Ruffin v. Remy Real Estate & Investment Inc et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
MARY RUFFIN,
Plaintiff.
V.
REMY REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT INC, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00399
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
There are 11 motions pending before me in this civil rights case:
1. 	Defendant Keith Gross’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 11);
2. Gross’s motion for sanctions (Dkt. 12);
3. Plaintiff Mary Ruffin’s motion to strike exhibits to Gross’s
motion to dismiss (Dkt. 18);
4. Defendant Remy Real Estate & Investments, Inc.’s motion
to dismiss (Dkt. 19);
5. Ruffin’s motion for preliminary injunction against Gross
(Dkt. 22);
6. Ruffin’s request for an in-person hearing (Dkt. 23);
7. 	Ruffin’s motion for substituted service (Dkt. 27);
8. Ruffin’s motion to strike exhibits to Remy’s motion to
dismiss (Dkt. 30);
9. Defendant Lani Harkey’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 32);
10. Ruffin’s motion for sanctions (Dkt. 36); and
11. Ruffin’s motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint
(Dkt. 43)
I will start by addressing the motions to dismiss brought by Gross (Dkt. 11),
Remy (Dkt. 19), and Harkey (Dkt. 32). For the reasons explained below, this court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over most of Ruffin’s claims under the Rooker–
Feldman 	doctrine. What few claims the 	court may exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over should nevertheless be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 08, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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After disposing of the motions to dismiss, I will discuss the motions for
sanctions filed by Gross and Ruffin. Finally, I will briefly address the remaining
motions pending before me.
BACKGROUND
In August 2020, Ruffin sued Remy in justice court for negligence. Gross was
Remy’s attorney in that case. The justice court dismissed Ruffin’s suit for lack of
standing. Ruffin appealed that decision to the county court. The county court judge
conducted a bench trial in February 2024. After a trial on the merits, the county
court judge signed a final judgment, ordering that Ruffin take nothing. Ruffin then
appealed that decision to the court of appeals. See Ruffin v. Remy Real Est. & Inv.,
Inc., No. 14-24-00299-CV, 2025 WL 684733 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Mar. 4, 2025, pet. denied). I take judicial notice of this appellate decision. See Stiel
v. Heritage Numismatic Auctions, Inc., 816 F. App’x. 888, 892 (5th Cir. 2020)
(“[T]he district court may properly take judicial notice of public state court
records.”). 1
One issue that Ruffin raised to the appellate court concerned the county
court’s order requiring Ruffin to pay all future court costs. See Ruffin, 2025 WL
684733, at *2. As the appellate court noted, “Ruffin filed at least two statements of
inability to pay court costs, both of which were contested.” Id. The first challenge
to Ruffin’s indigency status was brought by Remy. The justice court sustained
Remy’s challenge to Ruffin’s inability to pay. The county court reversed the justice
court’s order “and affirmed [Ruffin]’s indigency.” Dkt. 1 at 8. Later at the county
court, however, court reporter Mary Piper also challenged Ruffin’s indigency
status. The county court sustained that challenge, ordering Ruffin to pay all future
court costs. On appeal, Ruffin argued that the county court’s “earlier order
[reversing the justice court’s order and affirming Ruffin’s indigency] should have
1 Gross and Remy both attach a copy of the court of appeals’ opinion to their respective
motions to dismiss. Ruffin asks me to strike the opinion. See Dkts. 18, 30. That request is
denied. Ruffin also asks me to strike various state court pleadings attached as Exhibit 2
to Remy’s motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 30. That request is, likewise, denied.
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precluded the county court from sustaining the court reporter’s contest filed in
county court.” Ruffin, 2025 WL 684733, at *2. The appellate court overruled this
issue “[b]ecause Ruffin failed to challenge the complained-of county court’s order
within ten days after the order was signed.” Id. The appellate court affirmed the
county court’s judgment. See id. at *5.
