State of Texas v. Galveston Independent School District et al Case remanded to (122nd Judicial Court of Galveston County, Texas).

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In the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
GALVESTON D IVISION
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No. 3:25-cv-378
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STATE OF T EXAS, P LAINTIFF,
v.
G ALVESTON I NDEPENDENT SCHOOL D ISTRICT , ET AL., D EFENDANTS.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
══════════════════════════════════════════
J EFFREY VINCENT BROWN , UNITED S TATES D ISTRICT JUDGE:
Before the court is the plaintiff’s motion to remand, Dkt. 4, and the
defendants’ motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6),
Dkt. 5. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion to remand and deny as moot
the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkts. 4, 5.
Factual and Procedural Background
On November 7, 2025, the plaintiff sued the Galveston Independent
School District (“GISD”) and members of GISD’s Board of Trustees in the 122nd
Judicial District Court of Galveston County asserting claims under the ultra
vires doctrine and the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act. See generally Dkt. 1-1.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants willingly violated Texas Senate Bill 10
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 10, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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(“SB 10”), which requires elementary and secondary public schools in Texas to
display the Ten Commandments in their classrooms. Id.
On November 20, 2025, the defendants removed the case to federal
court based on federal-question jurisdiction and sought to dismiss the case
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). Dkts. 1, 5. The plaintiff now seeks to
remand the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 4.
For the reasons below, the court grants the plaintiff’s motion to remand,
Dkt. 4, and denies as moot the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 5.
Legal Standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “must presume that
a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d
912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). “[T]he burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests
on the party seeking the federal forum.” Id. The law authorizes removal only
where original jurisdiction already exists—whether based on federal question or
diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal-
question jurisdiction), 1332 (diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction).
The Supreme Court has explained that for purposes of determining
federal-question jurisdiction, a case “arises under” federal law in two ways.
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013). First, federal-question jurisdiction
exists when “federal law creates the cause of action asserted.” Id. But when state
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law, rather than federal law, supplies the plaintiff’s cause of action, “arising
under” jurisdiction may exist only in a “special and small category” of cases in
which state-law claims turn on questions of federal law. Id. at 258.
The Supreme Court has instructed that “federal jurisdiction over a
state-law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually
disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without
disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Id. (citing Grable &
Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)). Because
the Supreme Court first articulated the four parts of this inquiry in the Grable
case, they are referred to as “the Grable factors.”
Analysis
The only issue at this point is whether this court has jurisdiction. The
defendants 	aver 	that 	federal-question 	jurisdiction 	exists 	because 	the
plaintiff’s “right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law,” which is whether SB 10 is constitutional. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 6,
8. The plaintiff responds that “there is simply nothing federal on the face of
this complaint.” Dkt. 4 at 2. The court agrees with the plaintiff.
“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed
by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction
exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s
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properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987) (quotations omitted). The plaintiff’s cause of action against the
defendants is a purely state-law claim made pursuant to the ultra vires
doctrine and the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act for allegedly failing to
display the Ten Commandments per SB 10. Dkts. 1 -1 ¶¶ 18–22, 4 at 5–6.
Because the plaintiff’s complaint does not include a federal cause of
action, the court must determine whether it falls into the “special and small
category” of cases in which the state-law claims necessarily turn on questions
of federal law. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013). To do so, the court
must apply the Grable factors.
A. “Necessarily Raised”
The first factor is whether a federal issue is “necessarily raised.” Id. The court
agrees with the plaintiff that the complaint does not necessarily raise a federal issue.
At its core, the dispute revolves around the defendants’ alleged violation of SB 10—
a state law. Dkt. 1-1 ¶¶ 18–22. The plaintiff did not frame its allegations in terms of
federal law, nor did the plaintiff rely on federal law to raise or sustain its claims. The
complaint makes “no explicit mention of any specific federal statute or regulation.”
Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 918 (5th Cir. 2001). Instead, the
defendants argue that the success of the plaintiff’s claim depends on the legal
interpretation and constitutionality of SB 10 itself. Dkt. 10 at 7.
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The problem with the defendants’ argument is that it raises a federal-law
defense to a state-law cause of action. The Supreme Court has established that
a federal defense against a state-law claim cannot confer federal jurisdiction,
even when the defense is anticipated and the plaintiff refers to the defense in
its complaint. See Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003);
Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). “Although
such allegations show that very likely, in the course of litigation, a question
under the Constitution would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, the
plaintiff’s original cause of action, arises under the Constitution.” Louisville
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
Because 	an 	issue 	of 	federal-law 	is 	not 	raised 	in 	the 	plaintiff’s
complaint—and is instead asserted as a defense—a federal question is not
necessarily raised. Therefore, the first Grable factor is not satisfied.
B. “Actually Disputed”
The second factor, whether a federal issue is “actually disputed,” is not
satisfied either. As established above, an affirmative defense premised on a
federal issue, like the one the defendants present, does not provide a basis for
federal-question jurisdiction. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393
(1987) (“[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court
on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the
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plaintiff’s complaint.”). Because the plaintiff only alleges that the defendants
violated a state law, Dkt. 1-1 ¶¶ 18–22, there is no federal issue in dispute.
C. “Substantial”
As to the third factor, whether a federal issue is “substantial,” the court
must look to assess “the importance of the issue to the federal system as a
whole,” not merely whether the federal issue is important “to the plaintiff’s
case and to the parties before it.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 260 (2013).
Here, the defendants fail to assert why the decision of a Texas state
court, in ruling whether or not the defendants violated SB 10, would weigh
heavily on “the federal system as a whole.” Id. That is because it would not.
Therefore, the third Grable factor is not satisfied either.
D. “The Federal-State Balance”
Finally, because the plaintiff’s complaint does not “necessarily raise a
federal issue” that is “actually disputed” or “substantial,” entertaining it
would disturb the “congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities.” Id. at 258. Thus, the fourth Grable factor also
weighs in favor of remand.
Without more, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case
because no federal question exists.
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* 	* 	*
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the plaintiff’s motion to
remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 4. The Clerk of the Court
is directed to remand this case to the 122nd 	Judicial District Court of
Galveston County. The court further denies as moot the defendants’ motion
to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). Dkt. 5.
Signed on Galveston Island this 10th day of July, 2026.
___________________________
J EFFREY VINCENT BROWN
U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT JUDGE
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