Collins v. Florida Department of Revenue et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JEFFREY LEE COLLINS,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-1163
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
Pending before the Court1 is Defendant Florida Department of Revenue’s
(“FDOR”) Motion to Quash Service of Process (ECF No. 55), FDOR’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended 	Complaint (ECF No. 59), Defendant
Elvira Bromfield’s (“Bromfield”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 60), and FDOR’s
Motion to Take Judicial Notice (ECF No. 61). Based on a review of the motions,
arguments, and relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS FDOR’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 59) and Bromfield’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 60) be GRANTED. 	The Court further DENIES
AS MOOT FDOR’s Motion to Quash Service of Process (ECF No. 55) and
Motion to Take Judicial Notice (ECF No. 61).
1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 9).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 11, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. 	Background
Pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey Lee Collins (“Plaintiff”) describes this case as a
civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress ongoing and
prospective violations of Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights. (ECF No. 58
at ¶ 1). 	Plaintiff alleges FDOR initiated and escalated coercive child-support
enforcement measures without providing constitutionally adequate notice, a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, or sufficient procedural safeguards to
prevent erroneous or arbitrary deprivation of protected liberty and property
interests. (Id. at ¶ 3).
Factually, Plaintiff alleges a “child-support order concerning Plaintiff
was entered in the State of Florida in or around 2008.” (Id. at ¶ 22). Plaintiff
adds that he was “deprived of meaningful notice and a fair opportunity to
participate 	in 	proceedings 	and 	administrative 	processes 	that 	materially
affected his rights and obligations.” 	(Id. at ¶ 25). 	Plaintiff further alleges
FDOR undertook a series of enforcement actions against Plaintiff including,
but not limited to, “administrative collection measures, levies or garnishments,
reporting 	to 	credit 	and 	financial 	agencies, 	referral 	for 	passport-related
restrictions, and other coercive enforcement mechanisms.” (Id. at ¶¶ 29–30).
Plaintiff states that he seeks “declaratory and prospective injunctive
relief to prevent ongoing and future constitutional violations, as well as
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compensatory damages for harms already suffered as a result of [FDOR’s]
unconstitutional enforcement practices.” 	(Id. at ¶ 5). 	Plaintiff also named
Bromfield as a defendant, describing her as a private individual who benefited
from the child-support enforcement action. 	(Id. at ¶ 15). 	However, Plaintiff
does not assert a cause of action against Bromfield. (See id. at ¶¶ 15–16).
FDOR and Bromfield have each filed motions to dismiss. (See ECF Nos.
59–60).
II. 	Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge the exercise of the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. 	FED. R. C IV . P. 12(b)(1). 	Whether a federal court has
jurisdiction must “be established as a threshold matter” and “is inflexible and
without exception.” 	Webb v. Davis, 940 F.3d 892, 896 (5th Cir. 2019). 	The
party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof for a 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss. 	Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). 	The
Court generally will accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true
and construe those allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kumar
v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist., 443 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777–78 (E.D. Tex. 2020).
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12
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motions, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
III. 	Discussion
a. FDOR
FDOR advances numerous reasons as to why Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint should be dismissed, beginning with immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. 	(See ECF No. 59 at 5–23). 	The Court ultimately agrees with
FDOR. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against FDOR fails because (1) FDOR is not a
person within the meaning of § 1983 and (2) FDOR is immune from suit under
the Eleventh Amendment. 	As explained by the District Court for the Middle
District of Florida in a case where a plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case
against FDOR following a state child support proceeding:
Plaintiff cannot assert a section 1983 claim against the Florida
Department of Revenue for at least two reasons. 	First, section
1983 authorizes suits against “[e]very person who . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). The term “person” does
not include states or their agencies. 	Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Taylor v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 142 F.
App’x 373, 374–75 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 	The Florida
Department of Revenue is part of the state executive branch and
administers 	the 	state’s 	child 	support 	enforcement 	program
established under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. 	See, e.g.,
Fla. Stat. § 20.21(2)(h). 	The agency is therefore not a person
within the meaning of section 1983. 	See Newton v. Duke Energy
Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[N]either the
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State of Florida nor its agencies are “persons” within the meaning
of § 1983.”).
Second, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from
exercising jurisdiction over an action against a state unless the
state has consented to suit or has waived its immunity or Congress
has overridden the immunity. Cross v. State of Ala., 49 F.3d 1490,
1502 (11th Cir. 1995). 	The immunity is “in the nature of a
jurisdictional bar” and should be decided early. Bouchard Transp.
Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 91 F.3d 1445, 1448 (11th Cir. 1996).
When the immunity applies, dismissal without prejudice for lack
of jurisdiction is warranted. 	Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d
726, 733 (11th Cir. 2016).
The immunity extends to a state agency or state entity functioning
as an arm of the state. 	Ross v. Jefferson Cty. Dep’t of Health, 701
F.3d 655, 659 (11th Cir. 2012). The immunity applies whether the
requested relief is legal or equitable. 	Uberoi v. S. Ct. of Fla., 819
F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 2016). Florida has not agreed to be sued
under section 1983 for a civil rights violation. Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t
of Health & Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1515 (11th Cir. 1986).
