English v. Christus Spohn Health System Corporation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
CRYSTAL M. ENGLISH,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00133
CHRISTUS SPOHN HEALTH SYSTEM
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Crystal M. English’s Motion for Reconsideration of
Partial Summary Judgment (D.E. 87). On March 24, 2026, United States Magistrate Judge
Jason B. Libby issued his Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R), recommending that
the Court deny her motion. D.E. 88. Both parties were provided proper notice of, and
opportunity to object to, the Magistrate Judge’s M&R. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Special Order No. C-2023-1. Plaintiff timely filed her objections on April 1,
2026. D.E. 91.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court must review de novo any portion of a magistrate judge’s proposed
findings and recommendations on dispositive matters to which the parties have filed
specific, written objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After considering proper objections, the
district court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, those portions of the
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 14, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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proposed findings and recommendations. Id. As to any portion for which no objection is
filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous factual findings and conclusions of law.
United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
DISCUSSION
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider simply
rehashes her prior arguments, is conclusory in nature, and fails to raise a satisfactory reason
to reconsider the prior decision. D.E. 88, p. 3. Plaintiff raises five objections to the M&R.
The Court begins with Plaintiff’s final objection, wherein she argues that the
Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that her motion for reconsideration merely restates
prior arguments. D.E. 91, pp. 3-4. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and her subsequent
objections rely on evidence and arguments that the Court has already considered and
rejected. See D.E. 75, 85. Plaintiff raised the same arguments in her objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s memorandum and recommendation on Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. See D.E. 77, 82. Thus, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that
Plaintiff’s motion rehashes arguments that have already been rejected. Therefore, the
objection is OVERRULED, but the Court considers the substance of Plaintiff’s other
objections below.
In Plaintiff’s first two objections, she argues that the prior rulings on Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment made improper credibility determinations and failed to
analyze material evidence. D.E. 91, p. 2. While she lists several examples of specific
evidence she claims the prior orders improperly weighed or failed to address, she does not
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explain how this evidence contradicts the conclusions from the prior rulings. The
Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the Court’s prior orders properly analyzed this
evidence and did not make credibility determinations.
The Court previously concluded that Plaintiff failed to (1) present competent
comparator evidence and (2) show that Defendant’s legitimate basis for terminating her
was pretextual. See D.E. 75, pp. 23-24; D.E. 85, pp. 3-4. Plaintiff’s objections do not
address the lack of a comparator. And her argument regarding competing evidence,
particularly with respect to Defendant’s alleged divergence from disciplinary policies and
procedures does not address the underlying nondiscriminatory basis for her termination.
Accordingly, the objections are OVERRULED.
In Plaintiff’s third objection, she argues that the pretext standard has been
misapplied. D.E. 91, p. 3. The Court’s prior orders correctly set out and applied the burden-
shifting framework for race discrimination claims. See D.E. 75, pp. 22-25. Plaintiff’s
evidence was insufficient to meet her burden to show that Defendant’s proffered basis for
terminating her was pretextual. The conclusory statements about this evidence in her
objection do not alter this conclusion. Moreover, the objection does not address the Court’s
primary conclusion that Plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case for race discrimination.
Id. For these reasons, the objection is OVERRULED.
In her fourth objection, Plaintiff contends that she presented evidence for a cat’s
paw theory of causation and the Court did not properly consider it. D.E. 91, pp. 3. The
Court previously rejected this theory because Plaintiff failed to present evidence that
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Catherine Webb acted with racially discriminatory animus, which is a required element for
a cat’s paw theory of causation. See D.E. 85, p. 3; Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969
F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff’s objection presents no reason to question that
conclusion. The objection is OVERRULED.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set
forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, as well as Plaintiff’s
objections and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made a de novo
review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation to
which objections were specifically directed, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s
objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge
(D.E. 88). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (D.E. 87) is DENIED.
ORDERED on May 14, 2026.
_______________________________
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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