Gaskin v. University of Houston Police Department

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Case 4:25-cv-01658 Document 31 _ Filed on 12/08/25 in TXSD Page 1 of 11
United States District Court

Southem District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT December 08, 2025
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
Johnny Ray Gaskin, §
Plaintiff, §
§
Vv. § Civil Action H-25-1658

§
University of Houston Police §
Department, §
Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pending before the court are the University of Houston
Police Department's (UHPD) Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10;
Johnny Ray Gaskin’s Motion for Leave to File First (1s*) Amended
Complaint) (Motion for Leave to Amend), ECF No. 23; and two
motions to strike filed by UHPD, ECF Nos. 28, 29. The parties
consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned for all purposes,
including entry of judgment. ECF Nos. 19, 20, 22. For the reasons
stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, the Motion for
Leave to Amend is DENIED, and the motions to strike are
DENIED as moot.

1. Facts and Procedural Posture

Johnny Ray Gaskin filed his Complaint against the
University of Houston Police Department (UHPD) on April 10,
2025. ECF No. 1. He alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for race
and sex discrimination as well as retaliation. /d. at 1, 4-6. Gaskin
alleged that he was employed by UHPD from 2016 to 2021, during
which time he was subjected to race and sex discrimination,
disparate treatment, and retaliation. Jd. at 3. He claims that his

supervisors exhibited and allowed discriminatory and retaliatory

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conduct. Id. According to Gaskin, female and non-Black officers
were favored in promotions and assignments and were not
subjected to the same scrutiny as he was. Id. Gaskin alleges he
made multiple internal complaints and was constructively
terminated, fd.

UHPD filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 7, 2025, ECF No. 10.
UHPD argued that Gaskin’s claims are barred by Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity; that Gaskin lacked standing to
bring his claims; and that Gaskin failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Jd. at 2. As to the last ground, UHPD
argued in part that all claims against it were barred by the statute
of limitations. Id. at 8. On May 9, 2025, Gaskin responded to the
motion to dismiss. ECF No. 11. Gaskin did not address sovereign
immunity or the statute of limitations, but he did ask for leave to
amend his complaint.

The court held a scheduling conference on July 31, 2025, but
took no substantive action at that time. The court reset the
conference to August 28, 2025. On August 27, 2025, the parties
consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge.
ECF Nos. 19, 20, 22. The court held a hearing on August 28, 2025.
ECF No. 21. The court stayed discovery pending resolution of the
pending motions. Jd. The court also granted Gaskin leave to file a
motion for leave to amend his complaint by September 19, 2025,
Id. The court ordered that the motion must identify any additional
defendants that Gaskin wished to add to the case and address
whether amendment of the complaint would be futile, including
whether sovereign immunity would apply to any proposed
additional defendants. Id.

On September 4, 2025, Gaskin filed his Motion for Leave to
Amend. ECF No. 23. He seeks to add as defendants the University
of Houston System Board of Regents, the police department chief,

the assistant police department chief, a police captain, and a police

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event, the court’s analysis is not impacted by Gaskin’s September
4, 2025 Response, so the motions to strike are also moot.

On October 9, 2025, UHPD filed its Response in Opposition
to Gaskin’s Motion for Leave to Amend. ECF No. 30. UHPD argues
that amendment would be futile because all of Gaskin’s claims are
barred by the relevant statutes of limitation. /d. Gaskin did not file
a reply.

2. Motion to Dismiss

The live Complaint in this case, ECF No. 1, identifies only
UHPD as a defendant and alleges claims only under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states and state
agencies, including state universities and departments thereof,
including their police departments, from suit in federal court.
Harrell v. Univ. Hous. Police Dep’t, 44 F.3d 1004 (5th Cir. 1995)
(finding that the University of Houston Police Department was a
department within the University of Houston and was thus
entitled to sovereign immunity); Dittmer v. Tex. S. Univ., No. 10-
182, 2010 WL 3119925, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2010): Williams v,
Univ. Tex. Police Dep’t, No. H-18-8711, 2019 WL 4274376, at *2
(S.D, Tex. Sept. 10, 2019) (finding that The University of Texas
Police Department, as a department of The University of Texas,
was entitled to sovereign immunity). UHPD is entitled to
sovereign immunity.

