Mitchell v. Warden Luna, et al.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
WILLIAM MITCHELL,
Petitioner,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00181
WARDEN LUNA, ET AL.,
Respondent.
ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Respondent’s motion for summary judgment. D.E. 20. On April
2, 2026, United States Magistrate Judge Mitchel Neurock issued his Memorandum and
Recommendation (M&R), recommending that the Court grant the motion, deny Petitioner
William Mitchell’s habeas corpus petition, and dismiss this action. D.E. 29. The parties
were provided proper notice of, and opportunity to object to, the Magistrate Judge’s M&R.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Petitioner timely filed his objections with the
Court.1 D.E. 33.
1 Parties usually have fourteen days to file objections to an M&R. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
However, the M&R was served on Petitioner by mail, so Petitioner had an additional three days to object. See Rangel
v. ASLM II, No. EP-24-CV-00436-DCG, 2025 WL 2731841, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2025) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(d)). Additionally, under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s objections to an M&R are “deemed filed and
served at the moment they are forwarded to prison officials for delivery to the district court.” See Thompson v.
Rasberry, 993 F.2d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying the prison mailbox rule to filing objections to an M&R). The
envelope containing Petitioner’s objections was postmarked on April 17, 2026. The objections are thus deemed timely
filed within seventeen days from the day the M&R was mailed to Petitioner. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C); D.E. 33.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 12, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court must review de novo any portion of a magistrate judge’s proposed
findings and recommendations on dispositive matters to which the parties have filed
specific, written objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections must point out with sufficient
particularity any alleged error in the magistrate judge’s analysis; otherwise, they do not
constitute proper objections and will not be considered. Id. After considering proper
objections, the district court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, those
portions of the proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). As to any
portion for which no objection is filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous factual
findings and conclusions of law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir.
1989) (per curiam).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner raises five objections. First, Petitioner repeats his previous argument that
the Disciplinary Hearing Officer improperly sanctioned him by using the wrong sanction.
D.E. 33, p. 1. He points to BOP Policy 5270.09,2 an excerpt of which he attached to his
objections. Id. at pp. 4-8. He claims that Sanction B, under 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, is not
permitted for an inmate sentenced on or after November 1, 1987. BOP Policy 5270.09
states:
Sanction B does not apply to inmates committed under the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act for crimes committed on or after November 1, 1987, and
2 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Policy No. 5270.09, Inmate Discipline Program, incorporating
Change Notice 1 (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5270_009_cn_1.pdf (“BOP Policy 5270.09”).
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prior to passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 (September 23, 1994). For those inmates, the applicable sanction is B.1.
BOP Policy 5270.2, p. 14.
The Magistrate Judge correctly explained that Petitioner misinterprets this
paragraph. D.E. 29, p. 14. This paragraph sets out a range of dates of criminal conduct—
from November 1, 1987, to September 23, 1994—for which Sanction B does not apply.
Because Petitioner’s criminal conduct occurred in 2016—well outside of that range—
Sanction B does apply to him, and the forfeiture of 283 days was proper. Accordingly,
Petitioner’s first objection is OVERRULED.
Second, Petitioner objects to the “magistrate litigating for government” and that the
Magistrate Judge did not permit Respondent to file a reply. D.E. 33, p. 1. It is unclear what
Petitioner means in this objection. The Magistrate Judge followed the proper procedure for
dispositive matters under Rule 72. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). And Respondent did not attempt
to file a reply. The objection is OVERRULED because it fails to point out a specific error
in the M&R and its apparent complaint is not supported by the record.
Third, Petitioner objects that the Magistrate Judge should not be allowed to issue a
memorandum and recommendation without reading and understanding Petitioner’s
argument. Id. at p. 2. This objection likewise fails to point out a specific error in the
Magistrate Judge’s analysis. Moreover, it is evident from the Court’s review of the M&R
that the Magistrate Judge fully comprehended Petitioner’s argument and rejected it, as
explained above. Therefore, the objection is OVERRULED.
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Fourth, Petitioner again objects that his sanction was improper because he was
sentenced after November 1, 1987, as a “new law” prisoner. This objection is redundant
with Petitioner’s first objection and, for the same reasons, is OVERRULED.
Fifth and finally, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to
deny leave to amend. He argues that he would be able to more clearly set forth his claims
through amendment. However, Petitioner has failed to point out any alleged error in the
Magistrate Judge’s analysis in which he found that Petitioner’s proposed amendment
pursuing the same claims would be futile. And Petitioner’s request for leave to amend—
without explaining other specific amendments sought—fails to state a proper objection.
See United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387
(5th Cir. 2003). The objection is therefore OVERRULED.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set
forth in the Magistrate Judge’s M&R, as well as Petitioner’s objections and all other
relevant documents in the record, and having made a de novo review of the portions of the
Magistrate Judge’s M&R to which objections were specifically directed, the Court
OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and
conclusions of the Magistrate Judge (D.E. 29). The Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion
for summary judgment (D.E. 20). Further, Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
and his construed motion for leave to amend are both DENIED, and all other pending
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motions in this action are TERMINATED as moot. This action is therefore DISMISSED
with prejudice.
ORDERED on June 12, 2026.
_______________________________
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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