And Congress has not overridden a state’s immunity for a section
1983 civil rights violation. Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521,
1525 (11th Cir. 1990). And Eleventh Circuit “case law is clear that
as a state agency, the [Florida Department of Revenue] is immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.” Brown v. Fla. Dep’t of
Rev. Off. of Child Supp. Enf’t, 697 F. App’x 692, 693 (11th Cir.
2017).
For these reasons, Plaintiff cannot state a section 1983 claim
against the Florida Department of Revenue.
Lewis v. Castro, No. 6:24-cv-1608, 2024 WL 5673709, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 12,
2024), 	report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	No. 	6:24-cv-1608, 	2024 	WL
5673724 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2024); Moore v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 3:25-cv-
817, 	2025 	WL 	3646608, 	at 	*4 	(N.D. 	Fla. 	June 	30, 	2025), 	report 	and
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recommendation adopted, No. 3:25-cv-817, 2025 WL 3645866 (N.D. Fla. Dec.
16, 	2025) 	(finding 	FDOR 	was 	immune 	from 	suit 	under 	the 	Eleventh
Amendment in a case where a plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 relating to child support orders entered against him in state
court); see also Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 115 (11th Cir. 1989) (“This
Eleventh Amendment bar applies regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks
money damages or prospective injunctive relief.”).
Plaintiff also requests declaratory2 and injunctive3 relief. 	(ECF No. 58
at ¶¶ 58–64, 71–78). 	The “Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for
injunctive or declaratory relief against individual state officials acting in
violation of federal law.” Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328 (5th
Cir. 2013) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908)). 	However, in
order “[t]o fall within the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, . .
2 Plaintiff seeks the following declarations: (1) Defendants’ enforcement actions, as
alleged herein, violated Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment by depriving him of constitutionally protected liberty and property interests
without adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and (2) Defendants’
reliance on unverified third-party representations in initiating and escalating enforcement
actions, without implementing appropriate procedural safeguards, is inconsistent with
constitutional requirements governing the exercise of state authority. (ECF No. 58 at ¶¶ 60–
61). 3 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief that (1) prohibits FDOR from “initiating, escalating,
or continuing enforcement actions against Plaintiff unless and until Defendants provide
constitutionally adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to such
actions” and (2) requires FDOR to “implement and adhere to procedural safeguards designed
to ensure accuracy, fairness, and due process in future enforcement actions involving
Plaintiff.” (Id. at ¶¶ 75–76).
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. a plaintiff must name individual state officials as defendants in their official
capacities.” 	Id. 	(finding 	that 	although 	plaintiff 	had 	asserted 	claims 	for
injunctive and declaratory relief, he could not utilize the Ex parte Young
exception to sovereign immunity because he named only state entities, and not
their individual officers, as defendants). 	Here, Plaintiff clearly named only
FDOR, a state agency immune from suit, and did not name any individual state
officials. 	As such, 	Plaintiff’s 	suit 	against FDOR 	is 	barred by 	sovereign
immunity. 	See id. 	(“Although Raj has asserted claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief, he cannot overcome sovereign immunity under Ex parte
Young because he has named only LSU, LSU Health, and the LSU Board as
defendants.”); see also City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 1003-04 (5th Cir.
2019) (finding a district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over a state
agency because state agencies are not subject to the Ex parte Young exception).
As such, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants be
dismissed 	without 	prejudice 	for 	lack 	of 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction. 	See
Sanders v. Tex. A&M Univ. Texarkana, No. 5:21-cv-93, 2022 WL 4594218, at
*5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:21-cv-
093, 2022 WL 4594240 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 29, 2022) (noting that sovereign-
immunity-based dismissals are without prejudice).
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b. Bromfield
Bromfield also filed a motion to dismiss. 	(ECF No. 60). 	As discussed,
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not assert a cause of action against
Bromfield. (See ECF No. 58 at ¶¶ 15–16). Further, in response to Bromfield’s
motion, Plaintiff states he does not oppose Bromfield’s dismissal from this case.
(ECF No. 63 at 3–4). As such, the Court recommends Bromfield be dismissed
from the lawsuit without prejudice.
IV. 	Leave to Amend
“[D]istrict courts often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure
pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects
are incurable or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are unwilling or
unable to amend in a manner which will avoid dismissal.” Great Plains Tr. Co.
v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). Here,
“any additional opportunity [to amend] would be futile given the Court’s lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.” See Griffin v. Furlow, No. 5:23-cv-016, 2023 WL
3604735, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2023), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 5:23-cv-016, 2023 WL 3611448 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2023) (collecting cases).
As such, the Court recommends Plaintiff not be given leave to amend.
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V. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS FDOR’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 59) and Bromfield’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 60) be GRANTED. 	Specifically, the Court
RECOMMENDS 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	FDOR 	be 	DISMISSED
WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE 	and 	Bromfield 	be 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE from this lawsuit. 	As such, the Court RECOMMENDS the
case be DISMISSED in its entirety. 	The Court further DENIES AS MOOT
FDOR’s Motion to Quash Service of Process (ECF No. 55) and Motion to Take
Judicial Notice (ECF No. 61).
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on May 11, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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