Mitchell v. Warden Luna, et al.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
WILLIAM MITCHELL, §
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 2:25-CV-00181
WARDEN LUNA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner William Mitchell is a federal inmate who was formerly incarcerated in this
district at the Federal Correctional Institution – Three Rivers. While at Three Rivers, appearing
pro se, he filed this habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner has paid
the filing fee. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends1 that the district
court GRANT Respondent’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 20), DENY Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and his construed motion for leave to amend, and DISMISS
Petitioner’s action.
A. Proceedings.
Petitioner is a federal prisoner confined within this district, at Federal Correctional
Institution (FCI) Three Rivers. (Doc. No. 1, p. 2.) He filed this action,2 arguing that he was
wrongly stripped of good conduct time and First Step Act credit without due process, in
absentia. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 2, 6.) He asks the Court to “have both 365 [good conduct time] and
1 This case has been referred to the undersigned for case management and recommendations on dispositive matters.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636.
2 Petitioner filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. That court
transferred the case here. (Doc. Nos. 1, 3, 4.)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 02, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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365 days [First Step Act earned time credit] added back to his release date, which should release
him immediately.” Id. at 7.
The Court ordered a response. (Doc. No. 8.) Respondent answered and moved for
summary judgment, contending that Petitioner was afforded all process due. (Doc. No. 20.)
Respondent also submitted evidence, to which Petitioner has not objected. (Doc. No. 20-1.)
Petitioner replied to Respondent’s motion for summary judgment, and also submitted
evidence, to which Respondent has not objected. (Doc. Nos. 26, 26-1.) In his reply, Petitioner
argues that his forfeiture of time credit was beyond the permitted maximum. (Doc. No. 26, pp.
4-10.) Petitioner thereafter submitted an amended petition, which the Court construes as a
motion for leave to file an amended petition. (Doc. No. 27.)
B. Background.
Petitioner was ordered into the custody of the Bureau of Prisons in 2016 after pleading
guilty to bank robbery and interference of commerce by robbery. See United States v. Mitchell,
No. 2:14-cr-339, Doc. No. 45 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 2016). Among other punishments,
Petitioner was sentenced to 127 months’ confinement, to be followed by three years of
supervised release. See id., Doc. Nos. 44 (sentencing hearing minute entry), 46.
The undisputed summary judgment evidence indicates that Petitioner was subsequently
placed at a Seattle halfway house, called a Residential Reentry Center, or “RRC.” When he was
first assigned to the RRC, Petitioner signed a document called “Escape/Abscond Consequences.”
In it, he acknowledged that RRC staff would place him on escape status if he failed to “return to
the RRC at the time designated on the Authorized Absence or Employment Seeking form.”
(Doc. No. 20-1, p. 13.)
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On July 10, 2022, Petitioner failed to return from work to the RRC when required, and
was placed into escape status. (Doc. No. 20-1, p. 2 ¶ 3; id. at 8.) Two days later, while
Petitioner was still in escape status, the RRC’s Center Discipline Committee held a hearing
against Petitioner in absentia. Id. at 3-4 ¶ 4; id. at 9-10; id. at 19 (hearing notice); id. at 21-22
(notification of procedural rights). The committee concluded that Petitioner had committed the
prohibited act of escape (a violation of code number 102), id. at 9-10, and recommended that he
lose good conduct time at the discretion of the Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO). Id. at 16.
On August 11, 2022, the DHO imposed the following sanction:
Disallow 41 days good conduct time
1 year removal from RRC
Forfeit 283 days non vested good conduct time
(Doc. No. 20-1, p. 16.) The DHO specified that an in-person hearing would be required once
Petitioner returned to custody. Id.
