Snellings v. United States Of America et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
SIDNEY RAY SNELLINGS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:26-CV-00029
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DISMISS CASE AS BARRED BY THE THREE STRIKES RULE
Plaintiff Sidney Ray Snellings, proceeding pro se, has filed this prisoner civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.E. 1). Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s:
(1) Motion for Preliminary Injunction (D.E. 2); and (2) Motion to Proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) in this action (D.E. 3). As discussed below, a review of Court records
reveals that Plaintiff is ineligible to proceed IFP because he has accrued at least three strikes
under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The undersigned, therefore, respectfully recommends that
Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (D.E. 3) be DENIED, that his Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (D.E. 2) be DENIED as moot, and that his case be DISMISSED without
prejudice.
Prisoner civil rights actions are subject to the provisions of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, including the three strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The three strikes rule
provides that a prisoner who has had, while incarcerated, three or more actions or appeals
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 05, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted is prohibited from bringing any more actions or appeals IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);
Baños v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Adepegba v. Hammons,
103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). The three strikes rule provides an exception permitting
prisoners who are under imminent danger of physical harm to proceed without prepayment
of the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Baños, 144 F.3d at 884.
Plaintiff has had five prior civil rights action dismissed as frivolous or for failure to
state a claim for relief. See Snellings v. Montgomery Cnty. Jail Medical Dep’t, No. 4:22-
cv-00687 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2024) (dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief);
Snellings v. Garcia, No. 6:23-cv-00119 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2023) (dismissed for failure to
state a claim for relief); Snellings v. Nichols, No. 4:22-cv-00265 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2022)
(dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for relief); Snellings v. Montgomery
Cnty. Sheriff Office, No. 4:17-cv-00343 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2024) (dismissed as frivolous
and for failure to state a claim for relief Snellings v. Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-01708 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 5, 2015) (dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief). Plaintiff, therefore, is
barred from proceeding IFP in this prisoner civil rights action unless he can show he is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
This Court must assess whether Plaintiff is exposed to imminent danger of serious
injury at the time that he filed this action. Choyce v. Dominguez, 160 F.3d 1068, 1071 (5th
Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (citing Baños, 144 F.3d at 884–85). To satisfy the imminent danger
requirement of § 1915(g), the threat must be “real and proximate.” Ciarpaglini v. Saini,
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352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). In addition, the harm must be
imminent or occurring at the time the complaint is filed, and the plaintiff must refer to a
“genuine emergency” where “time is pressing.” Heimermann v. Litscher, 337 F.3d 781,
782 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Congress intended a safety valve to
prevent impending harms, not those injuries which allegedly had already occurred. Abdul–
Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal
Institutions Division (“TDCJ”). At the time he filed this action, Plaintiff was housed at the
TDCJ’s McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas. Plaintiff’s allegations and claims arise in
connection with his stay at the McConnell Unit. He recently submitted a Notice of Change
of Address indicating that he is now housed at the Darrington Memorial Unit in Rosharon,
Texas. (D.E. 13).
Plaintiff’s allegations and claims set forth in his complaint are hard to follow as they
are presented in a haphazard and confusing manner. Plaintiff claims that Defendants have
violated several constitutional amendments, Texas statutory and regulation provisions, and
federal statutes, including the Civil Right Act of 1964, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Title IX of the Educational Amendments
of 1972, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. (D.E. 1-1, pp. 4, 8-9, 12, 15-17).
Plaintiff’s states that, as of March 2024, he is an ex-gang member who has been and
continues to be confined in administration segregation. (D.E. 1-1, p. 11; D.E. 11, pp. 7-8).
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Plaintiff clarified at his Spears1 hearing that the claims in this case challenge the denial of
his right to continue in his rehabilitation education. (D.E 11, p. 7). Plaintiff specifically
complains about the failure of prison officials to place him in the Gang Renouncement and
Disassociation (“GRAD”) program in a timely manner. (D.E. 1-1, pp. 11-12). Plaintiff
states further that, despite having followed all policies and regulations, he remains in
administrative segregation without the ability to access certain trade skill college courses.
(D.E. 11, p. 8). According to Plaintiff, the denial of rehabilitation education has interfered
with his eligibility for parole. Id. at 7.
The Court initially notes that Plaintiff filed a second prisoner civil rights action in
which he alleges he suffered cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment during his time in administrative segregation at the McConnell Unit. See
Snellings v. United States of America, No. 2:26-CV-00041 (S.D. Tex. 2026) (“Snellings
II”). It is well settled in the Fifth Circuit that an inmate’s claim of imminent danger must
relate to the complaint filed. See Prescott v. UTMB Galveston, Tex., 73 F.4th 315, 321 (5th
Cir. 2023) (holding that “there must be a nexus between the supposed imminent danger
and the allegations and claims in the underlying suit”); Judd v. Federal Election Comm.,
311 F. App’x 730, 731 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that allegations of imminent danger
must be relate to the allegations and claims asserted in the complaint).
The allegations and claims raised in Snelling II do not relate to the denial-of-
rehabilitation-education claims brought against Defendants in this action. As such,
1 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).
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Plaintiff may not successfully claim that he faces imminent danger of serious harm in this
action based on any allegations of cruel and unusual punishment suffered in connection
with his stay in administrative segregation.2 Upon review of Plaintiff’s complaint and
testimony provided at the Spears hearing, Plaintiff’s allegations challenging the delay or
denial of his participation in the GRAD program and other rehabilitation education fail to
suggest he was exposed to imminent danger of serious injury at the time he submitted this
action on January 16, 2026.3
Because he has failed to allege he was in imminent danger of serious physical harm
at the time he filed this lawsuit, Plaintiff should be barred from proceeding IFP.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed
IFP (D.E. 3) be DENIED, that his complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice, that his
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (D.E. 2) be DENIED as moot, and that the Clerk of
Court be INSTRUCTED to send notice of this dismissal to the Manager of the Three
Strikes List for the Southern District of Texas at Three_Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.
2 Moreover, the undersigned has entered a Memorandum and Recommendation in Snellings II, recommending that
Plaintiff’s second action be dismissed without prejudice as barred by the three-strikes rule because his allegations have
failed to establish the imminent danger exception.
3 Under the prison mailbox rule, an inmate’s pleading is deemed filed on the date the pro se inmate submits his
pleading to prison authorities for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). Plaintiff’s original
complaint was signed and dated January 16, 2026. (D.E. 1, p. 5). The undersigned will assume that he deposited the
complaint with McConnell Unit prison authorities for mailing on the same day. Thus, the undersigned deems the
original complaint (D.E. 1) to have been filed on January 16, 2026.
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Respectfully submitted on March 5, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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