforcements 	in 	bathroom 	walls 	to 	allow
later installation of grab bars; and
(IV) usable kitchens and bathrooms such that an
individual in a wheelchair can maneuver about the
space.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C). 	Bowman 	asserts 	that 	Defendants
designed and constructed the Property such that it fails to comply
with the statutory requirements. Compl. at 1, 3, 7.
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Additionally, Bowman asserts that because Property fails to
comply with Section 3604(f)(3)(C), Defendants have constructively
denied Bowman, and other handicapped individuals, access to an
apartment at the Property and its facilities. Compl. at 7–8, 10– 11.
He alleges that such denial of access violates Sections 3604(f)(1)
and 3604(f)(2). Id. Section 3604(f)(1) provides that it is unlawful
[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or
renter because of a handicap of--
(A) that buyer or renter,
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that
dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available,
or
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). Similarly, Section 3604(f)(2), states that it
is unlawful
[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
with such dwelling, because of a handicap of—
(A) that person; or
(B) any person residing in or intending to reside in
that 	dwelling after 	it 	is 	so 	sold, 	rented, 	or 	made
available; or
(C) any person associated with that person.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2).
3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
On February 20, 2026, Defendants filed their Motion to
Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 39. Defendants
argue that Bowman lacks standing under the FHA because he has
not asserted an injury in fact. Id. at 5, 13–19. Accordingly, they
seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. Additionally, Defendants argue that Bowman’s
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Complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 19–21.
In the alternative, Defendants move for a more definite statement
under 	Rule 	12(e), 	asserting 	that 	Bowman’s 	Complaint 	lacks
sufficient detail. Id. at 21–22. Bowman opposes the Motion. ECF
No. 41.
4. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard and Analysis
Defendants move to dismiss Bowman’s Complaint under
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing. ECF No. 39. A court may dismiss
an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction[,]” and the presumption is that “a suit lies outside this
limited 	jurisdiction.” 	Settlement 	Funding, 	L.L.C. 	v. 	Rapid
Settlements, Ltd., 851 F,3d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Federal 	courts’ 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	extends 	“only 	to
‘Cases’ 	and 	‘Controversies.’” 	Spokeo, 	Inc. 	v. 	Robins, 	578 	U.S.
330, 337 (2016) (quoting U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2). Constitutional
“[s]tanding 	to 	sue 	is 	a 	doctrine 	rooted 	in 	the 	traditional
understanding 	of 	a 	case 	or 	controversy” 	and 	is 	an 	“essential
component[] of federal subject matter jurisdiction [that] can be
raised at any time by either party or the court.” Id. at 338.
The burden to demonstrate standing 	changes “with the
manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages
of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992). “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion
to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those
specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted). “[A] motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that
the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim
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that 	would 	entitle 	plaintiff 	to 	relief.” 	Choice 	Inc. 	of 	Tex. 	v.
Greenstein, 691 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 2012).
The three requirements of constitutional standing are that
(1) the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, 578 U.S.
at 338. Even when these constitutional requirements are met, “a
plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential principles by
which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad
social import where no individual rights would be vindicated . . . .”
Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979).
However, through legislation, Congress may bypass the judiciary’s
prudential standing requirements to broadly confer standing to
the full extent permitted by Article III. Id. at 100. It did just that
in the FHA. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 581 U.S. 189, 197
(2017).
Under the FHA, any “aggrieved person” may file a lawsuit
to obtain relief for an alleged discriminatory housing practice.
42 U.S.C. § 3613(a). An “aggrieved person” is “any person who
(1) claims 	to 	have 	been 	injured 	by 	a 	discriminatory 	housing
practice; or (2) believes that such a person will be injured by a
discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 3602(i). 	“[T]he 	sole 	requirement 	for 	standing 	to 	sue 	under
[Section 3604] is the [Article] III minima of injury in fact: that the
plaintiff allege that as a result of the defendant’s actions he has
suffered ‘a distinct and palpable injury[.]’” Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975)).
