Morales v. Nationwide Investigations & Security, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MARC MORALES,
Plaintiff / Judgment
Creditor,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-cv-3085
NATIONWIDE
INVESTIGATIONS &
SECURITY, INC., ALLEN
HOLLIMON, AND SONIA D.
TIMS,
Defendants / Judgment
Debtors.
ORDER
On July 20, 2026, the Court reconvened a hearing on Court-appointed
Receiver James W. Volberding’s (the “Receiver”) Motions for Order to Show
Cause (ECF Nos. 138, 140, 142) and the Court’s subsequent Orders to Show
Cause (ECF Nos. 154, 155, 156). 	The Court heard arguments from 	both
parties. 	As discussed, 	the Court ORDERS that all deposits or checks for
Nationwide Investigations & Security, Inc. (“Nationwide”) be deposited with
Nationwide’s Chase Bank account or provided to the Receiver’s Office. 	The
Court further ORDERS that Ms. Caziere meet with the Receiver, at his office
in Tyler, Texas, to provide any and all financial records for Nationwide.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 27, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. 	The Halcyon Property
Also at issue is the real property located at 2918 Halcyon Time Trail,
Houston, Texas (the “Halcyon Property”). 	Currently pending before the Court
is 	Allen 	Hollimon 	(“Hollimon”) 	and 	Sonia 	Tims’s 	(“Tims”) 	(collectively,
“Judgment 	Debtors”) 	Motion 	to Vacate (ECF No. 182) 	and the Receiver’s
Motion for Turnover and Attachment Order (ECF No. 186). 	Hollimon and
Tims request that the Court vacate its previous Order (ECF No. 115), which
authorized the Receiver to sell the Halcyon Property. (ECF No. 182 at 2).
The Halcyon Property originally belonged to Tims’s mother. 	(See id. at
1). 	The Receiver argues the Halcyon Property passed to Tims following her
mother’s death pursuant to Texas Estates Code § 101.001, which states that
property devised by a will vests immediately upon death.1 (ECF No. 186 at 3).
For support, 	the Receiver relies on an affidavit 	that Tims filed in Harris
County Probate Court that stated the Halcyon Property passed solely to Tims
through the will of her late mother. (Id. (citing ECF No. 186-3)). On December
11, 2025, the Receiver moved for authorization to sell the Halcyon Property.
(ECF No. 111). 	The Judgment Debtors did not file a response. 	Pursuant to
1 See TEX . ESTATES CODE § 101.001 (“Passage of Estate on Decedent’s Death”), (a)
Subject to Section 101.051, if a person dies leaving a lawful will: (1) all of the person’s estate
that is devised by the will vests immediately in the devisees; (2) all powers of appointment
granted in the will vest immediately in the donees of those powers; and (3) all of the person’s
estate that is not devised by the will vests immediately in the person’s heirs at law. (Section
101.051 pertains to child-support and other debts, which are not applicable in this case.)
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Local Rule 7.4, failure to respond is taken as a representation of no opposition.
S.D. T EX. L OCAL R. 7.4. 	As such, based upon Tims’s affidavit and the lack of
objection from the Judgment Debtors, the Court ordered the Halcyon Property
transferred to the Receivership Estate and sold. 	(ECF No. 115).
The Judgment Debtors now argue the Halcyon Property is not Tims’s
property, and remains in the estate of Tims’s mother, because the will has not
been admitted to probate. 	(ECF No. 182 at 5 (citing T EX. E STATES C ODE §
256.001)). Further, the Judgment Debtors contend § 101.001 only applies if “a
person dies leaving a lawful will” and that Tims’s mother’s will is facially
invalid because it lacks two signatures from disinterested witnesses. 	(Id. at
6). Thus, the Judgment Debtors argue the question of title needs to be resolved
by the probate court before this Court takes any action with the Halcyon
Property. (Id. at 6–7).
“[F]ederal courts lack jurisdiction over proceedings that ‘interfere with’
state 	probate 	proceedings, 	assume 	general jurisdiction 	of 	the 	probate, 	or
assume control of property in the custody of the probate court.” Lemery v. Ford
Motor Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (collecting cases). 	To be
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clear, the probate exception2 does not apply in this case because the Court has
federal-question 	jurisdiction 	under 	the 	Fair 	Labor 	Standards 	Act. 	See
Dearborn Life Ins. Co. v. Ramirez, No. 1:23-cv-1060, 2024 WL 5371990, at *3
(W.D. Tex. June 28, 2024) (“Because the Court has found that it has federal-
question jurisdiction under ERISA, . . . the probate exception does not apply.”).
