Landscape Consultants of Texas, Inc. et al v. City of Houston, Texas et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
LANDSCAPE CONSULTANTS OF
TEXAS, INC. AND
METROPOLITAN LANDSCAPE
MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS,
AND MIDTOWN MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT
Defendants.
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§ 	Civil Action No. H-23.:-3516
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FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
& ORDER OF PERMANENT INJUNCTION
This case arises out of a challenge to the constitution~lity of the City of
Houston and Midtown Management District's requirements for awarding·public
contracts. On September 19, 2023, Plaintiffs Landscape Consultants of Texas, Inc.
("Landscape") and Metropolitan Landscape Management, inc. ("Metropolitan")
(collectively, "Plaintiffs") brought suit against Defendants City of Houston, Texas
("Houston") and Midtown Management District ("Midtown") (collectively, the
' 	•
"Defendants") seeking to permanently enjoin Houston and Midtown's enforcement
of their race-conscious public contracting policies pursuant to the Equal Protection
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 28, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Clause of the Fourteen Amendment. 1 Plaintiffs have. m~de clear throughout the
course of this litigation that they only challenge the race-conscious aspects of both ·
Houston's 	Minority, 	Women, 	and 	Small 	Business 	Enterprise 	Program 	and
Midtown's Minority, Woman, and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Policy. Thus,
any injunctive relief provided must be limited to the "minority-owned business"
portion ofHouston and Midtown's race-conscious public contracting programs. See
National Federation ofIndependent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 522 (2o'10)
("[w]hen a court confronts an unconstitutional statute, its endeavor must be to
conserve, not destroy, the legislation.").
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief
declaring Houston 	and' Midtown's race-conscious public contracting programs
unconstitutional. Commencing on December 1, 2025, the Court conducted a four-
day bench-trial, with witness testimony, as to the request for a permanent injunction
1 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Document No. 1 at 1-17. Specifically, Plaintiffs
challenge Houston's revised ordinance, Houston Code, Art. V § 15-82, which set
new citywide minority-owned business goals for Houston contracts. The Court notes
that the category in which Plaintiffs compete-nearly doubled its· minority-owned
business enterprise subcontracting goal, increasing from eleven percent to nineteen
percent.
2
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(the "Hearing"). 2 Plaintiffs now move this Court to declare the City of Houston's
Minority, Women, and Small Business Enterprise Program unconstitutional and to
permanently enjoin the City of Houston from operating its program or using similar
racial preferences in the award of public contracts. 3 Plaintiffs also move this Court
to declare Midtown Management District's Minority, Woman, and Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise Policy unconstitutional and to permanently enjoin Midtown
Management District from operating its policy or using similar racial preferences in
the award of public contracts. 4 Plaintiffs specifically bring this pending action to
challenge the racial aspect of Houston and Midtown's Programs.
The Court notes that this case presents an issue of first impression within the
federal caselaw. Plaintiffs ask this Court to determine whether the constitutional
framework announced by the Supreme Court in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.
v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023), governs race-
conscious municipal public contracting programs. In resolving that question, this
2 The parties presented testimony from six witnesses, submitted a total of 114
documents in evidence, and stipulated to eighty-seven Joint Admissions of Fact.
Plaintiffs called the principal owner of both Landscape and Metropolitan, Gerald
Thompson, and expert witness George La Noue. Midtown called its Senior Director
of Engineering & Strategic Development, Marlon Marshall. The City of Houston
called its Director of the Office of Business Opportunity, Cylenthia Hoyrd, and
expert witness Andres Bernal.
3 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Document No. 1 at 16.
4 Id. at 17.
3
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Court addresses an unresolved issue of constitutional law. Thus, having considered
the record in this case, oral argument presented at the Hearing, and applicable law,
the Court now enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Any conclusion of law that should be
construed as a finding of fact is hereby adopted as such. Any finding of fact that
should be construed as a conclusion of law is hereby adopted as such.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
The following facts have been established by a preponderance of the evidence:
A. 	THE CITY OF HOUSTON'S MINORITY, WOMEN, AND SMALL
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM
1. 	Houston administers its program to "stimulate the growth of local minority,
women, and small business enterprises by encouraging the full participation of
these business enterprises in various phases of city contracting."5
2. 	Section 15-81(a) of the Houston City Code provides that the program is not
intended to remedy any single specific, past violation of the U.S. Constitution,
but to mitigate and remedy the effects of past discrimination and its lingering
5 Houston Code, Art. V § 15-81 (a).
4
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effects against minority and women-owned businesses, and to make public
contracting opportunities equally available to such businesses. 6
3. 	Houston has not identified any prime contract awards based on intentional
discrimination against minority bidders in the last five years. 7 Houston has also
not disciplined any employee or Houston official for discriminating in the
award of public contracts for the last five years. 8 Houston has also not identified
any 	specific 	constitutional 	or 	statutory 	violations 	related 	to 	its 	public
contracting or procurement process or awards in the last five years. 9
4. 	Instead, "[t]he compelling interests advanced by the program includes the City
of Houston's attempts to remedy past discrimination by rectifying its own
actions." 10
6 Joint Proposed Pretrial Order, Document No. 118, Exhibit 5 at 134 (Joint
Admissions of Fact) [hereinafter Joint Admissions of Fact]; see also Houston Code,
Art. V § 15-8l(a) ("[i]t is the policy of the city to stimulate the growth of local
minority, 	women 	and 	small 	business 	enterprises 	by 	encouraging 	the 	full
participation of these business enterprises in various phases of city contracting.").
7 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6 at 1 6.
8 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6 at 17.
9 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6 at 1 8.
10 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6 at 19.
