Swarm Technology LLC v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Swarm Technology LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Company,
Defendant.
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Civil Action H-24-4927
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 36. Swarm
Technology 	LLC 	(Swarm) 	filed 	this 	lawsuit 	against 	Hewlett
Packard Enterprise Company (HPE), alleging infringement of U.S.
Patent No. 12,159,1611 	(the ’161 Patent).2 	ECF No. 30; ECF
No. 53-2. The court held a claim construction (Markman3 ) hearing
on December 4, 2025. See Hearing Transcript, ECF No. 72.
1. Background
The ’161 Patent is titled “System and Method for Swarm
Collaborative 	Intelligence 	Using 	Dynamically 	Configurable
Proactive 	Autonomous 	Agents.” 	The 	patent 	states 	that 	“[t]he
present invention generally relates to parallel-process computing,
and 	particularly 	to 	a 	processing 	architecture 	which 	involves
autonomous co-processors configured to proactively retrieve tasks
from a task pool populated by a central processing unit.” 1:19–23.
1 Where citing to the specification and claims of the ’161 Patent, the court uses the format
“column:lines.” without naming the patent each time.
2 Swarm also alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No. 10,592,275 (the ’275 Patent) but has
since limited its allegations to the ’161 Patent. See ECF No. 61; ECF No. 53-2.
3 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 23, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued the ’161
Patent on December 3, 2024. The ’161 Patent is the fourth in a
family of patents. 1:8–15. Preceding the ’161 Patent is the ’275
Patent, issued on March 17, 2020, which is a continuation of U.S.
Patent No. 9,852,004, (the ’004 Patent) issued on Dec. 26, 2017,
which is a continuation of U.S. Patent No. 9,146,777, (the ’777
Patent) issued on Sep. 29, 2015. Id.; ’275 Patent, ECF No. 1-1.
The court has read and carefully considered all the parties’
filings 	and 	evidence 	as 	to 	claim 	construction. 	For 	reasons 	of
judicial economy, however, the court has not addressed in writing
every single argument that the parties have made. The parties
should thus not assume that the court has failed to consider an
argument or evidence that is not specifically discussed herein.
2. Legal Standard for Claim Construction
“The purpose of claim construction is to ‘determin[e] the
meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.’”
Lemoine v. Mossberg Corp., 2020-2140, 2021 WL 4199934, at *2
(Fed. 	Cir. 	Sept. 	15, 	2021) 	(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)). In construing patent claims, context is important. See,
e.g., Lemoine, 2021 WL 4199934, at *2 (finding that the preamble
of the patent provided “important context for the nature and
structure of the invention being claimed” without which it was
“difficult to make sense of the claims”); Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp.
v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(relying on “the context in which the term was used within the
claim 	and 	the 	specification” 	to 	determine 	the 	“proper
construction”).
Claim construction is an issue of law to the extent that it is
decided on the intrinsic evidence. Data Engine Techs. LLC v.
Google LLC, 10 F.4th 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see also Teva
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Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 326 (2015)
(stating that “the ultimate issue of the proper construction of a
claim should be treated as a question of law”). Unless the inventor
acts as a lexicographer and defines claim terms in a special way,
“[t]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary meaning,
which is ‘the meaning that the term would have to a person of
ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.’”
Data Engine Techs. LLC, 10 F.4th at 1381–82 (quoting Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)); see
also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (allowing inventors to give claim
terms special meanings). For purposes of claim construction, “a
person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term
not only in the context of a particular claim in which the disputed
term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
The claims are the portion of the patent that define “the
scope of the patentee’s rights.” Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 574 U.S.
at 321. The court must read the claims, however, in light of the
specification and the prosecution history if in evidence. 	Data
Engine Techs. LLC, 10 F.4th at 1382 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1315, 1317 (referring to the patent as “a fully integrated written
instrument” consisting of a specification that concludes with the
patent claims)). “Typically, the specification is the best guide for
construing the claims.” Lemoine, 2021 WL 4199934, at *2 (citing
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim
construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best
guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”)).
