Thomas v. Woods et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
LAUREE THOMAS,
Plaintiff.
V.
MAJKA WOODS, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00209
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before me is Defendants’ Second Amended Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. 79. Having reviewed the briefing, the
record, and the applicable law, I recommend that the motion be granted.
BACKGROUND1
This is an employment discrimination dispute. Plaintiff Lauree Thomas, an
African American woman, worked for Defendant University of Texas Medical
Branch (“UTMB”) from 2001 to 2024. Defendants are UTMB and the following
individuals: UTMB Vice Dean for Academic Affairs Majka Woods; UTMB then-
Acting Dean Jeffrey L. Susman; UTMB Interim Chief Human Resources Officer
Philesha Evans; Dean of UTMB’s John Sealy School of Medicine Charles P.
Mouton; UTMB President Jochen Reisner; and University of Texas System
Chancellor (ad interim) John Zerwas (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”).
Thomas started at UTMB as an Associate Dean for Admission and Student
Affairs in the UTMB/John Sealy School of Medicine. On December 2, 2020, UTMB
appointed Thomas as Associate Dean for Student Diversity, Health, Inclusion, and
1 This background section is taken from the live pleading, Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint. Dkt. 77. At the motion to dismiss stage, I am required to accept “all well-
pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to [Thomas].” Martin K.
Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation
omitted).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 18, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Equity. In her role as Associate Dean, Thomas reported to Dr. Alfredo Torres,
UTMB’s Chief Diversity Officer in its Office of Faculty Affairs and Professional
Development.
According to Thomas, UTMB and its officials had predetermined as early as
December of 2022 that they wanted to terminate Thomas’s employment. In one
instance, Susman met with Torres and Woods to discuss Diversity, Equity, and
Inclusion (“DEI”) initiatives and UTMB’s progress towards those initiatives. At
some point after this meeting, Torres told Thomas that Susman and Woods had
asked Torres to falsify Thomas’s performance evaluation so they could fire
Thomas. Torres refused to falsify Thomas’s performance evaluation.
In April 2023, Susman and Woods held a meeting with Thomas, voiced
strong support for DEI initiatives, and committed to continue DEI work at UTMB.
In this meeting, Woods informed Thomas that she would be reassigned to the
Office of Academic Affairs, where she would report directly to Woods effective May
1, 2023. Thomas was not, however, given a new job description, designated salary,
or specific job duties in connection with this reassignment.
In June 2023, shortly after Thomas’s reassignment, the Texas Legislature
passed 	Senate 	Bill 	17 	(“SB 	17”), 	which 	prohibits 	public 	universities 	from
establishing or maintaining DEI offices. Thomas’s DEI office was dismantled;
Thomas was relieved of responsibility for DEI functions; and Thomas no longer
supervised DEI employees. Woods never met with Thomas to discuss Thomas’s
new role and responsibilities in the Office of Academic Affairs. For five months
following Thomas’s reassignment, Woods: (1) did not assign Thomas duties or
work responsibilities, (2) provided Thomas no direction on how she should
function or what her role would be, (3) did not invite Thomas to Operations
Committee meetings or other departmental meetings, (4) did not introduce
Thomas to other staff and employees in the Office of Academic Affairs, and (5) did
not introduce Thomas as a new member of the Office of Academic Affairs during
an all-staff meeting at which all other Academic Affairs staff were introduced.
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In September 2023, Woods told Thomas that she was concerned about
Thomas’s future at UTMB because she had no position to offer Thomas going
forward. In November 2023, UTMB held a Zoom meeting with all its DEI officers
and senior-level administrators instructing them to find new names for their
offices, but to continue their work as DEI officers under different titles. DEI
employees 	at 	other 	UT-System 	institutions, 	such 	as 	UT-Houston, 	UT-
Southwestern, UT-San Antonio, and UT-Tyler, were reassigned or invited to
reapply for positions under new titles. Several unidentified DEI employees who
worked with Thomas at UTMB were given other job responsibilities to absorb the
percentage of time they had spent in DEI related activities. Around this time,
Thomas proposed renaming her office as the Office of Student Professional
Development and Cultural Engagement, but Woods rejected Thomas’s proposal
and indicated that there was no need for a new office title.
On December 8, 2023, Woods gave Thomas termination papers. That same
day, UTMB revoked Thomas’s campus and office access, preventing her from
accessing her office, emails, and files. On January 17, 2024, Thomas filed a charge
of 	discrimination 	(the 	“Charge”) 	with 	the 	Equal 	Employment 	Opportunity
Commission. On January 23, 2024, UTMB sent Thomas a letter extending her
termination date via certified mail. The letter was dated January 12, 2024. On that
extension letter, Woods made a handwritten note stating that the letter was being
sent at the request of the human resources department. 	On February 21, 2024,
Thomas filed an internal complaint against Woods and UTMB challenging her
termination on discriminatory grounds. The next week, on February 28, 2024,
UTMB terminated Thomas’s employment.
