Otero v. City of Rockport et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
MATTHEW OTERO,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00246
CITY OF ROCKPORT, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
In September 2025, Plaintiff Matthew Otero (“Otero”), proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, filed this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the
City of Rockport, Texas (“the City”) and the Aransas County Navigation District (“the
Navigation District”). The City and the Navigation District have each filed motions to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that Plaintiff failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (D.E.s 17, 26). Plaintiff filed responses to
the motions to dismiss arguing that he has adequately pled constitutional violations. For
the reasons discussed further below, it is recommended that the City’s and the Navigation
District’s motions to dismiss (D.E.s 17, 26) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims against
them be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. It is further recommended that the Court
DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s related state law claims.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 26, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges the following in the complaint. (D.E. 1). On July 5, 2025, Plaintiff
drove a vehicle hauling a trailer onto the property of the Navigation District. (Id. at 2).
Plaintiff was initially granted permission to enter the property but was later stopped by a
Navigation District worker who told Plaintiff he needed to pay to enter. The Rockport
Police Department were called to the scene where they ultimately arrested Plaintiff. During
the arrest, Plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff was taken to a hospital and later detained for five
days before he was released. While detained at the Aransas County Detention Center
(“ACDC”), Plaintiff was denied his medications. (Id.). After his arrest, Plaintiff suffered
from shortness of breath and was diagnosed with a collapsed artery and heart blockage.
(Id. at 3). To date, no criminal charges have been pursued by the prosecutor’s office. (Id.).
Plaintiff raises claims against the City and the Navigation District pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §1983 for: (1) unlawful arrest; (2) unlawful detention; (3) excessive force;
(4) malicious prosecution; and (5) denial of medical care. Plaintiff also asserts state
common law claims of: (1) false imprisonment; (2) wrongful detention; (3) assault;
(4) battery; (5) malicious prosecution; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and
(7) negligent failure to provide adequate medical care. Plaintiff seeks compensatory
damages of $2,500,000, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs, pre- and post-
judgment interest, and out of pocket expenses to include medical expenses. (Id. at 6).
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS
a. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of an action for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In determining whether to grant a
motion to dismiss, the court must not go outside the pleadings and must accept all well-
pleaded facts as true, looking at them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scanlan
v. Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003).
A pleading must include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief and giving the defendant fair notice of what the claim is. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, but the
plaintiff must nonetheless provide more than merely labels and conclusions, and a
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. The factual
allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true, even if unlikely, but the allegations
must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. A claim has facial plausibility where the factual
allegations allow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Facts that are merely
consistent with a defendant’s liability are insufficient. Id.
In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that Plaintiff proceeds
pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction and,
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“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Even under this lenient standard, a pro se plaintiff must allege more
than “‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the factual
allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid
legal theory. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; McCormick v. Stadler, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th
Cir. 1997).
b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, under color of law,
causes another to be deprived of a federally protected constitutional right. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any state ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
Id. Section 1983 exists to prevent a government official’s “[m]isuse of power, possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the [official] is clothed with the
authority of state law.” Johnston v. Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254, 1257 (5th Cir. 1986); Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (Eighth Amendment); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344
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(1986) (Fourteenth Amendment); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (Fourteenth
Amendment). However, § 1983 does not grant a cause of action for every state official’s
action. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
Plaintiff must make two allegations to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “First,
the Plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he
must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or
territorial law.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Manax v. McNamara, 842
F.2d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 1988).
III. DISCUSSION
a. Municipal Liability
In the motions to dismiss, the City and the Navigation District first argue that
Plaintiff has not adequately alleged facts that could give rise to municipal liability against
the City nor the Navigation District. (D.E. 17 at 5-6; D.E. 26 at 5-7). They argue that:
(1) the City and the Navigation District cannot be sued for injuries inflicted solely by their
employees under Monell; (2) Plaintiff fails to plead a viable denial of medical care claim;
(3) Plaintiff’s claims or damages for reputational and medical harm do not exist; and (4) the
City and the Navigation District have not waived their immunity regarding Plaintiff’s state
law claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act. (Id.).
Plaintiff responds that he has adequately alleged municipal liability because he has
identified municipal policies/customs, alleged municipal causation, and alleged deliberate
indifference. (D.E.s 20 & 30). Plaintiff further argues that his claims fall within the Texas
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Tort Claim Act’s waiver provisions because he alleged intentional torts. Id. Defendants
replied reiterating the same arguments previously presented. (D.E.s 23 & 31).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Under § 1983, a municipality cannot be held liable solely under a
theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978). Instead, a municipality may only be held liable if the violation of rights
was “pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature.” Id. It is only “when execution
of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. Id. at 694. The Navigation District is
a political subdivision of the State of Texas under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas
Constitution and Chapters 60 and 62 of the Texas Water Code. A political subdivision of
the State of Texas is considered a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983 and is
treated as a municipality for the purposes of Section 1983 liability under Monell. Appling
Cnty. v. Mun. Elec. Auth. of Georgia, 621 F.2d 1301, 1308 (5th Cir. 1980).
“Proof of municipal liability sufficient to satisfy Monell requires: (1) an official
policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive
knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or
custom).” Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). A policy or custom
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may be either an officially adopted rule or a “persistent, widespread practice of city
officials or employees which, although not authorized by officially adopted and
promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly
represents municipal policy.” Id.
If relying on an unofficial policy or custom, a plaintiff must show actual or
constructive knowledge by the municipality’s governing body or an official with policy-
making authority. Id. To establish a pattern, a plaintiff must show “sufficiently numerous
prior incidents” of the specific constitutional violation at issue. Peterson v. City of Fort
Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009). “[P]lausibly to plead a practice ‘so
persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law,’ a plaintiff must do more
than describe the incident that gave rise to his injury.” Pena v. City of Rio Grande City,
879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted).
