Ocean Marine Services, LLC v. DMW Marine, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
OCEAN MARINE SERVICES,
LLC,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-3086
DMW MARINE, LLC, DMW
MARINE GROUP, LLC,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court1 is Plaintiff Ocean Marine Services, LLC’s
(“Ocean Marine”) Motion for Default Judgment against Defendants DMW
Marine, LLC (“DMW Marine”), and DMW Marine Group, LLC (“DMW Marine
Group”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 10). Defendants have failed to
answer or otherwise defend the action. 	Based on a review of the motion,
argument, and relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS Ocean Marine’s
Motion for Default Judgment (id.) be GRANTED.
1 On July 8, 2025, this case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 4). A
motion for default judgment is a dispositive motion appropriate for a Magistrate Judge
recommendation. 	PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Atkins, No. 4:24-cv-3111, 2025 WL 1490542, at *6
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:24-cv-03111, 2025 WL
1490501 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2025).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 09, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. 	Background2
On July 2, 2025, Ocean Marine sued Defendants for breach of contract
over the purchase of marine industrial equipment. (ECF No. 1).
According to the Complaint, Ocean Marine “is engaged in the business
of marine services and equipment operations in the Gulf of Mexico and other
waters.” 	(Id. at 2). 	In 2022, Ocean Marine negotiated with DMW Marine
Group to buy a marine crane and related equipment for Ocean Marine’s
operations. 	(Id. at 3). 	Around June 11, 2022, DMW Marine Group issued
Invoice No. 29761 (the “Invoice”) to Ocean Marine for the purchase of a DMW
Model marine crane with radio remote controls and a 15000 kg winch for
$229,500, and a 12-foot-tall pedestal for $8,350, for a total of $237,850. 	(Id.,
Ex. A). 	The Invoice required Ocean Marine to pay a 50% deposit of $118,925
upon order, “with the balance due following Factory Acceptance Testing but
prior to shipment.” (Id.).
In 	accordance 	with 	the 	agreement, 	Ocean 	Marine 	timely 	paid 	the
$118,925 deposit to DMW Marine Group. (Id.). Despite receiving the deposit,
DMW Marine Group failed to deliver the marine crane and related equipment
2 Because Defendants failed to respond to Ocean Marine’s complaint and the default
judgment motion or to otherwise appear in this case, the Court accepts the allegations in the
complaint as true. 	See Cantu v. Platinum Mktg. Grp., LLC., No. 1:14-cv-71, 2015 WL
13912331, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 13, 2015).
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to Ocean Marine as agreed. (Id.). After 24 weeks passed since the order, DMW
Marine Group provided no updates, explanations, or delivery. (Id.).
On December 9, 2022, Ocean Marine’s counsel sent a demand letter to
DMW Marine Group, requesting information about the delivery and delay.
(Id., Ex. B). Instead of finalizing delivery of the equipment, Ocean Marine and
Douglas Weidner, DMW Marine Group’s president, agreed to a return of the
deposit.3 	(Id. at 3–4). 	However, only $25,000 of the $118,925 deposit was
returned, and the remaining $93,925 was not repaid. (Id. at 4).
Around April 6, 2023, DMW Marine—through Weidner who was its
Managing 	Member—executed 	a 	promissory 	note 	(the 	“Promissory 	Note”)
acknowledging it owed a $93,925 debt to Ocean Marine and promising to repay
by May 31, 2023. 	(Id., Ex. C). 	Under the Promissory Note’s terms, DMW
Marine agreed that if the $93,925 was not paid by May 31, 2023, DMW Marine
would make monthly payments of $7,500 until the debt was fully satisfied, and
interest would accrue at a rate of 5% per annum. (Id.). On June 6, 2023, DMW
Marine Group paid $10,000 to Ocean Marine, leaving the remaining principal
balance owed at $83,925. 	(ECF No. 10 at 9). 	No other payment was made
under the Promissory Note. (Id.).
3 Ocean Marine contends Douglas Weidner performs the work for both DMW Marine
Group and DMW Marine and serves as an officer or managing member of each. (ECF No. 1
at 4).
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On June 4, 2025, Ocean Marine’s counsel sent a final demand letter to
DMW Marine Group demanding immediate payment of the outstanding debt,
including principal and accrued interest (ECF Nos. 1 at 4; 10 at 9).
On July 2, 2025, Ocean Marine filed its Complaint against Defendants,
raising claims for breach of contract based on the unperformed Invoice against
DMW Marine Group and Promissory Note against DMW Marine, as well as
unjust enrichment in the alternative against both Defendants. (ECF No. 1 at
5–6). 	According to filed certificates, the Texas Secretary of State forwarded
the Complaint by certified mail to Defendants on August 1, 2025; a return
receipt as to DMW Marine Group was dated August 8, 2025 (ECF No. 7); and
a return receipt as to DMW Marine was dated September 12, 2025 (ECF No.