However, the dispute surrounding the ownership of Halcyon Property needs to
be resolved by the probate court. 	Thus, to not “interfere 	with” any state
probate proceedings, the Court GRANTS the Judgment Debtors’s Motion to
Vacate (ECF No. 182), VACATES this Court’s previous Order regarding the
Halcyon Property (ECF No. 115), and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the
Receiver’s Motion for Turnover and Attachment Order (ECF No. 186).
II. 	The Receiver’s Motions (ECF Nos. 194–195)
The 	Court 	also 	heard 	arguments 	on 	the 	Receiver’s 	Motion 	for
Authorization to Sell Company Assets and to Retain Specialized Personnel
(ECF No. 194) and Motion for Supplemental 	Receivership Order (ECF No.
195). These motions relate to three corporations3 that the Receiver refers to as
2 “[T]he probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or annulment
of a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate; it also precludes federal courts from
endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the custody of a state probate court. But it does
not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and otherwise within
federal jurisdiction.” Curtis v. Brunsting, 704 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Marshall
v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311–12 (2006)).
3 These corporations include (1) NetWRX3, Inc., (2) Hollimon Transportation Services,
Inc., and (3) Lifeline Resources Group, Inc.
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Nationwide’s subsidiaries. 	(ECF No. 194 at 1). 	For support, the Receiver
explains that an “’[a]nalysis 	of Nationwide’s 	bank statements 	reveals that
money flows freely between Nationwide’s accounts and the accounts of these
entities without any legitimate business purpose or documentation, rendering
them subsidiaries or auxiliaries of Nationwide.” 	(ECF No. 195 at 7–8). 	As
such, the Receiver (1) seeks authorization from the Court to sell Nationwide
and the corporations (ECF No. 194 at 14) and (2) requests a Supplemental
Receivership 	Order 	assigning 	the 	alleged subsidiaries 	to 	the receivership
estate (ECF No. 195 at 1). 	For support, the Receiver relies on Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code § 31.002, which is commonly referred to as the
Texas turnover statute. 	(See ECF No. 194 at 11–12); Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d
334, 342 (5th Cir. 2002).
In contrast, the Judgment Debtors contend the corporations are not
subsidiaries of Nationwide, citing to the corporations’ own public filings that
“reflect no parent, no subsidiary, and no affiliation among the entities.” 	(ECF
No. 212 at 3–4). 	The Judgment Debtors add that these corporations are non-
judgment debtors and that a turnover receivership “cannot liquidate the assets
and operations of a separate corporation that was never sued and against
which no judgment exists.” 	(Id. at 3). 	Stated a different way, the Judgment
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Debtors contend that “[a] judgment against a shareholder . . . does not make
the corporation’s assets available for turnover.” 	(Id. at 4–5).
The 	Texas 	turnover 	statute 	is 	a 	procedural 	mechanism 	by 	which
judgment creditors can reach assets of a judgment debtor that are otherwise
difficult to attach or levy on by ordinary legal process. 	See Beaumont Bank v.
Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tex. 1991). The Texas Supreme Court has noted
that “[t]he purpose of the turnover proceeding is merely to ascertain whether
or not an asset is in the possession of the judgment debtor or subject to the
debtor’s control.” Id. at 227. However, “Texas courts do not apply the turnover
statute to non-judgment debtors.” 	Id.; see Bollore S.A. v. Imp. Warehouse, Inc.,
448 F.3d 317, 322 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Texas courts construing 	the turnover
statute have expressly and consistently held that it may be used to reach only
the assets of parties to the judgment, not the assets of non-judgment third
parties.”).
Importantly here, “[t]here is little doubt that the Texas turnover statute
cannot be used to litigate the property rights of third parties.” 	Resol. Tr. Corp.
v. Smith, 53 F.3d 72, 79 (5th Cir. 1995). As recognized by the Fifth Circuit, “a
Texas appellate 	court concluded 	that it was improper 	to use the turnover
statute to reach the assets of corporations which were allegedly alter-egos of
the judgment debtors without a separate proceeding that pierced the corporate
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veil.” Id. (citing United Bank Metro v. Plains Overseas Group, Inc., 670 S.W.2d
281, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ)). 	Thus, because the
corporations at issue “are distinct legal entities that have substantive property
rights in the assets in which they hold title,” this Court “does not have the
authority to adjudicate [their] substantive rights under the turnover statute.”
Maiz, 311 F.3d at 345 (citing Resol. Tr. Corp., 53 F.3d at 77). 	Rather, the
corporations would have to be adjudicated as the alter egos of the Judgment
Debtors through a “piercing-the-veil” judicial process before being subjected to
turnover. 	See United Bank Metro, 670 S.W.2d at 283–84 (holding that non-
judgment debtor corporations should not be treated as judgment debtors based
upon evidence that they are alter egos of judgment debtors without a prior trial
on the merits that adjudicates the alter ego issue); Bollore S.A., 448 F.3d at
324 (“Texas law is clear that Appellees must pursue their alter ego proceedings
in a separate trial on the merits in the appropriate forum before using the
turnover statute to reach Appellants’ assets to satisfy the judgment against Ali
Mackie.”); see also Maiz, 311 F.3d at 345 n.10 (remarking that non-judgment
debtor 	corporations 	“not 	being 	properly 	before 	the 	district 	court 	raises
troubling due process concerns”).
