Escobar Pudis v. Warden, El Valle Detention Facility

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
HILTON JOHN ESCOBAR PUDIS,
Petitioner,
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§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-580
§
WARDEN, OF EL VALLE
DETENTION CENTER, in his/her
official capacity.
Respondent.
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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner Hilton John Escobar Pudis’s “Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241” (Escobar Pudis’s “§ 2241 Petition”). Dkt. No. 1. For the
reasons discussed below, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Escobar Pudis’s § 2241
Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Escobar Pudis, a citizen of Nicaragua, is in immigration custody at El Valle Detention
Facility (“El Valle”) located in Raymondville, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. In his § 2241 Petition,
Escobar Pudis states that he has been detained at El Valle since January 10, 2026. Id. at 7.
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) subsequently placed Escobar Pudis into
removal proceedings, detaining him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (hereinafter, “§
1225(b)(2)(A)”). Id. As a result, Escobar Pudis remains in detention pending his removal
proceedings.
1 Information obtained from Escobar Pudis’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1. Escobar Pudis’s A-number is
A-249145731, and his country of origin is Nicaragua. Dkt. No. 1 at 1; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 29, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Congress authorized district courts to resolve habeas
petitions, including immigration-detention cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1), (c)(3); see also
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001). Habeas exists solely to “grant relief from
unlawful imprisonment or custody.” Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935–36 (5th Cir.
1976). 	Thus, for the writ to issue, the petitioner must be “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	A court
considering a habeas petition must “determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and
justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
B. 	28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, “if
the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under
§ 1229a[.]” 	When an alien is held under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the statute mandates detention
pending the resolution of the alien’s removal proceedings, subject to certain narrow
exceptions2. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) (hereinafter, “§ 1226(a)”), “[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the
alien is to be removed from the United States.” Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) allows, but
2 The Secretary of Homeland Security may temporarily parole into the United States “any alien applying
for admission” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022). However, once the purposes of the
parole have been served, the alien must immediately be returned to custody, and his case “shall continue
to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
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does not require, the Attorney General to release detained aliens on bond. 	28 U.S.C. §
1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). 	Buenrostro-Mendez held, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that DHS properly classified and detained noncitizens who are not admitted
to the United States under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502. The Fifth
Circuit held that “presence without admission deems the [aliens] to be applicants for
admission.” Id. Further, the Fifth Circuit held that “seeking admission” is equivalent to being
an “applicant for admission” by operation of law. Id. As a result, aliens who do not show
“clearly and beyond a doubt that” they are entitled to be admitted to the United States “shall
be detained.” See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)).
However, while Buenrostro-Mendez forecloses any statutory claim that might be
raised with respect to an alien’s detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), it does not address any
constitutional claims relating to the alien’s detention under the statute. Accordingly, a court
considering a habeas petition seeking relief with respect to § 1225(b)(2)(A) must still review
any constitutional claims raised by a petitioner.
C. 	Demore v. Kim
“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law
in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). 	However, the
Supreme 	Court 	has 	recognized 	that 	detention 	during 	deportation 	proceedings 	is 	a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523
(2003); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); see also Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001).
The Supreme Court reasoned that detention pending an alien’s removal proceedings
“serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during
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their removal proceedings.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. Further, the Supreme Court rejected
the petitioner’s arguments that mandatory detention was unnecessary to prevent aliens from
absconding during removal proceedings, stating that “the Due Process Clause does not
require [the Government] to employ the least burdensome means to accomplish its goal.” Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
In his § 2241 Petition, Escobar Pudis challenges the Government’s ability to detain
him without an individualized bond hearing under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause. Dkt. No. 1 at 6–7.
A. 	Buenrostro-Mendez forecloses any relief with respect to Escobar Pudis’s
claim that his continued detention violates the INA.
In his § 2241 Petition, Escobar Pudis argues that he is improperly held under
§1225(b)(2)(A) because “[n]oncitizens who are detained after having already been in this
country 	are 	being 	held 	illegally 	under 	mandatory 	detention 	pursuant 	to 	[§
1225(b)(2)(A)][…]”. 	Dkt. No. 1 at 7. 	Escobar Pudis states that he is misclassified as an
“applicant for admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he has been physically present in
the United States for “a considerable period.”. Id. at 6. However, in light of the Fifth Circuit’s
ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez, the Court finds that Escobar Pudis is properly classified under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).
Escobar Pudis states that he initially entered the United States in 2023. Dkt. No. 1 at
6. Critically, Escobar Pudis does not argue that he was admitted or paroled into the United
States prior to his detention. Escobar Pudis relies on his prolonged presence in the United
States to justify his eligibility for bond. 	As previously discussed, the Fifth Circuit in
Buenrostro-Mendez held that “presence without admission deems the [aliens] to be
applicants for admission.” 166 F.4th at 502. Further, “[a]n alien present in the United States
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who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States […] shall be deemed for the
purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
Escobar Pudis, then, appears to be properly classified as “an applicant for admission”
who is “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A); DHS “shall detain” Escobar Pudis pending
his removal proceedings.
B. 	Escobar 	Pudis’s 	continued 	detention 	does 	not 	violate 	the 	Fifth
Amendment’s 	Due 	Process 	Clause, 	as 	detention 	during 	removal
proceedings is constitutionally permissible
Escobar Pudis asserts that this § 2241 Petition should not be denied because “civil
immigration detention violates due process if it is not reasonably related to its statutory
purpose.” Dkt. No. 1 at 6.
As discussed above, Escobar Pudis’s detention is proper under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The
Court 	must 	then 	evaluate 	whether 	Escobar 	Pudis’s 	detention 	pending 	his 	removal
proceedings violates his Due Process rights. The Court finds the Supreme Court’s Demore
decision controlling in this instance. 	While the Demore decision focused on § 1226(c),
requiring mandatory detention for aliens convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, the
Supreme Court did not rely on a prior criminal conviction in reaching its decision. Instead,
the Supreme Court focused on the Government’s interest in ensuring that aliens did not
abscond prior to or during their removal proceedings. 	Id. at 528. 	Further, it explicitly
addressed the constitutional validity of mandatory detention during removal proceedings. Id.
at 531. The Court, then, finds that same reasoning applies to Escobar Pudis’s detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court finds that Escobar Pudis’s continued detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)
without a bond hearing does not violate his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Accordingly, Escobar Pudis’s § 2241 Petition should be denied.
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IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Escobar
Pudis’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
V. 	NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such
consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79
F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. C IV. P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 29th day of June, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
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