9).4 Defendants failed to file an answer or other responsive pleading.
On October 23, 2025, Ocean Marine filed a request for entry of default
and motion for default judgment, requesting the remaining principal amount
of $83,925, pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees. (ECF No. 10).
4 Although the certified mailing to DMW Marine, LLC was returned as “Unable to
Forward,” Ocean Marine has provided proof that the address used corresponds to DMW
Marine’s registered business address in its home state. (See ECF No. 10-1 at 3–4, 11–13, 18–
19). 	Ocean Marine also effected supplemental service on both Defendants by FedEx and
regular mail at their respective business and personal addresses found in corporate filings,
with delivery confirmations dated October 3, 2025. (ECF No. 10-1 at 5–6, 22–38).
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Based on the Court’s Order (ECF No. 13), the Clerk of the Court entered
default against Defendants on December 10, 2025.5 (ECF Nos. 14–15).
In 	support 	of 	its 	complaint 	and 	motion 	for 	default, 	Ocean 	Marine
submitted, among other things, the following evidence: (1) the Invoice, (ECF
No. 1-1; ECF No. 10-2 at 6–7); (2) December 9, 2022 Demand Letter, (ECF No.
1-2; ECF No. 10-2 at 8–9); (3) Promissory Note, (ECF No. 1-3; ECF No. 10-2 at
10–11); (4) Declaration of Jamie L. Godsey in Support of Proof of Service and
Defendants’ Default, (ECF No. 10-1 at 1–6); (5) Proofs of service from the Texas
Secretary of State, (ECF No. 10-1 at 14–19); (6) Declaration of Jordan Snikeris,
Ocean Marine’s Interim Chief Financial Officer, in Support of Defendants’
Default, (ECF No. 10-2 at 1–5); (7) June 4, 2025 Demand Letter (ECF No. 10-
2 at 12–14); (8) Plaintiff’s counsel’s Servicemember Affidavit, (ECF No. 10-3 at
1–3); (9) Plaintiff’s counsel’s Declaration for Attorneys’ Fees, (ECF No. 10-4 at
5 As the Court found in its Order, Ocean Marine has met the standard for entry of
default based on the evidence provided. (ECF No. 13 at 1–2). Specifically, Ocean Marine has
demonstrated proper service of the Complaint on Defendants, as detailed in the Declaration
of Jamie L. Godsey in Support of Proof of Service and Defendants’ Default (ECF No. 10-1, Ex.
A). The declaration is supported by the Whitney certificates from the Texas Secretary of State
(ECF No. 10-1, Exs. A-4, A-5), which certify that the Secretary of State forwarded process to
Defendants at their respective business addresses in accordance with Texas Business
Organizations Code § 5.251 (providing secretary of state is an agent of a filing entity or
foreign entity for purposes of service when, inter alia, the entity fails to designate a registered
agent, the registered agent cannot be found with reasonable diligence, or the entity transacts
business in the state without being registered), and § 5.252 (prescribing how to effectuate
service on the secretary of state under § 5.251). See also Ziegler v. Subalipack (M) SDN BHD,
No. 16-cv-2598, 2018 WL 3241230, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2018); Campus Invs., Inc. v.
Cullever, 144 S.W.3d 464, 465–66 (Tex. 2004).
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1–9); and (10) Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing invoices, (ECF No. 10-4 at 17–33).
Plaintiff represents these exhibits are true and correct copies of the Invoice,
Promissory Note, and proofs of service. (ECF No. 10-1 at 4–6; ECF No. 10-2 at
2–4).6 	To 	date, 	Defendants 	have 	not 	answered 	or 	otherwise 	made 	an
appearance in this case.
II. 	Legal Standard for Default Judgment
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55, “[w]hen a party
against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk
must enter the party’s default.” 	FED. R. C IV . P. 55(a). 	After the entry of
default, a party can apply to the court for a default judgment. 	FED. R. C IV . P.
55(b)(2). “Default judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal
Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.” Sun Bank of Ocala
v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989). Default
judgments are “available only when the adversary process has been halted
because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Id.
6 On October 24, 2025, Ocean Marine also filed an Amended Certificate of Service,
certifying its Request for Entry of Default and Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 10)
was served via the Court’s CM/ECF system and certified mail return receipt requested to all
known counsel of record and to Defendants at their respective business addresses. (ECF No.
11).
