Davis v. Guerrero

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Case 2:25-cv-00068 Document 23 Filed 03/27/26in TXSD Page1lof4
United States District Court

Southem District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 27, 2026
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
JOHNNY LEE DAVIS, §
§
Petitioner, §
Vv. § CIVIL ACTION NO, 2:25-CV-00068

§
ERIC GUERRERO, §
§
Respondent. §

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby’s Memorandum and Recommendation
C@M&R”). (D.E. 21), The M&R recommends that the Court grant Respondent’s motion for
summary judgment, (D.E. 15), dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Habeas Corpus, (D.E. 1), and deny
Petitioner a certificate of appealability. (D.E. 21, p. 1, 13). Petitioner filed written objections. (D.E.
22). After review, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, (D.E. 22), and ADOPTS the
M&R in its entirety, (D.E. 21). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion for
summary judgment, (D.E. 15), and DISMISSES the petition, (D.E. 1).

i. Law

When a party objects to the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, the
district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). As
to any portion for which no objection is filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous factual
findings and conclusions of law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (Sth Cir. 1989) (per
curiam). A party must point out with particularity any alleged errors in the magistrate judge’s
analysis. Pelko v. Perales, No, 2:23-CV-00339, 2024 WL 1972896, at *1 (S.D, Tex. May 3, 2024)

(Ramos, J.). “Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district

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AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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court.” Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (Sth Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc) (overruled
on other grounds by Douglass v. United Servs, Auto, Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1416 (Sth Cir, 1996) (en
banc)) (superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)\(1)). When a party raises a new
argument in his objections that was not first presented to the magistrate judge, it is not properly
before the Court. United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 630 (Sth Cir. 1992). Moreover,
“[o]bjections that merely re-urge arguments contained in the original briefing are not proper and
wili not be considered.” Neisen v. Nueces Cnty., No. 2:24-CV-00088, 2025 WL 1111549, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2025) (Morales, J.) (citing Edmonds v. Collins, 8 F.3d 290, 293 n.7 (Sth Cir.
1993}).
HL. Analysis

Petitioner raises several arguments in his written objections to the M&R. (D.E. 22). The
Court construes Petitioner’s arguments as raising several distinct objections. The Court addresses
each in turn.!

First, Petitioner objects to the M&R’s statement that “Petitioner fails to identify any due
process violations and Petitioner is instead asking this Court to reconsider the parole board’s
decision to deny him release to mandatory supervision.” (D.E. 22, p. 1) (citing D.E. 21, p. 9).
Petitioner objects to this statement, arguing that “[t]here [are] genuine issues of disputed facts,”
and that Petitioner “can mount a due process challenge to the procedures used by the ‘Texas Parole
Board in considering whether to release him to mandatory supervision,” /d. (citation omitted).

Although Petitioner is correct that he is permitted to raise a due process challenge to the
parole board’s process, his objection misunderstands the M&R’s statement. The M&R was not

saying that Petitioner cannot raise a due process challenge; rather, the M&R concluded that

' As to any objection not explicitly discussed below, the Cour OVERRRULES it as lacking sufficient
particularity. Pelko, 2024 WL 1972896, at *1.

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Petitioner’s arguments were effectively challenging the parole board’s ultimate decision under the
guise of due process. (D.E. 21, p. 6-9). And, as the Court’s rulings on Petitioner’s later objections
reaffirm, the M&R did not err in this finding. The Court therefore OVERRULES Petitioner’s first
objection.

Second, Petitioner appears to object to the M&R on the grounds that the parole board failed
to sufficiently describe the basis of its decision denying Petitioner mandatory supervision. Jd. at 2.

This objection fails, As the M&R correctly found, the parole board gave Petitioner a timely notice
listing the reasons for his denial and stating the month and year Petitioner would next be considered
for release, (D.E. 21, p. 8-9); (D.E. 1-3, p. 10). That is sufficient to satisfy due process. Boss v.
Quarterman, 552 F.3d 425, 428-29 (Sth Cir. 2008) (explaining that due process does not require a
parole board to provide a summary of evidence on which it based its decision), The Court therefore
OVERRULES Petitioner’s second objection.

Third, Petitioner objects that the reasons for the parole board’s denial were “fabricated,
completely made-up, false excuses, that are arbitrary and capricious, used by the board, which
violates due process [Petitioner] is entitled to under the 14th [Amendment] due process clause.”
(D.E. 22, p. 3). He references exhibits which allegedly show that the parole board cannot assess
his dangerousness and that he was denied certain rehabilitative opportunities. /¢. He then argues
that his good time in prison “prov[es] Petitioner has been a law abiding citizen and his release will
not endanger the public.” /d. at 4.

Rather than pointing out a constitutional violation in the parole board’s process, these
arguments amount to a disagreement with the parole board’s ultimate decision. As the M&R
rightfully pointed out, (D.E. 21, p. 9), the parole board was not required to “specify the particular

‘evidence’ in the inmate’s file” which it used to deny mandatory supervision, Greenholtz v. Inmates

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of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979), and there is nothing in the record
to suggest that the parole board fabricated any evidence here, Furthermore, Petitioner’s references
to exhibits and his good time credits go to the underlying merits of the parole board’s decision, not
any potential due process violation. In short, the M&R correctly concluded that Petitioner
“received all the due process to which he was entitled.” (D.E. 21, p. 9) (citation omitted). The
Court therefore OVERRULES Petitioner’s third objection.
TIE. Conclusion

Having reviewed the proposed findings and conclusions of the M&R, the record, the
applicable law, and having made a de novo review of the portions of the M&R to which Petitioner’s
objections are directed, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)\(1)(C), the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s
objections, (D.E. 22), and ADOPTS the M&R in its entirety, (D.E. 21). The Court therefore
GRANTS Respondent’s motion for summary judgment, (D.E. 15), DISMISSES Petitioner’s
petition, (D.E. 1), and DENIES Petitioner a certificate of appealability. The Cont! will enter a final
judgment separately.

SO ORDERED.

DAVID-S>MORALES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Signed: Corpus Christi, Texas
March 2745026

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