MMA Law Firm, PLLC v. MORRIS BART, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MMA LAW FIRM, PLLC,
P la inti.ff/App ellee,
vs.
MORRIS BART, LLC,
Defendant/Appe llant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
ORDER
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-4446
ADVERSARY PRO. NO. 24-3127
This Court has before it multiple pending civil actions arising from various adversary
proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, In re: MMA Law Firm,
PLLC, No. 24-31596 (Banl<r. S.D. Tex.). This matter is part of the ongoing disputes over the
collection of attorneys' fees and costs in thousands of underlying cases filed in Louisiana.
Throughout the course of the somewhat contentious proceedings in the Banl<ruptcy Court, the
parties have appealed or brought directly several different issues to this Court- 	spanning from
discovery-related disputes to di spositive motions. As a result, this Court has remained involved in
various stages of these somewhat complex adversary proceedings. In fact, after Morris Bart, LLC
("Morris Bart") invoked its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, this Court withdrew the
reference to the Bankruptcy Court for any matters concerning the dispute over attorneys ' fees or
costs but referred all pretrial proceedings back to the Bankruptcy Court. (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc.
Nos. 5, 21). 1 That dispute over attorneys ' fees and costs is the heart of the underlying adversary
proceeding and the immediate subject of this summary judgment analysis.
1 Due to the complex procedural nature of this proceeding, this Order requires docket citations for
at least four different civil actions pending in the Southern District of Texas. For clarity, any
citations to a docket entry will include the cause number and the corresponding docket number.
Many of these references are to filings in No. 4:24-CV-4446 and No. 4:25-CV-4059. While those
cases were consolidated into No. 4:24-CV-4446, (No. 4 :25 -4059, Doc. No. 17) , the citations are
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 23, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 33

This litigation is cunently in the summary judgment stage, though the procedural posture
leading up to this Order is somewhat unusual. Pending before this Court is the resolution of (1)
Monis Bart's Motion for Summary Judgment filed directly in this Court in Civil Action No. 4:24-
CV-4446 (Doc. No. 19) and (2) Monis Bart's appeal of the Bankruptcy Court order denying a
similar Motion for Summary Judgment filed in the underlying adversary proceeding. (Bankr. No.
24-3127, Doc. Nos. 96, 104, 105). That appeal is pending before this Court in Civil Action No.
4:25-CV-4059. For the ease of the parties, the Court consolidated these two civil actions into Civil
Action No. 4:24-CV-4446. (No. 4:25-4059, Doc. No. 17). 2 Upon review of the relevant pleadings,
admissible summary judgment evidence, and relevant legal standards, this Court finds that, with
two exceptions, McClenny Moseley and Associates, PLLC ("MMA") voluntarily and knowingly
waived its right to collect attorneys' fees or costs in any case pending in the Eastern District of
Louisiana on or before March 15 , 2024. The Bankruptcy Court order denying Monis Bart's Motion
for Summary Judgment (Bankr. No. 24-3127, Doc. No. 104, 105) is reversed-in-part. Monis Bart's
Motions for Summary Judgment filed in that proceeding and the one filed directly with this Court
to pre-consolidation filings referenced by the original cause number. Additionally, the Court notes
that there are several Louisiana-based actions that impact the disbursement of attorneys' fees.
These cases have been heavily cited by the parties and are referenced throughout this Order.
2 The Motion for Summary Judgment filed directly with this Court (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No.
19) was filed in the action wherein this Court withdrew the reference from the Bankruptcy Court
for "all matters concerning the fees in the Former Cases collected by Monis Bart and those claimed
in the Former Cases by MMA." (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 5). Morris Bart filed the Motion for
Summary Judgment in that matter on May 21 , 2025. (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19). On June
18 , 2025, Morris Bart filed an identical Motion for Summary Judgment in the underlying adversary
proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court. (Bankr. No. 24-3127, Doc. No. 96). The appeal of the
Bankruptcy Court order denying the Motion for Summary Judgment is also before this Court in
Civil Action No. 4:25-CV-4059. The Court has consolidated these two cases for ease of
consideration.
2
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 33

(No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19) are granted-in-part. Following the entry of this Order, the Court
will enter an order severing this issue into a new cause number to make it final and appealable.
I. 	Factual Background
In 2021 , Hurricane Ida made landfall across the Louisiana coastline. As the worst storm to
hit the State since Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Ida undoubtedly caused severe damage to a great
many properties with high winds, heavy rainfall, and flooding. In the wake of the devastation, a
Houston-based law firm, McClenny Moseley and Associates, PLLC, began marketing its services
to potential claimants with property damage from the storm. (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19-1 at
5). While there is a significant dispute over the exact scope of the alleged marketing services, it is
undisputed that MMA utilized a company called Velawcity to promote the law firm to potential
Hurricane Ida-related claimants, and Velawcity also helped MMA manage the client intake
process. 3 (Id. at 9). Through this marketing strategy, MMA represented (or, at least, represented to
Louisiana courts that it represented) hundreds, if not thousands, of Hurricane Ida claimants in cases
filed primarily against their home insurance companies. (Id. at 5).
These cases were filed in federal and state courts across Louisiana. Some courts became
particularly concerned with MMA's management of such a substantial docket and whether its use
3 There is a significant dispute over the role ofVelawcity in this litigation. On the one hand, MMA
contends that Velawcity's role was an ethical use of marketing services. (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc.
No . 22 at 7). On the other hand, Morris Bart, among other things, argues that Velawcity was
engaged in unethical practices, as well as the unauthorized practice of law. (No. 4:24-CV-4446,
Doc. No. 19 at 18 - 20). For the limited purpose of this Order, the Court need not determine the
exact role of Velawcity in any communications with the clients, or whether, as a matter of law, the
use of Velawcity violated some law or ethics rule. Nothing in this Order should be construed as a
finding on the legal or ethical standards governing the use ofVelawcity. A resolution of this issue
is not necessary to reach a determination at this stage of the summary judgment pleadings.
Nevertheless, courts across Louisiana have made factual and legal conclusions about the role of
Velawcity. This Court references those findings here for the sole purpose of adding context to this
Order, but this Court does not necessarily adopt those findings.
3
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 33

of Velawcity and other marketing strategies violated the State's ethical rules. For example, in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Chief Magistrate Judge Michael
North held several proceedings related to the alleged misconduct of MMA in these cases-
including its use of Velawcity to obtain clients. Judge North de scribed Velawcity as a "modem-
day case runner" that "violated multiple ethical rules and, quite possibly, Louisiana law. "
Franatovich v. Allied Tr. In s. C o. , 2023 WL 7005861 , at *1, * 11 (E .D. La. Mar. 16 , 2023). He also
described the relationship between MMA and Velawcity as "a brazen, multi-faceted campaign"
that utilized Velawcity as non-lawyer marketers "to directly solicit prospective clients and to obtain
written contingency-fee contracts from those persons . .. before the ' client' ever spoke with a
lawyer associated with MMA, much less any lawyer." Id. at * 1, * 12 (emphasis in original).
Considering these findings, Judge North held that MMA's conduct constituted an "overt and
knowing violation of Rule 11 " and impos ed monetary sanctions on the firm. Id. at * 12 .
MMA's ability to manage its Hurricane Ida docket apparently went quickly downhill. 4
After the Franatovich order, "all of the Louisiana-licensed attorneys at MMA [] resigned from the
firm and withdr[ew] from all cases they had filed on behalf of insureds with Hurricane Ida claims."
(No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19 -31 at 1). Obviously, these clients needed new attorneys to
represent them and/or to bring their cases to a conclusion. In many of these cases, former MMA
4 The Declaration of John Zachary Moseley ("Moseley Declaration"), the managing member of
MMA, states that "[a]fter negative orders were entered by Louisiana District Courts and the
licens es of MMA's attorneys were suspended in Louisiana, MMA was no longer able to represent
its clients in that state." (Bankr. No. 24-3127, Doc. No. 94-1 at~ 13). One must keep in mind that
the most critical orders and dates they were issued were: In re : Richard William Huye III, No.
2023-B-00277 (La. Mar. 3, 2023), Franatovich v. Allied Tr. Ins. Co. , 2023 WL 7005861 (E .D. La.
Mar. 16 , 2023), and In re McClenny, Moseley & Associates, PLLC, No. 3:23-mc-00062 (W.D. La.
Aug. 22, 2023) (Doc. No. 37), rev 'don other grounds, 2024 WL 2874371 (5th Cir. 2024). These
orders were all issued well before MMA filed for bankruptcy and well before the waiver issue
arose in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Thus, by the time the events pertinent to this matter
occurred, MMA admits that it was already incapable of representing its Louisiana clients.
4
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 33