On December 8, 2025, Ruffin instituted this lawsuit against Remy, Gross,
and two court reporters—Lani Harkey and Dale Lee—who “refused to submit or
provide transcripts [to Ruffin] without payment.” Dkt. 1 at 10. Ruffin asserts four
causes of actions against these defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) Fourteenth
Amendment due process violation; (2) Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
violation; (3) conspiracy; and (4) First Amendment denial of access to courts. 2
Remy, Gross, and Harkey have appeared and filed motions to dismiss. See Dkts. 11,
19, 32. While these defendants raise several reasons why Ruffin’s claims against
them should be dismissed, I need address only two. As to all of Ruffin’s claims
against Harkey and Lee, and to some of Ruffin’s claims against Remy and Gross,
this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
As to the claims over which this court has subject matter jurisdiction, Ruffin
nevertheless fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	R ULE 12(b)(1) AND THE R OOKER –F ELDMAN D OCTRINE
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction
conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). Rule 12(b)(1) allows a party to
challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(1) 	when 	“the 	court 	lacks 	the 	statutory 	or
2 Ruffin has labeled “Liability of Remy Real Estate Inc” as a fifth count in her complaint.
See Dkt. 1 at 14. This is not actually a separate cause of action; rather, it is a legal theory
by which Ruffin seeks to hold Remy liable.
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constitutional power to adjudicate the claim.” In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde
Prods. Liab. Litig. (Miss. Pls.), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation
omitted).
The 	Rooker–Feldman 	doctrine 	bars 	federal 	courts 	from 	exercising
jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “The
doctrine, however, does not preclude federal jurisdiction over an ‘independent
claim,’ even ‘one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached.’”
Weaver v. Tex. Cap. Bank N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Exxon
Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293). The relevant question then is whether the “the federal
claims are inextricably intertwined with a challenged state court judgment” such
that “the losing party in a state court action seeks what in substance would be
appellate review of the state judgment.” Weaver, 660 F.3d at 904 (cleaned up).
B. 	R ULE 12(b)(6)
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails “to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Conversely, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point
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of 	minimum 	expenditure 	of 	time 	and 	money 	by 	the 	parties 	and 	the
court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (cleaned up).
When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I accept “all well-pleaded facts as
true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings
v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted). 	I 	“do 	not, 	however, 	accept 	as 	true 	legal 	conclusions, 	conclusory
statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Benfield
v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Fifth Circuit “hold[s] pro se plaintiffs to a
more lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing complaints, but pro se
plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the
speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th
Cir. 2016); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS3
A. 	HARKEY AND L EE4
Ruffin claims that Harkey and Lee “obstructed [her] rights by refusing to
provide transcripts despite [Ruffin’s] indigency being established.” Dkt. 1 at 12.
This is the only allegation that Ruffin makes against Harkey or Lee in her
complaint. See id. at 10 (“Lani Harkey and Dale Lee (Defendant) refused to submit
or provide transcripts without payment, despite indigency being established
leading to denial [of] due process.”); id. at 13 (“Court Reporters Lani Harkey and
3 A motion to dismiss is a dispositive pretrial matter for which a magistrate judge may
only issue a recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Davidson v. Georgia-Pac.,
L.L.C., 819 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 2016).
4 Although Lee has yet to appear in this case, the Fifth Circuit has held that a district court
does not err in allowing non-appearing defendants “to benefit from the appearing
defendants’ favorable [dispositive] motion.” Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir.
2001). “The policy rationale for this rule is that it would be incongruous and unfair to
allow some defendants to prevail, while not providing the same benefit to similarly
situated defendants.” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, my recommendations as to Harkey
apply with equal force to Lee.
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Dale Lee denied Plaintiff access to transcripts despite knowing that Plaintiff’s
indigency had been established.”). Ruffin does not allege that Harkey or Lee
provided fraudulent statements to the court or took some independent action to
ensure that Ruffin did not receive transcripts. Rather, on the face of Ruffin’s
complaint, Harkey and Lee were merely following court rulings that “reverse[d]
[Ruffin]’s indigency determination.” Id. at 9. Ruffin herself acknowledges that it
was “the Court” who “denied [her] access to the court reporter’s records.” Id. at 10.