Petitioner was eventually captured and returned to custody. Because the original hearing
had been conducted in absentia, Petitioner was then afforded an in-person disciplinary hearing
with a resubmitted incident report. (Doc. No. 20-1, p. 4 ¶ 5; id. at 24-26.)3 Petitioner was given
a notice of discipline hearing before the DHO; he signed that notice and stated that he wished to
have the services of a “Dr. James” as a staff representative, and also that he desired to have
witnesses. Id. at 35. Petitioner was provided with a document outlining his rights at the
disciplinary hearing, which included: the right to have a written copy of the charge against him at
least 24 hours prior to the hearing; the right to have a reasonably available full-time member of
the staff to represent him; the right to call witnesses and present evidence; the right to present a
3 The in-person disciplinary hearing was suspended for a time, to allow Petitioner’s criminal prosecution for escape.
See Doc. No. 20-1, pp. 30-33 (criminal judgment). Petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced in January 2025 to
five months’ imprisonment. Id. at 30.
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statement (or to remain silent); the right to be present throughout the hearing; the right to be
advised of the DHO’s decision, the facts support that decision, and the DHO’s written
disposition; and the right to appeal. Id. at 38. Petitioner signed his acknowledgement that he had
been advised of those rights. Id.
At the hearing, Petitioner was again advised of his rights. (Doc. No. 20-1, p. 40.) As he
requested, Dr. James was present to represent him. Id. Petitioner admitted the charge of escape
and gave a statement in mitigation. Id. He waived the right to have any witnesses testify or to
present documentary evidence. Id. at 41. The DHO ruled that Petitioner had committed the
prohibited act of escape (code 102). Id. at 42. Given the opportunity make a statement,
Petitioner told the DHO:
There was an issue on sanctions used. I was sanctioned improperly. They took
both the good conduct time and the non-vested time, but it should have been just
the good conduct time per the program statement. For the incident, I wasn’t in the
right place. My mom had passed away. I was living in Seattle and nothing was
happening. No one ever came to get me. I figured everything was cleared.
Id. at 42-43.
As sanction for the prohibited act, Petitioner forfeited 283 days of non-vested good
conduct time, and 41 days of good conduct time were disallowed. (Doc. No. 20, p. 6 ¶ 7; Doc.
No. 20-1, p. 43.) The uncontradicted record indicates that Petitioner was not sanctioned with the
loss of First Step Act time credits. (Doc. No. 20, p. 6 ¶ 7.) The DHO’s report set forth the
sanctions and contained the reasoning for the sanction chosen. Id. The DHO’s report and
decision were delivered to Petitioner. Id. at 44.
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C. Respondent’s summary judgment motion, Petitioner’s response, and Petitioner’s
motion to amend.
1. Respondent’s summary judgment motion.
Seeking summary judgment, Respondent argues that Petitioner fails to demonstrate a due
process violation. (Doc. No. 20, pp. 9-15.) Respondent contends that Petitioner was given
written notice prior to the in-person hearing (id. at 10-11), that he was present at the hearing, had
a staff representative, had an opportunity to call witnesses, and was permitted to make a
statement (id. at 11-12), and that he was given a copy of the DHO report that provided the
evidence relied upon and the reason for the disciplinary action (id. at 12-13). Further,
Respondent says, the evidentiary standard for the disciplinary action was satisfied (id. at 13-15)
and the sanction was appropriate (id. at 15).
In support of summary judgment, Respondent has submitted the following evidence:
• Declaration of Michael Padgett, the DHO (Doc. No. 20-1, pp. 2-6).
• The following attachments to DHO Padgett’s declaration:
o Incident Report Number 3661449; Escape Flyer; Escape/Abscond Agreement (id.
at 8-13);
o Center Discipline Committee Report; CDC Checklist (id. at 15-17);
o Notice of Center Disciplinary Committee Hearing (id. at 19);
o Inmate Rights at Center Disciplinary Committee Hearing (id. at 21-22);
o Incident Report 3661449 January 2025 Copy Issuance (id. at 24-26);
o Advisement of Delay (id. at 28);
o Judgment and Commitment Order (id. at 30-33);
o Notice of Hearing Before the Discipline Hearing Officer (id. at 35-36);
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o Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing (id. at 38); and
o Discipline Hearing Officer Report (id. at 40-44).