5
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5. 	Houston is required by statute to "make its best efforts" to review its program
every five years to determine if the racial preferences are necessary. 11
6. 	When 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	their 	complaint 	in 	2023, 	Houston's 	program 	was
supported by a comprehensive disparity study from 2006. 12
7. 	After a ten-year delay, Houston commissioned a comprehensive disparity study
in 2016 that was completed in 2020. The Houston City Council chose not to
adopt this disparity study with no justification provided. 13
8. 	In March 2023, seventeen years after the last disparity study was adopted,
Houston awarded the contract for yet another new disparity study to MGT
Consulting, a public sector consulting firm. MGT's scope of work included
preparation of a new disparity study focusing on the four primary areas of City
procurement: goods, professional services, other services, and construction,
with particular focus on collecting data and analyzing disparities among the
minority groups identified in Section 15-82 of the Houston City Code. 14
11 Houston Code, Art. V § 15-81(b).
12 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 83:20-22.
13 Joint Proposed Pretrial Order, Document No. 118, Exhibit A-3 at ,r 8
[Defendant 	City 	of Houston's 	Preliminary 	Proposed 	Findings 	of Fact 	and
Conclusions of Law].
14 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 85:19-20, 192:17-18.
6
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9. 	The MGT study was completed and released to the public on Wednesday,
November 20, 2024, (hereinafter, the "2024 MGT Study"). 15
10. 	Houston's expert witness, Andres Bernal, testified that, like the 2006 study, the
2024 MGT Study showed a statistical underutilization .of minority-owned
businesses in Houston's contracting, thereby, in Mr. Bernal's view, confirming
the persistence of racial discrimination in Houston's contracting. 16
11. 	Mr. Bernal further testified that the 2024 MGT Study's statistical analysis
revealed 	that 	minority-owned 	businesses 	are 	significantly 	underutilized
compared to their non-minority-owned counterparts. 17
12. 	Mr. Bernal further testified that, based on all the data collected and analyzed,
the study' s conclusion is that there are statistical disparities which reflect that
minority-owned businesses are being discriminated against in the marketplace
and that Houston is passively engaging in discrimination. 18
15 Defendant ·City 	of Houston 's 	Response 	to 	Motion 	to 	Strike 	and for
Sanctions, Document No. 84 at 5.
16 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 209:22-210:5.
17 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 192:6-7; Defendant City
of Houston's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Document No.
146; 	Exhibit 	23 	at COH0006167, 	COH006175, 	COH0006185, 	COH0006187,
COH0006188 (the 2024 MGT Study) [hereinafter the 2024 MGT Study].
18 Hearing Transcript Day 3, Document No. 151 at 23:11-24:1, 44:23-45:9.
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13. 	However, Mr. Bernal conceded during his testimony that the 2024 MGT Study
identified no specific instances of racial discrimination, past or present, that
violate the Constitution or a statute. 19 Mr. Bernal also specifically stated at the
Hearing that the 2024 MGT Study he conducted failed to identify a single,
specific, discriminate act by Houston, past or present, in its public contracting
by any person or office associated with the City ofHouston. 20
HOUSTON'S ORDINANCE
14. 	On May 7, 2025, the Houston City Council voted to adopt the 2024 MGT Study
to "inform future program recommendations and policy decisions" affecting
Houston's program. 21 On the same date, the Houston City Council voted to
amend Chapter 15 of the Code of Ordinances. 22
15. 	Houston's Ordinance defines a "minority business enterprise" as a business in
which at least fifty-one percent of the ownership, stock, or assets are owned,
controlled, and managed by "minority persons." 23
19 Hearing Transcript Day 3, Document No. 151 at 56:10-21.
20 Hearing Transcript Day 3, Document No. 151 at 56:10-21.
21 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at ~54.
22 See Defendant City ofHouston's Motion to Dismiss for Lack ofJurisdiction,
Document No. 105, Exhibit 1 at 2 (City ofHouston, Texas Ordinance No. 2025-378)
[hereinafter City of Houston's Revised MWSBE Ordinance].
23 Houston Code, Art. V § 15-82.
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16. 	The revised ordinance sets new citywide minority-owned business goals for
Houston contracts. In doing so, Houston set annual minority and women-owned
business enterprise goals and gave city departments the authority to impose
contract-specific 	percentage 	goals 	for 	individual 	contracts, 	with 	limited
exceptions. 24
17. 	Most citywide goals in the revised ordinance were similar or identical to the
previous citywide goals, with one exception. Nonprofessional services-the
category in which Plaintiffs compete-nearly doubled its minority-owned
business enterprise subcontracting goal, increasing from eleven percent to
nineteen percent. 25
18. 	Additionally, the record in this matter is clear that Houston's ordinance creates
an imbalance between minority-owned and non-minority-owned businesses.
For 	non-minority-owned 	businesses 	like 	Plaintiffs, 	Houston's 	ordinance
requires that Plaintiffs' contract-goal must be subcontracted to a minority-
owned business. 26
24 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6 at ,I 3.
25 City ofHouston's Revised MWSBE Ordinance, supra note 22 at 4.
26 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 	150 at 133:9-13 (emphasis
added).
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19. 	Conversely, 	Houston 	allows 	minority-owned 	businesses 	to 	self-perform
subcontracting requirement with their own workers. 27
20. 	Firms who cannot fulfill the contract-specific goal must prove they made "good
faith efforts" to do so. 28
21. 	Whether a· firm made sufficient good faith efforts is up to the discretion of staff
in the City of Houston's Office of Business Opportunity, who wield the
authority to reject good-faith efforts of bidding contractors. 29
22. 	According to Houston, a contractor's performance will only be considered
unsatisfactory if the contractor failed to meet the minority-owned business goal
and was unable to document good faith efforts towards meeting such goal. A
contractor who has received an unsatisfactory rating on one contract is still
eligible to bid on, and be awarded, Houston contracts in the future. 30
27 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 133:6-8.