On July 3, 2025, Thomas instituted this lawsuit. In the Second Amended
Complaint, Thomas brings six causes of action against UTMB under Title VII:
(1) race discrimination; (2) color discrimination; (3) sex/gender discrimination;
(4) retaliation; (5) constructive discharge; and (6) hostile work environment.
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Thomas also asserts five causes of action for constitutional violations against
the Individual Defendants: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 discrimination in contracting;
(2) Fourteenth Amendment race discrimination; (3) First Amendment retaliation;
(4) Fourteenth Amendment due process violations; and (5) conspiracy to violate
constitutional rights.
Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them, asserting that Thomas
fails to state a claim that would entitle her to relief.
RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails “to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Conversely, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point
of 	minimum 	expenditure 	of 	time 	and 	money 	by 	the 	parties 	and 	the
court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (cleaned up).
When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I accept “all well-pleaded facts as
true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings
v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted). 	I 	“do 	not, 	however, 	accept 	as 	true 	legal 	conclusions, 	conclusory
statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Benfield
v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
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not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Fifth Circuit “hold[s] pro se plaintiffs to a
more lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing complaints, but pro se
plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the
speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir.
2016); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
ANALYSIS
A. 	TITLE VII CLAIMS (UTMB)
1. 	Discrimination Claims
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Thomas alleges that UTMB discriminated against her based on her race, color, and
gender. See Dkt. 77 at 20–23. Thomas bases her discrimination claims on a
disparate 	treatment 	theory. 	“Disparate-treatment 	discrimination 	addresses
employment actions that treat an employee worse than others based on the
employee’s 	race, 	color, 	religion, 	sex, 	or 	national 	origin. 	In 	such 	disparate-
treatment cases, proof and finding of discriminatory motive is required.” Pacheco
v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 2006).
Discriminatory motives may be shown through direct evidence of that
motive, meaning “any statement or written document showing a discriminatory
motive on its face.” Portis v. First Nat’l Bank of New Albany, Miss., 34 F.3d 325,
329 (5th Cir. 1994). Alternatively, discriminatory motive may be shown through
circumstantial proof. Although Thomas “do[es] not have to submit evidence to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination at this stage, [she] must plead
sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim to
make [her] case plausible.” Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762,
766 (5th Cir. 2019). The ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim are:
(1) “an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2) taken against a plaintiff ‘because of her
protected status.’” Id. at 767 (quoting Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d
568, 576 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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Here, each of Thomas’s discrimination claims fail because Thomas does not
make any allegations that suggest a discriminatory motive.
a. 	Race Discrimination
Thomas alleges that UTMB discriminated against her based on her race
because it: (1) terminated Thomas but retained unidentified, non-minority DEI
employees and allowed Dr. Torres to continue in his position for six additional
months; (2) excluded Thomas from her work and professional activities while
unidentified, non-minority colleagues were integrated and received invitations to
committees and task forces; (3) blocked Thomas’s title change that was offered to
other 	DEI 	employees; 	(4) requested 	falsification 	of 	Thomas’s 	performance
evaluation to provide grounds for termination; (5) predetermined Thomas’s
termination one year before SB 17 implementation; (6) denied Thomas standard
and customary procedures offered to other employees; and (7) denied Thomas
access to alternative employment positions. See Dkt. 77 at 20–22. Notably missing
from these allegations are any facts supporting an inference that any of these
actions took place on account of race.
The parties do not dispute that one of the adverse employment actions at
issue is Thomas’s termination. See Dkt. 79 at 6. Starting with this point, UTMB
correctly identifies that Thomas fails to allege facts “from which the Court could
conclude that [Thomas’s termination] occurred ‘because of’ [Thomas]’s protected
status.” Dkt. 79 at 7. Thomas offers no direct evidence of discriminatory intent.
Instead, she relies on circumstantial allegations that other employees involved in
DEI initiatives were treated more favorably. To support a disparate-treatment
theory, however, Thomas must identify similarly situated employees outside of
her protected class who received more favorable treatment. See Raj v. La. State
Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013). Thomas fails to do so.
First, Thomas references unidentified DEI employees at other University of
Texas System institutions who allegedly retained their positions. Dkt. 77 at 14. But
the Second Amended Complaint does not identify those employees, their roles, or
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their protected characteristics. Without such information, I cannot plausibly infer
that any of those employees were similarly situated or treated more favorably
because of their race. See Hendrix v. iQor Inc., No. 3:20-cv-0437, 2021 WL
3040776, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2021) (Plaintiff “does not identify particular
employees or describe specific situations involving similarly situated non-African
American employees, who were treated more favorably.”).