Petitioner has not objected to any of Respondent’s summary judgment evidence.
2. Petitioner’s response.
Petitioner replied to the summary judgment motion. (Doc. No. 26.) His opposition is
aimed not at the conduct of the hearing itself, but instead with the sanction imposed, which he
contends is impermissibly severe. Liberally construing his argument, Petitioner contends that
there is a genuine dispute of material fact, in that the DHO allegedly used the wrong sanction.
Id. at 2. Petitioner asserts that the most severe sanction available for a code 102 violation is the
“loss of 41 days.” Id. at 3; see also id. at 4-5. According to Petitioner, the DHO wrongly
imposed two types of sanctions that could not be imposed together. Id. at 8. This, he says,
violates the Fifth Amendment and the Bureau of Prisons’ inmate discipline regulation, 28 C.F.R.
Part 541. Id. Petitioner does not appear to contest Respondent’s position on the observance of
Petitioner’s due process rights with regard to the conduct of the hearing itself.
Petitioner has submitted the following summary judgment evidence:
• An excerpt from Respondent’s summary judgment motion describing the available
sanctions for a Code 102 violation (Doc. No. 26-1, p. 1);
• An excerpt from 28 C.F.R. § 541.4, which Petitioner states is reprinted from Bureau of
Prisons Policy 5270.09 (id. at 2);
• An excerpt from the list of available sanctions, apparently again drawn from Bureau of
Prisons Policy 5270.09 (id. at 3);
• An excerpt, apparently also drawn from Bureau of Prisons Policy 5270.09, addressing
available sanctions for inmates who commit the prohibited act of escape (id. at 4-5);
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• An extract from the Code of Federal Regulations’ table of prohibited acts and available
sanctions (28 C.F.R. § 541.3, Table 1) (id. at 7-9);
• A reprinted version of that same Table 1 (id. at 11-26); and
• A copy of 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (id. at 28).
Respondent has not objected to any of Petitioner’s summary judgment evidence.
3. Petitioner’s construed motion to amend.
On the same day that he filed his answer to Respondent’s summary judgment motion,
Petitioner separately filed an amended petition, along with a memorandum of law. (Doc. Nos.
24, 27.) Petitioner seeks to incorporate his original petition by reference. See Doc. No. 24, p. 7.
Because a responsive pleading had already been filed in this case, the Court construes
Petitioner’s filing as a motion for leave to amend. That construed motion is discussed in greater
detail later.
D. Law and analysis.
1. Jurisdiction.
Petitioner filed this action while confined at Three Rivers, but was subsequently
transferred to a prison in another district. See Doc. Nos. 1, 18. The Court retains jurisdiction to
consider Petitioner’s claim, even though he has been transferred out of this district. See Williams
v. Blackmon, No. 3:16-CV-279, 2018 WL 813364, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 9, 2018) (citing
Griffin v. Ebbert, 751 F.3d 288, 290 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Jurisdiction [under § 2241] attached on
that initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it was not destroyed by the transfer of petitioner
and accompanying custodial change.”)).
An action under section 2241 is the appropriate means by which a federal prisoner
challenges the computation of his or her sentence or the manner in which it is being carried out.
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See Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000). This includes actions like this one,
challenging revocation of time credits. See Brian R. Means, Federal Habeas Manual: A Practical
Guide to Federal Habeas Corpus Litigation § 1:29 (2025 ed.) (“All courts agree that § 2241 is an
appropriate vehicle to challenge government action that inevitably affects the duration of the
petitioner’s custody, such as challenges to administrative orders revoking good time credits
….”).
2. Summary judgment.
“Summary judgment is proper when the record shows that there is ‘no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Wood v.
Warden FCI Three Rivers, No. 2:25-CV-00096, 2025 WL 3130269, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 2,
2025) (Hampton, M.J.), adopted, 2025 WL 3127731 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2025) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a)). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those
portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
(citing Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up)).
A genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The Court must examine “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. If the
nonmovant fails to sufficiently raise a genuine factual issue essential to his case and on which he
bears the burden of proof at trial, and if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, then
summary judgment must be granted. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Caboni v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2002). “If reasonable minds could
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differ as to the import of the evidence ... a verdict should not be directed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
250-51.
Courts view any disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and this general rule “applies with equal force in the context of
habeas corpus cases.” Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2000). But the nonmoving
party must point to record evidence that supports a conclusion that a genuine issue of material
fact exists, and may not simply rely on allegations in pleadings or unsubstantiated assertions.
See Wood, 2025 WL 3130269, at *3 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
3. Due process.
Petitioner’s challenge is to the revocation of his accumulated good time credits. Because
he has a liberty interest in those credits, their revocation must comply with minimal requirements
of due process. See Kapordelis v. Myers, 16 F.4th 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1985); Henson v. Bureau of
Prisons, 213 F.3d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 2000); Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir.
1997)).
a. Conduct of the proceeding: Wolff factors.
When a prisoner faces a loss of a protected liberty interest through a disciplinary hearing,
he or she is entitled to the due process protections set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974). See Dennis v. Edge, No. EP-25-CV-463, 2026 WL 826619, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25,
2026). For such a proceeding to comply with Wolff’s protections, it must afford the prisoner
advance written notice of the disciplinary charges, an opportunity to present evidence in his or
her defense, and a written statement by the factfinder regarding the evidence relied upon and the
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reasons for the disciplinary action. See id. (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-
67). The prisoner “must be presented with ‘some facts’ or a ‘modicum of evidence’ which
supports the disciplinary action.” Id. (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-55).
In this case, Petitioner claims to have had his credits revoked in absentia (Doc. No. 1, p.
6), but the undisputed summary judgment evidence reflects that after he was brought back into
custody the disciplinary hearing was re-held. Petitioner received notice of the subsequent
hearing and that he had been advised of his rights under Wolff. (Doc. No. 20-1, pp. 35, 38.)
Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to appear in person before the hearing officer, have the
assistance of a second person on hand, call witnesses, and present documentary evidence. Id. at
40-41. He requested and was provided assistance at the hearing. Id. at 35, 40. The DHO
prepared a written report and concluded that there was some evidence that Petitioner committed
the prohibited act (escape) alleged in the notice of hearing. Id. at 42. Petitioner has presented no
evidence showing that his due process rights were violated by the manner in which the
disciplinary hearing was organized or conducted, and summary judgment for Respondent on that
basis is appropriate.
b. Legality of the sanction imposed.
Summary judgment is also appropriate with regard to the propriety of the sanction
Petitioner received. At the DHO hearing, Petitioner stated:
There was an issue on sanctions used. I was sanctioned improperly. They took
both the good conduct time and the non-vested time, but it should have been just
the good conduct time per the program statement.
(Doc. No. 20-1, pp. 42-43.) In this action, Petitioner alleges that he lost 365 days of good time
credit for his escape violation, “which could have only resulted in the loss of 41 days for the
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single violation.” (Doc. No. 1, p. 6.) He also alleges that he lost “vested” good conduct time.
Id.
The summary judgment evidence, to which Petitioner has not objected, shows that he was
sanctioned only with the forfeiture of 283 days of non-vested good conduct time and the
disallowance of 41 days of vested good conduct time. (Doc. No. 20-1, p. 43.) Petitioner did not
suffer any forfeiture of First Step Act good conduct time. Id. at 6, 43. Petitioner does not
challenge the portion of the sanction involving the 41-day disallowance, see Doc. No. 1, p. 6, so
his challenge appears to focus only on the 283-day forfeiture of non-vested good conduct time.