A court also may rely on extrinsic evidence, which includes
dictionaries and expert testimony. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317;
Grace Instrument Indus., LLC v. Chandler Instruments Co., LLC,
57 F.4th 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
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[E]xpert testimony can be useful to a court for a
variety of purposes, such as to provide background on
the technology at issue, to explain how an invention
works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the
technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that
of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a
particular term in the patent or the prior art has a
particular meaning in the pertinent field.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. To the extent, however, that the expert
testimony is conclusory, unsupported, and “clearly at odds with the
claim 	construction 	mandated 	by 	the 	claims 	themselves, 	the
written description, and the prosecution history,” it should be
discounted. Id. (quoting Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161
F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Claim construction may require
that 	the 	district 	court 	“make 	‘credibility 	judgments’ 	about
witnesses.” Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 574 U.S. at 327.
3. Claim Construction
The parties dispute the meaning of these claim terms: (1)
task, (2) task pool, (3) primary controller, (4) and device function
reconfiguration 	task/reconfiguration 	of 	a 	device 	function. 	The
parties agree to the meaning of these terms: (1) task type, (2)
proactively, (3) configured to, (4) CPU/controller, and (5) searching
within the task pool . . . for one or more first tasks. 4
In construing the disputed claim terms and phrases, the
court has focused first and foremost on the claim language and the
specification’s 	description. 	The 	court 	notes 	when 	it 	has 	also
consulted a dictionary and considered the expert testimony to
determine the meaning of the claim language to one of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of the invention.
4 The parties agree to the meaning of this phrase, “searching within the task pool . . . for one
or more first tasks,” and its variations as used in Claims 8, 22, 25, 35, 37, 41, and 42. See
ECF No. 66 at 16.
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A. Task type
The parties agree and the court finds that a “task type” is “a
task attribute that indicates which co-processors/cells are capable
of performing a task.” See ECF No. 66 at 23.
B. Proactively
The parties agree and the court finds that “proactively”
means “initiating change rather than reacting to events (i.e., not
being told to act or not reactionary).” See ECF No. 66 at 29.
C. Configured to
The parties agree and the court finds that “configured to”
means “actually programmed or actually equipped with hardware
or software to.” See ECF No. 66 at 34.
D. CPU/controller
The parties agree and the court finds that the terms “CPU”
and “controller” are interchangeable and do not require the court’s
construction. ECF No. 62 at 36; ECF No. 63 at 22; Hearing
Transcript, ECF No. 72 at 5:16–6:12 (“whether one says plain and
ordinary meaning or the parties just aren’t disputing that, it
requires a construction, we’re fine with the words of the claim
without any further elaboration”).
E. Searching within the task pool . . . for one or
more first tasks
At the Markman Hearing, the parties agreed to the court’s
proposed construction of “searching within the task pool . . . for one
or more first tasks.” Hearing Transcript, ECF No. 72 at 88:24–89:5.
Thus, the parties agree, and the court finds that “searching within
the task pool . . . for one or more first tasks” means “evaluating and
choosing among the available tasks within the task pool in order
to selectively retrieve one with an appropriate task type.” Id.
F. Task
Swarm argues that no construction is necessary for the term
“task” because the plain and ordinary meaning, “a unit of work or
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computation,” applies. ECF No. 60 at 3. HPE argues that a “task”
is “a component or subset of a computational requirement.” ECF
No. 62 at 14.
The term “task” is used in many of the claims, and its
meaning is central to the patent. For example, Claim 1 recites, in
part, “[a] processing system, comprising: a task pool; a primary
controller configured to populate the task pool with a plurality of
tasks, each task having a type field comprising a task type, and a
status field[.]” 14:16–20 (emphasis added). Claim 2 recites the
processing system of Claim 1, “wherein: the first task further
comprises a function to be executed[.]” 14:33–34. Claim 8 covers,
in 	part, 	“[a] 	method 	of 	dynamically 	controlling 	processing
resources in a network comprising a task pool and a primary
controller configured to populate the task pool with a first plurality
of tasks each having a task type. . . [.]” 15:8–11.
