Houston v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
DEMOND HOUSTON,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-2071
WAL-MART STORES TEXAS, LLC,
Defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT
Demond Houston moved for relief from the final judgment that this court entered on
January 20, 2026, in his personal injury lawsuit against Wal-Mart. (Docket Entry No. 20). The
attorneys who represented Houston in that lawsuit, John Daspit and Robert Morse of the Daspit
Law Firm, told counsel for Wal-Mart that Houston would accept the $450,000 settlement amount
Wal-Mart had offered. Daspit and Morse then moved for entry of final judgment, which the court
granted. 	(Docket Entry No. 16). 	Houston moves for relief from that judgment based on his
contention that he did not authorize Daspit and Morse to accept that settlement and instead
instructed them to try the case.
Based on a review of the record, the parties’ submissions, and the arguments of counsel,
the court held an evidentiary hearing on April 13, 2026. (Docket Entry No. 33). Demond Houston;
his wife, Joanna Houston; Daspit; and Morse testified. For the reasons explained below, the court
finds that Daspit and Morse did not have actual authority to settle this case for $450,000.
Houston’s motion to vacate the judgment and reinstate the case, (Docket Entry No. 20), is granted.
The court vacates the judgment and sets a scheduling conference for August 3, 2026, at 3:00 p.m.
CDT, by Zoom. A link will be separately sent.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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The record evidence supports the finding that Daspit and Morse did not have actual
authority to settle Houston’s case. After mediation failed on December 16, 2025, Houston asked
Daspit and Morse to “[g]o ahead” and “set” the case for trial.” (Docket Entry No. 25-3 at 2). On
December 18, Houston requested a case update, including on whether mediation will “resume[].”
(Docket Entry No. 19-2 at 3). 	Morse responded that “[t]here is no update” because Houston’s
assessment that “the case was worth ten million dollars made the mediation a waste of time.” (Id.).
On December 30, Houston requested another update, and Morse reiterated that the case “isn’t
worth a fraction of the value you think it is worth so we just have to wait and see what a jury gives
you.” 	(Id. at 5). 	On January 12, 2026, after almost two weeks of no communication between
Houston and Daspit and Morse through the cell phone that Houston presented records for, Daspit
and Morse told counsel for Wal-Mart that Houston would accept its settlement offer of up to
$400,000. 	(Docket Entry No. 25-5 at 3; Docket Entry No. 23-3). Daspit and Morse did not tell
Houston of the settlement until three days later, on January 15, when he requested information.
(Docket Entry No. 19-2 at 7).
On hearing that his case had settled, Houston immediately texted Morse that “[n]othing
was resolved” and that he had told Daspit and Morse to “let” the case “go to trial” and to “let a
jury decide.” 	(Id.). 	Despite this text message and earlier communications from Houston, on
January 16, Morse filed an agreed take-nothing judgment. 	(Docket Entry No. 16). 	The court
entered it on January 20. (Docket Entry No. 17). There is no record evidence that Morse or Daspit
informed Houston that they had filed an agreed judgment or that the court had entered it. After
Houston requested another update on January 28, Daspit and Morse again told him that his case
had settled. Houston protested that they had settled the case without his authority. (See Docket
Entry No. 19-2 at 8–9).
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The parties directly dispute whether Houston gave Daspit authority to settle the case
during two unrecorded telephone conversations. Houston testified that he went into the mediation
demanding $10 million to settle but that Daspit persuaded him to accept between $2 million to
$2.5 million. (Tr. at 117:9–122:5). Houston testified that he never gave Daspit or Morse authority
to settle for between $400,000 and $2 million. (See Tr. at 110:23–111:6). Daspit testified that, at
“the conclusion of mediation,” Houston gave him authority “to settle [the] case for a number that
is $400,000 or greater.” 	(Tr. at 82:4–10). 	Daspit testified that he and Houston talked about
settlement possibilities after mediation because the mediator was going to analyze the case and
issue a mediator’s settlement proposal. (See Tr. at 83:20–84:9, 96:13–98:14; see also Tr. at 53:8–
18, 58:11–14).
Daspit testified that, several weeks after the mediation, he had a phone conversation with
Houston around Christmas—likely on December 30, 2025—during which Houston reaffirmed that
he would settle the case for $400,000 or more. (Tr. at 87:12–22, 98:15–99:11; see Tr. at 21:19–
26:21; 147:7–148:22). 	Houston does not remember this phone conversation. 	(Tr. at 147:7–
148:22). 	Houston’s and the former attorneys’ phone records reflect that there was one December
30 call between Houston and Daspit and it lasted 15 seconds to one minute. (Tr. at 29:13–30:24).
Daspit and Morse argue that in these conversations, Houston authorized them to settle the case for
an amount above $400,000.