Seeking summary judgment, Respondent points to the Bureau of Prison’s policy, which
provides for sanctions against inmates who commit prohibited acts. (Doc. No. 20, p. 15 (citing
United States Dep’t of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Policy No. 5270.09, Inmate Discipline
Program, incorporating Change Notice 1,
https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5270_009_cn_1.pdf (Nov. 18, 2020) (last visited Apr. 1,
2026) (“BOP Policy 5270.09”).) Petitioner was found to have committed a violation of Code
102, Escape, a violation which is classified at the “Greatest Severity Level.” See Doc. No. 20-1,
p. 43; 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, Table 1, Code 102. Sections 541.4(a)(2) and 541.4(b)(1) provide that
inmates (like Petitioner) whose criminal convictions occurred after April 26, 1996 who commit
prohibited acts “will lose good conduct sentence credit as a mandatory disciplinary sanction.” In
the case of violations of the Greatest Severity Level, an inmate “will lose at least 41 days, or
75% of available credit if less than 54 days are available for the prorated period, for each act
committed.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.4(b)(1).
In addition to this mandatory sanction, DHOs are also authorized to impose additional
sanctions for violations classified at the Greatest Severity Level. See BOP Policy 5270.09, p. 10
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(DHO “imposes one or more of sanctions A through E. … The DHO may impose any available
sanctions (A through M) in addition to sanctions A through E.”). As relevant here, these
additional available sanctions include:
A. Recommend parole date rescission or retardation.
B. Forfeit and/or withhold statutory good time or non-vested good conduct time
(up to 100%) and/or terminate or disallow extra good time (an extra good time or
good conduct time sanction may not be suspended).
B.1. Disallow ordinarily between 50% and 75% (27-41 days) of good conduct
time credit available for a year (a good conduct time sanction may not be
suspended).
B.2. Forfeit up to 41 days of earned First Step Act (FSA) time credits (see 28
C.F.R. Part 523, subpart E), for each prohibited act committed.
28 C.F.R. § 541, Table 1.
In this case, Petitioner first received the minimum mandatory disciplinary sanction – the
disallowance of 41 days of good conduct time as mandated by 28 C.F.R. § 541.4(b)(1).
Petitioner also received the additional authorized sanction of forfeiture of 283 days of non-vested
good conduct time. This sanction was authorized because Table 1 authorizes, as “Sanction B,”
such forfeitures of “non-vested good conduct time (up to 100%).” 28 C.F.R. § 541, Table 1.
Petitioner does not contend that his conduct of escape did not constitute a violation of Code 102,
and each sanction he received was authorized by Table 1 and § 541.4(b)(1). Cf. Frederickson v.
Warden, FCI Seagoville, No. 4:25-cv-1051, 2026 WL 360272, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2026)
(greatest severity finding mandated disallowance of at least 41 days of good conduct time, and
DHO was authorized to impose additional sanctions including forfeiture of up to 100 percent of
nonvested good conduct time); Garcia v. Warden, FCI Danbury, No. 3:25-cv-387, 2025 WL
1927909, at *5 (D. Conn. July 14, 2025) (inmates receive mandatory disciplinary sanctions
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under § 541.4 in addition to available sanctions listed in § 541.3). Because the procedural
requirements also were observed, as discussed above, Respondent is entitled to summary
judgment.
Petitioner voices several protests in his summary judgment response. First, citing BOP
Policy 5270.09, he contends that “any violation of a Greatest Severity Level prohibited act, like
petitioner’s violation of 102 escape can only [be] sanctioned by only a loss of 41 days.” (Doc.
No. 26, p. 3 (citing Doc. No. 26-1, p. 2).) This is incorrect. A loss of at least 41 days’ credit is
the mandatory disciplinary sanction, but the other sanctions outlined in Table 1 remain available
to DHOs. See BOP Policy 5270.09, p. 12 (describing mandatory sanction of at least 41 days); id.
at 10 (directing DHOs to impose one or more of Sanctions A through E); Frederickson, 2026
WL 360272, at *2 (greatest severity finding mandated disallowance of at least 41 days of good
conduct time, and DHO was authorized to impose additional sanctions including forfeiture of up
to 100 percent of nonvested good conduct time).