The ’161 Patent specification explains that the invention
relates 	to 	parallel-process 	computing. 	1:19–20. 	Traditional
computer processors execute machine coded instructions serially.
1:47–48. 	Traditionally, 	“[t]o 	run 	a 	plurality 	of 	applications
concurrently, 	a 	single 	processor 	interleaves 	instructions 	from
various programs and executes them serially[.]” 1:48–50. It goes
on to state that:
True parallel or multi-core processing, on the other
hand, is a computational approach that breaks large
computational 	tasks 	into 	individual 	blocks 	of
computations and distributes them among two or more
processors. A computing architecture that uses task
parallelism 	(parallel 	processing) 	divides 	a 	large
computational requirement into discrete modules of
executable code.
1:52–58. The specification explains that in a typical multiprocessor
system, the CPU “partitions the computational requirements into
tasks[,]” 	which 	are 	distributed 	to 	co-processors. 	1:62–64. 	The
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specification explains that “[e]ach task thread 21 represents a
computational task that may be a component or subset of the
larger aggregate computational requirement imposed on the CPU
11.” 7:16–19.
Swarm has stated to the PTO on multiple occasions that a
task “represents a computational task that is a component or
subset of a larger aggregate computational requirement imposed
on the CPU[.]” Swarm’s Response ’004 Patent IPR, ECF No. 62-11
at 27, 56, 9; Swarm’s Response ’275 Patent IPR, ECF No. 62-12
at 58. Swarm also argued that a task “represents a computational
task that may be a component or subset of a larger aggregate
computational requirement imposed on the CPU[.]” ECF No. 62-
12 at 33, 10 (emphasis added). Said another way, Swarm explained
that the CPU “divide[s] an aggregate computational problem into
a 	group 	of 	tasks,” 	or 	“partitions 	an 	aggregate 	computing
requirement into a plurality of tasks[.]” Id. at 12. Swarm also
argued that the prior art was distinguishable from its invention
because the prior art did not “divide a large computational task
into smaller groups of tasks[.]” ECF No. 62-11 at 24.
The Federal Circuit explained that a CPU “breaks down
large 	computational 	tasks 	into 	individual 	blocks 	of
computations[.]” Swarm Tech. LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2023-
2323, 2025 WL 1793698, at *1 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2025).
The 	court 	finds 	that 	a 	“task” 	is 	“a 	discreet 	block 	of
computations or machine executable instructions that is part of
the CPU’s overall computational requirement.”
G. Task pool
Swarm argues that “‘task pool’ requires no construction, and
should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning as described in
the specification: hardware and/or software for managing tasks.”
ECF No. 60 at 5. HPE argues that a “task pool” is “a collection of
tasks of multiple types.” ECF No. 62 at 18.
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The 	claims 	contemplate 	that 	a 	plurality 	of 	tasks 	will
populate the task pool. For example, the claims often refer to a
primary controller that is “configured to populate the task pool
with a plurality of tasks.” 14:18–19; 17:48–49; 18:3–4; 21:17–18;
22:18–19; 23:8–9.
The claims also contemplate that the task pool can send and
receive 	notifications 	to 	and 	from 	the 	CPU 	and 	co-processors.
14:56–57 (“prior to the task pool sending the second notification to
the controller of completion of the first task”); 14:63–65 (“the first
co-processor is configured to process the second task and notify the
task 	pool 	upon 	completion 	of 	the 	second 	task”); 	16:24–25
(“programming the CPU to communicate with the task pool”).
The specification explains that the task pool, after being
populated by the CPU, “contains one or more task threads,” where
each task thread may contain one or more discrete tasks. 7:15–22.
Thus, a populated task pool may contain one or more tasks. The
specification also states that the task pool may be software based
or “disposed in a dedicated hardware block.” 7:9–14.