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“When a party is seeking entry of default judgment under Rule 55, the
district court must examine its jurisdiction both over the subject matter and
the parties, liability, and damages.” PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Atkins, No. 4:24-cv-
3111, 	2025 	WL 	1490542, 	at 	*2 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	Apr. 	3, 	2025), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, No. 4:24-cv-03111, 2025 WL 1490501 (S.D. Tex. May
23, 2025) (citing BSG Clearing Sols. N. Am., LLC v. Durham Tech., LLC, No.
17-cv-1097, 2018 WL 6219812, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018)).
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Based on Diversity
The district courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs,” and is between “citizens of different States.” 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. When a plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, the amount in controversy is
based on the value of the object of the litigation, the value of the right to be
protected, or the extent of the injury to be prevented. PHH Mortg. Corp., 2025
WL 1490542, at *2 (citations omitted).
Here, 	Ocean 	Marine 	seeks 	relief 	for 	Defendants 	breaching 	their
agreement regarding the purchase of the marine crane and equipment. (ECF
No. 1 at 6–7). Specifically, Ocean Marine seeks damages of $83,925 stemming
from the breached contract with DMW Marine Group and the unfulfilled
Promissory 	Note 	executed 	by 	DMW 	Marine, 	which 	exceeds 	the 	$75,000
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jurisdictional threshold. (ECF No. 10 at 14). Ocean Marine is a Delaware LLC
and is a wholly owned subsidiary of JDH Capital LLC, whose sole member is
a Texas resident.7 (ECF No. 8). DMW Marine Group is a Georgia LLC, DMW
Marine is a Pennsylvania LLC, and they both share a sole member who is a
Georgia resident. 	(ECF No. 1 at 1–2). 	Therefore, based on the pleadings and
other evidence before the Court, diversity jurisdiction exists.
B. Personal Jurisdiction over Defendants
According to Ocean Marine, “[t]his Court has personal jurisdiction over
both Defendants under Texas long-arm jurisdiction and [Rule] 4(e)(1).” (Id. at
2). Ocean Marine alleges:
Defendants purposefully directed activities to Texas and entered
into 	agreements 	that 	required 	performance 	in 	Texas. 	More
specifically, Defendants have done business within the State of
Texas, including the transactions and promissory note that gave
rise to the claims asserted in this lawsuit, and DMW Marine Group
maintains two regular places of business in Corpus Christi and
Houston, Texas.
(Id.); see also Escalante v. Lidge, 34 F.4th 486, 489 (5th Cir. 2022) (“A
defaulting defendant is deemed to admit a plaintiff’s factual allegations, but
the district court still may inquire whether those allegations demonstrate legal
7 See Sinclair v. Krassenstein, No. 23-cv-109, 2023 WL 11999254, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
17, 2023) (“‘[T]he citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of all of its members.’
For any members of the LLC that are natural persons, their citizenship ‘is determined by
[their] domicile.’ And if any member of the LLC is itself an LLC, then citizenship ultimately
‘must be traced through however many layers of partners or members there may be to
determine the citizenship of the LLC.’”) (citations omitted).
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liability.”); PHH Mortg. Corp., 2025 WL 1490542, at *2 (“[U]ncontroverted,
non-conclusory 	allegations 	in 	the 	plaintiff's 	complaint 	must 	be 	taken 	as
true[.]”)
In addition, “a plaintiff must submit evidence that the defendant has
been properly served with the summons, complaint, and the default judgment
motion.” 	PHH Mortg. Corp., 2025 WL 1490542, at *3 (citing James Avery
Craftsman, Inc. v. Sam Moon Trading Enters., Ltd., No. 16-cv-463, 2018 WL
4688778, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 5, 2018)); see also S.D. Tex. L. R. 5.5 (“Motions
for default judgment must be served on the defendant-respondent by certified
mail (return receipt requested).”). 	“Without proper service, a court does not
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and, as a result, any default
judgment is void.” 	PHH Mortg. Corp., 2025 WL 1490542, at *3 (citation
omitted).
Here, Ocean Marine has established service. 	See supra Part I notes 4–
5; (ECF No. 10-1 at 1–6, 14–19). 	Because Ocean Marine properly effectuated
service on Defendants through the Texas Secretary of State and certified mail
(ECF Nos. 7, 9, 11), the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
III. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Should be Granted
“A default judgment is unassailable on the merits but only so far as it is
supported 	by 	well-pleaded 	allegations, 	assumed 	to 	be 	true.” 	Wooten 	v.
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McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 496 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Nishimatsu Constr. Co., v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.