28 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 149:19-150:9.
29 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 133:16-22,.138:10-21.
30 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 119:10-22, 142:20-24;
Defendant City of Houston'_s Trial Exhibit 3 at COH0000090-93 (City of Houston
Office 	of Business 	Opportunity Policies 	and Procedures); 	Defendant City 	of
Houston's 	Trial 	Exhibit 	4 	at 	78-84 	(City 	of Houston's 	Office 	of Business
Opportunity Good Faith Efforts Policy).
10
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23. 	The penalty for failing to comply with a contract-specific goal or being granted
a waiver for good faith efforts is debarment from all Houston contracts for five
years. 31
24. 	On May 8, 2025-one day after the revised ordinance passed-Landscape
received an email from the Houston Office of Business Opportunity's Contract
Compliance 	Division 	regarding 	Landscape's 	progress 	in 	meeting 	the
subcontracting goal for their ongoing city contract. The email threatened
Landscape with enforcement actions, including up to a five-year suspension
under 	Houston 	Code, 	Art. 	V 	§ 	15-85 	if it 	does 	not 	fulfill 	the 	City's
subcontracting goal or demonstrate acceptable ,good faith efforts. 32
B. 	MIDTOWN MANAGEMENT DISTRICT'S MINORITY, WOMAN,
AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE POLICY
25. 	The Midtown Management District ("Midtown") was created in 2000 to
provide quality of life services such as public safety, marketing services,
31 Houston Code, Art. V § 15-86(a).
32 Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 15 (May 8, 2025, Houston Office of Business
Opportunity's Compliance Email Sent to Landscape) [hereinafter May 8, 	2025,
Houston Office of Business Opportunity's Compliance Email Sent to Landscape].
The Court notes that Landscape's pre-existing contract with Houston requires a
subcontracting goal of eleven percent. Under Houston's revised ordinance, all
contracts Landscape obtains moving forward require a subcontracting 	goal 	of
nineteen percent. See Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 133:9-13
11
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maintenance, and urban planning within the area of the Midtown Tax Increment
Reinvestment Zone ("TIRZ") in Midtown Houston. 33
26. 	Midtown, 	operating 	through 	the 	District's 	Service 	and 	Maintenance •
Committee, is responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of public right of
way and public facilities within the Midtown Management District. 34
27. 	Midtown operates its program because it believes it is commanded to have such
a program by the Texas Legislature's enactment of Texas Local Government
Code § 375.222 in 1991 which orders management districts such as Midtown
to have a program for disadvantaged businesses. 35 Plaintiffs bring this action to
specifically 	challenge the 	minority-owned 	business 	aspect 	of Midtown's
program.
28. 	Texas Local Government Code § 375.222(a) states that ''[a] 	district shall
attempt 	to 	stimulate 	the 	growth 	of 	disadvantaged 	businesses 	inside 	its
boundaries by encouraging the full participation of disadvantaged businesses in
all phases of its procurement activities and affording those disadvantaged
businesses a full and fair opportunity to compete for district contracts."
33 Joint Admission of Fact, supra note 6 at ,f 62.
34 Joint Admission ofFact, supra note 6 at ,r 63.
35 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at ,f 76.
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29. 	Texas Local Government Code § 375.222(b) provides that "[a] district shall
establish 	one 	or 	more 	programs 	designed 	to 	increase 	participation 	by
disadvantaged businesses in public contract awards. Each program shall be
structured to further remedial goals and shall be established to eradicate the
effects of any prior discrimination."
MIDTOWN'S PROGRAM
30. 	Midtown's public contracting program's stated purpose is as follows: "[to]
stimulate 	the 	growth 	of 	minority, 	women, 	and 	disadvantaged 	business
enterprises inside the boundaries 	of the District by encouraging the full •
participation of disadvantaged businesses in all phases o_f its procurement
activities 	and 	affording 	those 	disadvantaged 	businesses 	a 	full 	and 	fair
opportunity to compete for District contracts." 36
31. 	Midtown's program allows bidding companies certified by Houston as 	a
minority-owned business to receive up to a ten-point preference out of a 100-
point scale in the bidding process for public contracts. 37
32. 	Beginning in 2025, Midtown removed the ten-point award for minority owned
businesses, and instead now considers minority-owned business status as part
36 Midtown Management District's Trial Exhibit 14 at MMD00 171 (Midtown
Management District's 2004 Administrative Policies and Procedures).
37 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at~ 16.
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of the "organizational qualifications" section of its public contracting scoring
matrix. 38
33. 	Midtown's policy and procedures manual does not include a policy for how it
reviews and scores bids. Additionally, the scoring matrix for landscaping
services changed between 2022 and 2025, still with no information provided to
prospective Midtown public contract bidders regarding how Midtown reviews
and scores bids. 39
34. 	Midtown contends that it engages in race-conscious public contracting to
comply with Texas Local Government Code §375.222 and similar requirements
from the City of Houston, and notes a compelling interest to remedy prior
discrimination in the award of public contracts. 40
35. 	However, Midtown concedes that its program may disadvantage non-minority-
owned companies, even if those companies have never themselves been guilty
38 	Midtown 	Management 	District's 	Trial 	Exhibit 	38 	at 	5 	(Midtown
Management District's August 2025 Landscape Maintenance Instructions on Bid
Compliance) [hereinafter Midtown Management District's August 2025 Landscape
Maintenance 	Instructions 	on 	Bid 	Compliance]; 	Hearing 	Transcript 	Day 	2, .
Document No. 150 at 47:4-48:15; 76:1-5; 77:6-25.