To find for Ruffin on her claims against Harkey and Lee, this court would
have to “effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling” regarding
Ruffin’s indigency determination. Canal Cap. Corp. v. Valley Pride Pack, Inc., 169
F.3d 508, 512 (8th Cir. 1999) (“A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a
state court judgment when the relief requested in the federal action would
effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.” (quotation omitted)).
Despite Ruffin’s conclusory assertion that she “does not seek to relitigate or
overturn the judgment of the state courts,” she asks this court to issue an order
directing Harkey and Less “to prepare and provide, without cost, the full transcript
of all hearings and proceedings in Plaintiff’s civil case in Civil Court at Law No. 2,
Galveston County, Texas.” Dkt. 1 at 3, 16. That is exactly what Rooker–Feldman
does not allow this court to do—to effectively reverse a state court judgment. Thus,
Ruffin’s claims against Harkey and Lee must be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 5
B. 	GROSS AND R EMY
1. 	Claims Barred by the Rooker–Feldman Doctrine
To the extent that Ruffin’s claims against Gross and Remy would require this
court to effectively reverse the state court decision or void its rulings, those claims
are barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
5 Even if this court had subject matter jurisdiction over Ruffin’s claims against Harkey
and Lee, I would still recommend dismissal because Ruffin’s conclusory allegations
against Harkey and Lee fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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For example, Ruffin claims that she “was denied fair process” when Gross
“conspired with” the justice and county courts, “which lead [sic] to blocking
discovery, preventing hearings on Plaintiff’s motions, and [forced a] bench trial
despite non-compliance with docket control orders.” Dkt. 1 at 12. Ruffin raised a
similar argument to the appellate court: “In her second issue, Ruffin argues that
Remy failed to comply with the county court’s docket control order and that the
county court erred in not enforcing the order.” Ruffin, 2025 WL 684733, at *3. 6
This court does not have jurisdiction to say whether the county court was
wrong to hold a bench trial or to pass judgment upon how the county court
enforced its docket control orders. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 486–87 (1983) (“These allegations are inextricably intertwined with the
. . . Court of Appeals’ decisions, in judicial proceedings, to deny [Ruffin’s appeals].”
This court, “therefore, does not have jurisdiction over these elements of [Ruffin’s
claims].”); see also Sookma v. Millard, 151 F. App’x. 299, 300 (5th Cir. 2005)
(holding that district court correctly applied Rooker–Feldman, and that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s “complaint,
claiming defendants conspired with each other and state court judges presiding
over . . . proceedings between Sookma and [one of the defendants] to deprive her
of various civil rights”). Nor does this court have power to reverse the state courts’
determinations regarding Ruffin’s indigency, standing, or the admissibility of
Ruffin’s 30-year-old criminal conviction or driver’s license record. See Dkt. 1 at 7,
10. To the extent Ruffin’s claims rely on these allegations, this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear those claims.
6 Because Remy could act only through Gross in court, allegations about Remy and Gross
are interchangeable to the extent they pertain to Gross’s actions in court. Indeed, Ruffin
seeks to hold Remy liable by claiming that Remy “support[ed] and benefit[ed] from the
Keith Gross (Defendant) conspiracy with state actors.” Dkt. 1 at 15.
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2. 	Claims Over Which This Court Has Jurisdiction
There are, however, certain claims against Gross and Remy over which this
court has jurisdiction. Even so, those claims must be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
Ruffin alleges that Gross “violated Tex. R. Civ. P. 21c by filing documents
containing [Ruffin]’s driver’s license number . . . on the public court record.” Id. at
10. Ruffin claims that this disclosure of her “sensitive personal data . . . was
irrelevant to the cause of action and served no legitimate purpose.” Id. As a result
of these disclosures, Ruffin claims that she was “exposed . . . to identify theft,
scams, 	and 	harassment, 	forcing 	[her] 	to 	restrict 	personal 	and 	professional
activities to prevent further abuse.” Id. at 11. Specifically, Ruffin alleges that her
“former daughter-in-law . . . engaged in obsessive and invasive conduct, exploiting
the improperly disclosed information to intrude upon [Ruffin]’s life.” Id. Nothing
about the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars this court from hearing claims based
upon these allegations. See Poplar v. Waite, No. 1:11-cv-470, 2011 WL 3585366, at
*5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2011) (Rooker–Feldman does not bar federal jurisdiction
over “claims for monetary damages against Defendants arising from their conduct
leading up to the state court’s decision.”). Even so, Ruffin has not stated a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
In this lawsuit, Ruffin asserts claims solely under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section
1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
“Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quotation omitted).
