Starkey v. Collier et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
BROCK ANDREW STARKEY, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 4:19-CV-04055
§
KHARI MOTT, §
§
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Brock Andrew Starkey is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(“TDCJ”). He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that TDCJ officials used excessive
force against him and denied him medical care for his injuries. A different court in this
district entered a default judgment against Defendant Khari Mott after Mott failed to
show cause. (Dkt. No. 80). Accordingly, the only question before the Court is the amount
of damages to which Starkey is entitled.
For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Brock Andrew Starkey’s Motions to
Enforce Judgment, (Dkt. Nos. 122–124), and AWARDS him (1) $100 in compensatory
damages; (2) $465 in reasonable court costs; and (3) post-judgment interest.
I. BACKGROUD
Brock Andrew Starkey alleges that he was assaulted by TDCJ Correctional Officers
at the Estelle Unit around February 2018. (Dkt. No 1 at 7). Following the assault, Starkey
was sent to Huntsville Memorial Hospital. (Id. at 8). It is unclear, however, whether this
hospitalization was for injuries sustained during the alleged assault or for a mental health
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 14, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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evaluation. (Id.). Starkey alleges that after his return to the Estelle Unit, he began
requesting medical attention for physical injuries; again, it is unclear from his complaint
whether these injuries resulted from the alleged assault.1 (Id.).
Starkey complained on several occasions that TDCJ Officials failed to provide
adequate medical care and failed to take his grievances seriously. (Id. at 8–11). Several
of these complaints were either reviewed by Mott, (id. at 37–42, 45–46), or were directed
to Mott, (id. at 51), because of Mott’s role as the Estelle Unit Medical Business Manager,2
(Dkt. No. 16 at 5). In these complaints, Starkey claimed that he had “been ignored when
requesting medical care” and that his “condition [was] worsening because of continual
neglect.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 37). He concedes that he was seen by TDCJ medical professionals,
(see id. at 37, 41), but claims that they were “openly aggressive” and failed to properly
address his concerns, (id. at 41). Starkey also complained to Mott in a letter dated July 23,
2018, that TDCJ failed to release his medical records to his family. (Id. at 45). Mott
responded to these grievances by explaining that Starkey had received proper care and
that he could follow up as needed with TDCJ medical personnel. (Id. at 37–42, 45–46).
Unhappy with TDCJ and Mott’s responses, Starkey filed this suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Id.) After failing to show cause for why judgment should not be entered, a
default judgment was entered against Mott. (Dkt. No. 80). The Court held a hearing to
1 Starkey later testified at a damages hearing that he suffered injuries to his pelvis,
shoulder, and left knee (specifically a joint effusion according to an x-ray of his knee) from the
assault and that these injuries had mostly recovered. (See Sept. 4, 2025, Dkt. Minute Entry).
2 Starkey’s complaint is devoid of information about Mott besides the job title, including
even whether Mott is a man or woman. Starkey admitted in the damages hearing to never having
seen Mott in person. (See Sept. 4, 2025, Dkt. Minute Entry).
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determine damages in which Starkey testified under oath. (Sept. 4, 2025, Dkt. Minute
Entry).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“After a default judgment, the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations are taken
as true, except regarding damages.” United States ex rel. M-CO Constr., Inc. v. Shipco Gen.,
Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987). “Thus, the district court takes as true the facts
asserted by a plaintiff against a defaulting defendant,” Escalante v. Lidge, 34 F.4th 486, 492
(5th Cir. 2022), but a party entitled to judgment by default is required to prove the
appropriate amount of damages, see L. Funder, LLC v. Munoz, 924 F.3d 753, 761–62 (5th
Cir. 2019), as revised (June 6, 2019); Oberstar v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 494, 505 n.9 (8th Cir. 1993)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)). If damages sought against a defendant are not
ascertainable from documentary evidence or affidavits, the court may hold a hearing to
determine the amount of damages. See UnitedHealthcare Ins. v. Holley, 724 F.App’x 285,
289 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857
(5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)); James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993). “[T]he Court
must then determine whether the relief requested is appropriate based on the governing
law.” T-Mobile USA Inc. v. Shazia & Noushad Corp., No. 3:08-CV-00341, 2009 WL 2003369,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2009).