Second, Thomas identifies several UTMB employees who “were allowed to
continue in their positions under different titles or reassignments.” 2 But Thomas
does not allege the race of these individuals or describe how they are similarly
situated to her. Without knowing whether these individuals were similarly situated
to Thomas but of a different race, I cannot plausibly infer that any difference in
treatment occurred because of race. See Graham v. Bluebonnet Trails Cmty.
Servs., 587 F. App’x. 205, 207 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Without similarly situated
comparators of a different race who were allegedly treated more favorably, there is
no basis for a factfinder to infer discrimination.”); Franklin v. City of Slidell, 936
F. Supp. 2d 691, 706 (E.D. La. 2013) (dismissing race discrimination claims
because “Plaintiff has neither alleged that he was replaced by a non-African
American nor that he was treated any differently than similarly situated non-
African American employees.”).
Thomas also attempts to compare herself to her supervisor, Torres, who
continued working after Thomas’s employment was terminated. See Dkt. 77 at 14.
Yet, Thomas fails to explain how Torres is similarly situated to her. “A comparator
typically must share the same supervisor, not be plaintiff’s supervisor.” Holmes v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 1:24-cv-1135, 2025 WL 4642495, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sep.
2, 2025); see also Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“The employment actions being compared will be deemed to have been taken
2 Thomas identifies Dr. Denny Fe Agana, Dr. Cindy West, Daniel Jupiter, Dr. Jose Rojas,
and Norms Perez as UTMB DEI employees who did not lose their employment but were
given other job responsibilities to absorb the time previously spent on DEI activities. See
Dkt. 77 at 15.
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under nearly identical circumstances when the employees being compared held the
same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their employment
status determined by the same person.”).
UTMB and Thomas argue at length about whether UTMB had legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Thomas and whether those reasons
are pretextual. See Dkt. 79 at 9–11; Dkt. 85 at 7–8. But “whether [UTMB] had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [terminating Thomas] is not pertinent
until the summary judgment stage, and even then, only after [Thomas] establishes
h[er] prima facie case.” Jenkins v. City of Dallas, 717 F. Supp. 3d 528, 538 (N.D.
Tex. 2024). The arguments made on both sides are premature. Thomas is correct
that she is not required to disprove each possible legitimate explanation for her
termination at this stage. But she must first sufficiently allege the ultimate
elements of her claim. She fails to do so.
Thomas argues in her response to UTMB’s motion to dismiss that her “[April
2023] Reassignment Without Duties” and “December 8, 2023 Lockout” constitute
separate adverse employment actions distinct from her termination. See Dkt. 85 at
8–9. Yet, neither of those adverse employment actions salvages her discrimination
claims. There is still an absence of well-pleaded allegations to raise an inference,
much less a plausible one, that her alleged reassignment or lockout had anything
to do with her race. Thomas argues that her allegation that “no one else was treated
that way” establishes differential treatment. See id. at 10. Even if I accept, as true,
that “no one else was treated that way,” mere differential treatment is insufficient
to establish that a similarly situated person outside of Thomas’s protected classes
was treated more favorably than she was under similar circumstances. Nor do
Thomas’s repeated references to “non-minority DEI employees” move the needle.
See Dkt. 77 at 2, 20. Half of Thomas’s references to her “non-minority colleagues”
refer to these individuals as “younger,” suggesting that they are not similarly
situated to Thomas in terms of experience. See id. at 2, 9, 11, 20, 21.
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Without a similarly situated comparator, Thomas fails to raise a plausible
inference that any adverse action taken against her was taken because of her race.
Accordingly, Thomas’s race discrimination claim must be dismissed.
b. 	Gender Discrimination
As to Thomas’s gender discrimination claim, she recycles many of the same
allegations advanced in her race discrimination claim as support. These allegations
are equally deficient. Thomas does not point to a similarly situated comparator
whose different treatment would suggest that Thomas suffered any adverse action
because 	of 	her 	gender. 	In 	fact, 	Thomas’s 	gender 	discrimination 	claim 	is
undermined by her identification of male and female UTMB DEI employees who
were given other job responsibilities after DEI functions were curtailed. See id. at
15. The fact that other women did not lose their employment prevents me from
inferring that Thomas’s employment was terminated because of her gender. Thus,
Thomas’s gender discrimination claim should also be dismissed.
c. 	Color Discrimination
As to Thomas’s color discrimination claim, Thomas asserts only that
“Defendants may have treated her differently based on her color.” See id. at 22
(emphasis added)). “Color discrimination arises when the particular hue of the
plaintiff’s skin is the cause of the discrimination, such as in the case where a dark-
colored African-American individual is discriminated against in favor of a light-
colored African-American individual.” Whittington v. Harris County, No. 24-
20172, 2025 WL 1864956, at *3 (5th Cir. July 7, 2025) (quoting Bryant v. Bell Atl.
Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002)). Thomas fails to address the color
of her own skin, much less any possible comparator. Accordingly, Thomas fails to
state a plausible color discrimination claim. See, e.g., Khan v. City of Houston, No.