Petitioner next argues that Sanction B in Table 1’s list of additional available sanctions
does not apply to him, because that sanction is reserved for what he terms “‘old law’ prisoners,
that committed their crimes before the Sentencing Reform Act provisions of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act (November 1, 1987).” (Doc. No. 26, pp. 4, 5.) The reason for this, he says, is
because the list of available sanctions in Table 1 begins with a reference to rescission or
retardation of an inmate’s parole date, so Sanction B logically must also be reserved only for
those so-called “old law prisoners.” See id. at 4-5; Doc. No. 26-1, pp. 2-3. He also points to
discussion in BOP Policy 5270.09 addressing the old “statutory good time available for
forfeiture” as further evidence that Sanction B was not available to the DHO at Petitioner’s
hearing. (Doc. No. 26, p. 5 (citing Doc. No. 26-1, p. 3).)
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Petitioner’s interpretation of the list of available sanctions is incorrect. Nowhere in Table
1 or BOP Policy 5270.09 is there any statement that Sanction B is reserved for “old law
prisoners,” and Petitioner points to no authority indicating that Sanction B was intended to apply
only to people who committed their crimes before November 1, 1987. In fact, BOP Policy
5270.09 states that Sanction B is not intended for use only when the inmate committed his or her
offense on or after November 1, 1987 but before September 23, 1994. BOP Policy 5270.09, p.
14. If the intent was for Sanction B not to be applicable to Petitioner, who was convicted of his
offense in 2016, the policy could reasonably be expected to have stated as much. And BOP
Policy 5270.09’s reference to statutory good time credit bears no relation to Petitioner’s
situation, but instead merely guides DHOs faced with disciplinary proceedings against inmates
whose crimes occurred prior to more recent changes in the law: some of those inmates’ good
time credits are not available for forfeiture. It does not matter that the prior scheme for
accumulating statutory good time credit has been abolished, for the policy is providing guidance
only on how to apply sanctions to inmates who had accumulated some quantity of that credit
(which Petitioner did not).
Petitioner next argues that Respondent has conflated Sanction B with Sanction B.1 “in an
attempt to misdirect the court in believing that the petitioner was given the correct sanction.”
(Doc. No. 26, pp. 7-9 (citing Doc. No. 20, p. 15).) Respondent’s briefing could have been more
clearly written, but that the sanctions imposed by the DHO were properly available: there was a
mandatory sanction (under § 541.4, the disallowance of 41 days) and a discretionary sanction
(under Sanction B, the forfeiture of 283 days).
Petitioner asserts that there is a “conflict” between Sanction B.1 and BOP Policy
5270.09’s mandatory disciplinary sanction of at least 41 days. (Doc. No. 26, p. 9.) Not so.
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First, Petitioner did not receive Sanction B.1, so any conflict is irrelevant. In any event, section
541.4 merely overlays the discretionary sanctions contained in Table 1 (like Sanctions B and
B.1) in situations where, as here, an inmate committed his or her offense on or after April 26,
1996 and committed a prohibited act of the Greatest Severity Level. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.4(a),
(b)(1). In other circumstances, such as where an inmate’s offense occurred before September 13,
1994, the mandatory sanction does not apply. There is no conflict.
Finally, Petitioner argues that Respondent “attempts to juxtapose the non-vested language
of Sanction B with the not-vested language of statute 18 USC 3624 ….” (Doc. No. 26, p. 10.)
Section 3624(b)(2) of Title 18, United States Code, provides that notwithstanding any other law,
“credit awarded under this subsection [good conduct time] after the date of enactment of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act shall vest on the date the prisoner is released from custody.” It is
not clear what Petitioner is arguing here, but Respondent does not cite section 3624, nor does
Respondent contend that the DHO deprived Petitioner of any vested good conduct time.
Considering the parties’ briefing and the undisputed summary judgment evidence, the
sanctions imposed on Petitioner for his misconduct were authorized by virtue of Petitioner’s
misconduct and applicable law and regulations. Petitioner is entitled to no relief, and
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment.
4. Leave to amend: futile.
The Court has construed Petitioner’s amended petition and memorandum of law (Doc.