“Damages awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by common law tort
principles.” Combs v. Holman, 134 F.App’x 669, 670 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing
Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1994)); Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,
477 U.S. 299, 306–07, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542–43, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). A plaintiff may seek
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compensatory damages and punitive damages. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306–07 & n.9, 106
S.Ct. at 2542–43 & n.9. A plaintiff may also seek costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.
DeLeon v. Abbott, 687 F.App’x 340, 342 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Universal Amusement
Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 172 (5th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 445 U.S. 308, 100 S.Ct. 1156, 63 L.Ed.2d
413 (1980).
III. DISCUSSION
Because the damages sought were not readily ascertainable from documentary
evidence or affidavits, the Court held a hearing to determine the appropriate amount.
(See Dkt. No. 125); Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). The only evidence Starkey presented was his
sworn testimony. (See Sept. 4, 2025, Dkt. Minute Entry). The Court gave Starkey 30 days
to submit additional evidence relating to his damages, however, no new evidence was
submitted. (Id.). The Court evaluates Starkey’s evidence to determine what “relief
requested is appropriate based on the governing law.” T-Mobile USA, 2009 WL 2003369,
at *3.
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Starkey requests $3,000,000 in compensatory damages. (Dkt. No. 1 at 16).
“[C]ompensatory damages may include . . . out-of-pocket loss and other monetary
harms,” as well as injuries such as “mental anguish and suffering.” Stachura, 477 U.S. at
307, 106 S.Ct. at 2543 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350, 94 S.Ct. 2997,
3012, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974)); Oby v. Sander, 778 F.App’x 326, 327 (5th Cir. 2019) (per
curiam).
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Starkey has not presented sufficient evidence to justify awarding him
compensatory damages for out-of-pocket expenses. None of the evidence in the record
nor his testimony at the damages hearing provide the Court with proof of any out-of-
pocket expenses. Besides costs associated with prosecuting this lawsuit, see infra Section
III(C), Starkey does not assert that he has incurred or suffered monetary expenses
associated with the events of this case such as medical expenses or loss income. Starkey
did testify at the damages hearing, however, that he was asking for compensatory
damages to cover potential future medical expenses. (See Sept. 4, 2025, Dkt. Minute
Entry). Despite this, any future medical expenses that Starkey could incur are speculative
at best given that he also testified that his injuries were mostly healed and that he still
had 25 years left on his sentence. (Id.). As a result, the Court finds that he is not entitled
to compensatory damages for out-of-pocket expenses.
Starkey may also receive compensatory damages for pain and suffering. “Physical
injury, pain and suffering, personal humiliation, mental distress, and embarrassment are
compensable under § 1983.” Jones v. Conner, 233 F.3d 574, at *1 (5th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished table decision) (citing Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam)); Knight v. Kirby Offshore Marine Pac., LLC, 983 F.3d 172, 180 (5th Cir. 2020)
(“General damages are available for pain and suffering and their negative impact on
one’s normal life routines.”); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 301–02 (5th Cir. 1987).
But valuing “damages for pain and suffering . . . presents unique challenges.”
Recio v. Vasquez, No. 5:18-CV-00264, 2023 WL 2144300, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2023) (citing
Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 455 (5th Cir. 2016)), report and recommendation adopted, 2023
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WL 2142984 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2023). “When a damage award includes recovery for pain
and suffering,”—which are, “to a large degree, not susceptible to monetary
qualification”—the factfinder has “especially broad” discretion. Cowart, 837 F.3d at 455
(quoting Seidman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 1134, 1141 (5th Cir. 1991)); see also Sulkowska
v. City of New York, 129 F.Supp.2d 274, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[T]he law does not provide
a precise formula by which pain and suffering and emotional distress may be properly
measured and reduced to monetary value.”).