Before a state university or one of its departments may be
sued, either the Texas Legislature must waive sovereign immunity ~
or Congress must abrogate the state's sovereign immunity,
Dittmer, 2010 WL 3119925, at *3; Bazile v. Tex. Juv. Just. Dep't,
No. 24-2936, 2025 WL 2664248, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2025).
Gaskin has not addressed the issue of sovereign immunity and has
thus not demonstrated that Texas waived its sovereign immunity

or that Congress abrogated it when it enacted section 1983. It does

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not appear that either of those things have occurred. Bazile, 2025
WL 2664248, at *2 (“Texas has not waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and Congress did not abrogate that
immunity when enacting § 1983.”); Williams v. Univ. Hous.
Downtown Police Dep’t, No. 18-3712, 2019 WL 2931669, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Jun. 18, 2019); see also Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 111.83
(“Nothing in this section shall be construed as granting legislative
consent for suits against the board, the University of Houston
System, or its component institutions and entities except as
authorized by law.”).

“Because [Eleventh Amendment] sovereign immunity
deprives the court of jurisdiction, the claims barred ...can be
dismissed only under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1)
and [without] prejudice.” Duhon v. Healthcare Pros, Found, La.,
No. 20-2022, 2022 WL 8173802, at *4 (B.D. La. Feb. 2, 2022)
(quoting Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., 88 F.8d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Accordingly, Gaskin’s claims against UHPD under section 19838
are DISMISSED without prejudice. The court need not reach any

of UHPD’s other arguments for dismissal.
3. Motion for Leave to Amend

Under Rule 15(a), courts “should freely give leave [to amend]
when. justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a}(2). “Though that’s
a generous standard, ‘leave to amend can be properly denied where

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there is a valid justification.” Robertson v. Intratek Comput., Inc.,
976 F.3d 575, 584 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Carroll v. Fort James
Corp., 470 F.8d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 2006)). Valid justifications
include undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, and whether the
facts underlying the amended complaint were known to the party
when the original complaint was filed. Jd. (quoting Southmark
Corp. v. Schulte Roth & Zabel (In re Southmark Corp.), 88 F.3d

8311, 816 (th Cir. 1996)), Courts may also consider a plaintiffs

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repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments,
undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of the proposed
amendment, Wimm vu. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 187, 139 (6th Cir.
1993) (citing cases). An amended complaint is futile if “the
amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.” Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 873
(5th Cir. 2000) (citing cases). The analysis requires courts to apply
“the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule
12(b){6).” Id. (quoting cases).

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the court to dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(0b)(6). Generally, the court is constrained to the “four
corners of the complaint” to determine whether the plaintiff has
stated a claim. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 401 (th Cir.
2011); see also Loofbourrow v. Comm’r, 208 F. Supp. 2d 698, 708
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (“the court may not look beyond the four corners
of the plaintiffs pleadings.”).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court determines whether the
plaintiffs complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P.,
970 F.8d 576, 580 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to
a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Ultimately, the “[flactual allegations [in the complaint]
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 Gnternal citation omitted).

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Courts accept “all well-pleaded facts as true” and “view[]
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Allen v. Walmart
Stores, L.1.C., 907 F.3d 170, 177 (th Cir, 2018) (quoting -Jones v.
Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). “A plaintiff need only
plausibly allege facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim
to survive a motion to dismiss.” Cicalese v. Univ. Tex. Med. Branch,
924 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2019), “Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level... on
the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even
if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable[.]” Id. at 556.