clients turned to Morris Bart, a Louisiana-based law firm. 5 (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19-32).
As Morris Bart began its representation of these clients, the distribution of attorneys' fees and the
payment of litigation costs became relevant to any final settlement. Moreover, in order to complete
the resolution of the claims, the defendant insurance companies needed to know if MMA retained
any interest in the settlement funds by virtue of its contingent fee contracts. This issue created a
need to address whether- 	after all of the alleged misconduct and mismanagement of these cases-
MMA was entitled to attorneys' fees or costs at all. Ricks v. Imperial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co ., No. 23-
2844, 2024 WL 1750738, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2024).
In order to resolve this Eastern District-wide problem, Judge North ordered MMA to "show
cause why, by virtue of the numerous established instances of its misconduct in this District . ..
MMA has not forfeited the right to recover fees and/or costs from its former clients who settle their
claims prose or with the assistance of new counsel." Ricks, No. 23 -2844 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2024)
(Doc. No. 31 ). In response to this order, MMA argued that there was no active case or controversy
for the court to decide because it did not intend to seek fees in the Ricks case, so "such a categorical
approach . . . to determine MMA's entitlement to attorney's fees on a docket-wide basis ... would
be improper." Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Feb. 14 , 2024) (Doc. No. 36). In other words, MMA
argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether its conduct effectively forfeited
its right to attorneys' fees and costs in other Hurricane Ida cases because it was not seeking fees in
the Ricks case. Id. The Ricks court held the show cause hearing on February 21 , 2024. Ricks, No.
23-2844 (E.D. La. Feb. 21 , 2024) (Doc. No. 41).
5 The Moseley Declaration also states that "at least 1,524 [] clients formally substitute[ed] Morris
Bart in place of MMA." (Bankr. No. 24-3127, Doc. No. 94-1 at 1 17). The total number of
underlying cases- 	including those cases in which other Louisiana law firms became the successor
law firm-involved in this bankruptcy proceeding exceeds 2,000. Thus, Morris Bart took over a
substantial part of the MMA's Hurricane Ida docket.
5
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 33

After the hearing, counsel for the insurance company filed a supplemental brief related to
whether the Ricks court had jurisdiction to issue a district-wide order to address whether MMA
was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E .D. La. Feb. 28 , 2024) (Doc. No.
45). The brief argued that although MMA waived its right to seek attorneys' fees or costs in the
Ricks lawsuit, the issue was not moot, as "a lender, Equal Access Justice Fund . .. claim[ ed] that
it ha[d] a 'fully perfected security interest in [MMA]'s fee interest in' the cases transferred" to
successor law firms . Id. Thus, as counsel for the insurance company contended, MMA's waiver of
fees in the Ricks case would not prevent MMA's litigation lenders from attempting to collect the
fees and costs; whereas, "if the [c]ourt rule[ d] that MMA is ineligible for fees, it effectively
extinguishes both MMA's and the [lender' s] claims to those fees, eliminating the grounds for the
[lender] to later challenge MMA's fee waiver." Id.
In response, MMA reiterated the same jurisdictional argument: the Ricks court could not
determine whether MMA was eligible for fees across all Hurricane Ida cases because MMA had
waived its right to fees in the Ricks case. Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Mar. 15 , 2024) (Doc. No.
47). MMA additionally represented that it "does not intend to intervene in any cases pending in
[the Eastern District] to seek attorneys' fees or costs." Id. MMA qualified this waiver with a
footnote stating that "MMA does not waive any rights, other than to notify the [c]ourt that it does
not intend to file interventions in any cases in this [c]ourt." Id. The footnote also stated that "MMA
specifically reserves the right to institute proceedings against successor law firms like Daly &
Black to advance any claims it may have for breach of contract, or any other remedy it may pursue
under the law, against any firms that have caused MMA redressable harm." Id.
In response to this "non-waiver" statement, the court ordered MMA to provide "a complete
and comprehensive list of every case currently pending in this District in which it intends to
6
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 33

seek attorneys' fees and/or costs." Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Mar. 25, 2024) (Doc. No. 49)
(emphasis added). In response to this order, MMA filed a "List of Cases Currently Pending in the
Eastern District of Louisiana in Which Non-Party MMAintends to SeekAttorneys' Fees and/or
Costs." Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2024) (Doc. No. 50) (emphasis added). In the event
its objection to the court's jurisdiction was overruled, MMA once again stated that it "maintains
that there are no [Eastern District] cases in which it intends to intervene or file liens to recover
attorney's fees ." Id. (emphasis added). Further, MMA represented that it "does not intend to
intervene in any cases pending in this [c]ourt, so there is no list to provide reflecting pending
[Eastern District] cases in which MMA intends to seek attorney's fees ." Id. (emphasis added).
MMA's blanket waiver was made with only two exceptions: MMA stated that it was
"considering filing lawsuits against Daly & Black and Galindo Law, which MMA believes have
breached agreements with MMA and which have taken action that may give ri se to various causes
of action for relief related to Daly & Black's and Galindo Law's handling of Hurricane Ida claims
for former clients." Id. " In a good faith attempt to comply with the [c]ourt's order ," MMA
provided a list of all of the cases "in which it intends to seek attorneys' fees and/or costs"
including only those cases in which either of those two firms was the successor law firm. Id.
(emphas is added). This list only referred to fees that may "be at issue in a potential future lawsuit."
Id. MMA repeatedly referred to Daly & Black and Galindo Law as the only two law firms from
which it intended to seek fees or costs through future litigation. MMA never mentioned Morris
Bart or any other firm or lawyer, and it did not list any of their cases on this all-inclusive list.
After holding the show cause hearing and reviewing the briefing, Judge North, relying on
the totality of these representations, held that "the multiple affirmative statements in multiple briefs
filed with [the court] that it would not seek to recover fees and/or costs from cases pending [in the
7
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 7 of 33

Eastern District] constitutes a voluntary and knowing waiver of any right to do so." Ricks, 2024
WL 1750738, at *4. Judge North also held that "MMA has knowingly and completely waived its
rights to intervene or otherwise seek to recover fees and/or costs in this or any other lawsuit
pending in this District." Id. at *6. United States District Judge Sarah Vance adopted the Ricks
Report and Recommendation without objection on April 23, 2024. Ricks v. Imperial Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co ., No. 23-2844, 2024 WL 1740172 (E.D. La. Apr. 23 , 2024).
On April 9, 2024- 	five days after the Ricks order referenced above held that MMA
voluntarily and knowingly waived its right to collect fees or costs in any pending case in the
Eastern District- 	MMA filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas. (Bankr.
No. 24-31596, Doc. No. 1).
Once in bankruptcy, MMA filed an adversary proceeding against Morris Bart (and other
successor law firms) to seek reimbursement for attorneys' fees and costs resulting from the
Hurricane Ida cases. (Bankr. No. 24-3127, Doc. No. 1) . These proceedings include an attempt to
recover the very fees that MMA told Judge North it would not seek. Morris Bart then filed Motions
for Summary Judgment in this Court and in the Bankruptcy Court adversary proceeding to argue
that, as a matter of law, MMA is not entitled to attorneys' fees or costs. Among the grounds raised
in the summary judgment motions is the fact that all Eastern District fees and costs (with the
exceptions of the two law firms noted above) have been waived. The Bankruptcy Court denied the
Motion, and its order is now on appeal in this Court. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed
directly in this Court is still pending. Both sides have briefed the issue. Since both cases concern
the same issues, the Court consolidated the cases into the oldest cause number. Given that this
Court must review the Bankruptcy Court order de novo and that the same Motion for Summary
Judgment (the subject of the Bankruptcy Court order) is still pending in this Court, this Court will
8
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 8 of 33