39 Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 5 at 4 (Marlon Marshall Deposition Ex. 3, Invitation
to Bid); Midtown Management District's August 2025 Landscape Maintenance
Instructions on Bid Compliance, supra note 38 at 5.
40 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at~ 76.
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of discrimination. 41 Midtown further concedes that it has zero evidence of racial
discrimination· in its public contracting program. 42
36. 	Midtown's program is not based on a disparity study 	of the area within
Midtown's boundaries. Midtown has not adopted _any study, report, or research
that identifies specific instances of discrimination in public contracting in the
last five years. 43 Additionally, Midtown has not adopted the aforementioned
2024 MGT Study conducted by Houston. 44
3 7. 	Midtown has not identified any prime contract award based on intentional
discrimination against minority-owned business bidders in the last 5 years. 45
38. 	Midtown can identify no specific constitutional or statutory violations related
to its public contracting or procurement process awards. 46
41 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at 117.
42 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at 118.
43 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6 at 114.
44 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at 1112, 14-15.
45 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6 at 121.
46 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at 1 23.
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C. 	THE PLAINTIFFS
39. 	Plaintiffs Landscape and Metropolitan are small, family-owned landscaping
businesses that share the same owner, Gerald Thompson, and approximately
fifty employees, ninety-five percent of which are racial minorities. 47
40. 	The 	companies 	have 	operated 	in 	the 	Houston 	area 	since 	2006, 	with
approximately ninety percent of each company's annual revenue coming from 	·
winning local government landscaping contracts. 48
41. 	Neither Plaintiff Landscape nor Plaintiff Metropolitan qualify, or are certified,
as 	a minority owned business enterprise when bidding on contracts with
Houston or Midtown. 49
1. 	PLAINTIFFS' INTERACTIONS WITH HOUSTON
42. 	Landscape has successfully bid on-and been awarded-various government
contracts that set minority-owned business participation goals. In May 2021,
Landscape was awarded a five-year, $1,300,000.00 contract by Houston that
remains ongoing. 50
47 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at 11 24, 34.
48 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6at1125-26.
49 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6at1127:-28.
50 Hearing 	Transcript 	Day 	1, 	Document No. 	149 	at 	67:3'--9; 	Hearing
Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 123:14-19.
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43. 	Landscape's 	current 	contract 	with 	Houston 	includes 	an 	eleven 	percent •
minority-owned business participation goal. 51
44. 	However~ Houston's revised ordinance passed in May 2025 now imposes a
nineteen percent minority-owned business goal. 52 Landscape's owner, Gerald
Thompson, testified that learning about this increase from eleven percent to·
nineteen percent would 	be 	"very 	expensive 	and very 	costly" 	for 	small
businesses like Landscape and Metropolitan. 53
45. 	With nearly 	all 	of Landscape 	and Metropolitan's 	revenue 	commg 	from
contracts with Houston-area local governments, Mr. Thompson testified that
the growth of Houston's program and its spread to other municipalities "could
threaten the livelihood of his business." 54
46. 	Mr. Thompson's fears quickly became a harsh reality. On May 8, 2025---one
day after the revised ordinance passed-Landscape received an email from the
Houston Office 	of Business Opportunity's Contract Compliance Division
regarding Landscape's 	progress 	in meeting the 	minority-owned business
subcontracting goal for their ongoing city contract. The email threatened
51 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at~ 28.
52 Hearing Transcript Day 1, Document No. 149 at 40:21-24.
53 Hearing Transcript Day 1, Document No. 149 at 40:21-24, 82:13, 88:10.
54 Hearing Transcript Day 1, Document No. 149 at 50:5-11.
17 •
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I,,
Landscape with enforcement actions, including up to a five-year suspension
under Houston 	Code, 	Art. 	V 	§ 	15-85 	if it 	does 	not 	fulfill 	the 	City's
subcontracting goal or demonstrate acceptable good faith efforts. 55
ii. 	PLAINTIFFS' INTERACTIONS WITH MIDTOWN
47. 	On December 31, 2025, Metropolitan completed a multi-year landscaping
contract to maintain Midtown's Baldwin and Glover Parks. 56
48. 	In addition to the Baldwin and Glover Parks contract, Metropolitan also held
Midtown's Field Maintenance Service Project contract off-and-on over the last
fifteen years. 57
49. 	In 2022, Metropolitan's bid for the Field Maintenance Service Project contract
was unsuccessful due to Midtown's policy of awarding ten points to minority-
owned business bidders, but not to non-minority-owned business bidders like
Metropolitan. 58
55 May 8, 2025, Houston Office of Business Opportunity's Compliance Email
Sent to Landscape, supra note 32.
56 Hearing Transcript Day 	1, Document No. 	149 at 28:13-14; 	Hearing
Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 27:5-10.
57 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at ,r 30; Hearing Transcript Day 1,
Document No. 149 at31:16-19.
58 Hearing Transcript Day 1, Document No. 149 at 31:12-32:6; 34:6-12.
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50. 	The parties agree that if Metropolitan had been awarded the additional ten
points minority-owned businesses may be awarded, Metropolitan would have
had 	the highest score 	and 	secured the 	$350,000.00 	contract. 59 Midtown
concedes that Metropolitan outscored the winning bidder in every category,
except the category that precluded Metropolitan from receiving ten additional
points due to the race of its owners. 60
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. 	GENERAL STATEMENTS OF LAW
51. 	The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
52. 	Declaratory relief is authorized by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
2201-2202.
53. 	Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b), on the ground that all or a
substantial part of the acts giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims have occurred or will
occur in the Southern District of Texas.
59 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at ,r 33.
