England v. Mullin et al

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Case 1:26-cv-00379 Document10- Filed 05/20/26 in TXSD Page1lof4
United States District Court

Southem District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT May 20, 2026
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
YENNIFER N.E., §
“Petitioner,” §
§
V. §
§ Civil Action No, 1:26-cv-00379
MARK WAYNE MULLIN, ef al, in their §
official capacities, §
“Respondents.” §

ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner’s “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” (Dkt. No. 1)
(“Petition”), Respondents’ “Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to
Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment” (Dkt. No. 6) “MTD”), the Magistrate Judge’s
“Report and Recommendation to Grant Petitioner’s Habeas Petition” (Dkt. No. 7) (“R&R”), and
Respondents’ “Objection to Dkt. No. 7” (Dkt. No. 9) (“Objection”).

The Magistrate Judge recommended this Court 1) grant the Petition (Dkt. No. 1) in part,
(2) deny the MTD (Dkt. No. 6), (3) order Respondents to release Petitioner and after that comply
with the regulations governing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) status
termination, and (4) direct the Clerk of Court to close the case. Dkt. No. 7 at 2. Upon a de novo
review, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 7).

L BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a Mexican citizen who has lived in the United States for over 25 years. Dkt.
No. | at 5. The record confirms that Petitioner was granted deferred action status under the DACA
program in 2012. /d. That status remains valid until June 23, 2027. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 1.

On February 17, 2026, Petitioner was arrested for driving with an expired license, Dkt, No.
6 at 2, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) the day after, on February 18, 2026. fd.
Since then, Petitioner has been detained at El] Valle Detention Center in Los Fresnos, Texas. Dkt.
No. | at 2,

On April 3, 2026, Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus requesting her release under 8

U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that her DACA status was not terminated by Respondents in conformity

with the applicable regulations, Dkt. No. 1 at 8, which require the government to “provide a

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 1:26-cv-00379 Document10- Filed 05/20/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 4

Notice of Intent to Terminate and an opportunity to respond prior to terminating a grant of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.” 8 C.F.R, § 236.23(d)(1), Respondents counter that
Petitioner is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and Petitioner’s actrve DACA status
does not render that detention unlawful. Dkt. No. 6 at 7.

IL. LEGAL STANDARD
If a party objects to a magistrate’s ruling, the district court will review that determination

de novo. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (Sth Cir. 1989).

Ii, DISCUSSION
A. RESPONDENTS DID NOT ADHERE TO THEIR OWN AGENCY REGULATIONS AND
VIOLATED PETIFIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

In general, an agency’s “[flailure to adhere to regulations can constitute a denial of due
process of law.” Francois vy. Garland, 120 F.4th 459, 465 Gth Cir. 2024) (quoting Arzanipour v.
LN.S., 866 F.2d 743, 746 (Sth Cir. 1989)), Not every administrative misstep equates to a due
process violation. Arzanipour, 866 F.2d at 746, But when regulations safeguard important,
individual rights derived from the Constitution or a federal statute, “it is incumbent upon agencies
to follow their own procedures.” Morton y, Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), Failure to do so is a “a
denial of due process.” Gov't ef Canal Zone v. Brooks, 427 F.2d 346, 347 (Sth Cir. 1970) (citing
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, (1954)).!

8 C.E.R. § 236.23(d)(1) requires the government to “provide a Notice of Intent to
Terminate and an opportunity to respond prior to terminating a grant of Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals.” Respondents argue that 8 C.F.R. § 236.23(d)(1) prohibits removal without
proper DACA termination, but not detention without formal termination. Dkt. No. 9. And so long
as Respondents have not formally terminated Petitioner’s DACA status, there has been no §
236.23(d)(1) violation. Jd. at 2. The Court finds that argument to lack merit because it ignores the

operative effect of Respondents’ actions in this case.

' By contrast, to state a due process violation for an agency’s noncompliance with regulations net required by federal
law or the Constitution, there must be a showing of “substantial prejudice.” Francois, 120 F.4th at 466. 8 C.F.R. §
236,23(d}(1) affords notice and an opportunity to be heard to DACA recipients who face status termination. Such
“important and imperative procedural safeguards” fit within the class of agency actions to which cognizable due
process interests attach. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S, 741, 760 (1979). Thus, a showing of substantial
prejudice is not required.

Case 1:26-cv-00379 Document10_- Filed 05/20/26 in TXSD Page 3of4

DACA is, by definition, a grant of deferred action. See 8 U.S.C. § 236.21(c)(1). The
Supreme Court has defined “deferred action” as a “decision to decline to institute [removal
proceedings], terminate [removal proceedings], or decline to institute a final order of [removal].”
DHS vy, Regents of the Univ. of California, 591 U.S. 1, 45 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part)
(quoting Reno v. Am,-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999)), “A case may
be selected for deferred action treatment at any stage of the administrative process.” Reno, 525
USS. at 484, In other words, deferred action reflects the Government’s decision “not to pursue the
removal” of an otherwise removable alien. 8 U.S.C. § 236.21(c){1).

Here, regardless of whether Respondents formally label their actions a “termination” of
DACA, Dkt. No. 9 at 2, Respondents took steps contrary with the continuation of deferred action,
Respondents issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and detained her under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A). Dkt. No. 6 at 2, Both actions reflect a decision to pursue removal rather than defer
it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (“... the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section
1229a of this title); See a/so 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1 “Every removal proceeding ... to determine the
deportability or inadmissibility of an alien is commenced by the filing of a notice to appear with
the immigration court.”). In practical effect, Respondents abandoned deferred action despite
leaving the label nominally intact.

Respondents cannot evade the procedural safeguards required by 8 C.F.R. § 236.23(d)(1)
by maintaining DACA in name while taking actions contrary to the continuation of deferred action
in practice. Because Respondents effectively terminated Petitioner’s DACA status through the
commencement of removal proceedings and Petitioner’s detention-——without first providing the
notice and opportunity to respond required by the regulation—Respondents failed to follow their
own procedures. Because that failure amounts to a due process violation, Respondents’ first
Objection (Dkt. No. 9) to the R&R is hereby OVERRULED,

B. RELEASE IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR THE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION,

Respondents also argue that, even if a regulatory violation occurred, release is not the
proper remedy. Dkt. No. 9 at 4. Respondents contend they should be allowed to correct the
regulatory violation. /¢, The Court disagrees and finds release the appropriate remedy here. See
Santiago v. Noem, 2025 WL 2792588 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025) (finding release the appropriate
remedy for detaining DACA holders in violation of due process). Respondents functionally

terminated a status carrying significant protection, initiated removal proceedings, and detained

Case 1:26-cv-00379 Document10- Filed 05/20/26 in TXSD Page 4of4

Petitioner without first providing the process contemplated by the DACA regulations. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.23(d)(1}. This is not the type of procedural defect that can be retroactively cured while
detention continues.

Respondents’ second Objection (Dkt. No. 9) to the R&R is thus OVERRULED.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Court hereby ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 7), Accordingly, the Petition (Dkt. No. 1) is
hereby GRANTED in part and the MTD (Dkt. No. 6) is DENIED. Respondents are ORDERED
to immediately release Petitioner and after that comply with the regulations governing DACA
status termination, The Clerk of the Court is ORDERED to close the case.

Signed on this 20" day of May 2026

Rola do Olvera
United States District Jud