address the pending Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19) and the
appeal of the Bankruptcy Court order denying summary judgment (No. 4:25-CV-4059) together
in this Order. In re Webb , 954 F.2d 1102, 1103 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 501 (5th
Cir. 1998).
II. 	Legal Standards
The Court will use the traditional summary judgment standard to conduct the analysis
below. Summary judgment is warranted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Clv. P.
56(a). "The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. " Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc. , 485
F.3d 253,261 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322- 25 (1986)). Once
a movant submits a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show that
the court should not grant the motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321 - 25. The non-movant then must
provide specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute. Id. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co . v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S . 574, 587 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if
"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in deciding a summary judgment
motion. Id. at 255. The key question on summary judgment is whether there is evidence raising an
issue of material fact upon which a hypothetical, reasonable factfinder could find in favor of the
nonmoving party. Id. at 248. It is the responsibility of the parties to specifically point the Court to
the pertinent evidence, and its location, in the record that the party thinks are relevant. Malacara
9
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 9 of 33

v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003). It is not the duty of the Court to search the record for
evidence that might establish an issue of material fact. Id.
Ill. 	Analysis
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Morris Bart offers two theories to establish that
MMA is not entitled to attorneys' fees or costs in the underlying Hurricane Ida cases. First, Morris
Bart argues that since MMA violated substantive state law and the general ethical standards in
Louisiana, MMA should be precluded from recovering any fees or costs. Second, and in the
alternative, Morris Bart argues that even if Louisiana state law does not bar MMA from recovering
fees or costs, MMA voluntarily and knowingly waived any right to fees or costs in any case that
was pending (or may still be pending) in the Eastern District of Louisiana. This Order addresses
the latter.
At the outset of this analysis, the Court notes that the majority of the briefing on summary
judgment addresses the former issue, so it involves Louisiana state law and ethical standards.
Morris Bart briefed an intricate argument that the combination of certain case law on the collection
of attorneys' fees, the Louisiana civil code, and the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct bars
MMA from collecting any attorneys' fees or costs. Given the nature of the subject of this litigation
and the somewhat dramatic history that Louisiana courts have with MMA, this Court plans to
submit a certification request to the Supreme Court of Louisiana with certain questions related to
the substantive state law that relate to the claim that MMA is precluded from recovering attorneys'
fees or costs. This Court is hopeful that, if accepted, the response to the certification by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana will provide significant guidance toward the resolution of the overall
litigation. Consequently, this Order will not broach the topics that will be addressed in the
certification request. Until this Court receives the response from the Supreme Court, it will reserve
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 10 of 33

any ruling on the substantive state law issu es that may affect each of the underlying cases in various
different judicial venues in Louisiana, not just those stemming from the Eastern District.
Nevertheless, the record is sufficient to address the second argument set forth in the Motion
for Summary Judgment: did MMA waive its right to collect attorneys' fees or costs in the Eastern
District of Louisiana? If so, can MMA, through the magic of bankruptcy, "undo" such a waiver
and claim the fees or costs as a part of its bankruptcy estate? The Court proceeds with the analysis
below and finds, as a matter of law, that MMA did voluntarily and knowingly waive any right to
collect attorneys' fees or costs from any case that was pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana
on or before March 15, 2024, the date on which MMA first represented to the Eastern District that
it waived its right to any attorneys ' fees or costs. Therefore, this Court grants-in-part Morris Bart's
Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19) and reverses the Bankruptcy
Court order denying summary judgment as it relates to any case that emanates from the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
A. The Waiver
While this Court has already provided some background, it will endeavor to cover the
pertinent (and somewhat contentious) history of the relevant Hurricane Ida litigation- 	with a focus
on the tension between Louisiana courts and the conduct of MMA. This history includes several
different court orders in different jurisdictions- 	issued both before and after MMA filed for
bankruptcy here in the Southern District of Texas. The parties argue that the Bankruptcy Court
here and the courts of the Eastern District of Louisiana are polarized when it comes to what the
other court orders mean, and which court has jurisdiction over what. While this alleged conflict
may appear to be somewhat unusual- 	as all courts tend to afford each other a certain level of
comity- 	it also may be somewhat expected given this unusual multi-jurisdictional fact pattern.
11
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 11 of 33

Nevertheless, this Court finds that the perceived conflict does not prevent an orderly disposition
of this issue.
As discussed above, the attorneys ' fees and costs dispute arises from a multitude of
underlying cases that stem from the damage caused by Hurricane Ida. In the immediate aftermath
of the storm, lawyers- 	both in-state and from outside of Louisiana- 	began to seek clients. Well
before MMA filed for bankruptcy or the hearing or rulings at issue in this proceeding occurred,
the Louisiana courts (both state and federal) were not only burdened with an avalanche of cases
but were also faced with a number of ancillary problems created by allegations of misconduct
taken by unscrupulous lawyers and law firms. MMA and its lawyers (and agents) were the primary
focus of much of the criticism in this judicial drama. This Court need not go into detail about the
various misdeeds that allegedly occurred throughout this Hurricane Ida litigation, but it does feel
that there is a need to set the stage for what happened next- 	especially as it pertains to the eventual
waiver of attorneys ' fees and costs.
To that end, the Court will briefly quote from two federal district court opinions-one from
the Eastern District of Louisiana and one from the Western District of Louisiana. As one can readily
see, these opinions include descriptions of various actions that would certainly grab the attention
of any legal ethics professor. In the Eastern District, Chief Magistrate Judge Michael North wrote:
Since first appearing in this District less than a year ago, [MMA] and its attorneys,
in particular Zach Moseley ("Moseley") and R. William Huye, III ("Huye"), have
engaged in a pattern of misconduct on a scale likely never before seen here. The
record in these cases establishes that they have undertaken a brazen, multi-faceted
campaign to enrich themselves with ill-gotten contingency fees paid to them by
unwitting insurance companies ostensibly on behalf of named insureds that they
and their firm did not represent.
They have lied to numerous insurance carriers claiming to represent insureds who
had never heard of them; they have invoked appraisal and even filed lawsuits on
behalf of people they knew they did not represent; they have, through non-lawyer
agents in faraway places, directly solicited insureds who had never previously
12
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 12 of 33

reached out to them; they have filed cases in multiple districts on behalf of insureds
they did represent in which they sued the wrong insurance company; they have paid
millions of dollars to an advertising firm to act as their agent to "deliver" pre-
screened clients and signed contingency-fee agreements to their firm at a rate of
$3,500.00 per contract; they have failed to disclose known conflicts to potential
clients; and they have lied to the judge in open court.
If only this were hyperbole- alas, it is all established fact, proven by MMA's own
statements and documents they have produced that are now in the record. I've been
a lawyer for 25 years- I have never seen a clearer or more shameless series of
violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the Rules of Professional
Conduct than what confronts us here. What is less clear is: What will be the ultimate
impact of the violations and misconduct catalogued here on the Court and, far more
importantly, on the policyholders of this District who continue to await resolution
of their Hurricane Ida claims because of MM A' s misconduct?
Franatovich, 2023 WL 7005861 , at *1.
The Western District of Louisiana recounted similar expenences with MMA.
United States District Judge James D. Cain wrote:
Due to the continued misconduct of current MMA attorneys, the suspensions by
this Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court of said attorneys, and the Louisiana
Insurance 	Commissioner 's 	Cease 	and 	Desist 	letter, this 	Court extended 	its
suspension ofMMA and its attorneys.
Because of MMA's abrogation of their duty and responsibility toward these
Louisiana residents, the Court finds that MMA is not entitled to any attorney fees,
costs and/or expenses either pending in this Court or in the list herein attached as
Exhibit 	" A. " 	MMA's 	clear 	solicitation 	of 	clients 	voids 	any 	contract 	of
representation. In addition, their continued unethical behavior including but not
limited to mishandling of client trust funds, failure to deposit client funds into a
properly registered IOLTA trust account in the State of Louisiana, and MMA's clear
abrogation of their representation of alleged clients evidenced by sending out
emails and text messages with the phone nun1ber of this District Court to their
alleged Louisiana Clients and instructing them to contact this Court for status
updates on their cases, nullifies any ownership, fee interest, and/or property interest
of MMA, its attorneys or any related entity or third party. This Court further rules
that MMA, its attorneys or any related party have no property or ownership interest
in the checks or funds identified in Exhibit A. This includes any claims made under
state or federal law.
In re McClenny, Moseley & Associates, PLLC, No. 3:23-mc-00062 (W.D. La. Aug. 22 , 2023) (Doc.
No. 37), rev 'don other grounds, 2024 WL 2874371 (5th Cir. 2024).
13
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 13 of 33