Daspit and Morse argue that the court’s decision depends on credibility: theirs versus
Houston’s. (Docket Entry No. 36). They argue that Houston’s testimony is not credible because
he suffered a traumatic brain injury that affects his ability to recall events; he contacted various
malpractice attorneys; he could not recall clearly his lowest settlement demand at the mediation;
he swore that he was struck by a dock plate when he was struck by a pole; and he could not recall
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how the mediation process and the mediator’s proposal worked. 	(Id. at 1–2). 	They argue that
Houston’s testimony, given these issues, is insufficient to rebut the presumption that his attorneys
had authority to settle the case.
The court accepts that while there are some reasons to doubt Houston’s memory, his
credibility was not as impaired as Daspit and Morse argue. But even assuming that Houston gave
authority at the December 16 mediation, and on December 30, to settle the case for at least
$400,000, those conversations did not justify the settlement and entry of judgment in the middle
of January without notice to Houston and his confirmation.
“Authority conferred for a specified time terminates at the expiration of that period; if no
time is specified, authority terminates at the end of a reasonable period.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND )
OF AGENCY § 105 (Am. L. Inst. 1958). 	“If no time is specified, what constitutes a reasonable time
during which the authority continues is determined by the nature of the act specifically authorized,
the formality of the authorization, the likelihood of changes in the purposes of the principal, and
other factors.” 	Id. cmt. b. 	Ultimately, “the agent has authority to act if, in view of all the
circumstances, it is reasonable for him to believe that the principal still intends him to act.” Id.
Based on the circumstances, it was not reasonable for Daspit and Morse to settle the case
in January 2026 without talking to Houston at that time and obtaining his authorization to settle
on the terms offered. 	The conversations in which Daspit claimed he had received Houston’s
authorization to settle the case were informal. 	The first relevant conversation between Daspit and
Houston occurred at the end of the failed mediation. 	Daspit told Houston that Wal-Mart had
offered $60,000, and Daspit thought the mediator’s proposal would not reach $400,000. (Tr. at
85:15–86:6, 96:10–12, 97:11–98:14). 	The second relevant conversation between Daspit and
Houston was less than a minute long and included little, if any, conversation about the case. (See
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Tr. at 87:12–22, 98:15–99:11). Even if Houston had told Daspit that he was interested in settling,
he did so when the prospect of settlement appeared remote and when his view of the value of the
case was, in his attorneys’ view, inflated. Houston credibly testified that he wanted to try the case
because of the severity of his injuries. 	(Tr. at 117:13–21, 118:5–119:8, 121:1–11, 132:11–133:6,
134:6–135:11, 144:13–22).
How Daspit and Morse settled the case further supports the conclusion that they lacked
authority to do so. On January 12, 2026, Houston asked Morse for an update on the case status,
including when the case was set for trial. (Docket Entry No. 19-2 at 6). This request was consistent
with Houston’s other communications about going to trial. 	(See id. at 2–17). 	Morse did not
respond. 	Daspit settled the case the same day (or a short time afterward), without notifying
Houston of either the settlement or the mediator’s proposal. (Docket Entry No. 23-3; Docket Entry
No. 19-2 at 8–17; Tr at 103:10–18, 104:14–20). There is no explanation in the record about why
Daspit and Morse agreed to the settlement without first telling Houston about the offer and
obtaining his consent. (See Tr. at 102:5–105:5). Morse did not inform Houston that his case had
settled until January 15, after Houston sent Morse a follow-up request for an update. 	(Docket
Entry No. 19-2 at 7).
After hearing of the settlement, Houston expressed outrage, sending Morse a text protesting
that “[n]othing was resolved” and that Houston wanted to “let” the case “go to trial” and “let a jury
decide.” (Id.). Despite this text message, and Houston’s clear indication that he did not want to
settle the case, on January 16, Morse filed on this court’s docket an agreed take-nothing judgment.
(Docket Entry No. 16). 	Morse had no satisfactory explanation for why he ignored his client’s
express wishes by filing the settlement on the docket. Morse filed the dismissal paperwork because
he was “not worried” that Wal-Mart was going to pay; they’re “good for the money,” in his words.
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(Tr. at 60:19–24). Obtaining what Morse thought was a realistic settlement amount, rather than
following what he thought were his client’s unrealistic expectations and instructions, appeared to
take priority. Daspit did not tell Houston about the settlement until two weeks later. (See Tr. at
103:10–18).
The fact that Daspit and Morse did not communicate with Houston after the mediator’s
proposal tilts the preponderance of the evidence towards finding that they did not believe Houston
would agree to the settlement they accepted on his behalf. 	See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 105 cmt. b (“[T]he agent has authority to act if, in view of all the circumstances, it is
reasonable for him to believe that the principal still intends him to act.”). The court finds, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that Daspit and Morse did not have actual authority to settle the
case in January 2026, even though they acted on a good-faith belief that the settlement was
reasonable and realistic.
For these reasons, the court grants Houston’s motion for relief from the judgment, (Docket
Entry No. 20), vacates the judgment, (Docket Entry No. 17), and sets a scheduling conference for
August 3, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. CDT, by Zoom.
SIGNED on July 16, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
_______________________________________
Lee H. Rosenthal
Senior United States District Judge
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