The court finds that a “task pool” is “hardware or software
that contains the available tasks.” The words of each claim must
be read in conjunction with this definition to determine the scope
of the claimed invention. The court’s definition does not exclude
the possibility that the task pool may contain only one task or a
single task type when populated. This definition also does not
exclude the possibility that the task pool will send and receive
notifications.
H. Primary controller
Swarm 	argues 	that 	“‘primary 	controller’ 	requires 	no
construction, and should be accorded the ordinary meaning it has
in the field of computing and as described in the specification:
hardware 	and/or 	software 	for 	managing 	a 	network 	and 	for
accessing the task pool.” Swarm argues that “primary controller”
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is used interchangeably with “CPU” and “controller.” ECF No. 60
at 18. HPE argues that “primary controller” is indefinite.
Patent claims are indefinite if, when read in light of the
intrinsic evidence, “they do not ‘inform those skilled in the art
about 	the 	scope 	of 	the 	invention 	with 	reasonable 	certainty.’”
Horizon Pharma, Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys Inc., 839 F. App’x 500,
505 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments,
Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014)). “The definiteness requirement . . .
mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute precision is
unattainable.” Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 910. Because “[a] lack of
definiteness renders invalid ‘the patent or any claim in suit[,]’” the
burden of proof is by clear and convincing evidence. Nautilus, Inc.,
572 U.S. at 902; Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d
1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Many patent claims in the ’161 Patent refer to a “primary
controller” (e.g., Claims 1, 8, 9, 25, 26, and 37–42). See, e.g., 14:18;
15:9–10; 15:36; 17:48, 67; 18:3, 26; and 21:16. Often, the claims
state that the primary controller is configured to populate the task
pool with a plurality of tasks. The claims do not explicitly state
how a primary controller is different from any other controller.5
The claims also sometimes use “primary controller” synonymously
with “CPU” and “controller.” See, e.g., Claims 1, 26, 38, 39, 40.
The specification describes multiple embodiments, which the
court separates into three situations. (1) A system that may
contain more than one controller and more than one task pool,
without describing which controller is “primary”; (2) a system with
a single controller, not referred to as a “primary” controller; and
5 Swarm spends most of its reply brief differentiating the primary controller from co-
processors. ECF No. 63 at 14–16. This distinction does not inform the court about how the
primary controller is different from a “controller” or “CPU.” The parties agree that “CPU”
and “controller” are interchangeable terms.
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(3) a system with a single controller described as a “primary control
unit.”
As to the first situation, the specification states that the
system may include more than one CPU and more than one task
pool, “in which case a particular CPU 11 may interact exclusively
with a particular task pool 13, or multiple CPUs 11 may share one
or more task pools[.]” 4:56–60. The specification does not describe
which of the multiple CPUs that may populate the task pool is the
“primary controller.” The specification does not ever use the word
“primary” 	when 	describing 	such 	an 	embodiment. 	Swarm’s
argument seems to indicate that all CPUs that populate a task pool
are also the “primary controller.” See, e.g., Hearing Transcript,
ECF No. 72 at 76:24–77:22 (“Primary controller equals controller.
Neither are equal to coprocessors.”).
As to the second situation, the specification describes a
system including one CPU or controller, a task pool, and one or
more co-processors. See, e.g., 	3:62–65; 4:37–45; 12:41–44. The
controller in these examples is not referred to as a “primary
controller.”
As to the third situation, the specification refers to a system
with one controller that is the “primary control unit.”6 11:65–66.
This 	is 	the 	only 	reference 	to 	“primary” 	in 	the 	specification.
Referring to Figure 5, the specification explains that “an internet
of things network 500 use case illustrates the dynamic harnessing
of nearby (or otherwise available) devices. Network 500 includes a
primary control unit 502 (e.g., a laptop, tablet, or gaming device),
a task pool 504, a first co-processor device 506, and a second co-
processor 	device[].” 	11:65–12:1. 	The 	specification 	provides 	an
example wherein a laptop connects to the task pool and populates
6 The patent does not explicitly say that a primary control unit is the same as a primary
controller.