Even the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the lead Lo ui siana lawyer for MMA,
Richard William Huye III, participated in less than stellar conduct. It suspended him on an interim
basis for "threat of harm" to the public. In re: Richard William Huye III, No. 2023 -B-00277 (La.
Mar. 3, 2023).
It can easily be seen from the cases cited above that two of the three federal District Courts
of Louisiana and the Supreme Court of Louisiana uniformly found the tactics and behavior of
MMA and its lawyers (and agents) to be inappropriate. These orders were filed we ll before the
series of hearings and orders relevant to the issue of waiver and well before MMA chose to file
bankruptcy. The importance of these summaries is that the relevant briefing and subsequent
hearings on attorneys' fees and costs- 	which the Court will detail below- 	did not happen in a
vacuum. There was already an extensive history of tension between MMA and the state and federal
courts in Louisiana. MMA and its lawyers and agents were accused of misbehavior on a massive
statewide scale, which affected its ability to represent its clients, and consequently, affected
hundreds, if not thousands, of Louisianans that had already suffered losses from the impact of
Hurricane Ida.
The Court now turns to the series of events that led to the waiver of attorneys ' fees and
costs in the Eastern District. Initially, the Court finds it helpful to set out a short timeline ofrelevant
orders, and then this Court wi ll flesh out the surrounding circumstances, relevant court hearings,
and the ultimate rulings that got the parties to this point. The following chronology may set the
scene of the present dispute:
1. 	January 31, 2024 - Order on Rule to Show Cause filed in Ricks v. Imp erial Fire and Cas.
Co., No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2024) (Doc. No . 31). The court ordered MMA to "show
cause why, by virtue of the numerous established instances of its misconduct in this District
14
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 14 of 33

... MMA has not forfeited the right to recover fees and/or costs from its former clients
who settle their claims prose or with the assistance of new counsel." Id.
2. 	February 14, 2024 - MMA filed its Response to the Court's Show-Cause Orders in Ricks,
No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2024) (Doc. No. 36). MMA argued the court did not have
jurisdiction to enter a docket-wide order on attorneys' fees and costs because MMA waived
its right to any fees and costs in the Ricks case. Id.
3. 	February 21, 2024 - Show Cause Hearing held in Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Apr. 5,
2024) (Doc. No. 41).
4. 	February 28, 2024 -Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Brief in Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La.
Feb. 28, 2024) (Doc. No. 45). Plaintiff argued that MMA's waiver did not moot the issue
as to its eligibility to receive attorneys' fees and costs. Id.
5. 	March 6, 2024 - The court entered an order requiring MMA to provide "a complete and
comprehensive list of every case currently pending i~ this District in which it intends to
seek attorneys' fees and/or costs." Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2024) (Doc. No.
46).
6. 	March 15, 2024 - MMA filed a Supplemental Brief in Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Mar.
15 , 2024) (Doc. No. 47). MMA stated that it "does not intend to intervene in any cases
pending in [the Eastern District] to seek attorneys ' fees or costs." Id.
7. 	March 25, 2024 - The court entered another order requiring MMA to provide "a complete
and comprehensive list of every case currently pending in this District in which it intends
to seek attorneys ' fees and/or costs." Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Mar. 25 , 2024) (Doc.
No. 49).
15
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 15 of 33

8. 	March 29, 2024 - MMA filed a "List of Cases Currently Pending in the Eastern District
of Louisiana in Which Non-Party MMA Intends to Seek Attorneys' Fees and/or Costs."
Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2024) (Doc. No. 50). MMA maintained that there
were "no [Eastern District] cases in which it intend[ ed] to intervene or file liens to recover
attorneys' fees." Id. However, MMA provided a list of over 150 cases- 	involving Daly &
Black law firm- 	that "may be at issue in a potential future lawsuit." Id. Consequently,
MMA did not list any cases involving any plaintiff (other than those involving the Daly &
Black and Galindo Law firms) in which it "intended to seek attorneys' fees and/or costs."
Id. Pertinent to the pending motions, no Morris Bart cases were listed.
9. 	April 5, 2024 - Order and Recommendation of Chief Magistrate Judge Michael B. North
in the Eastern District of Louisiana filed in Ricks, 2024 WL 1750738 (E.D. La. Apr. 5,
2024). The court held that MMA knowingly and voluntarily waived its right to any
attorneys' fees and costs in any case pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
10. April 9, 2024 - MMA filed for bankruptcy in Houston, Texas. The case was assigned to
Chief Bankruptcy Judge Eduardo Rodriguez. (Bankr. No. 24-31596, Doc. No. 1).
11. April 23, 2024 - The Report and Recommendation in Ricks was adopted by Judge Sarah
Vance in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Ricks v. Imperial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2024 WL
1740172 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 2024).
12. June 24, 2024 - MMA initiated the adversary proceeding against Morris Bart to collect
attorneys' fees and costs from the underlying cases. (Bankr. No. 24-3127, Doc. No. 1).
13. July 15, 2024 - Chief Judge Rodriguez entered a preliminary injunction against Morris
Bart. (Id. at Doc. No. 31).
16
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 16 of 33

14. December 12, 2024 - Chief Magistrate Judge 	orth filed an order in Foskey v. American
Modern Prop. And Cas. Ins. Co ., No. 23-5316 (E .D. La. Dec. 12 , 2024). (No. 4:24-CV-
4446, Doc. No. 19 -45).
15. December 19, 2024 - The Eastern District of Louisiana issued an en bane order governing
all Hurricane Ida cases. (Id. at Doc. No. 19-46).
Obviously, over the course of this litigation, there have been several orders (including some
issued by this Court) entered by all of the judges involved in these cases on a variety of subjects,
but those mentioned above are the ones most relevant to the issue of waiver that is presented on
appeal and is before this Court in the summary judgment briefing. The most pertinent order is
Judge North's pre-bankruptcy Ricks order, which was not challenged or appealed and was
ultimately adopted by Judge Vance. Ricks, 2024 WL 1750738. The Ricks order originated due to
numerous complaints regarding MMA's apparent misconduct in the Eastern District and elsewhere
and was the first order in the Eastern District to address the availability of attorneys' fees or costs. 6
The Ricks order, and the conduct proceeding it, are the lynchpins in this waiver dispute. Therefore,
this Court analyzes it in detail.
Leading up to the Ricks order, the parties in the underlying case requested the court to
allocate attorneys ' fees and expenses. (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19-38). Judge North issued a
show cause order directing MMA to demonstrate why- 	in the face of what the court considered
to be rampant misconduct- 	the firm should have the opportunity to recover any fees or costs in
6 The Western District of Louisiana had already ruled (in a case later reversed by the Fifth Circuit
on notice grounds in McClenny, Moseley & Associates PLLC v. Equal Access Justice Fund LLP,
2024 WL 2874371 (5th Cir. 2024)) that MMA forfeited its rights to fees or costs in certain cases
due to its "abrogation of their duty and responsibility. " In re McClenny, Moseley & Associates,
PLLC, No. 3:23-mc-00062 (W.D. La. Aug. 22 , 2023) (Doc. No. 37). The recoverability of fees or
costs (from cases that were or are pending) in the Western District is not an issue addressed by this
Order.
17
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 17 of 33