1975)). 	“There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment
entered.” 	Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. 	“For the court to enter
default judgment, the complaint must satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.” PHH Mortg. Corp., 2025 WL 1490542, at *3.
In the Fifth Circuit, Courts have developed a three-part test to determine
whether a default judgment should be entered. “First, the court must consider
whether the entry of default judgment is ‘procedurally warranted.’ Second, the
court assesses the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claims to determine
whether there is a ‘sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment.’ 	Third,
the court determines ‘[the] form of relief. . . .’” Hancock Whitney Bank v. ECS
Exec. Corp Servs., No. 4:21-cv-00932, 2022 WL 1211375, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
25, 2022) (citation modified). The Court will address each step in turn.
A. Default Judgment is Procedurally Warranted
Under the first prong, the court must consider whether: (1) material
issues of fact are at issue; (2) there has been substantial prejudice; (3) the
grounds for default are clearly established; (4) the default was caused by a good
faith mistake or excusable neglect; (5) the harshness of a default judgment;
and (6) the court would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the
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defendant’s motion. 	PHH Mortg. Corp., 2025 WL 1490542, at *3 (citing Vela
v. M&G USA Corp., No. 2:17-cv-13, 2020 WL 421188, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27,
2020) (citing Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998))).
The Court finds that all these factors have been met in this case. First,
Defendants 	have 	not 	filed 	an 	answer 	or 	any 	responsive 	pleadings;
consequently, there are no material facts in dispute. 	See Nishimatsu Constr.
Co., 515 F.2d at 1206 (“The defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment,
and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.”). Second,
Defendants’ “failure to respond threatens to bring the adversary process to a
halt, effectively prejudicing Plaintiff’s interests.” 	Ins. Co. of the W. v. H & G
Contractors, Inc., No. 10-cv-390, 2011 WL 4738197, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5,
2011). 	Third, grounds for default are clearly established given that, as
reflected by the record and noted in the Clerk’s Entry of Default, Defendants
“failed to plead or otherwise defend in this case as required by law.” (ECF Nos.
14–15). Fourth, there is no indication that Defendants’ silence is the result of
a “good faith mistake or excusable neglect.” 	Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. 	Fifth,
Ocean Marine seeks only the relief to which it is entitled under the law,
mitigating the harshness of a default judgment against Defendants. 	See id.
Finally, the Court is not aware of any facts that would give rise to “good cause”
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to set aside the default if challenged by Defendants. Id. Therefore, the Court
concludes that default judgment is procedurally warranted.
B. There is a Sufficient Basis for Default Judgment
Next, 	the 	Court 	must 	determine 	whether 	the 	pleadings 	provide 	a
“sufficient basis” for entering default judgment. Hancock Whitney Bank, 2022
WL 1211375, at *3. 	Due to their default, Defendants are deemed to have
admitted the well-pleaded facts alleged in the Complaint. 	Nonetheless, the
Court must review the pleadings to determine the substantive merits of Ocean
Marine’s claims for relief. Id.; Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206.
Ocean Marine has asserted claims for breach of contract against each of
the Defendants.8 (ECF. No. 1 at 5–6). Under Texas law, to prevail on a breach-
of-contract claim a plaintiff must show “(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2)
performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract
by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
breach.” 	Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 418 (5th Cir. 2009)
8 Because the Court finds that a valid contract for the purchase of the crane and
equipment covers the subject matter of the parties’ dispute, the Court does not reach
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. 	See N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., v. Cigna
Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182, 204 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Generally, ‘when a valid, express contract
covers the subject matter of the parties’ dispute, there can be no recovery under a quasi-
contract theory, such as unjust enrichment.’”); Osborn v. Blue Pumpkin Software, Inc., No.
3:03-cv-2085, 2005 WL 8158040, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2005) (“Under Texas law, no
recovery can be had under the theories of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment when claims
pleaded under those theories are the subject of a valid contract between the parties.”)
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(quoting Aguiar v. Segal, 167 S.W.3d 443, 450 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2005, pet. denied)). The allegations set out in the Complaint satisfy these four
elements. 	Specifically, the Complaint alleges: (1) the Invoice and Promissory
Note 	at 	issue 	constitute 	valid, 	enforceable 	contracts; 	(2) 	Ocean 	Marine
performed its contractual obligations; (3) DMW Marine Group failed to deliver
the marine crane and equipment as required by the purchase agreement, and
DMW Marine failed to pay back Ocean Marine as required by the Promissory
Note; and (4) Defendants’ breaches have caused significant financial injury to
Ocean Marine. 	Both the Invoice and Promissory Note were attached to the
Complaint. (See ECF No. 1-1; ECF No. 1-3). Given these well-pleaded factual
allegations, default judgment is appropriate.
