Guerra Gutierrez de Guerra v. Warden, Port Isabel Service Processing Center et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
JENNY KARINA GUERRA GUTIERREZ DE
GUERRA,
Petitioner,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-CV-327
WARDEN, PORT ISABEL SERVICE
PROCESSING CENTER, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER AND OPINION
Petitioner Jenny Karina Guerra Gutierrez de Guerra is a Guatemalan national who is
currently detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials. Petitioner has protection
from removal to Guatemala, but Respondents indicate they plan to remove her to Mexico. In this
habeas action, Petitioner challenges Respondents’ third-country removal procedures and
requests her immediate release from detention on multiple grounds. She also challenges a fine
that Respondents assessed against her.
Respondents move for summary judgment on all claims and request that the Court deny
the petition for writ of habeas corpus. After considering the applicable law and the record in this
case, the Court concludes that Petitioner has demonstrated that the law requires injunctive relief
of a limited nature, and that Respondents are entitled to summary judgment on the remainder of
Petitioner’s claims.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner is a Guatemalan national. She has twice fled her native country with her minor
daughter due to threats of violence and abuse. In the first instance, they fled to Mexico, where
government officials placed them in the custody of a cartel. The cartel threatened to kill them if
Petitioner’s family did not pay a ransom, and when the family made the payment, the cartel
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 30, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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released Petitioner and her daughter, but forced them to cross into the United States. United
States immigration officials quickly repatriated Petitioner and her daughter to Guatemala.
After returning to Guatemala, Petitioner again faced threats from the same gang and from
her abuser. In 2023, she and her daughter fled the country to the United States. After a brief
period of detention at the border, immigration officials released them on an Order of Release on
Recognizance (Doc. 16–4).
Petitioner and her daughter moved to Maryland, where Petitioner found employment.
While there, Petitioner sought asylum and withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)
and under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18. In August 2024, an Immigration
Judge issued a Final Order of Removal as to Petitioner, but granted her withholding of removal
to Guatemala under Section 1231(b)(3). (IJ Order, Doc. 5–1) Going forward, Petitioner was
required to complete periodic check-ins with ICE officials.
On October 8, 2025, when Petitioner appeared for a scheduled check-in, officers from
Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained her. The same day, officers served Petitioner
with a Notice of Revocation of Release (Doc. 5–2, 2), indicating that her “order of supervision”
had been revoked “based on a review of your official alien file and a determination that there are
changed circumstances in your case.” The Notice also advised Petitioner that she would be
“afforded an informal interview at which you will be given an opportunity to respond to the
reasons for the revocation.” (Id.) The interview occurred later that day, as reflected in the
Interviewing ICE Officer’s Memorandum summarizing the conversation with Petitioner. (See
Alien Informal Interview, Doc. 16–8) Still on the same day, Respondents also served Petitioner
with a Notice of Removal (Doc. 16–7) indicating that ICE intended to remove her to Mexico, and
with a Notice of Fee Assessment under 8 U.S.C. § 1815 (Doc. 5–6), reflecting an imposed fine of
$5,000.
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Two days later, Petitioner received a reasonable fear interview regarding Mexico, based on
the third-country removal procedures outlined in a March 2025 Guidance Regarding Third
Country Removals (Doc. 16–11) from then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem. Under
those procedures, DHS informs an individual of removal to a third country. If the individual
affirmatively expresses a fear of removal to that country, immigration officials refer the individual
to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services “for a screening for eligibility for protection
under [8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)] and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) for the country of
removal.” (Id.) Through the screening, USCIS determines “whether the alien would more likely
than not be persecuted on a statutorily protected ground or tortured in the country of removal.”
(Id. at 2) “If USCIS determines that the alien has not met this standard,” removal to the third
country proceeds. In the present matter, the USCIS official interviewed Petitioner and
determined that she “did not established that it is more likely than not that [she] will be
persecuted or tortured in Mexico.” (Third Country Screening Notice1, Doc. 16–10) Petitioner has
remained in detention since then.
On March 19, 2026, Petitioner filed her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1),
presenting a due process challenge to Respondents’ third-country removal procedures and
requesting her immediate release from detention. The following day, she requested a temporary
restraining order based on her “imminent removal from the United States[,]” and requesting an
injunction precluding her removal to Mexico. (Mot. for TRO, Doc. 3, 1)
On March 24, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 5),
alleging that on March 20, Respondents unsuccessfully attempted to remove her to Mexico. She
retained her original allegations and added a new claim to challenge Respondents’ authority to
re-detain her and the legal basis of the $5,000 fine imposed on her.
