Guajardo v. City of Corpus Christi, Texas

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
PAULETTE M. GUAJARDO, §
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Plaintiff,
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:26-CV-111
CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS,
Defendant.
ORDER
Pending before the Court is an application for a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) (Dkt. 22) filed by Plaintiff Paulette Guajardo (“Guajardo”) against the City of
Corpus Christi, Texas (“the City”) and five members of its city council—Carolyn Vaughn;
Gil Hernandez; Sylvia Campos; Kaylynn Paxson; and Eric Cantu. Considering Plaintiff’s
motion and the applicable law, the Court respectfully DENIES the motion. Accordingly,
the TRO previously entered by the Court (Dkt. 8) will expire at 5:00 p.m. on April 27,
2026. By separate notice, the Court will set a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction.
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS
Guajardo has sued Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and Texas
state law, and she seeks a TRO restraining Defendants from proceeding with removal
proceedings against her. (Dkt. 22 at pp. 13–20). To obtain a TRO, an applicant must
demonstrate entitlement to a preliminary injunction. Greer’s Ranch Café v. Guzman, 540
F. Supp. 3d 638, 644–45 (N.D. Tex. 2021). In the Fifth Circuit, the following well-
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 27, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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established framework generally governs the determination of whether to grant a
preliminary injunction:
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the movant must satisfy each of
the following equitable factors: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury
to the movant outweighs the threatened harm to the party sought to be
enjoined; and (4) granting the injunctive relief will not disserve the public
interest. Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, it
should not be granted unless the movant has clearly carried the burden of
persuasion on all four requirements. Failure to sufficiently establish any one
of the four factors requires this Court to deny the movant’s request for a
preliminary injunction.
Id.
ANALYSIS
Based on the current evidentiary record, the Court concludes that Guajardo has not
clearly carried the burden of persuasion on the four preliminary injunction factors. Among
other things, Guajardo has not clearly established a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits of her claims.
—Section 1983
Guajardo brings most of her claims under Section 1983. “To state a claim under
§1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 515
(5th Cir. 1995).
i. Procedural and Substantive Due Process
Guajardo claims a violation of her rights under the procedural and substantive due
process components of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Dkt. 22 at p.
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13). “Procedural due process requires the government to follow appropriate procedures
before it deprives a person of an interest in life, liberty, or property; substantive due process
ensures that, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used, the government does not use
its power for oppressive purposes.” Patterson v. Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency,
398 F. Supp. 3d 102, 116 (W.D. Tex. 2019). “In other words, procedural due process
guarantees that a state proceeding which results in a deprivation of property is fair, while
substantive due process ensures that such state action is not arbitrary and capricious.” Id.
(brackets and quotation marks omitted).
A claim under either component of the Due Process Clause requires a plaintiff to
establish “a liberty or property interest that is entitled to due process protection.” McIntosh
v. Barbour, No. 4:10-CV-72, 2010 WL 5169045, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 14, 2010); see
also Atkinson v. Pustilnik, No. 4:22-CV-4315, 2025 WL 2856557, at *9–10 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
8, 2025) (“To prevail on either claim, Ms. Atkinson must establish a protected interest.”).
“It is a well-established principle, however, that public officials do not have a property
interest or right to hold elected office.” McIntosh, 2010 WL 5169045 at *4; see also
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944) (“More than forty years ago this Court determined
that an unlawful denial by state action of a right to state political office is not a denial of a
right of property or of liberty secured by the due process clause.”); Wilson v. Birnberg, 667
F.3d 591, 597–98 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e continue to hold that public office does not
constitute property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.”); Gosey v. City of
Forest Hill, Texas, No. 4:11-CV-47, 2011 WL 2883639, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. July 15, 2011)
(“By this action, plaintiff, the mayor of City, seeks to hold City liable for injuries he
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allegedly suffered in connection with his suspension from office in December 2010. . . .
Because he is an elected official, plaintiff has no property interest in his position as
mayor.”).
At this time, under binding authority from the Fifth Circuit and the United States
Supreme Court, as well as highly persuasive authority from other district courts, the Court
concludes that Guajardo has not established a property interest in her position as mayor
that is entitled to federal due process protection. Accordingly, Guajardo has not clearly
shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of this claim.
ii. Equal Protection
Guajardo also claims a violation of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause. (Dkt. 22 at p. 18). Specifically, Guajardo brings a “class of one”
equal protection claim.