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To establish § 1983 liability against Gross or Remy, Ruffin “must (1) allege a
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States” and
(2) demonstrate that each defendant was “acting under color of state law.” Moore
v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000). Even if Ruffin could
establish a constitutional violation, her claims against Gross and Remy fail because
Ruffin cannot show that either was acting under color of state law. See Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“The under-color-of-state-law
element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how
discriminatory or wrongful.” (cleaned up)).
Ruffin claims that Gross acted under color of state law “through collusion
with judges and court reporters.” Dkt. 1 at 3. But the United States Supreme Court
has held that “merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a
lawsuit does not make a party a co–conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.”
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980). Ruffin is not the first plaintiff to attempt
to establish state action “by reasoning that a private party is a state actor if the
party either (1) complies with a wrong judgment, or (2) commits wrongful acts that
influence a judgment”—an argument that the Fifth Circuit has flatly rejected.
Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Grp., Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 2003).
“With respect to the first argument, [Fifth Circuit] precedent establishes that
even if a court wrongly decides a case, the fact that a private party complies with
that wrong decision does not constitute state action.” Id. As to the second
argument, the one that Ruffin relies most heavily on, the Fifth Circuit has said that
“[i]f a judge reaches a decision based on misinformation that counsel provides, the
issuance of the decision does not imply that counsel acted under color of state law.”
Id. Because Ruffin alleges no facts to plausibly suggest that any state court judge
“knowingly participated in the alleged conspiracy,” she cannot establish that Gross
or Remy acted under color of state law. Id. at 354. Accordingly, to the extent this
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court has jurisdiction over parts of Ruffin’s claims against Gross and Remy, she
nevertheless fails to state a claim against them. 7
MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS8
I now turn to the motions for sanctions filed by Ruffin and Gross. See
Dkts. 12, 36.
In seeking sanctions, Ruffin claims that Gross has filed legally frivolous
pleadings. I disagree. To the contrary, Gross has correctly pointed out that Ruffin’s
claims for affirmative relief should be dismissed. Accordingly, Ruffin’s request for
sanctions (Dkt. 36) is denied.
As for Gross’s motion for sanctions, Gross complains that Ruffin has abused
the legal process by filing a frivolous lawsuit. He urges the court to award monetary
sanctions against Ruffin under Rule 11. Rule 11 provides that attorneys and pro
se litigants presenting a filing to a court are certifying that, to the best of their
belief, after reasonable inquiry: (1) the filing is not being presented for an improper
purpose, such as harassment, delay, or increasing costs; (2) any claims, defenses,
and 	other 	legal 	contentions 	are 	supported 	by 	either 	existing 	law 	or 	by 	a
nonfrivolous argument for changing existing law or establishing new law; and
(3) factual contentions have or will likely have evidentiary support. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b).
7 Because Ruffin is proceeding pro se, her pleadings “are to be liberally construed and, so
construed, are not to be dismissed unless they are not subject to proof on any plausible
state of facts.” McCray v. Sullivan, 559 F.2d 292, 293 (5th Cir. 1977). The facts that Ruffin
alleges regarding Gross’s publication of her sensitive, personal information could
theoretically give rise to Texas state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress or invasion of privacy. I express no opinion on the viability of such claims. I raise
the issue to state only this: even if Ruffin’s allegations could plausibly give rise to state
law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress or invasion of privacy, this court
would lack jurisdiction over such claims because Ruffin and Gross are both Texas citizens.