A “city can be liable under § 1983 for inadequate training of its employees,” but the
failure to train must amount “to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom
the police come into contact.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
A single officer’s inadequate training does not alone subject a municipality to liability. Id.
at 390-91. To establish a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must plead facts plausibly
establishing “(1) that the municipality’s training procedures were inadequate, (2) that the
municipality was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy, and (3) that the
inadequate training policy directly caused the violations in question.” Zarnow v. City of
Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2010). “[A] plaintiff must allege with specificity
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how a particular training program is defective.” Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d
287, 293 (5th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff’s complaint specifically alleges that:
10. “Upon arrival, a Rockport police officer violently threw Plaintiff to the
ground without justification, causing significant injury, and placed him
under arrest.”
12. “Plaintiff was ultimately transported to a hospital, where the officer’s
own report noted that Plaintiff had been ‘slammed very hard.’”
13. “Plaintiff was detained for five days before release. During detention,
Plaintiff was denied access to his prescribed medications.”
18. “Following the July 5, 2025 takedown by the Rockport police officer,
Plaintiff began experiencing shortness of breath within a week.”
20. Plaintiff’s collapsed artery and heart blockage conditions did not exist
prior to his arrest.
(D.E. 1 at 2-3).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not adequately allege a violation of rights that was
pursuant to a City policy or custom, nor has he adequately alleged a failure to train, and he
accordingly has not stated a claim for municipal liability for either the City or the
Navigation District. First, as to a custom or policy, Plaintiff has not alleged any custom or
policy of the City or the Navigation District that led to the alleged deprivation of rights.
(See generally D.E. 1). Instead, without identifying any policy or custom, Plaintiff
summarily states that “this conducted violated Plaintiff’s clearly established rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 3. To establish a custom, a “plaintiff must
demonstrate ‘at least a pattern of similar incidents.’ “ DeLeon v. Nueces Cnty., Texas, No.
2:21-CV-00143, 2022 WL 18232727, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2022), aff’d sub nom.
DeLeon v. Nueces Cnty., No. 23-40004, 2023 WL 4447023 (5th Cir. July 11, 2023); Snyder
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v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d 552,
554–55 (5th Cir. 1989)). Isolated examples of constitutional violations do not indicate a
pattern. See Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009); see also
Pineda, 291 F.3d at 329. Here, Plaintiff describes his arrest in depth; however, this one
example does not plausibly demonstrate “at least a pattern of similar incidents.” Snyder,
142 F.3d at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted). Imposing municipal liability for a
single incident is rare and only occurs if the municipality’s “official policy” commands an
officer to act in a way that creates a constitutional violation. See Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 470 (1986). No official policy is alleged here. In short, Plaintiff
has not alleged the first requirement to establish municipal liability under Monell. See
Pineda, 291 F.3d at 328 (listing the requirements).
As to Plaintiff’s failure-to-train claim, the complaint does not include any specific
allegations regarding how any City training program was defective. Roberts, 397 F.3d at
293. A failure to train or supervise claim requires three elements: (1) the [officer] “failed
to train or supervise the officers involved; (2) a causal connection between the alleged
failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the
failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001).
Deliberate indifference usually requires “a pattern of similar incidents” and a “‘narrow’
single incident exception has [only] applied when the court finds a complete failure to train,
not just a failure to train in ‘one limited area.’” Peterson, 588 F.3d at 849 (quoting Est. of
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Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richmond Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Here, Plaintiff does not plead any similar or specific instances of failure to train or
supervise and does not identify training procedures. Other than a blanket statement that
the Defendants “negligently failed to train and supervise its employees, creating conflicting
directives that led to Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest,” Plaintiff does not demonstrate a causal
connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the violation of Plaintiff’s
rights. (See D.E. 1 at 5). Similarly, Plaintiff has not alleged a “pattern of similar incidents”
or a “complete failure to train” showing that the City or the Navigation District were
deliberately indifferent. Other than plainly alleging that the Defendants failed to properly
train police officers, Plaintiff has also not alleged that the Defendants were deliberately
indifferent in adopting training policies or that the inadequate training directly caused the
alleged violations. Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 170. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged, at most, one
of the three requirements of a failure-to-train claim.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the City’s and Navigation District’s motions to
dismiss be granted and Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
b. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Along with his §1983 claims, Plaintiff asserts related state law claims under Texas
common law and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. (D.E. 1). A district court
is authorized to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to the
claims that provide the district court with original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
However, that same statute provides that, if the district court dismisses the claims upon
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which federal jurisdiction was originally based, especially at the onset of a proceeding, it
is prudent to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims and to
dismiss those claims without prejudice. Id. § 1367(c); Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641
F.3d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 2011). See also LaPorte Construc. v. Bayshore Nat’l Bank, 805
F.2d 1254, 1257 (5th Cir. 1986) (when district court dismisses federal claims at a
preliminary stage of litigation, judicial economy argues against exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims); Toney v. Owens, No. A-12-CA-313-LY, 2014 WL 358401,
at *15 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2014) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s related “state law claim under the Texas separation of powers doctrine and due
process clause of the Texas Constitution” after the Court “dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction”).
Because Plaintiff’s §1983 claims against the defendants are subject to dismissal, the
undersigned recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s related state law claims.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that the City’s and the
Navigation District’s motions to dismiss (D.E.s 17, 26) be GRANTED and that the Court
DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s related state law claims.
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Respectfully submitted on February 26, 2026.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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