When courts act as factfinders, they may consider pain-and-suffering awards in
cases with similar facts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hankins, 582 F.App’x 306, 308 (5th Cir. 2014)
(per curiam); Wheat v. United States, 860 F.2d 1256, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988); Recio, 2023 WL
2144300, at *8. But while “comparing damages awards in similar cases is helpful,” the
Fifth Circuit has emphasized that “each case depends on its own facts.” Wheat, 860 F.2d
at 1259. Analogous cases “provide an objective frame of reference, but they do not control
[a court’s] assessment of individual circumstances.” Id. “[C]ommon sense
dictates . . . that reference to other awards is more or less useful in relation to the number
of cases available for comparison as well as the similarity between those cases.” Id.
(quoting Wakefield v. United States, 765 F.2d 55, 59–60 (5th Cir. 1985)). “Consequently,
while a comparison with other awards might serve as a point of reference, such
comparison is not controlling.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Wakefield, 765 F.2d at 59–
60).
It is difficult for the Court to find comparable cases, however, because Starkey has
provided little to no factual allegations regarding his assault or Mott’s role in denying
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him medical care. Moreover, there is a fundamental omission in Starkey’s
complaint: whether the medical attention, he attempted to receive following the assault
was actually for the injuries he received from the assault. Even assuming that was the
reason he sought medical attention, Starkey provides little evidence regarding those
injuries. While he testified at the damages hearing to injuries to his pelvis, shoulder, and
left knee, (Sept. 4, 2025, Dkt. Minute Entry), he gave no explanation of their severity or
how they were exacerbated by lack of medical attention. The Court cannot award
damages for pain and suffering on such a sparse record.
Starkey also failed to provide any evidence specifically demonstrating how Mott’s
actions caused him pain and suffering. The only evidence presented regarding Mott—
Starkey’s letter and his grievance forms responded to by Mott—indicate that Mott did
not deny Starkey medical treatment and in fact informed him that he could see a medical
professional if his pain persisted. (Dkt. No. 1 at 38, 40, 42) (“An appointment [with a
medical professional] has been scheduled, however, if the pain persists prior to that
please submit a sick call request.”) (“Plan is as follows: . . . [follow up] as needed.”)
(“Patient was instructed to follow up as needed for pain and to submit a sick call request
if needed. Standard of care has been met.”).
Given the dearth of evidence presented by Starkey, the Court awards him only
nominal compensatory damages of $100. Compare Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct.
1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) (“Compensatory damages . . . are mandatory; once
liability is found, the [factfinder] is required to award compensatory damages in an
amount appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for his loss.”), with Williams v. Bd. Of
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Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 629 F.2d 993, 1005 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied sub nom. Saye v.
Williams, 452 U.S. 926, 101 S.Ct. 3036, 69 L.Ed.2d 428 (1981) (“In a § 1983 action damages
must be proved, rather than presumed.” (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042,
55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)).
B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Starkey also requests $2,000,000 in punitive damages. (Dkt. No. 1 at 16). Punitive
damages are available under Section 1983 “to punish as well as to deter the commission
of similar offenses in the future,” but they are considered “a harsh remedy and
normally . . . not favored by law.” Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311, 1319 (5th Cir. 1985)). They are available only if
the defendant’s conduct was “motivated by evil motive or intent” or involved “reckless
or callous indifference” to federally protected rights. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56, 103 S.Ct. at
1640; Holmes v. Reddoch, 117 F.4th 309, 320 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Cowart, 837 F.3d at 455).
Unlike compensatory damages, which are mandatory once liability is established,
punitive damages are a “discretionary moral judgment.” Smith, 461 U.S. at 52, 103 S.Ct.
at 1638; Heaney, 846 F.3d at 803 (“[U]nlike compensatory damages, punitive damages are
never available as a matter of right, no matter how egregious the defendant’s conduct
may be.” (quoting Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 404 (5th Cir. 1990))). Thus, even if a plaintiff
makes “a proper showing to justify an award of punitive damages,” the decision to award
them remains within the factfinder’s discretion. Fitzgerald v. Harris Cnty. Sheriffs Off., No.
4:15-CV-01330, 2018 WL 2046969, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 1, 2018) (citing Creamer, 754 F.2d at
1319); Heaney, 846 F.3d at 803.
