Barry v. Texas Office of Attorney General

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Case 4:25-cv-01118 Document 26 Filed 03/10/26 in TXSD Pagelof4

United States District Court
Southem District of Texas

ENTERED
March 10, 2026
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER BARRY, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
VS, § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-01118

§
TEXAS OFFICE OF ATTORNEY §
GENERAL, §
§
Defendant. §

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc, #21) and pro se Plaintiffs
Response (Doc. #22). Having considered the parties’ arguments and the applicable legal authority,
the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate two state-court orders enforcing child
support and medical support obligations (the “Child Support Orders”). Doc. #1 at 1. Plaintiff
alleges the Child Support Orders were entered without due process by an adjudicator who was
neither unbiased nor impartial. fd at 1-2. It appears that the Child Support Orders to which he
refers are (1) Order No. 0012587069, issued by the 418th Judicial District Court of Montgomery
County, Texas (the “Montgomery County Court”) on September 8, 2022, and (2) Order
No. 0013524129, issued by the Montgomery County Court on August 16, 2023. Doc. #21, Ex, 1;
Doc. #21, Ex. 2. Before issuing the Child Support Orders, the Montgomery County Court held a
contested hearing in which Plaintiff appeared. Doc, #21, Ex. 1 at 2; Doc. #21, Ex. 2 at2. Plaintiff
brought this action on March 7, 2025, demanding this Court vacate the Child Support Orders,

Doc. #1 at {. Defendant moved to dismiss on August 11, 2025, arguing the Court lacks subject

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 4:25-cv-01118 Document 26 Filed 03/10/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 4

matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Doc. #21.

“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction tests the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”
Wesolek v. Layton, 871 F. Supp. 2d 620, 627 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citing Home Builders Ass’n of
Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (Sth Cir, 1998)). “The burden of proof for a
[Rule] 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction, and, at the pleading stage,
the plaintiff's burden is to allege a plausible set of facts establishing jurisdiction.” Haverkamp y.
Linthicum, 6 F.4th 662, 668 (Sth Cir, 2021) (cleaned up). “[A]I] well-pleaded facts are taken as
true and all reasonable inferences must be made in the plaintiff's favor.” ld. at 668-69. District
courts may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on: “(1) the complaint alone;
(2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint

bad

supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resoiution of disputed facts.” Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (Sth Cir. 1981).

Defendant argues this case should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) pursuant to the
Rooker—Feldman doctrine. Under Rooker—Feldman, “federal district courts, as courts of original
jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts.”
Pinto v. Chin Sun Pinto, No. 6-12-21, 2012 WL 5386950, at *2 (S.D. Tex, Oct. 31, 2012) (quoting
Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 Gth Cir. 1994)); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine “is
confined to cases .. . brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Cerp., 544

U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In other words, “Rooker—Feldman prevents state-court litigants “from
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seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States
district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s
federal rights.’” Hall v. Dixon, No, 09-2611, 2010 WL 3909515, at *37 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2010)
(quoting Johnson vy. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)),

Here, without question, Plaintiff seeks review of or otherwise challenges state court
judgments. Specifically, he demands the Court “vacate [child] support orders without due process
of law by an adjudicator who is not unbiased nor impartial.” Doc. #1 at 1. Admittedly, the Court
finds it difficult to determine the precise causes of action Plaintiff intends to plead in his
Complaint. But to the extent Plaintiff's claims stem from the Montgomery County Court’s Child
Support Orders, they are barred under Rooker—Feldman. Dixon, 2010 WL 3909515, at *37; see
also Johnson v. Miss. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. 1:19-cv-829, 2020 WL 5415491, at *1 (S.D. Miss.
Apr. 14, 2020) (The federalism interests underlying the Rooker—Feldman doctrine particularly
apply to domestic issues like child custody and child support.” (citing Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d
895, 900 (Sth Cir. 1987))), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-cv-829, 2020 WL
2572535 (S.D. Miss. May 21, 2020),

Furthermore, any constitutional claims Plaintiff intends to plead are “inextricably
intertwined” with the decisions of the Montgomery County Court. See Uptown Grill, L.£.C. v.
Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc., 46 F 4th 374, 384 (Sth Cir. 2022) (““Rooker~Feldman prohibits
federal court review of claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court decision.”
(quoting Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384-85 (5th Cir. 2017))). At
bottom, “Rooker—Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal court” if a party “asserts as a
legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court

judgment based on that decision.” Truong v. Bank of Am, N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382-83 (Sth Cir,
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2013) (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). That is exactly what Plaintiff
has done here.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this
case under Rooker—Feldman, Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #21) is GRANTED and

Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. All other pending motions are DENIED AS

MOOT.
It is so ORDERED,
MAR 1.0 2026 | /
Date The Honora e Alfred H. Bennett

United States District Judge