C. Plaintiff is Entitled to Damages
After a court determines default judgment can be entered, the court must
determine what form of relief, if any, the plaintiff should receive. 	Nasufi v.
King Cable Inc., No. 3:15-cv-3273, 2017 WL 6497762, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19,
2017). 	The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the amount of damages.
Hancock Whitney Bank, 2022 WL 1211375, at *4 (citing U.S. for Use of M-CO
Constr., Inc. v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987)). 	The
plaintiff must establish the necessary facts, either through detailed affidavits
or an evidentiary hearing, to show its damages are “capable of mathematical
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calculation.” 	United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir.
1979). 	If a calculation can be made “with certainty by reference to the
pleadings and supporting documents,” a hearing to determine damages is
unnecessary. Hancock Whitney Bank, 2022 WL 1211375, at *4 (quoting James
v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Frame v. S-H, Inc., 967 F.2d
194, 204 (5th Cir. 1992))). “Accordingly, it remains Plaintiff’s burden to provide
an evidentiary basis for the damages it seeks.” 	Geiken v. Worku, No. 3:15-cv-
2442, 2017 WL 1709692, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 2, 2017).
1. Breach of Contract
In its motion for default judgment, Ocean Marine seeks damages of (a)
$83,925 for the unpaid principal balance on the Promissory Note; (b) pre-
judgment interest at the rate of 5.0% per annum on the outstanding principal
balance from June 1, 2023, to the date of entry of the final default judgment;
and (c) post-judgment interest. (ECF No. 10 at 14–16).
Ocean 	Marine 	supports 	its 	request 	for 	damages 	and 	pre-judgment
interest with the Declaration of Jordy Snikeris (“Snikeris”), Ocean Marine’s
Interim Chief Financial Officer. (ECF No. 10-2 at 1–5). The declaration states
that Snikeris has personal knowledge of the purchase of the marine crane and
equipment from DMW Marine Group, the unpaid portion of Ocean Marine’s
deposit that DMW Marine Group failed to refund after failing to deliver the
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purchased equipment, and the outstanding debt DMW Marine promised to pay
back under the Promissory Note. (Id. at 2–4). It further states that, other than
DMW Marine Group’s single payment of $10,000, Defendants have failed to
repay the Promissory Note, and that, giving all proper offsets, there was an
unpaid principal balance of $83,925 and accrued, unpaid interest of about
$9,975.759 (Id. at 4). 	The declaration also states that “[i]nterest continues to
accrue at the daily rate of approximately $11.50 per day ($83,925.00 × 0.05 ÷
365 days) until the debt is paid in full.” (Id. at 5). This rate is consistent with
the 5% annual interest rate specified in the Promissory Note. (See ECF No. 1-
3; ECF No. 10-2 at 10–11) (“No interest shall accrue on any unpaid amount of
this obligation from the date that this Promissory Note is executed through
May 31, 2023. 	In the event that any portion remains unpaid as of May 31,
2023, interest shall accrue at the rate of 5% (five percent) per annum on any
unpaid portion . . . .”).
Entering default judgment with respect to damages is appropriate. The
figures 	established 	by 	Snikeris’s 	declaration 	have 	not 	been 	disputed 	by
Defendants. Thus, “[Ocean Marine’s] damages for its breach of contract claims
9 This $9,975.75 figure represents the interest on the principal amount of $83,925.00
at the contractual rate of 5% per annum from June 1, 2023 (the day after the payment due
date) through October 15, 2025 (the final date invoiced by counsel for work performed on this
matter). Specifically, the $9,975.75 total is comprised of $77.20 accrued from June 1–6, 2023
and $9,898.55 accrued from June 7, 2023–October 15, 2025. (See ECF No. 10-2 at 4).
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can be determined ‘with certainty by reference to the pleadings and supporting
documents,’ obviating the need for an evidentiary hearing. 	Hancock Whitney
Bank, 2022 WL 1211375, at *4; James, 6 F.3d at 311. The Court enters default
judgment with respect to damages for breach of contract in the amounts
specified 	above. 	Moreover, 	an 	award 	of 	post-judgment 	interest 	at 	the
applicable federal rate is appropriate. Fairmont Specialty Ins. Co. v. Apodaca,
234 F. Supp. 3d 843, 855 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (noting district courts do not have
the discretion to deny post-judgment interest on monetary judgments); see 28
U.S.C. § 1961.