60 Id.; Hearing Transcript Day 1, Document No. 149 at 34:6-12.
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B. 	PRELIMINARY ISSUE OF MOOTNESS
54. 	A claim is rendered moot when a "case or controversy" no longer exists
between the parties. See, e.g., Brinsdon v. McAllen lndep. Sch. Dist., 863 F.3d
338,345 (5th Cir. 2017). "[A] case will become moot where 'there are no longer
adverse parties with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation' or 'when
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome' of the litigation." ·
Env 't Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 2008)
(quoting In re Scruggs, 392 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 2004)). "No matter how
vehemently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that
precipitated the lawsuit, the case is moot if the dispute is no longer embedded
in any actual controversy about the plai_ntiffs' particular legal rights." Already,
LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quotations omitted).
55. 	Here, Houston contends that Landscape's claim is moot because Landscape did
not amend its pleading after Houston enacted a new ordinance in 2025. Houston
further contends that Landscape's 2023 pleading seeks prospective relief only
as to Houston's now defunct program, relief which Houston claims is now
impossible for any court to provide.
56. 	Houston further argues that Houston's Office ofBusiness Opportunity Director,
Ms. Cylenthia Hoyrd, testified that Houston's new ordinance enacted in 2025
makes fundamental changes to Houston's program, allowing vendors to meet
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contract 	participation 	goals 	through 	race-neutral 	alternatives, 	such 	as
subcontracting with small or veteran-owned businesses. 61 Houston also notes
for the Court the testimony of Landscape's owner, Mr. Thompson, who testified
that he was not fully aware of the changes in Houston's program. 62 Houston
contends that based on the foregoing, Landscape's claims against Houston
should be denied as moot and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
57. 	In reviewing the challenged ordinance, the Court finds that Houston's May
2025 amendment did not narrow the challenged racial classifications or suspend
their enforcement. 63 On the contrary, Houston retained every racial category,
preserved race-based contract goals, and increased the goal applicable to
Plaintiffs' industry, raising the subcontracting percentage requirement from
eleven to nineteen percent. 64
61 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 107:9-20.
62 During the Court's four-day bench trial, Houston elicited testimony from
Landscape's owner, Mr. Thompson, suggesting he was unfamiliar with the details
of the revised statute Houston enacted. See Hearing Transcript Day 1, Document
No. 149 at 40:21-24, 65:6-11, 82:23-24. That testimony is inherently irrelevant-
particularly where, as here, the relevant facts are conceded. See Anne Harding, et.
al., v. County ofDallas, Texas, et. al., 948 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2020) ("[s]tanding
is not a pop quiz administered by able 	defense 	attorneys to unsophisticated
plaintiffs.").
63 City ofHouston's Revised MWSBE Ordinance, supra note 22 at 6.
64 Id.
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58. 	Houston does not dispute that it continues to operate a race-conscious program
post ordinance revision. 65
SQ. 	Houston also continues to enforce the revised ordinance against Plaintiffs,
evidenced by Houston emailing Landscape threatening that failure to comply
with a contract's subcontracting goal was grounds for up to 	a five-year
suspension from City of Houston contracting. 66
60. 	Additionally, testimony at the Court's four-day bench trial revealed that
Houston has not ceased the challenged conduct and continues to operate a race-
conscious public contracting program under Houston's amended ordinance. 67
61. 	The Supreme Court of the United States has condemned the practice of a
municipality replacing one race-conscious ordinance with a similar ordinance
at a late stage oflitigation, finding that the Northeast Florida Chapter of General
Contractors maintained standing after the City of Jacksonville, Florida repealed
an ordinance and replaced it with another ordinance that continued the same
conduct. See NE. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City
of Jacksonville, 	508 	U.S. 	656, 	660:.:61 	(1993) 	("Northeastern 	Florida")
65 Hearing Transcript Day 1, Document No. 149 at 206:8-10.
66 May 8, 2025, Houston Office of Business Opportunity's Compliance Email
Sent to Landscape, supra note 32.
67 Hearing Transcript Day 1, Document No. 149 at 206:8_:.10.
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("[t]here is no mere risk that Jacksonville will repeat its allegedly wrongful
conduct; it has already done so.").
62. 	In Northeastern Florida, the Supreme Court made clear that "[t]he gravamen
of petitioner's complaint is that its members are disadvantaged in their efforts
to obtain city contracts. The new ordinance may disadvantage them to a lesser
degree than the old one, but insofar as it accords preferential treatment . . . it
disadvantages them in the same fundamental way." Id. at 662.
63. 	Like the City of Jacksonville in Northeastern Florida, Houston replaced its
existing ordinance with another that continues to disadvantage Plaintiffs in the
same fundamental way. 68
64. 	Considering 	the 	Supreme 	Court's 	uniform 	rejection 	of mootness 	under
materially identical circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims for
relief against Houston are not moot.
C. 	PRELIMINARY ISSUE OF STANDING
65. 	To establish Article III standing, Plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) an-"injury in
fact" (2) that is "fairly traceable" to each defendant and (3) redressable by a
favorable decision. Lujan v. 	Defenders of Wildlife, 	504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992).
68 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 139:1-140:6.
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66. 	When analyzed in the context of government contracting, a party must show "it
is 	able 	and 	ready" 	to 	engage 	in 	government 	contracting 	"and 	that 	a
discriminatory policy prevents [it] from doing so on an equal basis." Ne. Fla.
Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S.
656, 666 (1993).
67. 	In a forward-looking equal protection challenge to a race-based program like
the one operated by Houston, a party "need only demonstrate that it is able and
ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from doing
so on an equal basis." Id.
68. 	Furthermore, a court must ensure that it restricts its standing analysis to the
specific contracts for which a contractor is actually eligible to apply within the
at-issue program. See W.H Scott Const. Co. v .. City of Jackson, Miss., 199 F.3d
206, 212 (5th Cir. 	1999). A plaintiff cannot simply challenge a program
"relating to every contract let by [a] City" but rather, only those it is eligible to
procure in the first place. Id.
