Jafari v. Mullin

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Case 1:26-cv-00447 Document 23 Filed 06/23/26 in TXSD Page1of8
United States District Court

Southem District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT June 23, 2026
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
SIAVASH J. |, §
Petitioner, §
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-cv-447
§
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, §
Respondent. §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DENY PETITIONER’S HABEAS PETITION

Before the Court is Petitioner Siavash J.’s “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241” (Dkt. No. 1) (“Petition”) and Respondents’ “Response to Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus and Motion for Summary Judgment” (Dkt. No. 17) (“MSJ”). For the
following reasons, it is recommended the Court DENY the Petition (Dkt. No. 1) and DENY
the MSJ (Dkt. No. 17) as moot.

Petitioner is a national of Iran who entered the United States on January 19, 2025.
Dkt. No. 17 at 2; Dkt. No. 17-1 at 1. Petitioner is currently detained by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement at the Port Isabel Detention Center in Cameron County, Texas.
Petitioner contests his prolonged detention while he awaits a decision from the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Although Petitioner filed a timely appeal of the
Immigration Judge’s June 30, 2025, the BIA issued a decision about a year later on May 21,
2026.7

Petitioner presented constitutional arguments based on the length of his detention

while he waited for a decision on his appeal from the BIA. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. The Government

' Due to significant privacy concerns in immigration cases and noting that judicial opinions are not subject
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, any opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition in this case will
refer to the petitioner only by first name and last initial.

> The Court takes judicial notice that the case appeal was dismissed on May 21, 2026, via the Executive

Office of Immigration Review’s public website showing automated case information. See the attachment
to this R&R at pages 7-8.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

2
responded to Petitioner’s arguments by filing an MSJ arguing detention during removal
proceedings is constitutional permissible. Dkt. No. 17. Because removal proceedings have
ended, the Court should dismiss the Government’s MSJ as moot.
Petitioner proceeds pro se.3 The Court notes that in his original Petition, Siavash J.
characterizes his detention by immigration authorities as “indefinite,” and Petitioner argues
that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Dkt.
No. 1 at 6. Considering these arguments, the Court liberally construes Petitioner’s claim as
a Zadvydas claim of indefinite detention following a final order of removal.
I. 	Legal Standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A court has “an independent obligation to determine whether subject-
matter jurisdiction exists,” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006), and, if it
“determines…that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,” it “must dismiss the action,” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3). One “essential component[]” of “federal subject-matter jurisdiction” is
“ripeness.” Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005). For a court to exercise
jurisdiction, then, the case “must be ripe for decision, meaning that it must not be premature
or speculative.” Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2002).
II. 	Discussion
Because Petitioner has not been detained for over six months since his removal order
became final, his claim is premature.
To begin, it is worth noting that because the BIA recently denied his appeal of his
removal order, the removal order has become administratively final and the removal period
authorizing mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (“§ 1231”) has begun. See 8 U.S.C.
3 Because Petitioner proceeds pro se, he receives the benefit of liberal construction of his claims. See
Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2006).
Case 1:26-cv-00447 Document 23 Filed 06/23/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 8

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§ 1231(a)(1)(B).4 To the extent, then, that Petitioner challenges detention under a different
statutory authority, his claims are moot. The remaining thrust of the Petition is that his
detention is no longer authorized under statute or constitutional, Dkt. No. 1 at 6, and this
claim fails at this point in his detention.
Once a removal order becomes final,5 § 1231 authorizes detention of the alien to
effectuate removal under two provisions. In the first 90 days (otherwise known as the
“removal period”), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1), the “Attorney General shall detain the alien” under
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). Once the removal period ends, the source of authorization shifts to §
1231(a)(6), which states that the alien “may be detained” by the Attorney General “beyond
the removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). To ensure § 1231(a)(6) would not lead to
constitutionally excessive detention, the Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)
construed it to have an implied limit: authorization of detention under § 1231(a)(6) would
run out when continued detention “exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal”
and removal “is no longer reasonably foreseeable.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. The Court,
however, also understood that a reasonableness standard, standing alone, would risk too
much judicial interference with the Executive’s “primacy in foreign policy matters.” Id. at
701. The Court thus found it “practically necessary” to “limit” its new standard by
recognizing a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of “six months.” Id.
Pieced 	together, 	the 	Zadvydas 	framework 	slots claims 	challenging 	post-final-
removal-order detention into two phases:6 1) a six-month period where the statute
4 The Court should recognize, however, that the removal period will be deemed to have begun later in the
even that Petitioner’s pending attempt to stay his removal in the Fifth Circuit is successful. See 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(1)(B)(ii).
5 A removal order becomes “administratively final” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i) upon “(i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period
in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(47)(B).
6 Some district courts in this circuit remain skeptical of this tidy two-phase scheme. See, e.g., Ali v. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703 (S.D. Tex. 2020); Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689 (S.D.
Tex. 2025). They, like Petitioner, suggest that Zadvydas prescribes a (rebuttable) presumption of
reasonableness during those first six months—and does not, in effect, proscribe claims brought before that
period elapses. See, e.g., Villaneuva, 801 F. Supp. at 703. Admittedly, Zadvydas is not precise about what
Case 1:26-cv-00447 Document 23 Filed 06/23/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 8