1 Petitioner did not receive notice of this determination until after she filed this habeas action.
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On the same day of the Amended Petition’s filing, the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (Doc. 6) prohibiting Respondents from removing or transferring Petitioner
while it considered the arguments that she raised. The Court later established a briefing schedule
for the parties, and has extended the Temporary Restraining Order on two occasions to maintain
the status quo while it considered the parties’ arguments. (See Order, Doc. 8; Second TRO, Doc.
15; Third TRO, Doc. 19)
On April 10, Respondents indicated that Petitioner had been transferred to Louisiana
before the Court’s issuance of the first Temporary Restraining Order, and also moved for
summary judgment on all claims.2 (MSJ, Doc. 16) Petitioner has submitted her Reply (Doc. 18)
in support of her claims and in opposition to the summary judgment motion.
II. Standard of Review
To be entitled to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must show that she
is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3); see Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“[N]either habeas
nor civil rights relief can be had absent the allegation by a plaintiff that he or she has been deprived
of some right secured to him or her by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United
States.” (quoting Hilliard v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 759 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam))). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that she is being held contrary to
law, and because the habeas proceeding is civil in nature, the petitioner must satisfy her burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992)); see also
Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir. 1976). A court considering a habeas petition must
“determine the facts [ ] and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
2 Petitioner’s transfer to Louisiana does not defeat the Court’s jurisdiction over this habeas action. See Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004) (“[W]hen the Government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition
naming her immediate custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent
within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner's release.”); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304–
05 (1944).
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“As a general principle, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to
summary judgment, applies with equal force in the context of habeas corpus cases.” Clark v.
Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2000). Under Rule 56, the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial
burden of providing the court with a legal basis for its motion. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet this burden, the moving party must inform the court of the basis
for the motion and identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact and the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law. See id.
at 333. If the moving party carries its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party. Id.
A court should grant summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to rebut the showing made
by the moving party. Id. at 323.
III. Analysis
Petitioner requests relief on multiple grounds. First, she argues that Respondents’ third
country removal procedures violate her Fifth Amendment due process rights and the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559. Second, she alleges that Respondents
detained her in 2025 in a manner that violated her due process rights and the APA. Third, she
claims that Respondents have no lawful basis to keep her in detention, requesting her immediate
release under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Finally, she alleges that the $5,000 fine
that Respondents imposed on her under 8 U.S.C. § 1815 is inapplicable under the statute and
unconstitutional under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
Respondents move for summary judgment and request that the Court deny the habeas
petition. They contend that they possess the statutory authority to detain Petitioner based on the
Final Order of Removal, and that her continued detention does not violate Zadvydas. They then
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argue that the procedures that they employ for third-country removal of individuals satisfy
statutory and constitutional obligations. And they defend the imposition of the $5,000 fine.
The Court addresses each of Petitioner’s claims in turn, simultaneously considering
whether she has demonstrated entitlement to the requested relief in habeas on each claim, and
whether Respondents have demonstrated that the claims fail as a matter of law.
A. Petitioner’s Challenge to Her Re-Detention
Petitioner alleges that Respondents violated her rights under the Fifth Amendment and
the APA by failing to follow federal regulations when re-detaining her in October 2025. In
particular, she alleges that “Respondents violated ICE’s own regulations by failing to provide
Petitioner with a notice of the reasons for revoking her [order of supervised release], an interview
and an opportunity to respond.” (Am. Pet., Doc. 5, ¶ 91) She claims that Respondents failed to
adhere to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) when revoking her release, in violation of the Accardi doctrine.
Respondents counter that Section 241.4(l)(1) is inapplicable because an immigration
official originally released Petitioner on her own recognizance, rather than under an order of
supervision. Alternatively, they contend that they nevertheless complied with the procedures
applicable to individuals released under an order of supervision, and that Petitioner has not
identified a “substantial prejudice” stemming from any claimed regulatory violation. (MSJ, Doc.
16, 9–10)
Here, Petitioner does not contest that she is subject to a Final Order of Removal. (See IJ
Order, Doc. 5–1) Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the United States must detain an alien against whom
such an order has issued. The statute prescribes time limits for the removal of the alien, see 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A), (a)(6), and under various circumstances, the United States can release an
individual on an order of supervision, subject to conditions, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). Such
release, however, does not “vacate[ ] or otherwise set aside” the final order of removal. Johnson
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v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 536 (2021). And absent such release, Section 1231(a) authorizes
the detention of the individual.