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it with computationally intensive tasks. 12:3–30. Then, a nearby
underutilized device, such as a smart phone, connects to the task
pool and becomes a co-processor assisting the laptop. Id. Under
these 	circumstances, 	there 	is 	only 	one 	controller, 	which 	is
described as the “primary” control unit.
The court turns to the remaining evidence. The prosecution
history shows that Swarm argued that a controller is a “system
level controller.” IPR ’275 Patent Hearing, ECF No. 62-14 at 35:1–
3. It is not clear how a “system level controller” varies from the
“primary controller” claimed in the ’161 Patent.
HPE 	provides 	extrinsic 	evidence 	from 	Dr. 	William
Michalson. Dr. Michalson states in his declaration that the scope
of 	the 	claims 	that 	include 	the 	term 	“primary 	controller” 	is
uncertain to one of ordinary skill in the art because the claims and
specification 	do 	not 	provide 	guidance 	on 	what 	a 	“primary
controller” is, as opposed to any other type of controller.7 ECF
No. 62-3 at 17 ¶ 45.
In common usage, “primary” means “first in order of time or
development” 	or 	“of 	first 	rank, 	importance, 	or 	value.”
Primary, M ERRIAM -W EBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/primary (last visited Jan. 14, 2026) (that definition
implies that there can be only one “primary” element in a given
system).
“[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in
light 	of 	the 	specification 	delineating 	the 	patent, 	and 	the
prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those
skilled 	in 	the 	art 	about 	the 	scope 	of 	the 	invention.” 	Biosig
Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2015). Claims must always be read in light of the specification.
7 Dr. Michalson’s testimony is unrebutted. Even so, the court understands that “expert
reports and testimony [are] generated at the time of and for the purpose of litigation and thus
can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence.” See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318.
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SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc’ns AB, 820 F.3d
419, 429–30 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “The construction that stays true to
the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s
description 	of 	the 	invention 	will 	be, 	in 	the 	end, 	the 	correct
construction.” Id. at 430.
The Federal Circuit has explained that interpretations that
render 	some 	portion 	of 	the 	claim 	language 	superfluous 	are
disfavored. 	SimpleAir, 	Inc., 	820 	F.3d 	at 	429. 	However, 	that
preference is “not an inflexible rule that supersedes all other
principles of claim construction.” Id. For example, in Intel Corp. v.
Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 801, 809–10 (Fed. Cir. 2021), the court
explained that every buffer is implemented in hardware. Thus,
“hardware buffer” “must mean something more than just a ‘buffer
implemented in hardware,’ . . . or else the word ‘hardware’ would
be erased from the claims.” Id. It is also highly disfavored to
construe terms in a way that renders them void or meaningless.
Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1288
n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
The Federal Circuit has also held that, where a patent allows
multiple methods that lead to different results, without guidance
as to which method should be used, patent claims are indefinite.
Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova Chemicals Corp., 803 F.3d 620, 633–34
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d
1335, 	1344–45 	(Fed. 	Cir. 	2015). 	Although 	“some 	modicum 	of
uncertainty” is tolerated, “the patent and prosecution history must
disclose a single known approach or establish that, where multiple
known approaches exist, a person having ordinary skill in the art
would know which approach to select.” Dow Chem. Co., 803 F.3d
at 630. In other words, a patent must afford clear notice of what is
claimed, thereby apprising the public of what is still open to them.
Teva Pharm., 789 F.3d at 1341.
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Here, the word “primary” should distinguish the “primary
controller” from any other controller or CPU. The claims and
specification 	do 	not 	inform, 	with 	reasonable 	certainty, 	those
skilled in the art how to identify which controller in a given system
is 	“primary.” 	The 	intrinsic 	evidence 	does 	not 	clarify 	what
controller is “primary.” The unrebutted extrinsic evidence shows
that the term “primary controller” has no specific meaning to one
of ordinary skill in the art. A person of ordinary skill in the art,
presented with a system having multiple controllers would have
no way of determining which one is “primary.” Similarly, a person
of ordinary skill in the art presented with a system having a single
controller would have no way of knowing whether the single
controller would qualify as “primary.” The patent does not afford a
clear notice of what is claimed.