4:23-cv-00998, 2024 WL 4829496, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2024), appeal
dismissed, No. 24-20564, 2025 WL 1694903 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2025) (holding that
the plaintiff failed to allege a color discrimination claim distinct from his racial
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discrimination claim where “none of [his]] factual allegations mention his skin
tone”).
2. 	Retaliation Claim
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision forbids UTMB from taking adverse
employment action against Thomas because she opposed practices made unlawful
by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To state a retaliation claim, Thomas must
allege 	(1) 	“that 	she 	engaged 	in 	a 	protected 	activity;” 	(2) 	“that 	an 	adverse
employment action occurred;” and (3) “that a causal link existed between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” Baker v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 430 F.3d
750, 754 (5th Cir. 2005). Thomas “does not have to submit evidence to establish a
prima facie case at the pleading stage.” Wright v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 990 F.3d
428, 	433 	(5th 	Cir. 	2021) 	(cleaned 	up). 	Rather, 	Thomas 	must 	“plead 	facts
permitting a reasonable inference that [UTMB] terminated her because of her
[protected activities].” Id. “At the pleading stage, this means that [Thomas is]
required to allege facts permitting at least an inference of her [UTMB]’s knowledge
of her protected conduct in order to establish the required causal link between her
conduct and the alleged retaliation.” Id. at 434.
Thomas alleges retaliation based on two events: (1) her filing a Charge on
January 17, 2024; and (2) her filing an internal complaint on February 21, 2024.4
Neither party disputes that Thomas engaged in protected activities and that
an 	adverse 	employment 	action 	occurred—the 	termination 	of 	Thomas’s
4 In her live pleading, Thomas also alleges that she filed unspecified “internal complaints
about discriminatory treatment before September 2023.” Dkt. 77 at 23. Although neither
party addresses internal complaints made before September 2023 in the motion to
dismiss briefing, I find such bare-boned allegations are insufficient to permit a reasonable
inference that a causal link existed between such internal complaints and her termination.
Thomas offers no explanation as to what alleged “discriminatory treatment” her internal
complaints concerned. More importantly, Thomas fails to allege when the internal
complaints were made—other than some time before September 2023. Without any more
specifics, I am unable to plausibly tie those internal complaints—which could have taken
place from the start of her employment at UTMB in 2001 to August 2023—to her
termination.
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employment. The heart of this dispute is whether Thomas has plausibly alleged
that a causal link exists between the protected activities and her termination.
UTMB argues that Thomas’s retaliation claim fails on three grounds:
(1) “UTMB informed Plaintiff that her position would be eliminated in September
of 2023, months before she engaged in her protected activities in January and
February of 2024”; (2) “[a]n adverse employment action that is decided and
documented before protected activity occurs cannot, as a matter of law, support a
retaliation 	claim”; 	and 	(3) 	Thomas 	“does 	not 	allege 	that 	her 	supervisor
(Dr. Woods) knew of her internal complaint.” Dkt. 79 at 13–14. 5
Thomas filed her Charge on January 17, 2024. See Dkt. 77 at 23. She alleges
the “termination extension letter was dated January 12, 2024, but was not mailed
until January 23, 2024 (six days after the EEOC charge).” Id. Thomas also alleges
that “Dr. Woods hand-wrote on [the termination extension] letter: ‘Please note
that this is being sent at the request of HR.’” Id. at 13. In a nutshell, Thomas
contends that “HR involvement indicated by the hand-written notation suggests
decisions made in response to [Thomas’s] protected activity, not in accordance
with standard and customary practices and procedures.” Id. at 24.
Thomas’s retaliation claim based on filing her Charge fails. In essence,
Thomas theorizes that because the letter extending her termination was sent after
she filed a charge, it likely was sent in response to her filing the charge. Even if
true, that is irrelevant. Extending Thomas’s employment was not an adverse
employment action. The adverse employment action was Woods’s terminating
Thomas’s employment. Woods gave Thomas termination papers on December 8,
2023—more than a month before Thomas filed her Charge. “Employers need not
suspend previously planned [terminations] upon discovering that a Title VII suit
5 UTMB also argues, relying on a Notice of Charge of Discrimination it attaches to its
motion to dismiss, that Thomas’s retaliation claim is defective because she “filed an EEOC
charge alleging a discharge that had not yet occurred, underscoring that the charge could
not have been prompted by the later termination decision.” Id. at 14. I see no need to
consider this evidence because it does not affect my analysis of Thomas’s retaliation claim.
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has been filed, and their proceeding along lines previously contemplated . . . is no
evidence whatever of causality.” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,
272 (2001). Because Thomas’s allegations make clear that her termination was
contemplated and decided well before she filed her Charge, I cannot plausibly infer
causality between the Charge and any adverse employment action. Nor can I infer
causality between Thomas’s termination and her February 21, 2024 internal
complaint. Both of these protected activities occurred after Thomas’s termination
had already been set in motion. Thus, Thomas fails to state a retaliation claim.