In the current matter, Petitioner was released on her own recognizance during her removal
proceedings. The proceedings continued, and in August 2024, an Immigration Judge issued a
Final Order of Removal, but granted withholding of removal to Guatemala. At that moment,
Respondents could have proceeded with her removal to another country, as no party contests that
the immigration statutes authorize a third-country removal under specified conditions. See 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1). Section 1231(a) authorized Petitioner’s detention for the purpose of such
removal.
As it turned out, Respondents did not decide to proceed with her removal until October
2025, identifying Mexico as the receiving nation. The parties contest whether Respondents had
to comply with the provisions of Section 241.4 when re-detaining Petitioner. That provision
grants the Executive Associate Commissioner the discretion “to revoke release and return to
[DHS] custody an alien previously approved for release under the procedures in this section.” 8
C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2). Upon the revocation of release, an individual “will be notified of the reasons
for revocation of his or her release or parole” and “will be afforded an initial informal interview .
. . to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1). Here,
irrespective of whether Section 241.4 applies, Respondents note that they provided such a notice
and an informal interview in which Petitioner had the opportunity to challenge the grounds for
the revocation of her release. (MSJ, Doc. 16, 7–8 (citing Notice, Doc. 16–6; Interview Summary,
Doc. 16–8)) Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the Notice and Petitioner’s ability to prepare
for the interview, (see Reply, Doc. 18, 15–16), but she does not cite any binding decision
establishing the inadequacy of the Notice or the interview procedures that Respondents utilized.
The record demonstrates that Respondents notified Petitioner that changed circumstances had
led them to revoke the conditions of her release, and that she had the opportunity to present
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arguments to contest her detention and request her release. As Petitioner herself explains, a
constitutionally adequate process requires, “at minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
(Reply, Doc. 18, 20) Respondents afforded such notice and opportunity to Petitioner in this case.
And Petitioner presents no binding authority establishing that Respondents had to comply with
these procedures before re-detaining Petitioner, rather than upon her detention.
As a result, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Respondents violated her statutory or
constitutional rights when re-detaining her based on the Final Order of Removal.
B. Challenge to Petitioner’s Ongoing Detention
Petitioner alleges that her ongoing detention violates her rights under the Due Process
Clause and that she is entitled to her immediate release under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001). Both challenges fail.
Petitioner bases her due process argument on the grounds that she presents neither a
flight risk nor a danger to the community. (Am. Pet., Doc. 5, ¶¶ 99–106). But as Respondents
observe, Petitioner is subject to a Final Order of Removal, which authorizes her detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
It is true that Zadvydas provides a legal theory by which an immigration detainee subject
to a final order of removal can challenge prolonged detention as unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment. In that decision, the Supreme Court recognized that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) does not
“authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. In setting the
boundaries of the statute, the Supreme Court explained that “once removal is no longer
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. As guidance
for courts considering a habeas action, the Supreme Court recognized six months as a
“presumptively reasonable period of detention” after the issuance of a final order of removal. Id.
at 701. Beyond that period, if “the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with
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evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. As the period of post-removal-order detention
lengthens beyond six months, the “‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to
shrink.” Id.
In the present matter, Respondents have detained Petitioner since October 8, 2025, which
narrowly exceeds the “presumptively reasonable” six-month period. Thus, to succeed on her
Zadvydas claim, Petitioner must provide “good reason” that negates a significant likelihood of
her removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. On this front, she argues that her challenges to
Respondents’ third country removal procedures will preclude her removal to Mexico, and that
Petitioners have not demonstrated that they have secured the necessary travel documents for her
removal to Mexico or that the country has agreed to receive her. (See Reply, Doc. 18, 12–13) As
to the challenge of the third-country removal procedures, the Court concludes in the following
section of this Order and Opinion that Respondents can proceed with Petitioner’s removal to
Mexico upon completing certain procedural safeguards. And the record reflects that Respondents
have already provided those safeguards to Petitioner. In addition, Respondents contend that they
stand ready to remove Petitioner to Mexico, but have been unable to do so based solely on the
Court’s injunctive relief and Petitioner’s refusal to disembark the vehicle when Respondents
attempted to remove her before this lawsuit commenced. (MSJ, Doc. 16, 6) Petitioner bears the
burden to demonstrate that Respondents cannot effectuate her removal to Mexico, and she offers
no evidence other than questioning whether Respondents’ efforts will prove successful. Based on
this record, the Court concludes that Petitioner fails to demonstrate that no significant likelihood
exists of her removal to Mexico in the reasonably foreseeable future. As a result, Petitioner’s
request for an order requiring her immediate release based on Zadvydas fails.