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must limit itself
to: (1) the facts in the complaint; (2) documents attached to the
complaint; and (3) matters of which the court may take judicial
notice. Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch, Dist., 9388 F.3d 724, 735
(5th Cir. 2019). The court has discretion to consider “any
documents attached to the complaint[] and any documents
attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and
referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), LP. v.
Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 888, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). Such
documents are considered part of the pleadings. See Causey v.
Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.8d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004).

UHPD argues that all of Gaskin’s proposed claims are
barred by the respective statutes of limitation. “A motion to
dismiss may be granted on a statute of limitations defense where
it is evident from the pleadings that the action is time-barred, and
the pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling.” Taylor v. Bailey
Tool Mfg. Co., 744 F.8d 944, 946 (5th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Baylor
Univ., 318 F, Supp. 3d 786, 791 (W.D. Tex. 2018).

Agegrieved employees filing suit under Title VII must first
file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

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5(e)(1). In Texas, the charge must be filed within 300 days of the
alleged wrongful conduct. Weathers v. Hous. Methodist Hosp.,
116 F.4th 324, 829 (5th Cir, 2024), After filing an EEOC charge, a
plaintiff must file suit within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-
sue letter for it to be timely, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). When the
date of receipt of a right-to-sue letter is unknown, “the Fifth
Circuit presumes that the letter was received on or prior to the
seventh day after the letter was mailed.” January v. Tex. Dep't
Crim. Just., 760 F. App’x 296, 299-300 (5th Cir. 2019). The ninety-
day period is strictly construed, and if a plaintiff files suit more
than ninety days after receiving notice of their right to sue, the
court will dismiss the plaintiffs action. Washington v. City of
Gulfport, 351 F. App’x 916, 918 (5th Cir, 2009).

UHPD attached the EHEOC’s letter informing Gaskin of his
right to sue to its Response to the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 30
at 9-12. The court will consider the letter because it is referred to
in the Motion for Leave to Amend, ECF No. 28 at 4, and is central
to Gaskin’s claim. The letter was issued on June 6, 2022, and is
thus deemed to have been received by Gaskin seven days later, on
June 20, 2022. Gaskin filed this lawsuit on April 10, 2025,! well
outside ninety days from receipt of the EEOC’s letter. His Title VIT
claims would therefore be untimely.

The statute of limitations for claims under Title IX is the
same as it is for claims under section 1983, which means that the
limitations period is borrowed from the forum state’s general
limitations period for torts. King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch.
Dist., 803 F.8d 754, 759-61 (5th Cir. 2015). In Texas, that is two

1 The court recognizes that only section 1983 claims were brought in the Original
Complaint and that only UHPD was named at that time. Thus, there may be an
argument that the later date on which the Motion for Leave to Amend was filed should
be used. But even using the earlier date, Gaskin’s suit is untimely, so the court uses
the earlier date to simplify the analysis.

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years, pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
§ 16.003. Id. Accrual of the limitations period is determined by
federal law. Id. at 762. Under federal law, a claim accrues when
the plaintiff becomes aware he has suffered an injury or has
sufficient information to know of the injury. /d. (relying on Spotts
v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 574 (5th Cir. 2010)). The same rules
apply in the context of claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Frame
v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 237 (5th Cir. 2011). Because this
suit was filed, at the earliest, on April 10, 2025, if Gaskin’s claims
accrued before April 10, 2023, all of his claims under Title IX,
section 1983, and Section 504 would be untimely.

In his Motion for Leave to Amend, Gaskin identifies many
forms of injury. The latest injury appears to be his constructive
discharge in 2021. The other injuries are those that occurred while
he was employed. For example, he alleges that UHPD and its staff
were hostile toward him, denied him advancement, favored female
employees, and disciplined him more harshly. ECF No. 23 at 2. He
also alleges that UHPD failed to accommodate his disability,
subjected him to intensified scrutiny, disciplined him unfairly,
gave him unfavorable assignments, denied him promotions, and
retaliated after he reported the discrimination. Jd. at 2-8. He
makes it clear that the mistreatment ended when he was
constructively discharged. fd. at 3 (“Instead of correcting the
discrimination, Defendants escalated the retaliatory treatment,
ultimately resulting in Plaintiff's constructive termination im
2021.”). The court can find no allegation of any injury in the Motion
for Leave to Amend that could plausibly have occurred after 2021.
All of the injuries that Gaskin claims to have suffered are the sort
that he would have known about immediately, or certainly before
he was constructively discharged. All of Gaskins claims under
Title IX, section 1983, and Section 504 would be untimely.