3. 	Constructive Discharge Claim
Thomas 	claims 	that 	UTMB 	constructively 	discharged 	her 	by 	creating
intolerable working conditions. As the Supreme Court has explained:
The constructive-discharge doctrine contemplates a situation
in which an employer discriminates against an employee to the point
such that his “working conditions become so intolerable that a
reasonable 	person 	in 	the 	employee’s 	position 	would 	have 	felt
compelled to resign.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141
(2004). When the employee resigns in the face of such circumstances,
Title VII treats that resignation as tantamount to an actual discharge.
A claim of constructive discharge therefore has two basic
elements. A plaintiff must prove first that he was discriminated
against by his employer to the point where a reasonable person in his
position would have felt compelled to resign. 	But he must also
show that he actually resigned.
Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555 (2016) (emphasis added) (cleaned up). It is
undisputed that Thomas did not resign—her employment was terminated. Because
Thomas did not resign, she cannot bring a constructive discharge claim. See Feds
for Med. Freedom v. Garland, No. 4:23-cv-1817, 2024 WL 1859958, at *9 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 29, 2024) (collecting cases).
4. 	Hostile Work Environment Claim
Thomas alleges that UTMB created a hostile work environment through:
(1) “systematic 	exclusion . . . from 	work, 	meetings, 	professional 	relationships,
departmental 	integration, 	office 	access, 	and 	email 	access 	treatment”;
(2) “falsification of performance evaluation”; (3) “blocking of accommodations”
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offered 	to 	other 	employees; 	(4) 	“retaliation 	for 	protected 	complaints”;
(5) “predetermined termination”; and (6) “denying Dr. Thomas standard and
customary practices and procedures afforded to other employees.” Dkt. 77 at 26.
UTMB argues that Thomas’s claim fails because she “does not allege anything that
was actually hostile.” Dkt. 79 at 15.
To state a claim for a hostile work environment under Title VII, Thomas
must allege that she: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on a
protected characteristic; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) UTMB knew or should have known
of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action. See
Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002). This “standard is not
easy to meet. Rather, these ‘factors are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title
VII does not become a general civility code.’” Friend v. McAdams, 861 F. App’x.
825, 831 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting West v. City of Houston, 960 F.3d 736, 742 (5th
Cir. 2020)). “[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined
only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
23 (1993).
The alleged falsification of Thomas’s performance evaluation, retaliation,
and termination are “isolated incidents,” which are not actionable. See Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). Additionally, retaliation and
termination, 	“although 	considered 	adverse 	employment 	actions . . . , 	are 	not
offensive or harassing in the way necessary to support a hostile work environment
claim.” Montgomery-Smith v. George, 810 F. App’x. 252, 259 (5th Cir. 2020).
As to the alleged systematic exclusion, blocking of accommodations, and
denial of standard and customary practices and procedures, these are not hostile
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or abusive actions. Even if these actions could be considered harassing, Thomas
alleges no facts that would give rise to the plausible inference that any such
treatment occurred because of a protected characteristic. Without evidence of
harassment based on a protected characteristic, Thomas cannot satisfy the third
element of a hostile work environment claim. See Friend, 861 F. App’x. at 831
(dismissing 	hostile 	work 	environment 	claims 	where 	plaintiff 	did 	not 	offer
“evidence suggesting these actions were ‘based on’ her race and sex”). Thus,
Thomas fails to state a claim for hostile work environment.
B. 	S ECTION 1983 CLAIMS (I NDIVIDUAL D EFENDANTS )
Thomas brings five § 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants in their
individual capacities. 7 Those claims are: (1) § 1981 violation for race discrimination
in 	contracting;8 	(2) Fourteenth 	Amendment 	race 	discrimination; 	(3) First
Amendment retaliation; (4) Fourteenth Amendment due process violations; and
(5) conspiracy to violate constitutional rights.
1. 	Section 1983
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of
7 The court has already dismissed Thomas’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims against UTMB and
the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. See Dkt. 45 at 2.
8 Section 1981 does not create a private cause of action against government officials in
their individual capacities. See Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989).
Thomas may, however, “pursue a § 1983 cause of action against persons acting under
color of state law in order to assert [her] substantive rights under § 1981.” Oden v.
Oktibbeha County, 246 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, I construe Thomas’s
Equal Rights Act claim as one seeking to vindicate her substantive § 1981 rights through
the procedural vehicle of § 1983. See Stading v. Tex. A&M Univ.-Texarkana, No. 5:24-cv-
00066, 2025 WL 748631, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2025) (allowing plaintiff to pursue
“§ 1981 claims through the remedial provision of § 1983 by specifically alleging that
Individual Defendants violated . . . §§ 1981, 1983.”); Graham, 587 F. App’x at 206 (“We
have doubts about the district court’s denial of Graham’s section 1981 claim on the ground
that she did not cite section 1983 as the procedural vehicle for asserting such a claim.”