4
constitutionally authorizes detention (and Zadvydas claims are thus not viable); and 2) a
period “after that,” in which the alien can seek conditional release under Zadvydas “if he can
demonstrate there is ‘no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.’” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). If a
petitioner seeks release from detention in the first phase—the presumptively reasonable
period—his or her claim is not yet ripe.7 Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F. App’x 317, 318 (5th
Cir. 2011); see also Kakhidze v. Venegas, No. 1:25-cv-00136, 2025 WL 2412854, at *3
(S.D. Tex. July 30, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2411229 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 20, 2025).
Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA from the Immigration Judge’s order of removal
occurred “on May 21, 2026,” which would make his removal order final on that same date.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). These facts show he is barely a month into the initial six-
month period of presumptively valid detention, and, thus, the remaining Zadvydas claim in
his Petition not yet ripe. Consequently, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this
case in its current form.8
its presumption means for the first six months. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. But the formulation offered by
the Court in and after that case only contemplates petitioners proving their detention is unreasonable after
the six-month period ends. Id. at 701 (“After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing”) (emphasis added); Clark, 543
U.S. at 378 (“after that [presumptive period], the alien is eligible for conditional release if he can
demonstrate…”) (emphasis added); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021) (same). The
Fifth Circuit, though not settling the issue, has issued strong signals of its own. It has described the timing
of Zadvydas claims in the same terms, see Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006); Hersh
v. United States ex rel. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743, 757 (5th Cir. 2008), approved of district courts dismissing
Zadvydas claims as “premature” when made during the presumptive period, Okpoju v. Ridge, 115 F. App’x
302 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Chance v. Napolitano, 453 F. App’x 535, 536 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam),
and itself found a Zadvydas claim to be “premature” for the same reason, Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F.
App’x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011).
7 Whether a claim of unreasonably prolonged detention is offered in statutory or constitutional terms, the
result is the same: it is “presumptively constitutional for an alien to be detained for six months after a final
order of removal.” Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F. App’x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added), and a
constitutional challenge to prolonged detention fails unless it meets the standard set by Zadvydas, see
Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F. 3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006).
8 Because dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice, Petitioner may file another
habeas petition once his claims are ripe. See Ruiz v. Brennan, 851 F. 3d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 2017).
Case 1:26-cv-00447 Document 23 Filed 06/23/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 8

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III. 	Recommendation
It is therefore recommended that the Court (1) DENY the Petition (Dkt. No. 1),
DISMISS the MSJ (Dkt. No. 17) AS MOOT, and (3) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to close
the case.
IV. 	Notice to the Parties
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with the United
States District Judge assigned to the instant case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When filing an
objection, a party must object to specific facts or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation. The District Judge is not required to consider frivolous, conclusive, or
general objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.
1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the record
before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings without
conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings on
appeal, except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., L.L.C.,
875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on June 23, 2026.
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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Case 1:26-cv-00447
Document 23 Filed 06/23/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 8
ATTACHMENT 1
6

Case 1:26-cv-00447 Document 23 _ Filed 06/23/26 in TXSD

EOIR Automated Case Informatio

Page 7 of 8

Court Closures Today June 8, 2026

Please check https://www, justice, gov/eoir-operational-status for up to date closures.

Home > J siavash (i)

———

Automated Case Information

Name: JAFARI, SIAVASH | A-Number: J | Docket Date: 2/14/2025

== Next Hearing Information

There are no future hearings for this
case.

EY BIA Case Information

The case appeal was DISMISSED on May 21,
2026.

=~ Court Decision and Motion
Information

The immigration judge ordered REMOVAL.

DECISION DATE
June 30, 2025

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LOS FRESNOS, TX 78566

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COURT ADDRESS
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LOS FRESNOS, TX 78566

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Case 1:26-cv-00447 Document 23 Filed 06/23/26 in TXSD Page 8of8

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