Bowman’s Complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish
standing. As to injury, Bowman alleged that during his tour of the
Property, he “observed and encountered accessibility barriers” and
the “lack [of] various mandatory elements required by the FHA” in
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Section 3604(f)(3)(C). Compl. at 7. He pleaded that such barriers
would interfere with his ability to access and use the facilities
because he would be unable to independently use certain features
of the Property. Id. He pleaded that encountering the accessibility
barriers and lack of usable features caused him to suffer injuries,
including 	“frustration, 	physical 	difficulty, 	indignation, 	and
emotional distress.” Id. at 8. Additionally, Bowman alleged that
the accessibility barriers function as a deterrent—for himself and
for other disabled persons—to rent an apartment from, and even
to visit, the Property. Id. at 7–8.
As to causation, Bowman’s Complaint states that each of the
named Defendants participated in the design and construction of
the 	Property. 	Compl. at 	3–4. 	It 	is 	a 	discriminatory 	housing
practice, 	under 	Section 	3604(f)(3)(C), 	to 	design 	and 	construct
multifamily dwellings, like the Property, that fail to comply with
the statutes’ requirements. The Complaint alleges that because of
the accessibility barriers that Bowman observed and encountered,
Defendants effectively denied Bowman access to an apartment at
the Property and its facilities, in violation of Subsections (f)(1)
and (f)(2).
And as to redressability, Bowman seeks actual and punitive
damages, attorney’s fees, costs, and injunctive relief. Id. at 12–13.
Such relief is authorized under the FHA. It permits an aggrieved
person 	to 	recover 	actual 	and 	punitive 	damages, 	including
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c). It also
permits the court to award injunctive relief in the form of “any
permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order,
or other order (including an order enjoining the defendant from
engaging in such practice or ordering such affirmative action as
may be appropriate).” Id.
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Having 	sufficiently 	alleged 	injury, 	causation, 	and
redressability, Bowman has standing to assert his FHA claims
against Defendants.
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Bowman
fails 	to 	meet 	the 	injury-in-fact 	standard 	announced 	in 	post-
TransUnion2 case law. ECF No. 39 at 13–19. Defendants assert
that 	Bowman 	suffered 	no 	injury 	in 	fact. 	Id. at 14. 	They
characterize Bowman as a “tester”—a person who, without the
intent to actually rent an apartment, poses as a prospective renter
for the purpose of collecting evidence of FHA violations. Id. at 14
(citing Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373). According to Defendants,
an uninjured “tester” cannot be an “aggrieved person” under the
FHA, so Bowman lacks standing to bring his claim. Id. at 15 (citing
Laufer v. Mann Hospitality, L.L.C., 996 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2021)).
In 	Laufer, 	the 	tester-plaintiff 	sued 	an 	inn 	under 	the
Americans with Disability Act (ADA) because the information
about the inn, available on third-party websites, “failed to identify
rooms accessible to disabled persons like her.” 996 F.3d at 271.
The tester-plaintiff had not visited the inn, and she had no plans
to do so in the future. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of the lawsuit under Rule 12(b)(1) for want of
injury in fact. Id. The Court explained that the tester-plaintiff
“fail[ed] to show how the alleged violation affect[ed] her in a
concrete way” because “she [did] not claim she tried to book a room
or even intended to do so.” Id. at 272.
2 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 427 (2021) (“[U]nder Article III, an injury
in law is not an injury in fact. Only those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed
by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation
in federal court.”) (emphasis in original).
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The court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that
Plaintiff lacks standing under the holdings in TransUnion and
Laufer. First, neither TransUnion nor Laufer overruled Havens
Realty. In Havens Realty, the Supreme Court held that under
the FHA, a tester can be an aggrieved person who has standing
to sue under Section 3604 of the FHA. 455 U.S. at 373–74. In
TransUnion, the Supreme Court held only that a plaintiff must
suffer 	a 	concrete 	injury 	to 	have 	standing 	under 	Article 	III.
594 U.S. at 427. At the same time, the Court recognized that
“Congress may ‘elevate to the states of legally cognizable injuries
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law,’”
such as injury caused by discriminatory actions. Id. at 425–26
(citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756–57 (1984) (holding, in the
context 	of 	racial 	segregation, 	that 	an 	injury 	resulting 	from
discriminatory practices is judicially cognizable and “one of the
most serious injuries recognized in our legal system”)).