69. 	Here, Landscape maintains that it has standing because it must compete on
unequal 	footing with minority-owned businesses 	in bidding for Houston
contracts. Plaintiffs' owner, Mr. Thompson, testified that Plaintiffs are able and
ready to bid on Houston contracts, and recently 	completed a multi-year
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landscaping 	contract for 	Houston. 69 Mr. 	Thompson 	further 	testified that .
Plaintiffs would continue to bid on Houston contracts if they can do so on an
equal footing with other bidders. 70
70. 	The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established an injury-in-fact through
evidence that they are treated in a racially discriminatory way when bidding for •
Houston contracts. In coming to this conclusion, the Court finds the following
evidence particularly persuasive.
71. 	The record in this matter is clear that Houston's ordinance creates an imbalance
between 	minority-owned 	and 	non-minority-owned 	businesses. 	For 	non-
minority-owned businesses like Plaintiffs, Houston's ordinance requires that
the 	entirety 	of 	Plaintiffs' 	contract-goal 	of 	nineteen 	percent 	must 	be
subcontracted to a minority-owned business. 71 Conversely, Houston allows
minority-owned businesses to self-perform contracting requirements with their
own workers. 72
69 Hearing Transcript Day 1, Document No. 149 at 36:8-14.
70 Hearing Transcript Day l, Document No. 149 at 50:16-52:1; Plaintiffs'
Trial Exhibit 13 (Plaintiffs' Alie/ Neighborhood Center Proposal); Plaintiffs' Trial
Exhibit 14 (Plaintiffs' Hermann Park Proposal).
71 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 133:9-13.
72 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 133:6-8.
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72. 	Houston's program imposes direct economic harm. The evidence offered at trial
shows that Plaintiffs must subcontract the entirety of the nineteen percent
minority-owned business subcontracting goal required by Houston, 	while·
minority-owned businesses may self-perform half with their own employees. 73
That differential requirement alters bid pricing, reduces margins, and compels
Plaintiffs to divert a fixed portion of contract value solely because of race.
Considering Plaintiffs' increased financial burdens due to Houston's revised
ordinance, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are experiencing a concrete, present
economic injury-not a speculative future harm. See Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of
Elections, 607 U.S. 71, 84 (2026) (Barrett, J., concurring}("[p]ocketbook harm
is a traditional Article III injury.").
73. 	The threat of harm to.Plaintiffs is not theoretical; Houston enforced its revised
ordinance against Landscape just one day after it was passed, threatening
Landscape with suspension for up to five years for failure to satisfy a contract's
minority-owned business goal. 74
74. 	Houston argues that Landscape's theory of standing is untenable ·because under
Houston's program both minority-owned businesses and non-minority-owned
73 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 133:6-13.
74 May 8, 2025, Houston Office of Business Opportunity's Compliance Email
Sent to Lcmdscape, supra note 32.
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businesses need do no m.ore than demonstrate "Good Faith Efforts" to meet
contract goals. On balance though, Houston's Good Faith Efforts Policy does
not level the playing field for non-minority-owned businesses. As Houston
Office of Business Opportunity Director Cylenthia Hoyrd testified, whether a
firm m.ade sufficient good faith efforts to waive a contract's minority-owned
business goal is within the complete discretion of the office's staff. 75
75. 	The Court also notes Midtown's sole argument attacking Plaintiffs' standing in
this case, noting. that "Landscape has never bid and never intends to bid on
Midtown projects, 	so 	it does not have 	standing to challenge Midtown's
policies." 76
76. 	Having considered the Supreme Court's clear guidance that a party "need only
demonstrate that it is able and ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory
policy prevents it from. doing so" in order to establish standing, the Court finds
Midtown's 	argument 	against Landscape 	unpersuasive, 	as 	Landscape 	has
provided sufficient evidence to show it is able and ready to bid on Midtown
contracts. See NE. Fla. Chapter ofAssociated Gen. Contractors ofAm. v. City
of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993).
75 Hearing Transcript Day 2, Document No. 150 at 133:16-22; 137:4-138:2.
76 	Defendant 	Midtown 	Management 	District's 	Preliminary 	Proposed
Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law, Document No. 143 at 17.
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77. 	Accordingly, and based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs possess
the requisite Article III standing with respect to their claims against Houston
and Midtown. The Court now turns to consider the merits of this case, whether
a permanent injunction should be issued to enjoin Houston and Midtown from
operating their race-conscious public contracting programs.
D. 	PERMANENT INJUNCTION
78. 	The elements of a permanent injunction are nearly identical to those of a
preliminary injunction, except that a "plaintiff must show actual success on the
merits rather than a mere likelihood of success." Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987). Thus, to establish it is entitled to a
permanent injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) an actual success on the
merits; (2) a substantial threat of immediate and irreparable harm for which it
has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that greater injury will result from denying
the [injunction] than from its being granted; and (4) that an injunction will not
disserve the public interest. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.3d 991, 993 (5th Cir.
1985); Amoco Prod., 480 U.S. at 546 n.12.
E. 	AC'l'UAL SUCCES ON THE MERITS
79. 	Race-based classifications are presumptively unconstitutional and can only be
overcome if the government satisfies the "daunting two-step examination" of
strict scrutiny. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) ..
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First, the burden is on Defendants to demonstrate that their programs' racial
classifications are used to "further compelling governmental interests." Gruffer
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). Second, Defendants must show that the
use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 311-12 (2013).