2. Attorneys’ Fees
Ocean 	Marine 	also 	seeks 	$38,288.23 	in 	attorneys’ 	fees, 	submitting
declarations and invoices in support. 	(ECF No. 10 at 15–16; ECF No. 10-1 at
1–6; ECF No. 10-4 at 1–9, 17–33). The Declaration of Jamie L. Godsey, counsel
for Ocean Marine, states that she and other attorneys worked on this matter
at the following rates: (1) Jamie Godsey, partner, at $655; (2) Lakshmi Kumar,
associate, at $450; and (3) Shelby Shanks, of counsel, at $450. 	(ECF No. 10-4
at 3). Per the declaration, the work they performed includes:
reviewing relevant documents and correspondence relating to the
relationship and obligations between the parties; counseling with
Ocean Marine’s representatives regarding payment demand to
Defendants and the facts and circumstances forming the basis of
the 	Dispute; 	researching 	and 	reviewing 	applicable 	legal
authorities; preparing and filing Plaintiff s Original Complaint;
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conducting legal research and fact investigation related to the
breach of contract claims; conducting fact investigation regarding
the 	ownership, 	state 	of 	incorporation, 	and 	domicile 	of 	the
Defendant entities; preparing service documents and coordinating
service on Defendants through the Texas Secretary of State and
via alternative methods; sending demand letters to Defendants;
preparing the Request for Entry of Default and Motion for Default
Judgment and evidence and legal research in support of the same;
and preparing for the final hearing on Ocean Marine’s Motion for
Default Judgment.
(Id.). 	The declaration indicates that as of October 15, 2025, Jamie Godsey
worked 23.1 hours, Lakshmi Kumar worked 41.7 hours, and Shelby Shanks
worked 1.6 hours on the matter, for a total of 66.4 hours. 	(Id. at 4). 	The
declaration further states Ocean Marine incurred $34,633.50 in attorney fees,
and $3,654.73 in costs, for a total demand of $38,288.23. (Id. at 4, 9). Counsel
has attached corresponding invoices submitted to Ocean Marine as of October
15, 2025, but the records “do[] not contain $14,053.00 in charges from the firm
for work performed from October 1, 2025 through October 15, 2025.” (Id. at 4,
17–33). However, “[t]hose amounts are included in the totals stated [t]herein.”
(Id. at 4).
“State law controls both the award of and the reasonableness of fees
awarded where state law supplies the rule of decision.” Mathis v. Exxon Corp.,
302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002). 	Under Texas law—which supplies the rule
of decision in this case—a prevailing party “may recover reasonable attorney’s
fees from an individual or organization” in a suit for breach of contract. 	T EX .
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C IV . PRAC . & R EM. C ODE § 38.001(b)(8). 	When a prevailing party in a breach
of contract suit seeks fees, an award of reasonable fees is mandatory, as long
as there is proof of reasonable fees. Mathis, 302 F.3d at 462.
In 	determining 	the 	reasonableness 	of 	attorneys’ 	fees, 	Texas 	courts
consider the following factors:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal
service properly; (2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) 	the 	time 	limitations 	imposed 	by 	the 	client 	or 	by 	the
circumstances; 	(6) 	the 	nature 	and 	length 	of 	the 	professional
relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or
uncertainty 	of 	collection 	before 	the 	legal 	services 	have 	been
rendered.
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997).
“[E]vidence of each of the Andersen factors is not required to support an award
of attorney’s fees.” Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Dieterich, 270 S.W.3d 695, 706
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). “The court can also look at the entire record,
the evidence presented on reasonableness, the amount in controversy, the
common knowledge of the participants as lawyers and judges, and the relative
success of the parties.” Hancock Whitney Bank, 2022 WL 1211375, at *5 (citing
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Jarvis v. Rocanville Corp., 298 S.W.3d 305, 318 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet.
denied)).
After 	reviewing 	the 	submitted 	billing 	records, 	declarations, 	and
supporting documentation, the Court finds that Ocean Marine’s requested
attorneys’ fees of $38,288.23 are excessive in light of the uncontested nature of
this breach-of-contract action, the limited complexity of the claims, and the
relatively modest amount in controversy ($83,925 in principal). At the outset,
to militate against an excessive fee award, the Court will exclude $14,053 from
the fee calculation because Ocean Marine has not submitted contemporaneous
billing records or other documentation from which the Court can ascertain the
reasonableness of those charges. 	See Chamberlain v. Waller Cnty. Asphalt
Inc., No. 4:19-cv-4941, 2023 WL 25380, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2023) (“[T]o be
considered reasonable . . . fees and costs must be properly documented and
supported.” (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)); Firequip,
Inc. v. Precision Frac, LLC, No. 17-cv-073, 2019 WL 13159712, at *7 (W.D. Tex.
