Williams v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
L.W.,1
Plaintiff.
V.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00198
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff L.W. seeks judicial review of an administrative decision denying her
application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act (the “Act”). L.W. and Defendant Frank J. Bisignano, the Acting Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”), 2 have briefed their
positions. See Dkts. 8, 15. After reviewing the briefing, the record, and the
applicable law, I reverse the Commissioner’s decision and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
On April 22, 2021, L.W. filed a Title XVI application for supplemental
security 	income. 	Her 	application 	was 	denied 	and 	denied 	again 	upon
reconsideration. Subsequently, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a
1 On May 1, 2023, the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States issued a memorandum recommending that
courts adopt a local practice of using only the first name and last initial of any non-
government party in Social Security opinions. This court has taken that guidance a step
further in the interest of claimant’s privacy and will use only initials in public opinions.
2 Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. Bisignano is
“automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); see also 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive
notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social
Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 08, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 3:25-cv-00198 Document 16 Filed 01/08/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 6

2
hearing. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that L.W.
was not disabled. L.W. filed an appeal with the Appeals Council. The Appeals
Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision final and ripe for judicial review.
APPLICABLE LAW
The standard of judicial review for disability appeals is provided in 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). See Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 2002). Courts
reviewing the Commissioner’s denial of social security disability applications limit
their 	analysis 	to 	“(1) whether 	the 	Commissioner 	applied 	the 	proper 	legal
standards; 	and 	(2) whether 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Est. of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d
744, 745 (5th Cir. 2000). Addressing the evidentiary standard, the Fifth Circuit has
explained:
Substantial evidence is that which is relevant and sufficient for a
reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it
must be more than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance. It
is the role of the Commissioner, and not the courts, to resolve conflicts
in the evidence. As a result, [a] court cannot reweigh the evidence, but
may only scrutinize the record to determine whether it contains
substantial 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision. 	A
finding of no substantial evidence is warranted only where there is a
conspicuous absence of credible choices or no contrary medical
evidence.
Ramirez v. Colvin, 606 F. App’x 775, 777 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Judicial
review is limited to the reasons relied on as stated in the ALJ’s decision, and post
hoc rationalizations are not to be considered. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947).
Under the Act, “a claimant is disabled only if she is incapable of engaging in
any substantial gainful activity.” Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir.
1992) (quotation omitted). The Commissioner uses a five-step approach to
determine if a claimant is disabled, including:
(1) whether the claimant is presently performing substantial gainful
activity; 	(2) whether 	the 	claimant 	has 	a 	severe 	impairment;
(3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment;
Case 3:25-cv-00198 Document 16 Filed 01/08/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 6

3
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant
from performing any other substantial gainful activity.
Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kneeland v.
Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2017)).
The burden of proof lies with the claimant during the first four steps before
shifting to the Commissioner at Step 5. See Salmond, 892 F.3d at 817. Between
Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), which serves as an indicator of the claimant’s maximum capabilities given
the physical and mental limitations detailed in the administrative record. See
Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 754. The RFC also helps the ALJ “determine whether the
claimant is able to do her past work or other available work.” Id.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ found at Step 1 that L.W. “has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since April 22, 2021, the application date and amended onset date.” Dkt. 7-
2 at 28.
The ALJ found at Step 2 that, L.W. “has the following severe impairments:
lumbar degenerative disc disease, diabetes mellitus, asthma, obesity, fibromyalgia,
obstructive sleep apnea, anxiety, and depressive disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder and history [of] intellectual disorder.” Id.
The ALJ found at Step 3 that L.W. “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments.” Id. at 29.
Prior to consideration of Step 4, the ALJ determined L.W.’s RFC as follows:
[L.W.] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she can occasionally climb ramps
and 	stairs; 	never 	climb 	ladders, 	ropes, 	or 	scaffolds; 	frequently
balance; and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can
have occasional exposure to pulmonary irritants such as noxious
fumes, odors, dust, and gases. The claimant can understand, carry out
and remember detailed, but not complex instructions. She requires a
cane to ambulate.
Case 3:25-cv-00198 Document 16 Filed 01/08/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 6

