Vasquez Lopez v. Warden, Port Isabel Service Processing Center et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
CARLOS ENRIQUE VASQUEZ-
LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
§
§
§
v. § Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-731
§
WARDEN, in his/her official capacity,
Port Isabel Service Processing Center,
et al.,
Respondents.
§
§
§
§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner Carlos Enrique Vasquez-Lopez’s “Verified Habeas
Corpus Petition” (“§ 2241 Petition”). Dkt. No. 1. For the reasons discussed below, it is
recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Vasquez-Lopez’s § 2241 Petition; and (2)
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
In or about 1996, Vasquez-Lopez, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States
without inspection. Dkt. No. 1 at 8–9. On or about June 19, 2026, Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers arrested Vasquez-Lopez in Bound Brook, New
Jersey. Id. at 9. ICE subsequently placed Vasquez-Lopez into removal proceedings under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and transferred him to the Port Isabel Service Processing Center
(“PISPC”) located in Los Fresnos, Texas, where he remains. Id. At the time the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) made its initial custody determination,
1 Information obtained from Vasquez-Lopez’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Vasquez-Lopez “was not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or §
1231.” Id. at 10.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 28 U.S.C. § 2241
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Congress authorized district courts to resolve habeas
petitions, including immigration-detention cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1), (c)(3); see
also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001). Habeas exists solely to “grant
relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody.” Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933,
935–36 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus, for the writ to issue, the petitioner must be “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). A court considering a habeas petition must “determine the facts, and dispose
of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,
“if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under § 1229a[.]” When an alien is held under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the statute
mandates detention pending the resolution of the alien’s removal proceedings, subject to
certain narrow exceptions2. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
2 The Secretary of Homeland Security may temporarily parole into the United States “any alien applying
for admission” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022). However, once the purposes of the
parole have been served, the alien must immediately be returned to custody, and his case “shall continue
to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
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Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) (hereinafter, “§ 1226(a)”), “[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether
the alien is to be removed from the United States.” Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a)
allows, but does not require, the Attorney General to release detained aliens on bond. 28
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Buenrostro-Mendez held, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that DHS properly classified and detained noncitizens who are not
admitted to the United States under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at
502. The Fifth Circuit held that “presence without admission deems the [aliens] to be
applicants for admission.” Id. Further, the Fifth Circuit held that “seeking admission” is
equivalent to being an “applicant for admission” by operation of law. Id. As a result,
aliens who do not show “clearly and beyond a doubt that” they are entitled to be admitted
to the United States “shall be detained.” See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)).
However, while Buenrostro-Mendez forecloses any statutory claim that might be
raised with respect to an alien’s detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), it does not address any
constitutional claims relating to the alien’s detention under the statute. Accordingly, a
court considering a habeas petition seeking relief with respect to § 1225(b)(2)(A) must
still review any constitutional claims raised by a petitioner.
C. Demore v. Kim
“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of
law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). However, the
Supreme Court has recognized that detention during deportation proceedings is a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
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523 (2003); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); see also
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001).
The Supreme Court reasoned that detention pending an alien’s removal
proceedings “serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing
prior to or during their removal proceedings.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. Further, the
Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s arguments that mandatory detention was
unnecessary to prevent aliens from absconding during removal proceedings, stating that
“the Due Process Clause does not require [the Government] to employ the least
burdensome means to accomplish its goal.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Vasquez-Lopez claims his continued detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) by the
Government violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Dkt. No. 1 at 13–18.
A. Vasquez-Lopez is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A), as he is an
“applicant for admission.”
Vasquez-Lopez argues that he is misclassified as an “applicant for admission”
under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Dkt. No. 1 at 2. However, in light of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in
Buenrostro-Mendez, the Court finds that Vasquez-Lopez is properly classified under §
1225(b)(2)(A).
Vasquez-Lopez states that he initially entered the United States 30 years ago. Dkt.
No. 1 at 8. Critically, Vasquez-Lopez does not argue that he was admitted or paroled into
the United States prior to his detention. See generally, id. Rather, he relies on his
prolonged presence in the United States, and the timeline of his immigration proceedings
to justify his eligibility for bond. Id. at 13–16. As previously discussed, the Fifth Circuit
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in Buenrostro-Mendez held that “presence without admission deems the [aliens] to be
applicants for admission.” 166 F.4th at 502. Further, “[a]n alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States […] shall be deemed
for the purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
Vasquez-Lopez, then, appears to be properly classified as “an applicant for
admission” who is “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A); DHS “shall detain”
Vasquez-Lopez pending his removal proceedings.
B. Vasquez-Lopez’s continued detention does not violate the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as detention during removal
proceedings is constitutionally permissible.
As discussed above, Vasquez-Lopez’s detention is proper under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court must then evaluate whether Vasquez-Lopez’s detention pending his removal
proceedings violates his Due Process rights. The Court finds the Supreme Court’s Demore
decision controlling in this instance. While the Demore decision focused on § 1226(c),
requiring mandatory detention for aliens convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, the
Supreme Court did not rely on a prior criminal conviction in reaching its decision.
Instead, the Supreme Court focused on the Government’s interest in ensuring that aliens
did not abscond prior to or during their removal proceedings. Id. at 528. Further, it
explicitly addressed the constitutional validity of mandatory detention during removal
proceedings. Id. at 531. The Court, then, finds that same reasoning applies to Vasquez-
Lopez’s detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court finds that Vasquez-Lopez’s continued detention3 under § 1225(b)(2)(A)
without a bond hearing does not violate his due process rights under the Fifth
3 Vasquez-Lopez had been in detention for approximately 16 days when he filed his § 2241 Petition. Dkt.
No. 1 at 9. To date, Vasquez-Lopez has been in continued detention for approximately 27 days.
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Amendment. The Court interprets Vasquez-Lopez’s remaining arguments to be
derivative of his claim that his continued detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Accordingly, Vasquez-Lopez’s § 2241 Petition
should be denied.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Vasquez-
Lopez’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
V. NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 16th day of July, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
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