Reyna et al v. Exxon Mobile Corporation et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
JOSEPH ANTHONY REYNA,1 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-cv-194
§
EXXON MOBILE CORP., et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§
ORDER GRANTING IFP MOTION (Dkt. No. 2) AND
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR DISMISSAL OF RULE 27 MOTION
I. 	Synopsis
Joseph Anthony Reyna wants to use Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
perpetuate testimony and preserve evidence against Exxon in what he alleges will be a federal
lawsuit regarding air pollution. Mr. Reyna does not plead the requirements of Rule 27, and this
Court recommends denial of his request and dismissal of this suit.
II. 	Background
On September 3, 2025, Plaintiff Joseph Anthony Reyna (“Reyna”) filed “Verified Rule 27
Petition to Perpetuate Testimony and Preserve Evidence” in the Southern District of Texas,
Brownsville Division. Dkt. No. 1. Reyna identifies the following Defendants: “Exxon Mobil
Corporation; Exxon Mobil Pipeline Company; Exxon Mobil Foundation; and John Does 1-25
(affiliates, ESG vendors, records custodians).” Dkt. No. 1, p. 3. Reyna states he expects to be a
party to a future action against Exxon Mobil based on several federal environmental statutes and
some environmental statutes from the state of Texas. Dkt. No. 1, p. 2. He alleges that he needs pre-
suit discovery to preserve evidence and to perpetuate testimony from the adverse parties. Dkt. No.
1, pp. 1-2.
III. 	Procedural Leniency for Unrepresented Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs proceeding without a legal representative are considered pro se plaintiffs and
1 Reyna names two petitioners in his case, himself and the corporation Dreams over Dollars. Dkt. No. 1, p.
1. He claims to represent both parties. Id. Only natural persons can represent themselves, and corporations
may not appear in federal court without an attorney. See Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S.
194, 202 (1993) and Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR, 385 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1982). Therefore, the Court
recognizes only Plaintiff Reyna in this action.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 21, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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receive the benefit of liberal construction of their claims. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d
524, 527 (5th Cir. 2006). However, pro se pleadings must still contain sufficient facts to support
their claims, and the plaintiff is still required to “fundamentally abide by the rules that govern the
federal courts.” United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1993); Fryer v. United States,
EP-19-CV-00134-DCG-ATB, 	2020 	WL 	6588397, 	at 	*3 	(W.D. 	Tex. 	July 	20, 	2020)
(quoting E.E.O.C. v Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014)). A party's pro se status does
not create an “impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the
judicial 	machinery 	with 	meritless 	litigation, 	and 	abuse 	already 	overloaded 	court
dockets.” Farguson v. Mbank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
IV. 	Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Title 28, Section 1915(a)(1) of the United States Code provides that “any court of the
United States may authorize the commencement . . . of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or
criminal . . . without prepayment of fees . . . by a person who submits an affidavit . . . that the
person is unable to pay such fees . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). An applicant need not be
“absolutely destitute” to benefit from this statute. Hayes v. U.S., 71 Fed. Cl. 366, 369 (Fed. Cl.
2006) (citing Adkins v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)).
In his IFP application, Reyna indicated he has minimal cash on hand, no real property, no
substantive personal property, and a minimal household income. Dkt. No. 2. After reviewing
Reyna’s application, the Court finds he cannot pay the filing fee without experiencing undue
financial hardship.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Reyna’s in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 2) and
ORDERS the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be filed without pre-payment of fees or costs.
This in forma pauperis status is granted subject to later determination that Reyna’s Rule
27 petition should be dismissed if the allegation of poverty is either untrue, or if the action is found
to be either frivolous or malicious under § 1915(e)(2). The Court may still impose costs of court
against a petitioner at the conclusion of a lawsuit. Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir.
1994).
V. 	Reyna’s Petition is improper under Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27 pertains to depositions to perpetuate testimony prior to
trial. Ash v. Cort, 512 F.2d 909, 911 (3d Cr. 1975). Pursuant to Rule 27(a)(1), the petition is filed
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by a “person who wants to perpetuate testimony about any matter cognizable in a United States
court. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 27. The petition “must ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to
depose the named persons [] to perpetuate their testimony.” Id. The rule provides further
requirements for the petition, stating
[t]he petition must be titled in the petitioner’s name and must show:
(A) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a United
States court but cannot presently bring it or cause it to be brought;
(B) the subject matter of the expected action and the petitioner's interest;
(C) the facts that the petitioner wants to establish by the proposed testimony and
the reasons to perpetuate it;
(D) the names or a description of the persons whom the petitioner expects to be
adverse parties and their addresses, so far as known; and
(E) the name, address, and expected substance of the testimony of each deponent.