any case in the Eastern District. (Id.). The parties were given ample time to bri ef the issues and to
produce all supporting documentation, including documentation that explained how "this [Ricks]
case was obtained by the firm. " (Id.). Relying on th is briefing, Judge North explained:
In it s responsive bri ef and at the show -c ause hearing, MMA argued that, because
it was not seeking a fee or reimbursement of costs in this case, there was no
live case or controversy remaining in the ca se, such that proceeding with a
hearing to determine MMA's rights to recover fees and/or costs in other cases
pending in this District wo uld violate Article III of the United States Constitution:
"Article III grants federal courts the power to redress harms that defendants cause
plaintiffs, 	not a freewheeling 	power to 	hold 	[parties] 	accountable for 	legal
infractions."
At the show-cause hearing, the Court indicated its te ndency to agree with MMA's
standing argument and indicated its hesitancy to undertake a docket-wide inquiry
in this case for the reasons advanced by MMA in its bri ef. At that point, counsel
for Plaintiff, for the first time, suggested that, because two of MMA's lenders
(Equal Access Justice Fund, LP and EAJF ESQ FUND, LP (hereinafter, the
"F unds")) had issued "lien letter s" to their firm in every case pending in this
District in which MMA was former counsel, a case or controversy persisted in
this case, based on the idea that MMA's voluntary relinquishment of the right
to recover fees in this ca se could be construed as a breach of contract by MMA
vis-a-vis the Funds, thus exposing Plaintiff's counsel to potential liability to the
Funds.
The Court then ordered Plaintiff's counsel to file a supplemental memorandum
fu ll y briefing this somewhat novel argument, which they ultimately fi led on
February 28 , 2024. Upon receipt of that brief, the Court ordered MMA to file a
responsive brief and to produce to the Court a "complete and comprehensive list of
every case currently pending in this District in which it intends to seek attorneys '
fees and/or costs."
On March 15 , 2024, MMA filed its response. As to the standing argument advanced
by Plaintiff's co unsel, MMA bolstered its argument that no case or controversy
exists here by attaching as an exhibit a letter from counsel for the Funds to MMA's
counsel "waiv[ing] and re lease[ing] their respective security interest in attorneys '
fees , if any, owed, du e, or owing" to MMA arising out of this matter only.
MMA went on to represent that " [w]ith respect to the second part of the Court's
Order [supplying the Co urt with a list of cases pending in this District in which
MMA will seek a fee] , MMA does not intend to intervene in any cases pending
in this Court to seek attorneys' fees or costs."
18
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 18 of 33

The undersigned initially mis-read this last statement as applying to the Ricks
matter only. This in turn led the undersigned to issue a second order suggesting that
MMA was in violation of the March 6 Order for failing to supply the Court with
the list of cases pending in this District in which it intended to seek a fee and
ordering the firm to submit such a list within five days.
While MMA had not produced such a list, it was not in violation of the Court's
March 6 Order because it had informed the Court that it did not intend to
intervene in any pending cases to seeks fees or costs. In its response to this second
order, MMA reiterated that
as it stated in its March 15 pleading, MMA maintains that there
are no EDLA cases in which it intends to intervene or file liens
to 	recover attorney's fees. As MMA previously explained in
response to the Court's March 6, 2024 Order, MMA does not intend
to intervene in any cases pending in this Court, so there is no list
to 	provide reflecting pending EDLA cases 	in which MMA
intends to seek attorney's fees.
The MMA response went on to note that
MMA is considering filing lawsuits against Daly & Black and
Galindo Law, which MMA believes have breached agreements
with MMA and which have taken action that may give rise to various
causes of action for relief related to Daly & Black's and Galindo
Law's handling of Hurricane Ida claims for former MMA clients.
The firm then attached a list of cases that appear to be those in which Daly & Black
and/or Galindo Law are involved in this District.
The Court finds that the multiple affirmative statements in multiple briefs
filed with this Court that it would not seek to recover fees and/or costs from
cases pending here constitutes a voluntary and knowing waiver of any right to
do so.
Ricks, 2024 WL 1750738 (internal citations omitted) (bold emphasis added).
In pertinent part, the actual pleading filed by the lawyers representing MMA (and relied
upon by Judge North) stated:
On March 25, 2024, the Court ordered, on pain of contempt and/or sanctions, that
MMA "provide the Court with a complete and comprehensive list of every case
currently pending in this District in which it intends to seek attorneys' fees and/or
costs." Because MMA and its creditors expressly have waived any right to any fees
or costs in the settled Ricks litigation, MMA objects to this Court's continued
19
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 19 of 33

exercise of jurisdiction in the Ricks matter. In addition, as stated in its March 15
pleading, MMA maintains that there are no EDLA cases in which it intends to
intervene or file liens to recover attorney's fees. As MMA previously explained
in response to the Court's March 6, 2024 Order, MMA does not intend to
intervene in any cases pending in this Court, so there is no list to provide
reflecting pending EDLA cases in which MMA intends to seek attorney's fees.
However, MMA is considering filing lawsuits against Daly & Black and
Galindo Law, which MMA believes have breached agreements with MMA and
which have taken action that may give rise to various causes of action for relief
related to Daly & Black's and Galindo Law's handling of Hurricane Ida claims for
former MMA clients. In a good faith attempt to comply with the Court's order,
MMA believes that fees received by Daly & Black in the following lawsuits may
be at issue in a potential future lawsuit against Daly & Black ....
Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Mar. 29 , 2024) (Doc. No. 50) (emphasis added). MMA then went on
to provide a list of over 150 cases spanning nearly four pages.
MMA concluded its filing by stating:
In addition to the cases included on this list, if Daly & Black has entered into fee
agreements with other law firms related to other cases pending in the Eastern
District of Louisiana or otherwise participates in lawsuits for former MMA clients,
MMA believes that attorney's fees from those cases could be the subject of a
future lawsuit against Daly & Black.
With respect to Galindo Law, Galindo Law entered into joint representation
agreements with MMA in many cases, but MMA is not aware of any cases in the
Eastern District of Louisiana in which attorneys from the Galindo Law firm are
currently emolled. However, MMA believes that the Galindo Law firm may be
receiving attorney 's fees from cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana
that are the subject of its joint representation agreements with MMA and may seek
to discover that information in a future lawsuit against Galindo Law.
Id. (emphasis added). No cases pertaining to Morris Bart or any other law firm were listed by
MMA- 	clearly telling the Eastern District judges that the only fees at issue were those involving:
(1) the Daly & Black cases listed; (2) the possible Daly & Black cases that could involve other
firms; and (3) the Galindo Law cases in which it had a joint representation agreement- 	although
MMA conceded that it was unaware of any such cases that were actually pending in the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
20
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 20 of 33