The ’161 Patent’s claims, read in light of the specification
and 	the 	prosecution 	history, 	fail 	to 	inform, 	with 	reasonable
certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the primary
controller. The court finds that “primary controller” is indefinite.
I. 	Device function reconfiguration task
Swarm argues that “device function reconfiguration task”
and “reconfiguration of a device function” require no construction
and should be accorded the ordinary meaning it has in the field of
computing and as described in the specification: “a task or process
which modifies a device’s capabilities.” ECF No. 60 at 15–16. HPE
argues that these claim terms are indefinite.
HPE 	argues 	that 	the 	claims 	provide 	no 	definition 	of
“reconfiguration” and that, “[w]ithout any criteria to distinguish a
‘reconfiguration task’ from other tasks, one of ordinary skill in the
art is unable to ascertain the intended scope.” In response, Swarm
argues that “a reconfiguration task generally refers to a task which
reconfigures a device.” ECF No. 63 at 17.
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The 	parties 	agree 	that 	“configured 	to” 	means 	“actually
programmed or actually equipped with hardware or software to.”
Claim 37 is the only claim that mentions “reconfiguration.”
21:14–36 (emphasis added). The Claim, in its entirety, recites:
21:13–36. The specification provides examples of a device. 11:42–
52. The specification states that an internet of things network
includes 	a 	controller, 	a 	task 	pool, 	and 	“various 	devices.” 	Id.
Examples of a “device” include a light bulb, a thermostat, an
electrical receptacle, a power switch, an appliance, a vehicle, a
keyboard, 	and 	“virtually 	any 	other 	plug 	and 	play 	device 	or
application capable of interfacing with a network.” 11:47–52.
The claim states that the first cell is configured to operate a
device. The first task “comprises a reconfiguration of a device
function of the device to perform a second task from the plurality
of tasks[.]” 21:34–36. Apparently, after the first cell performs the
first 	task, 	the 	device 	is 	enabled 	to 	perform 	a 	“second 	task.”
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Nowhere 	in 	the 	specification 	or 	claims 	is 	such 	an 	operation
disclosed. 	There 	is 	no 	intrinsic 	evidence 	to 	explain 	what
“reconfiguration” means in the context of Claim 37. There is no
explanation in the claim or specification that defines the scope of
a reconfiguration or how a reconfiguration task otherwise differs
from other tasks.
The closest the specification comes to describing what is
recited in Claim 37 is the discussion of Figure 5. 11:63–12:30.
There, the specification refers to a nearby underutilized device,
such as a smartphone. 12:22. The smartphone connects to the task
pool and retrieves an appropriate task. 12:23–24. The smartphone
thus “becomes a co-processor seamlessly assisting the laptop.”
12:25–26. The specification goes on to say that “even the processing
power of an available light-bulb 506 may become a co-processor to
the laptop.” 12:29–30. The problem is that this discussion does not
describe any sort of reconfiguration of the smartphone or the
lightbulb. There is no indication that the lightbulb, for example,
needed 	to 	be 	reconfigured 	to 	perform 	a 	task, 	or 	if 	any
reconfiguration took place, how that happened. One is simply left
to guess.
“[A] claim term is indefinite if it ‘leave[s] the skilled artisan
to consult the unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion.’”
Dow Chem. Co., 803 F.3d at 635. The patent and prosecution
history do not inform those skilled in the art about the scope of
“device function reconfiguration task” or “reconfiguration of a
device function.” Accordingly, the court finds that “device function
reconfiguration task” and “reconfiguration of a device function” are
indefinite.
4. Conclusion
The 	parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this
Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections. 28
U.S.C. 	§ 636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72. 	Failure 	to 	timely 	file
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objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal
conclusions, 	except 	for 	plain 	error. 	See 	Thomas 	v. 	Arn, 	474
U.S. 140, 147–49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–
77 (5th Cir. 1988).
Signed at Houston, Texas on January 23, 2026.
______________________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
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