Id.
The Rule “is not a substitute for discovery” and “is available in special circumstances to
preserve testimony which could otherwise be lost.” Ash, 512 F.2d at 912. Additionally, “Rule 27
is not appropriate for the purpose of discovering facts for a future lawsuit.” Robinson v. Winslow
Twp., No. 10-2824, 2010 WL 3326678, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2010). “Rule 27 simply authorizes
the perpetuation of evidence, not the discovery or uncovering of it.” In re Vratoric, No. 02:09–
mc–00284, 2009 WL 3526562 (W. D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) at *2. Additionally, “[c]ourts generally
agree that to allow Rule 27 to be used for the purpose of discovery before an action is commenced
to enable a person to fish for some ground for bringing suit would be an abuse of the rule.” Id.
Rule 27 also “requires that a petitioner demonstrate an immediate need to perpetuate evidence.”
In re Landry-Bell, 232 F.R.D. 266 (E. D. La. 2005) (internal citation omitted). General allegations
that evidence may be lost are insufficient. Id. (citing Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
68 F.3d 1371 (D.C.Cir.1995)).
Reyna admits at least one purpose for filing his Rule 27 petition not permitted by the rule,
because he writes that he “seeks pre-suit discovery.” Dkt. No. 1, p. 1. A Rule 27 petition cannot
be used to commence discovery before filing an action. See In re Ramirez, 241 F.R.D. 595, 596
(W.D. Tex. 2006) (“It is well-established in case law that perpetuation means the perpetuation of
known testimony.”).
Additionally, one of Reyna’s asserted reasons for not bringing the action now is because
“ephemeral retention makes complaint impossible without preservation.” Dkt. No. 1, p. 8.
Seemingly, he argues that he cannot make his complaint without access to these “ephemeral
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datasets” he refers to in his petition. Id. at p. 2. However, “Rule 27 simply authorizes the
perpetuation of evidence, not the discovery or uncovering of it.” In re Vratoric, 2009 WL 3526562
at *2.
Reyna also requests document production, a preservation order, a custodian list, limited
monitoring, a protective order, and notice to the Texas Attorney General. These requests show
Reyna’s use of a Rule 27 petition is improper, because he is essentially requesting Defendant
produce information as if discovery had commenced. See Robinson, 2010 WL 3326678, at *5
(“Rule 27 is not appropriate for the purpose of discovering facts for a future lawsuit.”).
Although Reyna requests “Depositions on written questions,” Reyna does not provide the
names of the expected adverse parties and their addresses. Dkt. No. 1, p. 7; See Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
27(a). Even if “Exxon Custodian of records; Port of Brownsville Records Officer; TCEQ Region
15 monitoring director” qualified as providing a “description of the person” expected to be the
adverse party, Reyna does not provide their addresses “so far as known.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 27(a).
Reyna also fails to provide “the name, address, and expected substance of the testimony of each
deponent” as required under FRCP 27(a)(1)(E).
Reyna writes that his petition is “necessary to avoid spoliation of ephemeral datasets . . .
that will otherwise vanish before a complaint can be pled with specificity” (emphasis in original).
Dkt. No. 1, p. 2. However, the conclusory statement that the ephemeral datasets “will otherwise
vanish” does not actually show the Court that this evidence will likely be lost before he is able to
file a lawsuit. See Ash, 512 F.2d at 912-13.
Moreover, Reyna points to datasets. Although datasets may aid a witness in providing
testimony, Reyna’s concern with the datasets demonstrates his petition is not truly concerned with
the perpetuation of testimony but, instead, with the discovery of data.
All in all, in his petition, Reyna does not show this is one of the special circumstances
where known testimony could be lost if not preserved prior to commencing an action. Ash, 512
F.2d at 912 (stating that Rule 27 “is available in special circumstances to preserve testimony which
could otherwise be lost.”). See In re Landry-Bell, 232 F.R.D. at 266 (stating that general allegations
evidence may be lost are insufficient).