The MMA filing and the Ricks order demonstrate that well before MMA ever filed for
bankruptcy, MMA had every opportunity to inform the Eastern District of its intention to try to
collect attorneys' fees or costs in the Hurricane Ida cases. Instead, MMA did the opposite. MMA
made several affirmative representations to the Eastern District that it did not intend to intervene
or otherwise pursue the collection of attorneys' fees or costs for any case pending in the Eastern
District with the two exceptions of cases involving two law firms- 	Daly & Black or Galindo
Law- 	because MMA had written agreements with those firms. This was a voluntary waiver that
was accepted by the court in the Ricks order. 7 Judge North documented the consequences of the
court's acceptance and reliance on these representations:
As the Court noted in its January 26 Order initiating the proceedings described
above, the intention of the Court in initiating those proceedings was to address
a circumstance in this District that has hampered efficient resolution of
insureds' claims and taxed the resources of the Court - 	certain insurers'
insistence that settlement checks include MMA as a payee based upon their status
as former counsel for settling insureds. The refusal to issue settlement checks
without MMA's name as a payee has (1) delayed payments to insureds even after
settlement, (2) required unnecessary motion practice seeking court orders that
insurers issue checks omitting MMA as a payee, and (3) caused the judges of this
Court, including this one, to make inquiries of MMA's counsel on a case-by-case
basis whether MMA intended to seek a fee in individual cases. This entire process
- 	caused 	directly 	by MMA's 	malfeasance 	in 	this District- has 	been 	a
tremendous drain upon the bar and this Court, and a waste of valuable
resources, the most important of which is time. Considering that hundreds of
cases involving former MMA clients remain open in this District, continuing on
this path is simply untenable.
7 MMA has argued that it did not expressly waive its right to attorneys' fees and costs because it
couched its waiver in terms of"not seeking to intervene." See, e.g., (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No.
22 at 18). The Court recognizes that the actions here in the Southern District of Texas are
bankruptcy adversary proceedings- 	not formal 	interventions in the underlying 	cases. 	This
argument is , at best, wordsmithing at a level that is unbecoming of the legal profession. Moreover,
if the argument were truly accurate, it glosses over the fact that MMA misled all of the judges in
the Eastern District of Louisiana. It listed all of the cases in which it might seek fees. It is bound
by that representation. This Court chooses to believe that the lawyers representing MMA in these
bankruptcy proceedings were not aware of the extent of the representations made in the Eastern
District and that this situation was caused by a miscommunication rather than a blatant attempt to
deceive the judges of the Eastern District.
21
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 21 of 33

The Court now finds, based upon MMA's multiple representations that it does
not intend to seek fees or costs in any case now pending in this District, that
this tortured process can and should come to an end.
Ricks, 2024 WL 1750738 (internal citations omitted) (bold emphasis added). Thus, before the
bankruptcy was filed, all claims except those contractual or quasi-contractual claims involving
only two law firms were extinguished. All rights to make any other claims were gone.
The court then went on to recount that it was of no matter to the courts of the Eastern
District if there were contractual disputes between law firms or disputes between MMA and its
litigation funders . Its language, while arguably imprecise, did not change the stipulations and
waivers that MMA made as to all Eastern District cases. The court wrote:
It matters not to the resolution of Hurricane Ida cases in this District that one
law firm might sue another law firm for breach of a contract between them.
That potential is of no moment to either insured or insurer. It is a matter strictly
between the various law firms. It follows then that there is no basis, given MMA's
affirmative statement of its intention to walk away from fees and costs from
cases pending here [in the Eastern District of Louisiana], for settling insurers
to continue to insist on including that firm on settlement checks.
Similarly, the fact that the Funds have sent "lien letters" to various law firms
representing former MMA clients suggesting they have a "perfected security
interest in and to 	the 	McClenny 	Moseley 	& Associates, 	PLLC, Law Firm
Proceeds" in cases involving those clients is not a matter impacting the insureds or
insurers. Whatever dispute arises out of these claims to fees by the Funds will be a
dispute between the Funds and a law firm over some portion of fees received by
that law firm. That dispute will not impact the actual parties to the litigation.
Id. (bold emphasis added). This opinion, regardless as to how one stretches one's interpretation,
did not alter MMA's clear "intention to walk away from fees and costs from the cases pending [in
the Eastern District]." Id. The genesis of the problem raised in this Motion for Summary Judgment
seems to be the following paragraph where the court wrote:
Based upon all the foregoing, the Court finds that MMA has knowingly and
completely waived its rights to intervene or otherwise seek to recover fees and/or
costs in this or any other lawsuit pending in this District. This finding is without
22
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 22 of 33

prejudice to MMA's or the Funds' right to bring whatever claims may exist for
breach of contract (or under any other theory) against MMA's successor law
firms . But the Court's finding here does act to remove as an impediment to
settlement and payment of settlement proceeds the possibility that MMA could, at
some point in the future, seek to intervene for fees and/or costs in any case pending
here. That possibility is now eliminated.
Id. (bold emphasis added).
It is clear, given the history of MMA's conduct, the hearings and motions, and the outright
waiver of any claims by MMA, that Judge North did not intend to reopen Pandora's box for a new
round of fee claims in every Easte rn District case with this single sentence. Instead, this sentence
was intended to convey that the court accepted MMA's reservation of contractual rights to proceed
against the Daly & Black and Galindo Law firm s. It was clear in its briefing that MMA claimed to
have contracts with these two firms and intended to file a breach of contract claim against these
two firms. MMA only mentioned these two firms by name in its pleadings on this issue and only
listed cases involving the Daly & Black law firm for "future litigation." Given the history
recounted above, it is clear that the phrase "or under any other theory" was to cover the possibility
that MMA's litigation funders might seek to pursue these two firms as well- 	even if they did not
have a contract with them. Hypothetically, if this Ricks order is considered to be ambiguous-
which given the robust context of the ongoing tension and allegations of misconduct, this Court
does not believe it to be - 	the wording of the order does not change MMA's earlier written waiver
of all its rights to fees and costs in Eastern District cases. It was a clear waiver with only two noted
exceptions: the Daly & Black and the Galindo Law firms. The waiver was made on multiple
occasions, and it was made in a fashion that MMA intended that all parties and all courts in the
Eastern District would rely upon it. No one objected to Judge North's order, and the Report and
Recommendation was adopted by Judge Vance. 2024 WL 1740172. The Ricks order is final. The
case is closed.
23
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 23 of 33

Given the subsequent course of events, it is clear that all of the courts of the Eastern District
have continued to rely on this pre-bankruptcy waiver. This waiver has not been set aside nor has
any party in the bankruptcy case asked the Eastern District to set it aside. The Eastern District
courts have reinforced their interpretation of this waiver on a multitude of occasions- 	albeit, after
MMA filed for bankruptcy here in the Southern District of Texas. On December 12, 2024, Judge
North- 	before whom the waiver was made and the author of the Ricks order---explained the scope
of his prior order on MMA's waiver:
In a previous matter in this Court, the undersigned issued an Order-never
appealed 	by 	MMA-finding that MMA had 	knowingly 	and 	voluntarily
forfeited its rights to intervene or otherwise seek to recover fees and/or costs
in any case then pending in this District, including this one. During the []
settlement conference, the Court was made aware of certain pleadings, arguments,
and rulings that have recently been made in the adversary proceeding, MMA Law
Firm , PLLC v. Morris Bart, LLC, pending in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas ("the Bankruptcy Case" ).
After reviewing the docket of that case and the associated master case, the Court
is now aware that MMA has taken the position in the Bankruptcy Court that
it never did, nor did it intent to, waive or forfeit its rights to recover fees in its
former cases pending in this District as of April 5, 2024. The firm has also
apparently taken the position in the Bankruptcy Case that this Court's Order
in Ricks did not have the effect of forfeiting said rights to fees and/or costs in
cases pending here. Neither of those things is true.
It 	now 	seems 	that, 	despite 	this 	Court's 	best 	efforts, 	MMA's 	tactics 	and
doublespeak continue to interfere with its former clients' full recoveries, some
three years-plus after Hurricane Ida made landfall. MMA's misrepresentations in
the Bankruptcy Case have also apparently resulted in the presiding Judge in that
matter issuing a preliminary injunction against Plaintiffs' counsel, Morris Bart,
LLC, that, among other things, requires
that, after the entry of this Order, a 33.3% attorneys fee portion of
any settlement or award in a Former Case, or, if an attorneys fee
portion greater than 33.3% is collected, the amount of attorneys' fees
collected, as well as the amount of expenses that MMA claims in
that Former Case, shall be held in trust by Morris Bart until further
order of this Court ....
24
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 24 of 33