July 15, 2019) (“The reasonableness of attorney fees is a question of fact that
must be supported by competent evidence.”). Although counsel represents that
Ocean Marine incurred $34,633.50 in attorneys’ fees, the invoices submitted
do not account for $14,053.00 in charges purportedly incurred between October
1, 2025 and October 15, 2025. 	Absent itemized time entries or supporting
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records, the Court cannot evaluate the nature of the work performed, the time
expended, or whether the charges are reasonable under the Andersen factors.
See Sonesta RL Hotels Franchising, Inc. v. Patel, 715 F. Supp. 3d 155, 165 (D.
Mass. 2024) (“[Plaintiff] has failed to produce the required time and billing
records. As an initial matter, ‘[i]t is unclear why it would take [over 75 hours]
to file a complaint, serve defendants, file a motion for an entry of default, and
file a motion for a default judgment.’ 	And where, as here, a party omits any
‘detailed contemporaneous time records,’ ordinarily ‘a substantial reduction in
any award’ is warranted.”) (citation modified); Nat’l Env’t Safety Co., Inc. v.
Katz, 	No. 	18-cv-2161, 	2019 	WL 	1994049, 	at 	*2 	(E.D.N.Y. 	May 	6, 	2019)
(reviewing billing records in motion for default judgment involving breach of
promissory 	note 	and 	finding 	“the 	hourly 	rates 	detailed 	therein 	to 	be
unreasonably high, particularly considering that plaintiff failed to provide any
support for the reasonableness of the requested rates”); cf. Wei v. Xu, No. 21-
cv-601, 2022 WL 1422926, at *14–16 (D. Md. May 4, 2022) (granting award of
$18,520 in attorney fees for 72 hours of work done by 2 attorneys and 2
paralegals 	following 	uncontested 	default 	judgment) 	(emphasis 	added).10
10 Although the Declaration of Jamie L. Godsey cites authority to support the
requested fee amount (ECF No. 10-4 at 7–8), the Court finds those cases inapposite to the
instant action: Spark Multinational, LLC v. Yong Xing Ltd., No. 22-cv-00030, 2023 WL
2569441, at *1, 6 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2023) (granting $10,571.50 in attorneys’ fees in default
judgment action where a partner expended 6.25 hours and an associate expended 13.2 hours,
and although higher average hourly rate was found to be “fair and reasonable,” the work
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Accordingly, any fee award must be based solely on the adequately documented
portion of Ocean Marine’s request. 	As such, the Court recommends reducing
the requested fee award to $24,235.23.11
Next, while the time spent on legal work by counsel, including partner
Jamie Godsey, associate Lakshmi Kumar, and of counsel Shelby Shanks, was
generally 	reasonable, 	a 	substantial 	portion 	of 	the 	hours 	billed 	appear
disproportionate to the tasks necessary for obtaining a default judgment. 	In
line with Fifth Circuit and Texas law, and consistent with reductions applied
in analogous out-of-circuit cases, the Court recommends a reduction of both
hours and rates. 	See M&T Equip. Fin. Corp. v. Bullet Express Line Inc., No.
4:23-cv-4177, 2024 WL 5048968, at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2024) (awarding
$5,428.50 	in 	attorneys’ fees 	for 	an 	uncontested 	default 	judgment, 	where
counsel’s 	work 	included 	preparing 	the 	complaint, 	coordinating 	service 	of
process, and filing motions related to the default judgment, with a total of 13.9
hours billed at rates ranging from $245 to $550 per hour); Griffin v. O’Brien,
performed was against an international trading and export company located in China that
agreed to sell plaintiff 8,200 cases of nitrile examination gloves for $639,600) (emphasis
added); Jane Roe/Rachel V. Rose v. BCE Tech. Corp., No. 4:12-cv-1621, 2014 WL 1322979, at
*3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2014) (assessing requested hourly rates from $65 to $475 and still
finding some excessive and duplicative billing, thus, reducing request to $19,964, in litigation
that reached motion to dismiss stage); EHO360, LLC v. Opalich, No. 3:21-cv-0724, 2025 WL
1638923, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 9, 2025) (awarding $568,862.40 in attorneys’ fees on post-
appeal motion after prevailing on breach of contract claim that went to trial) (emphasis
added).11 $34,633.50 – $14,053.00 = $20,580.50. $20,580.50 + $3,654.73 = $24,235.23.