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C. Third Country Removal Procedures
Petitioner alleges that Respondents’ procedures for removing an alien to a third country
fail to comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and run afoul of the APA.
1. Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim
Petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause requires that before her removal to a third
country, she must be afforded a reasonable fear interview as to that country, as well as the
opportunity to appeal a negative reasonable fear determination to an Immigration Judge. (Am
Pet., Doc. 5 ¶¶70–84; Reply, Doc. 18, 5–12) In support, Petitioner applies the balancing test that
the Supreme Court established in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), arguing in part
that the absence of review by an Immigration Judge exposes an individual to an unacceptably high
risk of harm to her life. She presents evidence that Immigration Judges reverse about 30% of
negative reasonable fear determinations, revealing that asylum officials render incorrect decisions
in a significant number of cases. She claims that in her case, such an incorrect decision occurred,
highlighting that the asylum officer rendered a negative reasonable fear determination despite
her previous kidnapping that Mexican government officials facilitated.
In turn, Respondents argue that Petitioner has received all the procedural protections that
the Fifth Amendment requires, and that this Court’s decision in Aranda-Gomez v. Bondi, No.
1:25-cv-258 (S.D. Tex., Feb. 20, 2026), forecloses her argument.
In Aranda-Gomez, this Court considered due process challenges to Respondents’ third-
country removal procedures. Those procedures entitle an individual subject to third-country
removal to a reasonable fear interview before a USCIS officer, but do not provide for review of a
negative determination. In Aranda-Gomez, the Court concluded that this procedure satisfies due
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process requirements.3 Here, Petitioner has received those procedural protections, and the Court
affirms that they satisfy constitutional requirements.
Petitioner challenges the Court’s conclusion in Aranda-Gomez on multiple grounds. But
these arguments are unavailing. First, while the reversal-rate evidence that Petitioner presents
indicates an elevated risk of erroneous deprivation in connection with the reasonable fear
determination, the data does not alter the Court’s previous conclusion in Aranda-Gomez.
Assuming that the Matthews analysis applies to the issue, the risk of erroneous deprivation
represents only one factor in the analysis. And the data that Petitioner submits, while modestly
in her favor, does not demand a different conclusion when considering the totality of the
circumstances and the factors that form part of the Matthews analysis.
Petitioner also argues that Respondents, when providing a reasonable fear interview
regarding a third-country removal, require proof of “fear . . . much higher than what is required
in the credible fear or reasonable fear processes[.] ” (Am. Pet., Doc. 23, ¶ 81) The reasonable fear
standard under 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c) requires that the individual demonstrate a “reasonable
possibility” of persecution or torture if removed to the country at issue. But the Secretary’s March
2025 guidance requires “noncitizens to show it is more likely than not they would be tortured or
persecuted[,]” which aligns with the higher standard required to prevail in withholding of removal
proceedings. (Am. Pet., Doc. 23, ¶ 81; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16) Petitioner argues that this
elevated standard, along with the limited opportunity for individuals to prepare for a reasonable
fear interview and abbreviated timeline in which to secure counsel, creates an “impossible
standard with no real chance to meet that standard[.]” (Reply, Doc. 18, 6)
Petitioner’s argument does not succeed. An immigrant who has not been admitted to the
country generally “has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by
3 The Court concluded that Respondents could not dispense with the reasonable fear interview as to a third country
from which the Department of State had received “credible diplomatic assurances” that individuals removed to that
country would not be persecuted or tortured.
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statute.” Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 105 (2020). Congress has
provided for third-country removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1), and Respondents invoke that
statutory authority here. Individuals in Petitioner’s position “are entitled to notice and
opportunity to be heard ‘appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Trump v. J.G.G., 145 S. Ct. 1003,
1006 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950)). As this
Court concluded in Aranda-Gomez, the March 2025 Guidance, to the extent that it provides for a
reasonable fear interview, complies with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. While
Petitioner identifies additional protections that would benefit her–i.e., a lower standard of review,
additional time to prepare—neither the Fifth Amendment nor the governing statutes require those
protections.
2. APA Claim
Petitioner also argues that Respondents violated the APA by failing to follow the third-
country removal procedures that they promulgated. In particular, Petitioner argues that
Respondents’ failure to “issue a fear determination to Petitioner before attempting to deport her
to Mexico” constitutes “a clear violation of an agency rule and is thus by definition arbitrary and
capricious.” (Am. Pet., Doc. 5, ¶ 90) But Petitioner later acknowledges that she received notice of
her negative reasonable fear determination, albeit only as an exhibit that Respondents filed in this
case. (Reply, Doc. 18, 14–15) Given the factual development, the Court finds this issue moot.