(cleaned up)).
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any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but
merely 	provides 	a 	method 	for 	vindicating 	federal 	rights 	elsewhere
conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quotation omitted).
To establish § 1983 liability against the Individual Defendants, Thomas
“must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States” and (2) demonstrate that the Individual Defendants were “acting
under color of state law.” Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th
Cir. 2000). There is no dispute that the Individual Defendants were acting under
color of state law. Accordingly, the relevant question for each of Thomas’s § 1983
claims is whether the alleged facts show “that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735.
The Individual Defendants assert that qualified immunity bars each of
Thomas’s § 1983 claims.
2. 	Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability in their
individual capacity to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights.” Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d
721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016). 	It is a judicially created doctrine designed to avoid “the
expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,
and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The doctrine arises from “the danger that
fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible 	public 	officials, 	in 	the 	unflinching 	discharge 	of 	their
duties.” Id. (cleaned up).
“Once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d
209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must
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show: “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that
the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quotation omitted). “These steps may be
considered in either order.” Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 320 (5th
Cir. 2018).
The first step asks whether the alleged facts “show the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If
Thomas’s allegations, viewed favorably, do not establish a constitutional violation,
no further inquiry is necessary. See id. The second step “asks whether the right in
question was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quotation omitted). The Individual Defendants are “shielded
from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation omitted). “A right is
clearly established only if the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any
reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was
violating it.” Mote v. Walthall, 902 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation
omitted). “[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the law” at the time of
the incident provided the Individual Defendants with “fair warning that their
alleged treatment of [Thomas] was unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.
Thomas bears a heavy burden on this prong because a right is clearly established
only if relevant precedent has “placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
“[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific
facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense
with 	equal 	specificity.” Arnold 	v. 	Williams, 	979 	F.3d 	262, 	267 	(5th 	Cir.
2020) (quotation omitted). I will address each of Thomas’s claims in turn, but I
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must first begin by addressing the paucity of Thomas’s allegations as to Reisner
and Zerwas.
3. 	Thomas States No Claim Against Reisner or Zerwas
“A Section 1983 claimant must establish that the defendant was either
personally involved in the deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally
connected to the deprivation.” See Jones v. Lowndes County, 678 F.3d 344, 349
(5th Cir. 2012). Thomas categorically cannot state any claim against Reisner or
Zerwas because she advances no substantive allegations against them.
Thomas mentions Reisner only twice in the operative pleading—once to list
his name in the style of the case and once to allege: “Dr. Jochen Reisner
(President, UTMB) holds final authority over all employment decisions at UTMB,
including terminations.” Dkt. 77 at 18.
Thomas mentions Zerwas only thrice in the operative pleading—once to list
his name in the style of the case and twice to allege: “Dr. John Zerwas
(Chancellor, ad interim, The University of Texas System) is Chancellor of The
University 	of 	Texas 	System 	and 	has 	system-wide 	authority 	over 	SB 	17
implementation at all UT institutions” and “Dr. Zerwas set system-wide policies
and directed how SB 17 was to be implemented, including determining standard
and customary practices and procedures for handling DEI positions across UT
System.” Id.
Simply detailing Reisner and Zerwas’ authority and responsibility are not
factual allegations establishing that either individual was personally involved in or
connected to the alleged deprivation of Thomas’s statutory or constitutional rights.
Because Thomas fails to advance any specific allegations concerning Reisner or
Zerwas, both gentlemen are entitled to qualified immunity and Thomas’s claims
against them must be dismissed.
With that, I will address each of Thomas’s § 1983 claims in turn, starting
with her § 1981 claim for race discrimination in contracting.
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4. 	§ 1981 Race Discrimination in Contracting
Section 1981 provides in pertinent part that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the
same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a). “[T]he term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, 	privileges, 	terms, 	and 	conditions 	of 	the 	contractual
relationship.” Id. § 1981(b). To state a claim for relief under § 1981, Thomas must
allege that: (1) she is a member of a racial minority; (2) each Individual Defendant
had an intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination
concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute, such as the
making and enforcement of a contract. See Perry v. VHS San Antonio Partners,
L.L.C., 990 F.3d 918, 931 (5th Cir. 2021). In addition, Thomas “bears the burden
of showing that race was a but-for cause of [her] injury.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 333 (2020).