4
Id. at 32.
At Step 4, the ALJ found that L.W. “has no past relevant work.” Id. at 38.
At Step 5, however, the ALJ found that “there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that [L.W.] can perform.” Id.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that L.W. “has not been under a disability, as
defined in the Social Security Act, since April 22, 2021.” Id. at 39.
DISCUSSION
This appeal presents two issues for my review: (1) whether the ALJ properly
evaluated L.W.’s use of a cane; and (2) whether the ALJ properly evaluated L.W.’s
subjective complaints regarding her need to frequently alternate positions. I need
address only the latter of these issues.
In her opinion, the ALJ acknowledged L.W.’s reported need “to alternate
between sitting and standing during the day.” Dkt. 7-2 at 33. Yet, the ALJ made no
allowance for L.W.’s reported need to alternate positions when crafting L.W.’s
RFC. In rejecting those of L.W.’s subjective complaints that were not consistent
with the ALJ’s RFC—which necessarily includes L.W.’s reported need to alternate
positions—the ALJ said, in relevant part: “Physical examinations have also
revealed no ongoing loss of motion of the [L.W.]’s spine.” Id. at 35. Yet, this
statement is at odds with the ALJ’s own recounting of L.W.’s medical history.
For example, the ALJ noted that “[w]hen seen in October 2022, with reports
of worsening pain that radiated from her back into her bilateral hips and right
lower extremity, . . . [t]here were no reports . . . of any loss of motion of the
claimant’s lumbar spine.” Id. at 34. “During a March 2023 examination,” however,
L.W.’s “range of motion of the cervical spine was decreased with 45 degrees of
flexion, 45 degrees of extension, 30 degrees of lateral flexion, bilaterally; and 60
degrees of rotation, bilaterally.” Id. During that same March 2023 examination,
L.W.’s “[r]ange of motion of the thoracic spine was also decreased with 70 degrees
of flexion; 20 degrees of extension and lateral flexion, bilaterally; and 15 degrees
of rotation, bilaterally.” Id. During an August 2023 examination, L.W. “displayed
Case 3:25-cv-00198 Document 16 Filed 01/08/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 6

5
tenderness over the mid-to-lower lumbar paraspinals bilaterally and flexion of the
lumbar spine was limited.” Id. Accordingly, the ALJ’s own summation of L.W.’s
medical history revealed an ongoing loss of motion of L.W.’s spine, contrary to the
ALJ’s reasoning. It is difficult to make sense of the ALJ’s reasoning when the ALJ
makes statements that are at odds with the ALJ’s own summation of the record.
Dr. Brian Harper and Dr. Prianka Gerrish, the medical examiners at the
initial and reconsideration level—neither of whom examined L.W.—both opined
that L.W. could “stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour
workday” and “sit for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday.” Id. at
36. Neither opined on L.W.’s need to alternate positions. The ALJ found these
medical opinions only partially persuasive because the “degenerative changes of
[L.W.]’s lumbar spine with some use of an assistive device is more supportive of a
conclusion that [L.W.] should nerve [sic] climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.” Id. at
37. Thus, the ALJ rejected these medical opinions in favor of postural limitations.
Because neither Dr. Harper nor Dr. Gerrish opined on L.W.’s need to alternate
positions, and because the ALJ rejected these medical opinions in favor of greater
postural limitations, these medical opinions do not support an analysis that is
silent as to L.W.’s reported need to alternate positions.
A 	finding 	of 	no 	substantial 	evidence 	is 	warranted 	“where 	there 	is 	a
conspicuous 	absence 	of 	credible 	choices 	or 	no 	contrary 	medical 	evidence.”
Ramirez, 606 F. App’x at 777. The ALJ rejected the only medical opinions of record
in favor of greater postural limitations. The ALJ credited L.W.’s report that she
needed a cane to ambulate by including such a requirement in the RFC. Thus, it is
difficult to understand why the ALJ did not also credit L.W.’s reported need to
alternate positions frequently. The ALJ failed to explain this choice. If the ALJ’s
statement that “[p]hysical examinations have also revealed no ongoing loss of
motion of the [L.W.]’s spine” was meant to be the explanation for why she rejected
L.W.’s reported need to alternate positions, that logic falls apart when compared
to the ALJ’s own summary of L.W.’s medical history, which revealed an ongoing
Case 3:25-cv-00198 Document 16 Filed 01/08/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 6

6
loss of motion of L.W.’s spine. Id. at 35. Because there is a conspicuous absence of
credible choices and no medical evidence to controvert L.W.’s reported need to
alternate positions, I must find that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence.
The ALJ’s failure to explain why she rejected L.W.’s reported need to
alternate positions—after accepting L.W.’s reported need for a cane—is not
harmless error. According to the Administration’s own adjudicative guidance:
In some disability claims, the medical facts lead to an assessment of
RFC which is compatible with the performance of either sedentary or
light work except that the person must alternate periods of sitting and
standing. The individual may be able to sit for a time, but must then
get up and stand or walk for awhile before returning to sitting. Such
an individual is not functionally capable of doing either the prolonged
sitting contemplated in the definition of sedentary work (and for the
relatively few light jobs which are performed primarily in a seated
position) or the prolonged standing or walking contemplated for most
light work. (Persons who can adjust to any need to vary sitting and
standing by doing so at breaks, lunch periods, etc., would still be able
to perform a defined range of work.)
SSR 83-12, Adjudicative Guidance. Thus, it is conceivable “that a different
administrative conclusion would have been reached” if the ALJ had properly
evaluated L.W.’s reported need to alternate positions. Keel v. Saul, 986 F.3d 551,
556 (5th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, this matter must be remanded.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I reverse the Commissioner’s decision and
remand this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
A final judgment will issue separately.
SIGNED this ____ day of January 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:25-cv-00198 Document 16 Filed 01/08/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 6