Case No. 24-03127 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.). The scope of the term, "Former Cases," as
used in the Bankruptcy Court's Injunction is not entirely clear, as it falls within this
statement: "The Debtor asserts that is has an interest in attorney 's fees and expenses
in numerous cases where the Debtor's former client are now clients of M01Tis Bart,
LLC ('Former Cases')." Id.
What is clear is that the term "Former Cases" and the Bankruptcy Court's
Injunction cannot describe or apply to cases in this District in which MMA
formerly 	represented 	litigants 	because 	MMA 	affirmatively 	waived 	and
forfeited any rights it might have had to fees and costs in all of those cases
before filing its Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition.
Foskey , No. 23-5316 (E. D. La. Dec. 12 , 2024) (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19-45) (emphasis
added).
This interpretation was not solely held by Judge North. The entire bench of the Eastern
District of Louisiana, en bane, held:
The Court recently learned that [MMA] , a debtor in bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Texas, has taken the position in that Court that it
is entitled to recover fees and/or costs from its former cases pending in this District
.. . . The Chief Magistrate Judge has issued Orders in two Hurricane Ida cases
in this District making clear that MMA voluntarily and knowingly waived and
forfeited whatever rights it may have had in fees and/or costs in its former
cases in this District before it declared bankruptcy .... [MMA] has no rights
to fees and/or costs in this District by virtue of its knowing and voluntary
prepetition waiver of said rights.
In re: Hurricane Ida Litigation (E .D. La. Dec. 19 , 2024) (en bane) (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No.
19-46) (bold emphasis added).
These orders have not been appealed by any person or entity. These are final orders. It is
not as if MMA or its lawyers are unequipped to appeal orders related to fees . They have done so
before. In fact, they successfully appealed the Western District order cited above to the Fifth
Circuit. McCle nny, Mo se ley & Associates PLL C, 2024 WL 287 43 71.
Although 	the 	orders 	quoted 	immediately 	above 	were 	filed 	after 	MMA 	filed 	for
bankruptcy- 	and therefore, one could argue the orders have minimal, if any, effect on the pending
25
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 25 of 33

bankruptcy- 	the orders do not involve new matters or even raise new issues. These orders-
especially the two cited above- 	are merely reaffirming and offering guidance on how to interpret
the pre-bankruptcy order and the waivers made by MMA which were relied upon by the parties
and the courts since that time. After all, these explanations were only required because MMA
obtained a preliminary injunction against Morris Bart in Bankruptcy Court. These further
clarifications should not be a surprise to any court or party given that the sweeping injunction
potentially has a docket-wide impact, and that the Bankruptcy Court has turned down all efforts to
extricate the Eastern District cases from the Debtor's overall attempt to roundup its assets.
Upon reviewing the significant history in the case- 	at all stages of this litigation- 	and
relying on the clear waiver MMA made in the Eastern District, this Court holds as a matter of law
that MMA voluntarily and knowingly waived its right to fees and costs as to all Eastern District
cases pending on or before March 15 , 2024 with two exceptions. First, MMA may pursue any
contractual rights that it may have with the Daly & Black and/or Galindo Law firms . Secondly,
MMA and/or its lawsuit funders may pursue any noncontractual rights it has against these same
two firms. That being said, all other claims for fees and/or costs from cases in the Eastern District
of Louisiana have been waived.
This holding is not only supported by the law and the record, but also by sound judicial
policy. It is clear that the pre-waiver setting for the show cause order in Ricks was one where the
presiding judge was already aware of what that court (and other courts) considered to be numerous
acts of misbehavior. That court had ordered MMA to produce certain information and to appear
before it to explain its conduct and/or justify any fee request in light of its misconduct. Rather than
do either, MMA chose to try to moot any hearing concerning the fees/costs issue, in which it might
be confronted with its various alleged misdeeds, by waiving all claims to those fees and costs. This
26
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 26 of 33

tactic was eventually successful, and it avoided what might have been a very unpleasant or
embarrassing (or worse) hearing where its course of conduct would be a central issue. One might
even surmise that, in this circumstance, MMA's discretion was the better part of valor.
In a vacuum, this Court cannot fault such a tactic. Nevertheless, one cannot make a
representation in order to escape potential disciplinary action, then pack up one's tent, go home,
file bankruptcy and then renege on those representations to another federal court. This Court finds
such a strategy to be totally unacceptable. Neither this Court nor any other federal court of which
this Court is aware would tolerate such gamesmanship. It is at best misleading, and at worst, a
fraud upon the courts. 8
At the very least, if MMA wanted to second-guess the consequences of the waiver and
reverse course, it should have petitioned the appropriate Eastern District court to withdraw its
waiver, or it should appeal those orders to the Fifth Circuit. It has done neither, and consequently,
those 	orders 	still 	govern. 	The 	fundamental 	principles 	of law, judicial 	economy, 	sound
jurisprudence, and the most basic tenets of legal ethics demand that courts are entitled to rely on
representations and waivers made in response to a show cause order because courts are entitled to
presume that those representations are intentional, truthful, and meant to be relied upon by parties,
counsel, and courts. After all, that is the purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. FED. R.
8 The Court feels compelled to point out that while the Moseley Declaration (creatively) addresses
the waiver issue, Moseley does not explicitly deny that MMA waived its right to attorneys ' fees
and costs in the Eastern District. Instead, he states that he "disputes [the] contention" that "MMA
waived its right to recover attorneys' fees based on two court orders entered by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana." (Bankr. No. 24-3127, Doc. No. 94-1at128).
Moseley merely cites the Ricks order for his conclusion that Judge North gave MMA permission
to "bring whatever claims exist under any theory against MMA's successor law firms." (Id.). While
Moseley framed these statements in terms of the Ricks order, Moseley does not deny that MMA
waived its right to attorneys' fees and costs when it failed to list any Eastern District cases (other
than those against Daly & Black or Galindo Law) from which it intended to seek fees or costs.
Ricks, No. 23-2844 (E.D. La. Mar. 29 , 2024) (Doc. No. 50).
27
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 27 of 33

Clv. P. 11 (b) ("By presenting to a court a pleadin g, written motion, or other paper ... an attorney
... certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry under the circumstances: it is not being presented for any improper purpose."); Sarco Creek
Ranch v. Greeson, 167 F. Supp. 3d 835, 838 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2016) ("And, of course, when
parties appear in court, the system depends on them telling the truth."); Tesco Corp. v. Weatherford
Intern. , Inc., 2014 WL 4244215 , at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2014) ("Just as with witnesses testifying
truthfully under oath, the proper administration of justice depends upon counsel being completely
forthright with the Court."). That is how this Court treats any such representation made to it, and
it is how this Court treats MMA's statements made to the judges of the Eastern District of
Louisiana.
Importantly, Rule 3.3 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct (which tracks the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct) mandates that a lawyer be
candid with any judge before which he or she appears. Rule 3.3(a) states that "a lawyer shall not
knowingly ... make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement
of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer." La. R. Pro. Conduct Rule
3.3(a)(l); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT§ 3.3(a)(l). Indeed, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
has applied this Rule to attorneys in disciplinary actions for making false statements in court. See
In re Ungarino, 330 So.3d 1077, 1085 (La. 2022) (per curiam) (finding that a lawyer violated Rule
3 .3 by "lying about the true intent" of an ex parte communication). Moreover, under this Rule, any
lawyer that inadvertently provides a false statement to the court must make every effort to correct
the record. See La. R. Pro. Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(3); MODEL RULES OF PRO . CO NDUCT§ 3.3(a)(3)
("If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence
28
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 28 of 33

and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures,
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal." ).
If the list containing the cases from which MMA was going to seek fees and costs did not
include Morris Bart cases, this misrepresentation should have been corrected before the list was
relied upon by the judges of that District. To this Court's knowledge, that correction has not been
made. While it wou ld be hard to conceive that the listing of the cases was done inadvertently, the
failure to "correct it" is on its face problematic. No party to the motions under consideration in this
Order has provided any competent summary judgment evidence demonstrating that MMA or its
counsel have taken any remedial measures with regard to those representations.
The Court holds that MMA must honor its own representations.
B. 	The Path Forward
The second issue this Court feels the need to address has less to do with the merits of the
motions filed by Morris Bart and more to do with how these cases will proceed in the future. The
Bankruptcy Court has written:
The Court finds that this is precisely what MMA has done by initiating the instant
Adversary Proceeding because MMA is seeking to recover fees from Morris Bart
and is not intervening in any of the MB /MMA Cases.
On December 12 , 2024, Judge North entered an order interpreting the impact of his
April 5, 2024 order differently. The December 12 , 2024 order explained that the
April 5, 2024 order "does not merely limit MMA's rights to file interventions or
liens in cases pending here - it unequivocally finds that the Firm waived its rights
to seek fees and costs in any way, shape, or form." It went on to say that, "[i]t makes
no difference" that "MMA reserved its rights to sue successor law firms for
damages for breach of contract," because those claims are for damages, not "some
non-fungible res that must be embargoed to be protected."
However, the December 12, 2024 order is not binding on this Court. This Court
entered an injunction on July 15 , 2024 expressly enjoining Morris Bart from taking
"any action, directly or indirectly, to prosecute claims regarding the Debtor's
interest or any entitlement to fees 	or costs without further order from this
Bankruptcy Court."
29
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 29 of 33