Thomas, 	a 	Black 	individual, 	clearly 	satisfies 	the 	first 	element. 	The
discrimination alleged also clearly satisfies the third element, as it pertains to the
enforcement of Thomas’s employment contract. Thus, I need to address only
whether Thomas has pleaded facts to show that each of the remaining Individual
Defendants—Woods, Mouton, Evans, and Susman—had an intent to discriminate
against her on the basis of race and that Thomas’s race was the but-for cause of her
injury. Under this lens, I analyze Thomas’s § 1981 claims with respect to each
Individual Defendant.
Thomas alleges that Woods “transferred Dr. Thomas to her department;
systematically excluded Dr. Thomas from work activities; admitted in September
2023 she had ‘no position to offer’ Dr. Thomas; blocked Dr. Thomas’s proposed
title change; and executed Dr. Thomas’s termination notice.” Dkt. 77 at 18.
Thomas 	alleges 	that 	Mouton 	“participated 	in 	decisions 	affecting 	Dr.
Thomas’s position; received Dr. Woods’s email blocking Dr. Thomas’s title change
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19
proposal; received copy of Dr. Thomas’s title change proposal; and had authority
to direct alternative solutions.” Id.
Thomas alleges that Evans “made decisions about implementing [Thomas’s]
termination” and “had authority to ensure that standard and customary practices
and procedures were followed and had authority to direct nondiscriminatory
treatment.” Id. at 19.
Thomas alleges that Susman, “in collusion with Dr. Woods requested Dr.
Torres falsify Dr. Thomas’s performance evaluation”; “coordinated with Dr. Woods
to transfer Dr. Thomas to an office without available positions”; provided “false
assurances of support” to Thomas; “had knowledge of the scheme to terminate Dr.
Thomas”; and “had authority to prevent the discrimination” against Thomas. Id.
In addition to these person-specific allegations, Thomas alleges generally
that the “Individual Defendants predetermined her termination based on race”;
“Individual Defendants denied her accommodations offered to non-minority
employees in standard and customary manner”; and “Individual Defendants
systematically excluded her from work opportunities afforded to non-minority
colleagues.” Id. at 27.
None of these allegations, alone or in combination, suggest that Thomas
would not have been terminated but-for her race. In fact, Thomas’s own allegations
suggest that the treatment she received was based on something other than race.
For example, Thomas alleges that Dr. Cindy West, the Director of Student
Engagement at UTMB’s School of Nursing and a Black woman, 12 “did not lose [her]
employment, but [was] given other job responsibilities to absorb the percentage
time [she] had spent in DEI related activities.” Dkt. 77 at 15. That another Black
woman received favorable treatment suggests that whatever the reason for
12 	See 	Accomplishments 	Overview, 	Cindy 	West, 	UTMB 	School 	of 	Nursing,
https://nursing.utmb.edu/About/Faculty/Biography/ciwest (last visited Mar. 10, 2026).
“[G]overnmental websites are proper sources for judicial notice,” and “a court may take
judicial notice of . . . a governmental website without converting a motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment.” Cicalese, 456 F. Supp. 3d at 871.
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Thomas’s different treatment, it was not based on race.13 Accordingly, Thomas fails
to state a § 1981 claim, meaning that every Individual Defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity from and dismissal of Thomas’s § 1981 claim.
5. 	Fourteenth Amendment Race Discrimination
Thomas alleges that she was treated differently than unidentified, non-
minority colleagues and Torres, and that her proposed accommodation was
blocked 	while 	identical 	accommodations 	were 	offered 	to 	unidentified, 	non-
minority employees in a standard and customary manner. See Dkt. 77 at 28. The
Individual Defendants retort that Thomas “presents no violation of her right to
equal protection because she does not allege facts to suggest that anyone outside
of her protected class received different treatment than she did under similar
circumstances.” Dkt. 79 at 22.
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from “deny[ing] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1. “To maintain an equal protection claim, a plaintiff typically alleges that he
received treatment different from that received by similarly situated individuals
and that the unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.” Club
Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 212 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
“[T]o state a claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and
§ 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the governmental official was motivated
by intentional discrimination on the basis of race.” Coleman v. Houston Indep.
Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
As discussed above, Thomas has not alleged facts that would give rise to a
plausible inference that any differential treatment she received was based on her
race. Thus, Thomas has not stated a constitutional violation, and Individual
13 To the extent that Thomas would complain that Dr. West is not a proper comparator,
that raises the separate problem, discussed above in connection with Thomas’s Title VII
claims, that Thomas has not identified any similarly situated comparators whose
treatment would give rise to the plausible inference that there was discriminatory motive,
much less but-for causation.
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Defendants 	are 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity 	from 	Thomas’s 	Fourteenth
Amendment race discrimination claim.
6. 	First Amendment Retaliation
Thomas alleges that “Individual Defendants retaliated against Dr. Thomas
for filing her EEOC charge by mailing her termination extension letter on January
23, 2024 (six days after charge),” and by terminating her employment on February
28, 2024. Dkt. 77 at 29. Individual Defendants contend that filing a Charge is not
protected speech under the First Amendment. See Dkt. 79 at 22.