80. 	Courts 	have 	long 	recognized that 	"combating racial 	discrimination 	is 	a
compelling government interest." W.H. 	Scott Const. 	Co. v. 	City of Jackson,
Miss., 199 F.3d 206, 217 (5th Cir. 1999). To invoke a compelling interest in
remedying racial discrimination, the City must provide a "strong basis in
evidence" that such remedial action is necessary. Id.
81. 	The Supreme Court made clear in its landmark decision in Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows ofHarvard College ("Harvard") that
there are only two compelling interests that permit the government to treat
individuals differently based on· race: (1) "remediating specific, identified
instances of past discrimination that violated the Constitution or a statute," or
(2) "avoiding imminent and serious risks to human safety in prisons." Students
for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S.
181, 207 (2023).
82. 	Furthermore, courts must undertake a "searching judicial inquiry into the
justification" of a race-based program to ensure that government entities are
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I
"pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool." City
ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
83. 	Here, Houston argues that the 	Court should apply the 	Supreme Court's
framework in Croson and decline to apply the Supreme Court's framework
offered in its recent Harvard decision because the specific factual posture of
this 	case "does not involve the 	educational 	benefits 	·of diversity 	in the
classroom." 77 In sum, Houston asks this Court not to extend the Harvard
framework to apply in instances of race-conscious public contracting.
84. 	On balance though, the Court is aware of the United States Supreme Court's
very recent opinion in Louisiana v. Callais, et al., 146 S.Ct 1131, 1131 (Apr.
29, 2026) ("Callais"). Therein, the Supreme Court extended its holding in
Harvard beyond the context ofhigher education admissions. 	Id. (applying the
Harvard 	framework 	in 	the 	context 	of 	evaluating 	instances 	of 	racial
gerrymandering under the Voting Rights Act). While the Supreme Court in
Harvard never limited its holding to higher education admissions, Harvard's
application 	to 	a 	Voting 	Rights 	Act 	case 	further 	emphasizes 	Harvard's
applicability in other contexts such as public contracting. Additionally, the
Supreme 	Court in 	Callais 	affirms that 	for 	any 	effort to 	remediate past
77 City of Houston's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Document No. 45 at 15.
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I
discrimination to qualify as a compelling state interest, the discrimination must
first be "identified discrimination." Callais, 146 S.Ct at 1152-153 (quoting
Croson, 488 U.S. at 499). The Supreme Court is clear and unequivocal that the
government "must identify the specific instances of past discrimination that it
aims to remediate," and that the government has "no compelling interest in
generally remediating 'past discrimination in a particular industry or region' or
"the effects of societal discrimination.'" Id. (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S.
899, 910 (1996)).
85. 	Having considered the record in this case and applicable law, the Court finds
no binding or persuasive authority precluding the Court from applying the
Supreme Court's framework established in Harvard in the present instance.
Accordingly, the Court now turns to apply the Harvard framework to Houston
and Midtown's race-conscious public contracting programs.
i. 	HOUSTON'S MINORITY, WOMEN, AND SMALL BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE PROGRAM
86. 	Under the Supreme Court's framework in Harvard, further amplified by the
Supreme Court in Callias, Houston holds the burden .to show that its race-
conscious public 	contracting program is 	"remediating specific, 	identified
instances of past discrimination that violated the Constitution or a statute."
Harvard, 600 U.S. at 207.
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87. 	Here, Houston admits that it cannot identify any racial discrimination in its
public contracting program, let alone identify any specific Constitutional or
statutory violations related to its public contracting program. 78 Within the last
six years, Houston has not sanctioned or investigated any dty employee for
racial discrimination, identified any prime contractor that has discriminated
against 	a 	minority-owned 	business 	subcontractor, 	or 	gathered 	any
contemporary evidence 	of disparities or discrimination within the greater
Houston area. 79 Houston cannot have an interest in "remediating specific,
identified instances of past discrimination that violated the Constitution or a
statute" if it has no proof of instances of past discrimination.
88. 	The 2024 MGT 	Study-despite 	being written after. the Supreme Court's
Harvard decision-neither searched for nor found any specific, identified
instances of past discrimination that violate the Constitution or a statute and is
therefore inadequate to prove past intentional discrimination towards any racial
or ethnic group granted a preference under Houston's ordinance. 80
89. 	Whether analyzed under Harvard or under the Fifth Circuit's longstanding
remedial-equal-protection cases, Houston is required to identify concrete,
78 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at ,r,r 6-8.
19 Joint Admissions of Fact, supra note 6 at ,r,r 6-8.
80 Hearing Transcript Day 3, Document No. 151 at 56:10-21.
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particularized discrimination and demonstrate that its use of race is necessary
to remedy that discrimination. Houston has not done so.
90. 	Because Houston has failed to comply with the Supreme Court's framework in
Harvard by failing to identify any specific instances of past discrimination that
violated the Constitution or a statute, and because Houston has not proven that
the 	racial 	classifications 	in 	its 	public 	contracting 	programs 	satisfy 	the
demanding requirements 	of strict scrutiny generally, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have shown actual success on the merits with respect to Plaintiffs'
Equal 	Protection 	claim 	against Houston's 	Minority, 	Women, 	and 	Small
Business Enterprise Program. 81 The Court now turns to consider whether
Plaintiffs have shown actual success on the merits with respect to their action
against Midtown.
ii. 	MIDTOWN'S MINORITY, WOMAN, AND DISADVANTGED
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE POLICY
91. 	Midtown admits that it has identified no specific constitutional or statutory •
violations related to its public· contracting or procurement process or awards in
81 Considering the Court's finding that Houston's. race-conscious public
contracting program is unconstitutional based on Houston's failure to meet its
burden under the Supreme Court's Harvard framework, the Court declines to
consider Plaintiffs' remaining arguments pertaining to constitutionality.