The Fifth Circuit in Laufer acknowledged that the “case
differed from the Supreme Court’s seminal ‘tester’ case, Havens
Realty,” as Laufer raised the issue of tester-standing under the
ADA, not the FHA. 996 F.3d at 273. Moreover, in contrast to the
tester-plaintiff in Laufer, who merely viewed information about
the inn on the internet, Bowman visited and toured the Property
and was offered a unit for rent. Bowman personally observed and
encountered 	design 	defects 	and 	accessibility 	barriers 	at 	the
Property, which, he alleges, caused him to suffer injury. Such an
injury is a concrete injury in fact, unlike the harm asserted by the
tester-plaintiff in Laufer.
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At this early stage of the case, Bowman’s pleadings are
sufficient. 	For 	these 	reasons, 	the 	court 	finds 	that 	Bowman
sufficiently alleged that he has standing to sue under the FHA.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Bowman’s Complaint for lack of
subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(1) 	should 	be
DENIED.
5. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard and Analysis
Defendants 	also 	move 	to 	dismiss 	Bowman’s 	Complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 39. Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the
court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Generally,
the court must constrain its review to the “four corners of the
complaint” to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim.
Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 401 (5th Cir. 2011); see also
Loofbourrow v. Comm’r, 208 F. Supp. 2d 698, 708 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(“[T]he court may not look beyond the four corners of the plaintiff’s
pleadings.”).
Under 	Rule 	12(b)(6), 	the 	court 	determines 	whether 	the
plaintiff’s complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable 	inference 	that 	the 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the
misconduct alleged.” Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P.,
970 F.3d 576, 580 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability 	requirement,’ 	but 	it 	asks 	for 	more 	than 	a 	sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Ultimately, the “[f]actual allegations [in the complaint]
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted).
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Courts accept “all well-pleaded facts as true” and “view[]
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Allen v. Walmart
Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Jones v.
Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). “A plaintiff need only
plausibly allege facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim
to survive a motion to dismiss.” Cicalese v. Univ. Tex. Med. Branch,
924 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2019). “Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on
the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even
if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable[.]” Id. at 556.
Only statements of fact are to be taken as true. “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory 	statements, 	do 	not 	suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Conclusory allegations are “disentitled . . . to the presumption of
truth.” Id. at 681. Thus, the court, in reviewing the plaintiff’s
complaint, may neither “accept conclusory allegations” nor “strain
to find inferences favorable to the plaintiffs.” Southland Sec. Corp.
v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).
Bowman asserts three claims under Section 3604 of the
FHA. Compl. at 11–12. “To state a claim under the FHA, plaintiffs
must allege facts that make it plausible, rather than merely
conceivable, that the defendants’ conduct fell within the terms of
the statute.” Hood v. Pope, 627 F. App’x 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2015).
“The allegations must amount to more than a ‘formulaic recitation
of the elements’ of a discrimination claim; a complaint that pleads
facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability is
insufficient.” Id.
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Bowman’s Complaint pleads facts sufficient to plausibly
allege Defendants’ liability under Section 3604 of the FHA. The
Complaint states that Bowman is a legally handicapped individual
who uses prosthetic legs, wheelchairs, and other assistive devices.
Compl. at 2–3. 	It 	alleges 	that 	Bowman 	“recently 	visited 	the
Property, toured public and common areas, and looked at one or
more units.” Id. at 7. It states that during his visit to the Property,
Bowman 	personally 	observed 	and 	encountered 	accessibility
barriers. Id. It identifies a non-inclusive list of the alleged barriers.
Id. For example, it states that the Property lacks accessible routes
to public walkways, trash dumpsters, centralized mailboxes, and
site amenities; that the Property’s entry doors have difficult-to-use
knob-style 	hardware; 	that 	narrow 	interior- 	and 	exterior-path
clearances prohibit proper wheelchair maneuverability; and that
certain 	thermostats, 	light 	switches, 	and 	electrical 	outlets 	are
located out of reach for persons in wheelchairs. Id.