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, Thomas “must establish
that: (1) she suffered an adverse employment action; (2) her speech involved a
matter of public concern; (3) her interest in commenting on matters of public
concern outweighs the employer’s interest in promoting efficiency; and (4) her
speech motivated the employer’s adverse action.” McLin v. Twenty-First Jud.
Dist., 79 F.4th 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted).
“[W]hen [a public employee] speaks as an employee on matters that address
only [her] personal employment conditions, [s]he is not protected from discharge
for engaging in that speech by the First Amendment.” Ayoub v. Tex. A & M Univ.,
927 F.2d 834, 837 (5th Cir. 1991). “Lodging a complaint with the EEOC, without
further airing of grievances, creates a private, personal dispute between employer
and employee. It does not create a generalized petition for a remedy to a public
problem.” Short v. City of W. Point, No. 97-60086, 1997 WL 575048, at *1 (5th Cir.
Aug. 29, 1997).
Here, because Thomas’s Charge was made “in furtherance of a private
employment dispute,” it is not speech that is protected by the First Amendment.
Bates v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 425 F. Supp. 2d 826, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
There is nothing about the Charge that implicates a public concern. Thomas did
not file her Charge as a “crusader[] for public justice” but rather as an individual
employee “seeking employment benefits to which [she] believed [she] w[as]
entitled.” Id; see also Dkt. 77 at 33 (Thomas seeking restoration of “all employment
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benefits and rights” as a professor). Thus, Thomas has not alleged the second
element a First Amendment retaliation claim.
Thomas also has not alleged the fourth element of a First Amendment
retaliation claim—that filing a Charge motivated UTMB to terminate her—for the
same reasons that Thomas fails to plead a Title VII retaliation claim. UTMB clearly
decided to terminate Thomas’s employment well in advance of any protected
activity or speech.
Because Thomas fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim, the
Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from and dismissal of
Thomas’s First Amendment retaliation claim.
7. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
As to her Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, Thomas alleges that
“Dr. Thomas had a property interest in her continued employment at UTMB under
the terms of her position and the representations made to her.” Dkt. 77 at 30.
Individual Defendants argue that Thomas does not have a constitutional right in
continued employment at UTMB. See Dkt. 79 at 21.
“[T]o 	advance 	a 	due 	process 	claim 	in 	connection 	with 	[her]
termination, [Thomas] must 	point 	to 	some 	state 	or 	local 	law, 	contract 	or
understanding that creates a property interest in [her] continued employment.”
Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1997). “In Texas, there
exists a presumption that employment is at-will unless that relationship has been
expressly altered in one of two ways. The at-will relationship may be altered by
contract; or by express rules or policies limiting the conditions under which an
employee may be terminated.” Muncy v. City of Dallas, 335 F.3d 394, 398 (5th Cir.
2003) (cleaned up).
Thomas does not point to any contractual provision, rule, or policy that
creates a property interest in her continued employment at UTMB. “Absent a
property interest, there is nothing subject to due process protections and [my]
inquiry ends.” Cabrol, 106 F.3d at 105. Because Thomas cannot demonstrate the
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basis of a property interest in her continued employment at UTMB, she cannot
state a due process claim. Accordingly, Individual Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity from and dismissal of Thomas’s due process claim.
8. 	Conspiracy
Thomas alleges that “Individual Defendants conspired to violate [her] rights
under Equal Protection, First Amendment, and Due Process Clauses.” Dkt. 77 at
32. Individual Defendants assert that because Thomas “does not abrogate the
qualified immunity of any of the Individual Defendants, the claims against them
should be dismissed.” Dkt. 79 at 23.
“To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
existence of (1) an agreement to do an illegal act and (2) an actual constitutional
deprivation.” Bevill v. Fletcher, 26 F.4th 270, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2022). In other
words, Thomas’s conspiracy claim rises or falls with her other constitutional
claims. Because Thomas has not stated any constitutional violation, she cannot
state a claim for conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights. The Individual
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Thomas’s conspiracy claim.
C. 	I NJUNCTIVE R ELIEF
Thomas asks the court to “[i]ssue injunctive and declaratory relief.” Dkt. 77
at 33. Defendants argue that Thomas “does not present a viable claim under Title
VII” or “under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or § 1983.” Dkt. 79 at 19. For all the reasons stated
above, I agree. “[B]ecause [Thomas] states no viable cause of action, injunctive
relief is unwarranted.” Sahara Health Care, Inc. v. Azar, 349 F. Supp. 3d 555, 579
(S.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d, 975 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2020). 14
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that Defendants’ Second
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 79) be granted.
14 Because Thomas’s failure to state a Title VII or § 1983 claim means that she is not
entitled to injunctive relief, I do not reach Defendants’ arguments regarding the Ex parte
Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
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The 	parties 	have 	14 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 	day of March 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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