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Gaskin makes brief mention of the continuing violation
theory and equitable tolling but does not provide any facts to
support the application of those principles. In the context of
harassment claims, the Fifth Circuit recognizes an equitable
exception to the filing period when the “unlawful employment
practice manifests itself over time, rather than as a series of
discrete acts.” Waliman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474
(5th Cir. 1989). This “continuing violation” exception requires that
the plaintiff show that “at least one incident of harassment
occurred within the [limitation] period.” fd. More specifically, a
plaintiff must show 1) at least one act of harassment was timely
exhausted; and 2) that the acts inside and outside of the statutory
period are sufficiently related. Lopez v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC,
767 F,. Supp. 3d 406, 430 (W.D. Tex. 2025). Here, there are no acts
of harassment that fall within the limitations period, so this
doctrine does not help Gaskin.

Gaskin has presented no facts to suggest that equitable
tolling should apply. Courts have allowed equitable tolling im the
context of Title VII claims when (1) a plaintiff timely files suit in
the wrong forum, (2) a plaintiff is unaware of the facts giving rise
to the suit because the defendant intentionally concealed them, or
(3) the EEOC misleads a plaintiff about her rights. Granger v.
Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that the list
is not exhaustive). Equitable tolling should be appled
sparingly. Id.

Other equitable doctrines may also toll the statute of
limitations. When a federal cause of action borrows a state statute
of limitations, state tolling rules apply. See King-White, 803 F.3d
at 764; Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F.3d 892, 897 (th Cir. 1998). For
example, the discovery rule defers accrual of the cause of action
“until the injury was or could have reasonably been discovered.”
Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.38d 924, 929-380 (Tex. 2011).

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The discovery rule only applies in cases where the nature of the
injury incurred is inherently undiscoverable. Id. “An injury is
inherently undiscoverable if it is by nature unlikely to be
discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due
diligence.” S.V. vu. R.V., 9383 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1996). Similarly, the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations
so that a defendant may not avoid liability “by deceitfully
concealing wrongdoing until limitations has run.” Shell Oil,
356 S.W.3d at 927. The doctrine requires a plaintiff to show that
the defendant “actually knew a wrong occurred, had a fixed
purpose to conceal the wrong, and did conceal the wrong.” Id.
Neither of these equitable doctrines applies here. The injuries that
Gaskin suffered would have been known to him at the time they
occurred. There is no allegation that UHPD or the other proposed
defendants concealed their wrongdoing. In fact, it appears that
Gaskin was well aware of the mistreatment, given that he was
constructively discharged—i.e., he was forced to resign to remove
himself from the situation.

Because all of Gaskin’s claims under Title IX, section 1983,
and Section 604 accrued during or before 2021, and tolling dees not
apply, they would be untimely. Accordingly, Gaskin’s Motion for
Leave to Amend would be futile and it is DENIED.

4, Conclusion

Because Gaskin’s claims are barred by Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, UHPD’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF
No. 10, is GRANTED. Gaskin’s section 1983 claims against UHPD
are DISMISSED without prejudice.

1]

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Additionally, because all of Gaskin’s claims are barred by the
relevant statutes of limitation, filing an amended complaint would
be futile. Gaskin’s Motion for Leave to Amend, ECF No. 23, is

DENIED, and UHPD’s motions to strike, ECF Nos. 28, 29, are
DENIED as moot.

Signed at Houston, Texas, on December S , 2025.

Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge

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