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Wexler, & Assocs., LLC, 680 F. Supp. 3d 772, 788 (E.D. Tex. 2023) (awarding
$10,840 in attorneys’ fees for an uncontested default judgment based on 27.1
hours of work billed at $400 per hour, where counsel’s efforts were limited to
identifying defendants, attempting communications, and preparing the entry
of default, motion for default judgment, and supporting declarations); Hardy
v. SDM Hosp., LLC, No. 20-cv-3157, 2022 WL 272718, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10,
2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:20-cv-3157, 2022 WL 271751
(N.D. 	Tex. 	Jan. 	28, 	2022) 	(approving 	attorney 	hourly 	rate 	of 	$525 	in
employment default judgment case ); Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. Re Rez L.P.,
No. 4:19-cv-630, 2021 WL 863766, at *10–12 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2021), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 4:19-cv-630, 2021 WL 857937 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 5, 2021) (finding reasonable attorneys’ fees of $8,317.80 for 10.5 hours of
work on an uncontested default judgment where plaintiff raised claim for
breach of promissory note); see also Prime Contractors Inc. v. APS Contractors
Inc., 786 F. Supp. 3d 524, 553–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (reducing attorneys’ fees in
an uncontested breach-of-contract default judgment by lowering both hourly
rates and compensable hours where 	the case involved 	a straightforward
application of contract law; awarding $9,442.50 based on 31.8 total hours—
26.7 associate hours at $325 per hour and 5.1 paralegal hours at $150 per
hour); Nat’l Env’t. Safety Co., Inc., 2019 WL 1994049, at *2 (reducing requested
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hourly rates in default judgment action on promissory note to: $500–$600 per
hour 	for 	partners, 	$300 	per 	hour 	for 	associates, 	and 	$100 	per 	hour 	for
paralegals, which lowered requested award by approximately 16%); Sonesta
RL Hotels Franchising, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 3d at 164–65 (reducing $27,957 in
requested attorneys’ fees to $20,800 in uncontested default judgment action to
allow 	“fees 	for 	the 	work 	performed 	by 	the 	two 	attorneys 	who 	[] 	signed
[Plaintiff’s] 	pleadings,” 	“while 	addressing 	the 	seemingly 	excessive 	hours
attributed to this litigation”); Faraca v. Fleet 1 Logistics, LLC, 693 F. Supp. 2d
891, 895–96 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (reducing attorneys’ fees in a default-judgment
commercial contract action from $5,875 to $5,075 by deducting hours spent on
misdirected or unnecessary tasks while otherwise finding 30.25 hours billed at
$200–$250 per hour reasonable for obtaining default judgment).
Applying the foregoing analysis to the contemporaneously documented
billing records, the Court therefore recommends further adjusting the hours
and rates.12 Partner Jamie Godsey’s hours are reduced from 15.60 to 12.50 and
her hourly rate is reduced from $655 to $550, resulting in an adjusted fee of
$6,875. Associate Lakshmi Kumar’s hours are reduced from 20.70 to 16.60 and
her rate is reduced from $450 to $350, yielding an adjusted fee of $5,810. 	Of
12 The Court’s recommendation is based on an approximate 20% reduction of the
reported hours of work, and at reduced hourly rates of $550 for the partner, and $350 for the
associate and of counsel.
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counsel Shelby Shanks’ hours are reduced from 1.60 to 1.30 at a rate of $350,
producing 	an adjusted fee of $455. 	Accordingly, the 	Court recommends
awarding Ocean Marine $13,140 in attorneys’ fees for services, in addition to
the 	previously 	documented 	$3,654.73 	in 	costs, 	for 	a 	total 	recommended
recovery of $16,794.73.
These adjustments reflect the Court’s assessment of the time reasonably
expended on essential tasks, including drafting the Complaint, coordinating
service via the Texas Secretary of State, preparing the Request for Entry of
Default and Motion for Default Judgment, and limited legal research directly
related to obtaining the default judgment, while excluding hours that were
excessive, duplicative, or not directly tied to the default judgment process. This
award ensures that Ocean Marine is fully compensated for reasonable and
necessary 	attorney 	work 	without 	including 	charges 	that 	cannot 	be
substantiated or are disproportionate to the nature of this uncontested breach-
of-contract action at the default judgment stage.
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Ocean Marine’s
Motion for 	Default 	Judgment (ECF 	No. 10) be 	GRANTED. 	The 	Court
FURTHER RECOMMENDS (1) a Final Default Judgment be entered in
Ocean Marine’s favor on its breach of contract claims against Defendants; (2)
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Ocean Marine be awarded actual damages in the amount of $83,925; (3) pre-
judgment interest at the rate of 5.0% per annum from June 1, 2023 through
the date of entry of final default judgment; (4) $16,794.73 in attorneys’ fees and
costs; and (5) post-judgment interest at the applicable rate provided by 28
U.S.C. § 1961 from the date of final default judgment until paid in full.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on January 8, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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