8 A motion for Rule 11 sanctions is a non-dispositive pre-trial matter that a magistrate
judge can decide by order. See Mosley v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 1:25-cv-460, 2025
WL 2429098, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ga. July 11, 2025) (collecting cases).
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A party seeking Rule 11 sanctions “must serve the non-moving party with a
proposed motion for sanctions at least twenty-one days before filing it with the
court, and the motion may not be filed if the non-moving party withdraws or
corrects the challenged [pleading] during that ‘safe harbor’ period.” Barret-Bowie
v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 631 F. App’x. 219, 221 (2015) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(2)). Strict compliance with the safe harbor provision is mandatory. See
In re Pratt, 524 F.3d 580, 588 (5th Cir. 2008). A party’s failure to comply with
the safe harbor provision precludes a district court from granting a motion for
sanctions under Rule 11. See Uptown Grill, L.L.C. v. Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc.,
46 F.4th 374, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2022). The movant has the burden to show
compliance with the safe harbor provision. See Elliot v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 216
(5th Cir. 1995).
Here, Gross filed his motion for sanctions with the court on January 26,
2026. See Dkt. 12. The record is devoid of any evidence that Gross served his
motion for sanctions on Ruffin prior to filing his motion with the court. Rather, it
is readily apparent, from my review of the record, that Gross could not have served
his motion for sanctions on Ruffin 21-days before he filed the motion with the
court. This is because Gross acknowledged in an email to Ruffin that he did not
even receive Ruffin’s lawsuit until January 23, 2026, a mere three days before he
filed the motion for sanctions. See Dkt. 24 at 4. Thus, Gross could not possibly
satisfy his burden to establish that he 	complied with Rule 11’s procedural
prerequisite. Accordingly, his motion for sanctions (Dkt. 12) must be denied.
See Elliott, 64F.3d at 216. 9
9 I recognize that, in addition to Rule 11 sanctions, all federal courts have the inherent
authority to take steps to protect the integrity of the court from vexatious litigants. See
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). The Supreme Court has cautioned that
“[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and
discretion.” Id. “The threshold for the use of inherent power sanctions is high,” and there
must be a showing of “bad faith” before the court may use its inherent powers to impose
sanctions. Chaves v. M/V Medina Star, 47 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1995). Based on my
review of the record, Ruffin has not acted in bad faith. I therefore decline to use my
inherent authority to award sanctions against her.
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REMAINING MOTIONS
There are several additional motions before me.
A. 	RUFFIN ’S M OTION FOR L EAVE TO F ILE S UPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT
(DKT . 43): 10
Ruffin seeks leave to file a supplemental complaint. Although pro se
plaintiffs are normally allowed an opportunity to supplement or amend their
complaint prior to dismissal, see Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th
Cir. 2009), a district court may properly deny leave to supplement or amend a
complaint if supplementation or amendment would prove futile. See Ariyan, Inc.
v. Sewage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2022) (“If the
complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal, then amendment is futile
and the district court [is] within its discretion to deny leave to amend.”).
Ruffin’s 	proposed 	supplemental 	complaint 	is 	directed 	only 	to 	Gross,
involves only post-complaint allegations, and asserts claims under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1985(2). See Dkt. 43-2. As for the § 1983 claims, Ruffin’s supplement
is futile because, as discussed above, Ruffin cannot establish that Gross acted
under color of state law. The § 1985 claim does not require that Gross have acted
under color of state law. The claim still fails, however, because it concerns solely
conduct made during Gross’s representation of his client, Remy, and himself.
Conduct by an attorney made during the course of representation is
“exempt[] from a conspiracy charge under section 1985.” Heffernan v. Hunter, 189
F.3d 405, 413 (3d Cir. 1999). As the Third Circuit explained in Heffernan:
The challenged activity may violate the canons of ethics, but so
long as it is within the scope of representation, it does not eliminate
the exemption from a conspiracy charge under section 1985. Simply
because a lawyer’s conduct may violate the rules of ethics does not
mean that the conduct is actionable, in damages or for injunctive
relief. The offended third party has a remedy . . . through court
imposed sanctions or reference to state disciplinary bodies.