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the last six years. 82 A review of the record in this case reveals that Midtown
cannot identify any specific, past constitutional or statutory violation that its
program is intended to remedy. Additionally, in the last six years, Midtown has
not disciplined, terminated, or otherwise sanctioned any employee or official
for discrimination in public contracting, nor has. it debarred or sanctioned a
contractor 	for 	discriminating 	against 	a 	minority-owned 	business
subcontractor. 83
92. 	As 	required 	by 	the 	framework 	set out 	in 	Harvard, 	without 	a 	specific
constitutional or statutory violation to remedy, Midtown has no compelling
interest 	in 	operating 	a 	race-based 	public 	contracting 	program. 	Because
Midtown has failed to comply with the Supreme Court's framework in Harvard
by failing to identify any specific instances of past discrimination that violated
the Constitution or a statute, and Midtown has not proven that the racial
classifications 	in 	its 	public 	contracting 	programs 	satisfy 	the 	demanding
requirements of strict scrutiny generally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
82 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6 at 122.
83 Joint Admissions ofFact, supra note 6 at 1119, 21.
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shown actual success on the merits with respect to Midtown's Minority,
Woman, and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Policy. 84
F. 	SUBSTANTIALTHREAT OF INJURY
93. 	The law is clear that the loss of a constitutional right is suJficient to show a
threat ofinjury or irreparable harm. See NE. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 657 (1993) ("[t]he
"injury in fact" element of standing in such an equal protection case is the denial
of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier-.here, the
inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process-not the
ultimate inability to obtain the benefit."); see also 1 lA Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948: 1 at 161 (2d ed. 1995)
(" [w]hen an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts
hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.").
94. 	Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that both Houston and Midtown's race-
based 	public 	contracting 	programs 	imperrnissibly 	infringe 	on the 	Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
84 Considering the Court's finding that Midtown's race-conscious public
contracting program is unconstitutional based on Midtown's failure to meet its
burden under the Supreme Court's Harvard framework, the Court declines to
consider Plaintiffs' remaining arguments pertaining to constitutionality.
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95. 	Accordingly, 	the 	effects 	of 	Houston 	and 	Midtown's 	race-based 	public
contracting programs will cause an irreparable injury which favors enjoining
both programs.
G. 	BALANCE OF HARMS
96. 	Determining if the balance 	of the hardship favors the party seeking the
injunction requires a court to consider "the competing claims of injury and ...
the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief."
Heil Trailer Int'! Co. v. Kula, 542 F. App'x 329, 336 (5th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def Council; Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)).
97. 	Here, the Court finds 	that the infringement 	of the Plaintiffs' 	Fourteenth
Amendment rights outweighs any hardship on Houston or Midtown.
98. 	Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have shown that the balance of harms weighs in their
favor.
. H. 	PUBLIC INTEREST
99. 	The public interest favors a permanent injunction because there is no public
interest in permitting the government to continue enforcing an unconstitutional
race-based policy. The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that there is a
strong 	public 	interest 	in 	requiring 	governmental 	actors 	to 	comply 	with
constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority. See Wages and White
Lon Investments, LLC v. FDA, 16 F.4th 1130, 1143 (5th Cir. 2021) ("there is
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generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.")
(quoting League of Women Voters of US. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir.
2016)) .
. 100. 	Accordingly, the Court finds the Plaintiffs have met all requirements to receive
injunctive relief.
I. 	ATTORNEYS' FEES
10 1. 	Plaintiffs also move the Court to issue an award of attorneys' fees and costs in
this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 42 U.S.C. §
1988.
102. 	42 U.S.C. ,r 1988(b) establishes that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1981 [or] 1983 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs ...." Such an award "may include expert fees as part of the
attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C. ,r 1988(c). "The party seeking reimbursement of
attorneys' fees ... has the burden of establishing the number of attorney hours
expended, and can meet that burden only by presenting evidence that is
adequate for the court to determine what hours should be included in the
reimbursement." Bode v. 	US., 919 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. 1990). "The
documentation supporting a factual finding regarding the amount of attorney's
fees must be sufficient for the court fo verify that the applicant has met its
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burden of establishing ah entitlement to a specific award." Gagnon v. United
Technisource, Inc.; 607 F.3d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 2010).
103. 	Here, the Court has reviewed the record in this case and finds ·no documentation
or evidence offered by Plaintiffs establishing the number of attorney hours
expended as is required under binding authority in this Circuit. Accordingly,
considering the discretionary nature of attorneys' fees in this case, and the
Plaintiffs' failure to offer the Court any documentation to assist the Court in
evaluating Plaintiffs' request, the Court determines that the pending request for
attorneys' fees should be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
DECLARES 	the racial 	aspect 	of Defendant City 	of Houston, 	Texas's
Minority, 	Women, 	and 	Small 	Business 	Enterprise 	Program
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 	The 	Court 	concludes 	that 	the 	portion 	of City 	of
Houston's 	Minority, 	Women, 	and 	Small 	Business 	Enterprise 	Ordinance 	that
discriminates on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court further
ORDERS that Defendant City of Houston, Texas is PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED from administering the racial aspect of its Minority, Women, and Small
Business Enterprise Program. The Court further
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DECLARES the racial aspect of Defendant Midtown Management District's
Minority, 	Woman, 	and 	Disadvantaged 	Business 	Enterprise 	Policy
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 	The Court concludes that the portion of Defendant
Midtown Management District's Minority, Woman, and Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise Policy that discriminates on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court further
ORDERS 	that 	Defendant 	Midtown 	Management 	District 	1s
PERMANENTLY 	ENJOINED 	from 	administering 	the 	racial 	aspect 	of 	its
Minority, Woman, and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Policy. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiffs' request for·attomeys' fees is DENIED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 28th day of July, 2026.
~JJ&.___:
· 	DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge
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