Accordingly, because the corporate veils of the three corporations at issue
have not been pierced in a separate judicial proceeding, the Court DENIES IN
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PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Receiver’s Motion for Authorization to
Sell Company Assets and to Retain Specialized Personnel (ECF No. 194) as to
the corporations. 	The Court also DENIES 	WITHOUT PREJUDICE 	the
Receiver’s Motion for Supplemental Receivership Order (ECF No. 195).
However, 	the 	Court GRANTS 	IN 	PART the 	Receiver’s Motion 	for
Authorization to Sell Company Assets and to Retain Specialized Personnel
(ECF No. 194) as to Nationwide. 	As noted by the Receiver, this Court has
jurisdiction over Nationwide and its property. 	(Id. at 9–10 (citing Tex. Bus.
Orgs. Code § 11.402(b))). The Texas turnover statute allows this Court to order
the Judgment Debtors to turn over nonexempt property that is in the debtor’s
possession or is subject to the debtor’s control and appoint a receiver to sell the
nonexempt property in order to satisfy the judgment. 	See T EX. C IV. P RAC. &
R EM. C ODE § 31.002(b).
The Receiver asserts that Nationwide has not filed a tax return or paid
corporate taxes since 2020 (ECF No. 194 at 2) and that millions of dollars have
been misappropriated 	from the company (id. at 10–11). 	In light of these
circumstances, the Receiver seeks to sell Nationwide’s assets, and to recover
and protect 	what Nationwide 	intangible assets remain. 	(Id. at 10). 	The
Receiver explains that the proceeds of the sale will pay the Court’s judgment
and six years of unpaid state and federal taxes. (Id. at 2).
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Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	the 	Court finds 	the 	sale 	of 	Nationwide 	is
appropriate. 	Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Provident Royalties, LLC, No. 3:09-cv-
1238, 2009 WL 10678431, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2009) (“Because the Order
Appointing Receiver empowered 	[the Receiver] . . . to take such action as
necessary and appropriate for the preservation of the assets or to take such
action as necessary to prevent the dissipation of the assets, the Receiver had
the authority to conduct the sale.”). 	The Receiver is also authorized to (1) hire
an experienced business broker to assist in the sale4 (id. at 3); (2) retain a CPA
to prepare the corporate state and federal tax returns for the last six years (id.
at 	4); and (3) 	hire 	a new Chief 	Financial Officer 	to recover 	control 	and
management of the company and its operations (id. at 5). (See ECF No. 101 at
8–9 (“. . . the Receiver shall immediately have the . . . general powers and duties
. . . to choose, 	engage and employ 	[third 	parties] 	as the Receiver deems
advisable 	or 	necessary 	in 	the 	performance 	of 	the 	Receiver’s 	duties 	and
responsibilities under the authority granted by this Order.”)).
III. 	The Judgment Debtors’ Motions (ECF No. 209–210)
Hollimon filed an Expedited Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
Compelling 	Payment (ECF No. 205) and Advisory 	of Present 	Inability to
4 The Receiver notes that he will facilitate appraisals if Hollimon and Tims object to
the price and contend additional appraisals should be obtained. (ECF No. 194 at 3). Hollimon
and Tims will be required to bear the cost of any such appraisals.
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Comply. 	(ECF 	No. 	209). 	Hollimon 	also 	filed 	a 	Motion 	for 	Expedited
Consideration (ECF No. 210), which the Court DENIES AS MOOT.
On July 17, 2026, the Court ordered Hollimon to bring a cashier’s check
payable to the Receiver for $73,824.17 and provide it to the Court during the
July 20, 2026 hearing. (ECF No. 205 at 7). Hollimon explains that he cannot
comply with the Court’s order because “every account he holds has been frozen,
Nationwide cannot make payroll or fund operations, and a substantial portion
of the funds the Order describes was itself transferred into a frozen account.”
(ECF No. 209 at 2). 	Given that the money can be recovered through the sale
of 	Nationwide 	in accordance 	with 	this Order, 	the 	Court will 	not impose
sanctions against Hollimon at this time. 	As such, the Court GRANTS IN
PART 	Hollimon’s 	Expedited 	Motion 	for 	Reconsideration 	of 	the 	Order
Compelling Payment (ECF No. 209) as to the issue of sanctions but DENIES
IN PART Hollimon’s motion (id.) as to all other relief sought.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on July 27, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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