D. Challenge to Fine Imposed Under 8 U.S.C. § 1815
Petitioner challenges the $5,000 fine that Respondents imposed upon her based on
Section 1815. She contends that the statute by its own terms cannot apply to her, and that even if
it did, doing so would violate her constitutional rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
Congress enacted Section 1815 in July 2025, mandating that “the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall require the payment of a fee, equal to the amount specified in subsection (b), by any
inadmissible alien at the time such alien is apprehended between ports of entry.” 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1815(a). In turn, subsection (b) sets the fee at “the greater of (A) $5,000; or (B) such amount as
the Secretary of Homeland Security may establish, by rule.” 8 U.S.C. § 1815(b)(1).
Petitioner construes the statute as requiring “two independent findings: (1) that the
noncitizen was apprehended between ports of entry, and (2) that the noncitizen is inadmissible
under INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).” (Am. Pet., Doc. 5, § 116) She argues that her
circumstances place her outside of these criteria because she “was not apprehended between ports
of entry at the time DHS issued the fee assessment[,]” as her present detention began “during a
routine, previously scheduled ICE check-in at the ICE building in Baltimore, not at or between
ports of entry.” (Id. at ¶ 117) In addition to her statutory argument, Petitioner also argues that the
fine is impermissible under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments because she received no notice or
opportunity to challenge the fine, and the fine represents a penalty that is “grossly
disproportionate” to her conduct of crossing the border unlawfully. (Id. at ¶ 121) In support of
these arguments, she cites to a district court decision that determined that a similar fee imposed
under Section 1815 was unconstitutional. See F.R.P. v. Wamsley, No. 3:25-CV-01917-AN, 2026
WL 482184 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2026).
As a threshold matter, Respondents contest that Petitioner can challenge the fine in a
habeas action. (MSJ, Doc. 16, 11) Although Respondents provide only cursory argument in
support of this argument, the Court agrees. A detained individual files a habeas action to contest
her detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Courts also apply Section 2241 to consider certain constitutional
challenges to the removal of a noncitizen, see, e.g., J.G.G., 145 S. Ct. at 1005 (citing cases
summarizing relief available in habeas), but those cases also concern the detention and control
over the individual. In contrast, courts have recognized that an individual cannot utilize a habeas
action to challenge an imposed fine. See, e.g., Spring v. Caldwell, 692 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir.
1982) (rejecting habeas jurisdiction where petitioner challenged only his fine). While those cases
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have arisen in criminal matters, the legal principle holds true in a civil context, such as this
lawsuit. Petitioner’s challenge of the imposed fine does not affect her detention or her removal.
It is true that in some circumstances, a court that sets aside a conviction within a habeas
action can also “correct the unlawful result of the conviction[,]” such as a fine. United States v.
Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir. 1973). Doing so avoids the necessity of the individual having
to bring a separate action to vacate a fine that could not have been imposed, given the setting aside
of the conviction that formed the basis of the fine. In the current case, however, Petitioner has
not succeeded in her principal claims challenging her detention and the procedures for her
removal to a third country. In essence, no need exists to “correct the unlawful result” of her
detention or third-country removal, as the Court has not found in her favor on those issues. As a
result, the Court finds that this case does not present the limited circumstances when courts have
found it appropriate to allow a habeas petitioner to challenge an imposed fine.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner Jenny Karina Guerra Gutierrez de
Guerra succeeds only to the extent that Respondents must provide her with the notice and
reasonable fear interview described in the Secretary’s 2025 Guidance before removing her to a
third country. As to Mexico, the record reflects that Respondents have afforded Petitioner with
these procedural protections. Still, in the event that Respondents do not proceed with removal of
Petitioner to Mexico, but in the future desire to remove her to another country, the Court will
enter a permanent injunction in accordance with this Order and Opinion. As a result, it is:
ORDERED that Petitioner Jenny Karina Guerra Gutierrez de Guerra’s First Amended
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 5) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART,
as indicated in this Order and Opinion and within the Permanent Injunction that the Court will
issue in connection with this Order and Opinion; and
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ORDERED that Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) is GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as indicated in this Order and Opinion and within the
Permanent Injunction that the Court will issue in connection with this Order and Opinion.
Aside from the relief afforded Petitioner in the Court’s Permanent Injunction, all other
relief that she requests is DENIED.
This is a final and appealable Order.
Signed on April 30, 2026.
____________________________
Fernando Rodriguez, Jr.
United States District Judge
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