Nos. 24, 27) as a motion for leave to amend the petition. The district court should deny that
construed motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B) governs amendments to pleadings, and
provides that a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course, subject to specified
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deadlines. “If the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required,” the rule requires
that the amendment be filed not later than “21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21
days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Here,
Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 20, filed December 2, 2025.) Far
more than 21 days elapsed before Petitioner filed the amended petition. See Doc. No. 24, p. 9
(amended petition dated February 4, 2026); Doc. No. 24-2 (postmark on amended petition of
February 8, 2026)).
Leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2), but it need not be granted if amendment would be futile – for example, if an amended
claim would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted or would merely restate
issues already decided. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (futility of amendment is
adequate justification to refuse to grant leave to amend); see also Fischer v. Boncher, 743 F.
Supp. 3d 252, 256 (D. Mass. 2024) (denying leave to amend § 2241 petition based on futility);
Coronado v. Stinson, Civ. No. 17-1002, 2018 WL 5617548, at *4 (D.N.M. Oct. 30, 2018),
adopted, 2019 WL 494431 (D.N.M. Feb. 8, 2019) (finding futile a proposed amendment that
merely restated claim that was recommended for dismissal). Amendment has also been found to
be futile where the proposed amendment is contradicted by the documentary evidence. E.g.,
Thomas v. Sillivent, No. 4:25-cv-1207, 2026 WL 579573, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2026) (citing
Wilson v. Grest, Civ. No. 17-2997, 2017 WL 4998651, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 2, 2017)).
Petitioner’s proposed amendment redoubles his attack on the sanction he received, but he
simply restates the same allegations and arguments from his original petition and his response to
the summary judgment motion. In his new filing, Petitioner first contends that good conduct
time was taken from him in absentia, without due process. (Doc. No. 27, p. 3.) As discussed
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above, the summary judgment record shows that the disciplinary hearing process was re-
accomplished once Petitioner was returned to custody: he had an in-person hearing with all
appropriate due process rights observed. Petitioner next alleges that the DHO wrongly imposed
Sanction B, because Sanction B allegedly was available only for “old law prisoners.” (Doc. No.
24, pp. 6-7, 8; Doc. No. 27, pp. 4-8.) As also discussed above, Sanction B was available to the
DHO in sanctioning Petitioner.
Petitioner also asserts that the policy guidance regarding available sanctions is
unconstitutionally ambiguous because it does not sufficiently guide DHOs on which sanctions
are available, depending on whether they were sentenced under prior or current law. (Doc. No.
24, pp. 7, 8; Doc. No. 27, pp. 11-12.) Petitioner does not allege, however, that the policy
guidance regarding his own situation was ambiguous: as discussed above, Sanction B was clearly
available to the DHO based on Petitioner’s date of conviction. Amendment on this point would
fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Finally, Petitioner argues that his equal protection rights were violated because 82 days of
good conduct time were disallowed, whereas “other inmates only lose 41 days GCT for a 100
series code violation.” (Doc. No. 24, p. 8.) As discussed above, the undisputed summary
judgment evidence indicates, however, that Petitioner only had 41 days of good conduct time
disallowed, not 82 days. See Doc. No. 20-1, pp. 6, 43.
All of the contentions Petitioner seeks to raise in the proposed amended petition have
either been raised and determined meritless as part of his original petition, fail to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, or are contradicted by the undisputed summary judgment
evidence. Amendment would therefore be futile, so the district court should deny Petitioner’s
construed motion for leave to amend the petition.
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E. Conclusion and recommendations.
The district court should take the following actions:
• GRANT Respondent’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 20);
• DENY Petitioner’s motion for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 1);
• DENY as futile Petitioner’s construed motion for leave to amend his § 2241 action (Doc.
No. 24);
• TERMINATE all other pending motions as moot (see Doc. No. 25); and
• DISMISS this action with prejudice.
F. Notice.
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to each
party or counsel. Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the Memorandum and
Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the United States Magistrate
Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),
and General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
A failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation in
a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy
shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-
to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
SIGNED on April 2, 2026.
_____________________________
MITCHEL NEUROCK
United States Magistrate Judge
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