Lightfoot v. Oak Bend Medical Center et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JAN ELIZABETH
LIGHTFOOT,
Plaintiff,
versus
OAK BEND MEDICAL
CENTER, et al,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:25-cv-00837
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
ORDER ADOPTING
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Jan Elizabeth Lightfoot proceeds here pro se.
She sued numerous entities and individuals, apparently
seeking damages and other relief related to her
involuntary commitment and alleged medical billing fraud,
among other things. Dkt 15 at 1–28. No Defendant has
been served or made an appearance in this case.
The matter was referred for disposition to Magistrate
Judge Christina A. Bryan. Dkt 5. She issued a
Memorandum and Recommendation recommending that
the claims be dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a
plausible claim for relief or, alternatively, for failure to
perfect service. Dkt 29 at 2–3.
The district court reviews de novo those conclusions of
a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically
objected. See FRCP 72(b)(3) & 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(C); see
also United States v Wilson, 864 F2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir
1989, per curiam). The district court may accept any other
portions to which there’s no objection if satisfied that no
clear error appears on the face of the record. See Guillory v
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 22, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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PPG Industries Inc, 434 F3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing
Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F3d
1415, 1430 (5th Cir 1996, en banc); see also FRCP 72(b)
advisory committee note (1983).
Plaintiff filed objections. Dkt 30. Among other things,
she contends that service was frustrated by the Court’s
denial of her request for service through the United States
Marshals. Id at 1. And she asserts that the complaint is not
frivolous because it contains “documented evidence” of
ongoing harm, constitutional violations, predicate acts
relevant to civil RICO, and actions taken under color of
law. Id at 2.
On de novo review and determination, Plaintiff’s
objections lack merit. Plaintiff filed her fifth amended
complaint on April 14, 2025. Dkt 15. She was thus required
by Rule 4(m) to perfect service by July 14, 2025. Still no
Defendant has been served. And Plaintiff—not the United
States Marshals nor the Court—is the party responsible for
perfecting service and prosecuting her case.
Th allegations contained within the complaint also fail
to state a cognizable claim for relief. Plaintiff presents
conclusory allegations as to violation of her constitutional
rights. See Dkt 15 at 1–28. The assertions contained
therein fail to make out a facially plausible claim for relief
under federal or state law. And Plaintiff has had notice of
the Court’s intent to dismiss this action and an opportunity
to respond such that sua sponte dismissal isn’t procedurally
unfair. See Anokwuru v City of Houston, 990 F3d 956, 967
(5th Cir 2021).
No clear error otherwise appears upon review and
consideration of the Memorandum and Recommendation,
the record, and the applicable law.
The objections by Plaintiff Jan Elizabeth Lightfoot to
the Memorandum and Recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge are OVERRULED. Dkt 30.
The Memorandum and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Memorandum and
Order of this Court. Dkt 29.
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This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The motions by Plaintiff Jan Elizabeth Lightfoot for
leave to file seventh amended petition and for permission
to file electronically are DENIED AS MOOT. Dkts 33 & 34.
This is a FINAL JUDGMENT.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on January 22, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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