Ayaz v. Warden, Port Isabel Detention Center

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
MUHAMMAD AYAZ,
Petitioner,
§
§
§
v. § Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-528
§
TODD BLANCHE,1 in his official
capacity, Acting U.S. Attorney General,
et al.,
Respondents.
§
§
§
§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court are: (1) Petitioner Muhammad Ayaz’s “Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus” (Ayaz’s “§ 2241 Petition”) [Dkt. No. 1]; (2) Ayaz’s request for an appointment of
counsel (Ayaz’s “Motion for Appointment of Counsel”) [Dkt. No. 1 at 8]; and (3) Ayaz’s
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Dkt. No. 2]. For the reasons discussed below,
it is recommended that the Court: (1) DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ayaz’s §
2241 Petition; (2) DENY AS MOOT Ayaz’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel; (3)
DENY AS MOOT Ayaz’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order; and (4) DIRECT
the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
1 In his § 2241 Petition, Ayaz names “Lyon Blanche” as the United States Attorney General. Dkt. No. 1 at 1.
The Court takes notice that the Acting United States Attorney General is Todd Blanche.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 05, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
On August 13, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Ayaz removed. Dkt. No. 1 at 5.
On September 2, 2025, Ayaz appealed the order of removal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”). Id. On February 12, 2026, the BIA dismissed Ayaz’s appeal. Id. at 6.
On March 2, 2026, Ayaz appealed the BIA’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Id. On April 29, 2026, the Ninth Circuit transferred Ayaz’s case to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, where the outcome of his case remains pending. Ayaz v. Blanche, 26-1446,
Dkt. Nos. 21, 22 (9th Cir. 2026); see generally Ayaz v. Blanche, 26-60318 (5th Cir. 2026).
On May 12, 2026, Ayaz, proceeding pro se, filed his § 2241 Petition. Dkt. No. 1. In
his § 2241 Petition, Ayaz requests that the Court appoint counsel to assist him; the Court
liberally construes Ayaz’s request as a Motion to Appoint Counsel. Dkt. No. 1 at 8. On
the same day, Ayaz filed his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Dkt. No. 2. Ayaz,
a citizen of Pakistan, is detained at Port Isabel Detention Center, located in Los Fresnos,
Texas. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. Ayaz alleges that he is entitled to relief because he has been
detained for more than six months and that his removal is not in the reasonably
foreseeable future. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Standing and Ripeness
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts presume that any given case lies outside this limited
2 Information obtained from Ayaz’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1.
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jurisdiction, and the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of showing
otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770,
775 (5th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, federal courts have an independent obligation to
examine their own subject matter jurisdiction, even sua sponte. Rivero v. Fid. Invs., Inc.,
1 F.4th 340, 344 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1670 (2022) (quoting Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).
The United States Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to the resolution of
“cases” and “controversies.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992); U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Standing is an “essential and unchanging part” of the
Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559. Standing
requires, in part, an “actual or imminent” injury, i.e., one that is “ripe for decision.” Id. at
560; Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Schuehle
v. Norton, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002). For a claim to be ripe, it must have “matured sufficiently
to warrant judicial intervention.” Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 779
F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). A premature claim for relief
is not judicially ripe and falls outside the federal courts’ limited jurisdiction. Shields, 289
F.3d at 835; see also Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(noting that standing and ripeness are “essential components of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.”).
Without subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts have no authority to adjudicate
a case and must dismiss it. Goodrich v. United States, 3 F.4th 776, 779 (5th Cir. 2021);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without
prejudice. Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021).
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B. Zadvydas v. Davis
Immigration judges are authorized to issue orders of removal, which become final
once the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has acted or the time to seek review of a
removal order expires. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1; Texas v. United States, 524 F.
Supp. 3d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (Tipton, J.). Generally, the Government has 90 days
to execute a final removal order and remove the unauthorized immigrant from the United
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
Though § 2241 proceedings “remain available as a forum for statutory and
constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention,” the detainee’s ability to seek
habeas relief is subject to certain time constraints. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688. When the
Government fails to execute a removal order within the 90-day period, post-removal
detention must be limited to a period “reasonably necessary” to effectuate removal;
indefinite detention is impermissible. Id. at 689.
This does not mean that any amount of post-removal-period of confinement is
unlawful; rather, the Government’s obligation to rebut a presumption of indefinite
detention does not activate until after detention has been ongoing longer than six months,
and only after the immigrant detainee first makes a showing that “there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. Up to six months
of immigration detention after entry of a final removal order is, therefore, “presumptively
reasonable.” Id.; Chance v. Napolitano, 453 F. App'x 535, 536 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
In arriving at the six-month presumption, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the sensitive interplay of separation of powers concerns and national
interests in the immigration context. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700. The six-month
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presumption, then, reflected a reasoned judgment that earlier review of post-removal-
period detention posed too great a risk to institutional interests to properly warrant
judicial scrutiny.
A pleading by a pro se litigant is liberally construed under a less stringent standard
of review than a formal pleading drafted by a lawyer. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). Nevertheless, a pro se filing must still “abide by the rules that govern the federal
courts.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Frazier v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 541 Fed.Appx. 419, 421 (5th Cir. 2013)). The Court need not
develop the plaintiff’s argument on his behalf. See United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22,
23 (5th Cir. 1993).
III. DISCUSSION
B. Ayaz’s § 2241 Petition
Construed liberally, Ayaz challenges his detention under Zadvydas, 533 U.S.,
claiming that he has been improperly detained for more than six months. See Dkt. No. 1
at 7. However, Ayaz has not received a final order of removal, so his petition is unripe.
Dkt. No. 1 at 6; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(i)(B)(i) (“The removal period begins … [t]he date the
order of removal becomes administratively final.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (stating
that the post-removal-period detention statute applies only after a noncitizen has been
ordered removed).
As a result, judicial intervention at this stage is premature and, for the reasons
explained in Zadvydas, would be imprudent considering the Executive branch’s primary
prerogative over the administration of immigrant removal. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
700. The Court interprets Ayaz’s remaining arguments to be derivative of his claim that
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his detention is unreasonably prolonged and there is no significant likelihood of removal.
Dkt. No. 1 at 7–8. Accordingly, Ayaz’s claim is not ripe and is subject to dismissal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Ayaz’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order
As stated above, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Ayaz’s § 2241 Petition
[Dkt. No. 1]. Therefore, Ayaz’s Request for Appointment of Counsel [Dkt. No. 1 at 8] and
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Dkt. No. 2] should be denied as moot.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ayaz’s § 2241 Petition [Dkt. No. 1]; (2) DENY AS MOOT
Ayaz’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Dkt. No. 1 at 8]; (3) DENY AS MOOT Ayaz’s
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Dkt. No. 2]; and (4) DIRECT the Clerk of
Court to CLOSE this case.
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V. NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 5th day of June, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
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