A plaintiff bringing a class-of-one equal protection claim must allege “that she has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562, 564 (2000). “Being similarly situated is key. Because the clause’s protection reaches
only dissimilar treatment among similar people, if the challenged government action does
not appear to classify or distinguish between two or more relevant persons or groups, then
the action does not deny equal protection of the laws.” Hines v. Quillivan, 982 F.3d 266,
272–73 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). To determine whether persons or groups
are similarly situated, the Court must “inquire as to whether they are in all relevant respects
alike.” Texas Entertainment Association, Inc. v. Hegar, 10 F.4th 495, 513 (5th Cir. 2021)
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(quotation marks omitted). As the Seventh Circuit aptly phrased it in a class-of-one case,
“[i]t is clear that similarly situated individuals must be very similar indeed.” McDonald v.
Village of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004). Because there is no suspect class
involved, a class-of-one plaintiff must show that there is no “reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Integrity Collision Center
v. City of Fulshear, 837 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir. 2016). “Moreover, the State need not
articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather the burden is
on the challenging party to negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
In support of her equal protection claim, Guajardo contends that she is being treated
differently from members of the Corpus Christi City Council who “participated in the same
collective legislative acts alleged in the articles of impeachment” against her. (Dkt. 22 at
p. 18). However, the record does not reflect that Guajardo and any particular council
member were alike in all relevant respects. Furthermore, the record does not reflect that
the removal proceedings against Guajardo—which were initiated by a petition filed by six
registered voters (Dkt. 22-3 at p. 2)—lack a rational basis. Accordingly, Guajardo has not
clearly shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of this claim.
iii. First Amendment Retaliation
Guajardo also brings a First Amendment retaliation claim. (Dkt. 22 at p. 16).
In order to successfully establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, Guajardo
must show that: (1) she was engaged in Constitutionally protected activity; (2) Defendants’
actions “caused [her] to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
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continuing to engage in that activity[;]” and (3) Defendants’ actions “were substantially
motivated against [her] exercise of [C]onstitutionally protected conduct.” Keenan v.
Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must
show that the government defendant’s “retaliatory animus” was a “but-for cause” of the
plaintiff’s subsequent injury, “meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would
not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 730
(5th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). “A First Amendment retaliation claim fails if
the action would have been taken anyway.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
The record does not reflect that the removal proceedings against Guajardo would
not have commenced absent a retaliatory motive on the part of Defendants. As previously
mentioned, the removal proceedings were initiated by a petition filed by six registered
voters. (Dkt. 22-3 at p. 2). Accordingly, Guajardo has not clearly shown a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of this claim.
—Texas state law
Guajardo brings one claim under Texas state law—an ultra vires claim alleging that
Defendants “lack legal authority to continue to pursue removal proceedings under the City
Charter, or any other law.” (Dkt. 22 at pp. 15–16).
Under Texas law, a “plaintiff may bring an ultra vires claim against a government
official in certain narrow instances, such as when she violates statutory or constitutional
provisions.” Martin v. Burgess, --F.4th--, 2026 WL 1084252, at *5 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2026)
(brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). “To succeed on an ultra vires claim, a
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plaintiff must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or
failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Guajardo bases her ultra vires claim on her contention that the City’s charter “allows
only for impeachment of ‘council members,’ not the Mayor.” (Dkt. 22 at p. 15). Article II,
Section 1 of the City’s charter1 provides that the City’s council “shall consist of eight
council members and a mayor[:]”
But, as Guajardo points out, Article II, Section 11 of the City’s charter, which
governs removal proceedings, only mentions “council member[s]” and does not specify
that it applies to the mayor:
1 The Court accessed the City’s charter at the following URL:
https://library.municode.com/tx/corpus_christi/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICH_ARTI
ICICO_INGE.
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The Court, however, is not convinced that the City’s charter unequivocally excludes
the mayor from removal or impeachment proceedings. Article II, Section 12 of the City’s
charter—which immediately follows the section discussing removal of council members—
provides explicit instructions regarding what to do “[i]n the event of . . . recall or
impeachment of the mayor[:]”
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The record does not reflect that Defendants are acting without legal authority or in
violation of the City’s charter. Accordingly, Guajardo has not clearly shown a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of this claim.
CONCLUSION
Guajardo’s pending request for a TRO (Dkt. 22) is respectfully DENIED.
Accordingly, the TRO previously entered by the Court (Dkt. 8) will expire at 5:00 p.m.
on April 27, 2026. By separate notice, the Court will set a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on April 27, 2026.
_______________________________
GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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