In re MMA Law Firm, PLLC, 673 B.R. 174,204 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2025) (bold emphasis
added). Meanwhile, in the en bane order of the Eastern District, the judges wrote:
The Chief Magistrate Judge has issued Orders in two Hurricane Ida cases in this
District making clear that MMA voluntarily and knowingly waived and forfeited
whatever rights it may have had in fees and/or costs in its former cases in this
District before it declared bankruptcy .... The Court bas held that, because of
this pre-petition waiver of rights, no portion of attorneys' fees or costs from
cases pending in 	this District can 	be considered property of the MMA
bankruptcy 	estate 	and 	that 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Court's 	requirement 	that
successor firms bold such fees and costs in trust is inapplicable to cases
pending in this District.
In Re: Hurricane Ida Claims (E.D. La.) (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19-46) (emphasis added).
At first blush, there seems to be an ongoing dispute between the Bankruptcy Court in the
Southern District of Texas and the District and Magistrate Judges of the Eastern District of
Louisiana. This conflict, if it indeed exists, is not insurmountable.
First, regarding the Bankruptcy Court, it goes almost without saying that any bankruptcy
court has the power to implement and enforce its own orders. 11 U.S.C. § 105 ("The court may
issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of this title."). Additionally, the Bankruptcy Court has the jurisdiction to issue orders to streamline
bankruptcy proceedings. Any bankruptcy court also has the jurisdiction and the power to issue
orders that manage the property of the bankruptcy estate. Id. Bankruptcy estates undoubtedly
include "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case." 11 U.S.C. § 541. In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee (or the debtor in
possession) has the duty to "collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for which such
trustee serves." 11 U.S.C. § 704. Moreover, when there is a dispute over the collection of
bankruptcy property, a trustee or debtor in possession can initiate an adversary proceeding to
litigate the ownership over the putative bankruptcy estate property. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
30
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 30 of 33

Meanwhile, the United States District Judges and the United States Magistrate Judges of
the Eastern District of Louisiana are equally empowered to interpret and enforce their own orders.
28 U.S. C. § 1651. In fact, in this instance, these judges have two decided advantages. First, and
most importantly, who would be better situated to interpret an order than the judge that presided
over the hearing and wrote the order under consideration and the judges that adopted and have
relied upon that order? The answer clearly is: no one. Secondly, as may be more applicable to the
remaining issues not addressed in this order, the judges of the Eastern District of Louisiana have
an innate advantage in the interpretation and application of Louisiana law. While both the
Bankruptcy Judge and this Court have the capability of researching, interpreting, and enforcing
the laws of a sister state (even one whose laws trace back to the Napoleonic Code), clearly those
who are educated, trained, and work on a daily basis with those laws have a distinct advantage.
This Court finds that the two orders quoted-above are not necessarily irreconcilable. First,
the Bankruptcy Court has emphasized the post-bankruptcy orders (the Foskey order and the In re
Hurricane Ida Claims order), wherein the Eastern District judge(s) explained their interpretation
and reliance on the pre-petition conduct and order (the Ricks order). Without question, these pre-
petition activities are important. This Court proceeds with that emphasis in mind. Second, the
Bankruptcy Court seems to concentrate only on the exact wording of the Ricks order and the later
Foskey order, while not focusing on the background facts and circumstances surrounding the MMA
waiver, the actual wording and intent of the waiver itself, and the list of cases provided by MMA
in response to the show cause order. This Court finds this history and context to be of great
importance when interpreting and applying the substance of the pre-petition order. As explained
in detail above, such history elucidates the intention of the holding in the Ricks order.
31
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 31 of 33

The Eastern District's en bane order, while post-petition, was no doubt intended to aid the
resolution of the issues the Southern District of Texas currently has before it. That order makes it
clear that all of the judges of the Eastern District found that MMA's pre-petition waiver waived all
claims for fees and costs (with the two exceptions being the Daly & Black and Galindo Law
situations). While this en bane order was post-petition, the substance of the order is merely an
explanation of the pre-petition status, already in place before the bankruptcy was filed. The pre-
petition Ricks order alone establishes that there can be no legal or equitable interest of the Debtor
in the proceeds of any case in the Eastern District. The later Foskey and en bane orders merely
confirm that conclusion. Whatever interests that may have existed in those attorneys ' fees and costs
were vo luntarily extinguished by MMA before it filed for bankruptc y. 9 While one can read the en
bane order as possibly treading on-the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, a fairer reading mak es
it clear the court is merely stressing that the injunction/embargo directed at cases in which MMA
may be seeking compensation has no effect on cases that were or are filed in the Eastern District
due to MMA's pre-petition actions. Hence, there are no such Eastern District cases to which the
injunction could apply. In other words, the fact that MMA is now in bankruptcy does not empower
anyone to revive claims that have clearly been extinguished by waiver and court order.
While this discourse may be viewed as unnecessary and irrelevant to the actual summary
judgment motions directed at the Eastern District cases, this Court obviously finds it important
enough to include given the tension that seems to exist between the lawyers in this case and to
preclude any argument that would try to pit one court's order against a sister court's order.
9 Some may question this Court's use of "voluntarily." It is clear that MMA waived all ri ghts in
order to avoid having to answer or explain its actions with respect to allegations of its misconduct
in the Eastern District. While it may have felt compelled to make the waiver to escape a hearing
on the propriety of its actions, that compunction was created by its own conduct- 	not because of
any action taken by a court or third party. The waiver was clearly a strategic decision.
32
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 32 of 33

This Court finds that MMA waived all its rights to attorneys' fees and costs in the Eastern
District of Louisiana (with the exceptions of contractual or quasi-contractual rights that MMA or
its litigation funders might have against the Daly & Black or Galindo Law firms). This Court grants
the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Morris Bart, as to any and all claims for attorneys'
fees and costs based upon the underlying Eastern District cases. This Court will sever this issue
from the other issues based upon substantive Louisiana state law included in the Motion (and
which may be the subject of a certification request to the Supreme Court of Louisiana), so that this
Order becomes final and appealable. A separate judgment compliant with Rule 58 will accomplish
this goa l.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants-in-part Morris Bart's Motion for Summary
Judgment (No. 4:24-CV-4446, Doc. No. 19) . The Court reverses-in-part the Bankruptcy Court
order denying summary judgment to the extent that the order denied summary judgment for the
collection of any attorneys ' fees or costs arising out of any underlying case pending in the Eastern
District of Louisiana on or before March 15 , 2024. (Bankr. No. 24-3127, Doc. Nos. 104, 105). The
Court holds that, as a matter of law, MMA made an affirmative pre-petition waiver of its right to
collect any attorneys ' fees or costs from any case pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
It is so ordered. rd._
Signed on this the ] J 	day of January 2026.
Andrew S. Han en
United States District Judge
33
Case 4:24-cv-04446 Document 41 Filed 01/23/26 in TXSD Page 33 of 33