For these reasons, Reyna’s Rule 27 petition is improper. Accordingly, this Court
recommends denying Reyna’s petition (Dkt. No. 1).
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VI. 	Frivolousness Review Under Section 1915(e)(2).
Because the Court grants Reyna leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is now
required to review Reyna’s cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Dismissal of a complaint prior to service of the defendants is authorized to “discourage the
filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants
generally do not initiate because of . . . the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). For
these reasons, the Court may dismiss a case on its own motion; the Court is not required to wait
until a defendant has been served, at taxpayer expense, and has moved for dismissal. Id.
Further, 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1915(e)(2) provides 	for sua 	sponte dismissal 	of 	a 	complaint
filed in forma pauperis if the Court determines at any time the action is (i) frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Amrhein v. United States,
740 F. App'x 65,66 (5th Cir. 2018) (“A district court must sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint in
a civil action at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune.”).
“Before dismissing a pro se litigant's case for failure to state a claim, a district court
ordinarily must give the litigant an opportunity to amend his complaint to remedy the deficiencies.”
Graves v. Cain, 734 Fed. Appx. 914, 915 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th
Cir. 1994)). The report and recommendation of a United States Magistrate Judge provides
sufficient notice of the Court's intent to dismiss, and the 14-day objections period provides time
for a response. Alexander v. Trump, 753 F. App'x 201, 208 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Magouirk v.
Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1998).
Reyna states 	he “anticipate[s] 	litigation” against 	“Exxon 	Mobil 	Corporation” and
affiliates.” Dkt. No. 1, p. 1. The anticipated litigation “aris[es] from operations affecting Cameron
and Willacy Counties, Texas.” Dkt. No. 1, p. 1. The operations are “Exxon’s port transfers,
pipeline transport, waste-handling practices, and affiliated LNG/export investments.” Reyna
appears to argue that these operations “impose disproportionate burdens on predominantly
Hispanic, low-income communities in the Rio Grande Valley.” Dkt. No. 1, p. 2. Reyna claims
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standing “arises personally (as resident, heir, whistleblower)[.]”2 Dkt. No. 1, p. 3.
Reyna’s admittedly anticipated litigation is not equal to filing an actual lawsuit against
another party. Reading Reyna’s Petition in the light most favorable to him, Reyna does not provide
facts to support his claim that the Defendants’ operations are burdening the local community.
Further, even though Reyna claims to be a resident, he provides the court with a mailing address
outside the area he claims is affected by Defendants’ actions. Reyna also claims to be RGV-born
and heir to land in Starr County, but none of these alleged facts suggest Reyna has been injured by
Defendants’ conduct in Cameron and Willacy counties.
Even with a liberal reading, Reyna’s claims lack a legal basis because the Court cannot
discern the gravamen of his complaint. These claims are “so insubstantial, implausible, . . . or
otherwise completely devoid of merit” that the Court lacks federal jurisdiction to entertain them.
Atakapa Indian de Creolo Nation v. Louisiana, 943 F.3d 1004, 1006 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cty., 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)).
For these reasons, the Court recommends Reyna’s action be dismissed as frivolous.
VII. 	Recommendation
The Court RECOMMENDS DISMISSISING Reyna’s Rule 27 Petition as improper under Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 27 (Dkt. No. 1).
The Court RECOMMENDS DISMISSING Reyna’s suit without prejudice as frivolous under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
VIII. 	Notice to Parties
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report
and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with the United States District
Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party filing objection must specifically identify the factual or legal
findings to which objections are being made. The District Judge is not required to consider
frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419,
421 (5th Cir. 1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
2 Reyna also claims standing “arises . . . organizationally (as director of a nonprofit serving
Cameron/Willacy).” Dkt. No. 1, p. 3. However, this Court does not recognize the organization “Dreams
over Dollars” as a plaintiff, because it is not represented by legal counsel. See n. 1 of this Order and Report
and Recommendation. Additionally, Reyna does not name himself as director of the corporation. For these
reasons, the Court does not consider this statement as an argument for standing on behalf the corporation.
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Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the record
before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings without
conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings on appeal,
except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243,
248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on November 21, 2025.
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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