As 	to 	Bowman’s 	claim 	under 	Section 	3604(f)(3)(C), 	the
Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to design and construct
the Property such that it meets the stated requirements of the
FHA and other accessibility standards. Compl. at 6–7. It alleges
that each Defendant participated in the design and construction of
the Property, thereby participating in a discriminatory action
under the FHA. Id. at 3–4, 8. And it states that the FHA applies
to the Property, as the Property contains multifamily dwellings
that 	were 	first 	designed 	and 	constructed 	for 	occupancy 	after
March 13, 1991. Id. at 7, 11.
The Complaint also alleges that because of the Defendants’
failure to design and construct the Property in an accessible
manner, 	Bowman, 	and 	other 	handicapped 	individuals, 	are
constructively denied the ability to rent from the Property and use
its facilities, in violation of Sections 3604(f)(1) and 3604(f)(2).
Compl. at 7–8, 10–12. 	It 	states 	that 	the 	accessibility 	barriers
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prevent 	Bowman, 	and 	other 	handicapped 	individuals, 	from
independently using certain features of the Property. Id. at 7. It
alleges that the accessibility barriers effectively deny handicapped
individuals the ability to visit tenants of the Property. Id. at 8. And
it 	alleges 	that 	absent 	remediation, 	the 	constructive 	denial 	to
handicapped individuals of rental privileges and facility use and
access will continue indefinitely. Id.
Bowman’s Complaint states that Bowman is an “aggrieved
person” under Section 3602, as he was personally injured by
Defendants’ discriminatory housing practice, and he believes that
other handicapped individuals will be injured if the discriminatory
practices are left uncured. Id. at 8, 11. The Complaint identifies
the 	alleged 	injuries 	that 	Bowman 	suffered 	as 	a 	result 	of
Defendants’ failure to design and construct the Property with
accessible features, as well as the relief Bowman seeks. Id. at 8,
12–14.
Defendants assert that Bowman failed to sufficiently plead
facts to state a claim, ECF No. 39 at 5. In their Motion to Dismiss,
Defendants 	argue 	that 	Bowman’s 	Complaint 	lacks 	sufficient
detail, including:
• 	Whether he used a wheelchair during his visit to and
tour of the Property;
• 	The specific locations of the alleged accessibility barriers;
• 	Whether 	his 	access 	to 	the 	Property 	was 	“actually
affected” by the alleged accessibility barriers;
• 	The details the unit he was allegedly offered (including
the unit number, the date of the offer, and the specific
terms of the rental offer);
• 	Whether he actually intended to rent a unit at the
Property; and
• 	Whether the alleged barriers deterred him from renting
a unit at the Property.
Id. at 7–9, 12.
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The details sought by Defendants are not required under the
Rule 8 standard. Bowman’s Complaint need only include a short
and plain statement of Bowman’s claims under the FHA. It does
that. Bowman’s allegations amount to more than mere speculation
or a formulaic recitation of the elements. Bowman alleged that he
encountered accessibility barriers, not that he merely observed
them. 	He 	alleged 	that 	the 	accessibility 	barriers 	that 	he
encountered caused him to suffer injury and functioned as a
deterrent to disabled individuals, like him, from renting a unit at
the Property. And as a bilateral below-the-knee amputee, it is, at
the very least, plausible that he required the use of an assistive
device during his visit. Bowman plausibly alleged that Defendants’
conduct falls within the terms of Sections 3604(f)(1), 3604(f)(2),
and 3604(f)(3). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be DENIED.
6. Motion for More Definite Statement
Defendants alternatively move for a more definite statement
under Rule 12(e). The Rule provides that a party may move for a
more 	definite 	statement 	of 	a 	complaint 	that 	“is 	so 	vague 	or
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The court has concluded that Bowman’s
Complaint provides sufficient detail to state a claim under the
FHA. 	It 	is 	far 	from 	“vague 	or 	ambiguous.” 	Accordingly,
Defendants’ Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement
should be DENIED.
7. Conclusion
The court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
or, in the Alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement,
ECF No. 39, be DENIED.
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The 	parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this
Memorandum 	and 	Recommendation 	to file 	written 	objections.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Failure to timely file
objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal
conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 147–49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77
(5th Cir. 1988).
Signed at Houston, Texas, on May _____, 2026.
______________________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
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