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Additionally, an award of punitive damages must be supported by the well-
pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. See Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank,
515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for
the judgment entered.”); SEC v. McDuff, 697 F.App’x 393, 394 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(“A default judgment must be ‘supported by well-pleaded allegations’ and must have ‘a
sufficient basis in the pleadings.’” (quoting Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206)).
Nothing in Starkey’s complaint demonstrates that punitive damages from Mott
are appropriate. As an initial matter, Mott was not one of the officials that assaulted
Starkey nor was Mott one of the medical providers that examined him after the assault.
There is no indication that Mott is even a medical professional at all. Mott was merely
the Unit Medical Business Manager that reviewed Starkey’s grievances. Starkey has had
no contact with Mott beyond the resolution of his grievances and the letter he sent in July
2018. (See Sept. 4, 2025, Dkt. Minute Entry).
Starkey also presented no evidence showing that Mott was deliberately indifferent
to his grievances regarding his medical needs, let alone that Mott was “motivated by evil
motive or intent” or showed “reckless or callous indifference” to Starkey’s federally
protected rights. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56, 103 at 1640. In fact, the records presented by
Starkey indicate that Mott addressed each of his grievances with specific instances of
Starkey receiving medical treatment from TDCJ. (Dkt. No. 1 at 37) (responding to
Starkey’s complaint that he had not been allowed to see a doctor by noting that he was
prescribed medication and that he had already been scheduled for a future appointment
with a medical provider); (Dkt. No. 1 at 40, 42) (responding to Starkey’s complaint that
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his condition had worsened because he was denied medical treatment by noting that a
medical provider had already examined him and believed he was “a poor historian” and
that he was intentionally exaggerating his symptoms). Because these responses indicate
neither evil intent nor callous indifference, the Court finds that there is no basis to award
Starkey punitive damages from Mott.
C. COSTS
Finally, Starkey seeks court costs and litigation expenses. (Dkt. No. 1 at 17). A
prevailing party under Section 1983 can recover costs under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Smith v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 909 F.3d 744, 752 (5th
Cir. 2018); U.S. ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, LLC, 807 F.3d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 2015).
Prevailing parties may also recover reasonable attorney’s fees and related expenses under
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). DeLeon, 687 F.App’x at 342 (quoting Associated Builders & Contractors
of La., Inc. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1990)). Starkey is the
prevailing party, and the Court finds it reasonable to reimburse him for the costs
associated with obtaining the default against Mott. The Court therefore awards him $465
in court costs to cover the $400 filing fee and $65 fee incurred from attempting to serve
Mott.3
* * *
3 The Court does not award Starkey the $505 filing fee from his appeal of Judge Hughes’
Order denying his requests for default judgment and a preliminary injunction against all
Defendants, (Dkt. No. 26), because that appeal was unsuccessful, (See Dkt. No. 47).
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The Court awards Starkey: (1) $100 in compensatory damages; (2) $465 in
reasonable court costs; and (3) post-judgment interest4 at the applicable federal rate.5 In
total, Starkey is entitled to recover $466 from Mott, plus post-judgment interest at the
applicable federal rate of 3.67%. Post-Judgment Interest Rates, U.S. Dist. & Bankr. Cts. of S.
Dist. of Tex., https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/page/post-judgment-interest-rates-2025
(last visited Nov. 13, 2025).
Starkey is responsible for enforcing and collecting the judgment. Fitzgerald, 2018
WL 2046969, at *5.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff Brock Andrew Starkey’s
Motion to Enforce Judgment, (Dkt. Nos. 122–124), and AWARDS him the following
amounts:
1) $100 in compensatory damages;
2) $465 in court costs; and
3) Post-judgment interest at the rate of 3.67%.
It is SO ORDERED.
4 Post-judgment interest “is awarded as a matter of course.” Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v.
Fogleman, 607 F.3d 161, 173 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a)).
5 The post-judgment interest rate is based upon the applicable federal rate. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961(a).
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Signed on November 13, 2025.
___________________________________
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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