10 Magistrate judges have authority to rule directly on a motion to supplement the
pleadings. See Talbert v. Am. Risk Ins. Co., 405 F. App’x. 848, 851 (5th Cir. 2010).
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Id. (cleaned up); see also Garner v. City of Many, No. CV 21-0228, 2021 WL
4129769, at *6 (W.D. La. Sept. 9, 2021) (dismissing plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims
because “[t]he actions allegedly taken by [a defendant-attorney], which the
[plaintiffs] believe evidence a conspiracy, clearly fall within the scope of a typical
attorney-client relationship”); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Ackerman Mcqueen, Inc.,
No. 3:19-cv-2074, 2021 WL 3618113, at *19 n.24 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2021) (“The
court will not consider [a party’s] conspiracy claim insofar as it concerns [another
party’s counsel].”). Thus, Ruffin’s motion for leave (Dkt. 43) is denied as futile.
B. 	RUFFIN ’S M OTIONS TO STRIKE E XHIBITS TO GROSS ’S AND R EMY ’S
M OTIONS TO D ISMISS (DKTS . 18, 30): 11
As already noted, these motions are denied. See supra n.1.
C. 	R UFFIN ’S M OTION FOR PRELIMINARY I NJUNCTION A GAINST GROSS
(DKT . 22): 12
Because Ruffin either cannot state a viable claim against Gross, or because
this court lacks jurisdiction over any other claim against Gross, I recommend that
Ruffin’s request for injunctive relief be denied. See Obey v. SN Servicing Corp.,
No. 4:22-cv-04000, 2023 WL 4714074, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 24, 2023).
D. 	R UFFIN ’S R EQUEST FOR AN I N-PERSON HEARING (DKT . 23):
Ruffin requests an in-person hearing on her motion for a preliminary
injunction against Gross. Because I recommend that the motion for preliminary
injunction be denied, oral argument is not needed. See S.D. Tex. LR7.5 (although
a party may request an oral hearing, the allowance of an oral hearing is within the
sole discretion of the judge handling the matter). The request is denied.
11 “District courts in the Fifth Circuit have universally treated motions to strike evidence
as non-dispositive matters that a magistrate judge may rule on by order as opposed to a
report and recommendation.” Dulcich, Inc. v. DaPron, No. 3:23-cv-00405, 2025 WL
976598, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2025) (collecting cases).
12 A motion for injunctive relief is a dispositive pretrial matter for which a magistrate
judge may only issue a recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Davidson, 819
F.3d at 763.
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E. 	R UFFIN ’S M OTION FOR S UBSTITUTED SERVICE (DKT . 27): 13
Ruffin requests the court to authorize substituted service for Lee. Because I
have recommended that Lee be dismissed from this case due to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction over the claims Ruffin asserts against him, there is no need for
substituted service. The motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
In sum, I recommend the court grant the motions to dismiss (Dkts. 11, 19,
32). 	Under 	the 	Rooker–Feldman 	doctrine, 	the 	court 	lacks 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction over Ruffin’s claims against Harkey and Lee, and lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Ruffin’s claims against Gross and Remy to the extent those claims
would invite this court to effectively reverse the state court judgment against
Ruffin. To the extent this court has jurisdiction over any portion of Ruffin’s claims
against Gross and Remy, I recommend the court hold that Ruffin fails to state a
claim against either Gross or Remy. I further recommend that Ruffin’s motion for
preliminary injunction (Dkt. 22) be denied. All other pending motions (Dkts. 12,
18, 23, 27, 30, 36, 43) are denied.
The 	parties 	have 	14 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 	day of April 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13 A motion for substituted service is a nondispositive pretrial matter on which a
magistrate judge may rule directly. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Kozlowski, No. 19-cv-159, 2021 WL
130978, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2021).
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