Dizon v. McKnight

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
WICHITA FALLS DIVISION
ALFRED DIZON, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 7:26-cv-00016-O-BP
§
JEFF EVERETT MCKNIGHT, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In this case, pro se Plaintiff Alfred Dizon sues Jeff McKnight, the presiding judge of the
30th Judicial District Court of Wichita County, Texas, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of
his fourteenth amendment due process rights and the federal criminal statute 18 U.S.C. § 242. ECF
No. 9 at 1-2. On February 18, 2026, the Court ordered Dizon to show cause as to why this Court
has subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. ECF No. 5. After considering the Amended
Complaint, Dizon’s response to the show cause order, and applicable legal authorities, the
undersigned recommends that Chief United States District Judge Reed O’Connor DISMISS
Dizon’s claim under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and DISMISS his constitutional claims without prejudice.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Subject matter jurisdiction
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). District courts “must presume
that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction
rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th
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Cir. 2001). A federal court has an independent duty, at any level of the proceedings, to determine
whether it properly has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their
own initiative even at the highest level.”); McDonal v. Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177, 182 n.5 (5th
Cir. 2005) (“[A] federal court may raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.”).
A court will not assume it has jurisdiction. Rather, “the basis upon which jurisdiction
depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established argumentatively or
by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted). And sua sponte dismissal is mandatory when a court discovers that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3)). Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction are without prejudice. Id. (citing Mitchell v.
Bailey, 982 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2020)).
B. 	Sovereign immunity
Under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, states may not be sued in federal court
unless they unequivocally consent to the suit or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of
power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate immunity. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment also bars § 1983 claims against
agencies of a state or officials sued in their official capacities. Fox v. Mississippi, 551 Fed. Appx.
772, 774-775 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir. 2010)).
However, there are three possible exceptions to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity:
(1) for claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against a state official under Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908); (2) a state’s waiver or consent, Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,
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267 (1997); and (3) Congress’s abrogation of the state’s immunity through section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001).
Young allows only the granting of “prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing
violation of federal law” against state officers in their official capacities and does not allow
damages or other retrospective relief. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). “Determining if
the exception applies involves ‘a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Spec’s
Fam. Partners, Ltd. v. Nettles, 972 F.3d 671, 680 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Va. Off. for Protection
& Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011) (cleaned up)).
Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar. See Carver, 18 F.4th at 497. “Because sovereign
immunity deprives the court of jurisdiction, the claims barred by sovereign immunity can be
dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice.” Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., Tex., 88 F.3d
341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996). And because sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar, it may be raised
sua sponte. Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Burge
v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1999).
C. 	Judicial immunity
Judicial immunity is an absolute immunity from suit, not just from the ultimate assessment
of damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Allegations of bad faith, malice, or corruption
do not overcome judicial immunity. Id. Judicial immunity is inapplicable only when: (1) a judge
takes an action that is not within his or her official capacity; or (2) as it concerns judicial actions
“taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. Courts must construe jurisdiction broadly
for purposes of judicial immunity. Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)).
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D. 	Dismissal with or without leave to amend
It is a “well-established policy that the plaintiff be given every opportunity to state a claim.”
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The decision to allow amendment
of the pleadings is within the sound discretion of the Court. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d
1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994). In determining whether to allow an amendment of the pleadings, the
Court considers: undue delay in the proceedings, undue prejudice to the opposing parties,
timeliness of the amendment, and futility of the amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962); Chitimacha Tribe of La. v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1163 (5th Cir.
1982). “At some point, a court must decide that a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make [his]
case; if, after that time, a cause of action has not been established, the court should finally dismiss
the suit.” Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986); Schiller v. Physicians
Resource Group Inc., 342 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2003).
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Sovereign immunity applies to Dizon’s claims.
Dizon does not specify whether he sues Judge McKnight in his official or individual
capacity. However, Dizon sues McKnight for “allowing/condoning his forged signature” on a final
order granting summary judgment. ECF No. 9 at 3. These alleged unconstitutional actions all took
place while Judge McKnight was performing his official duties as judge of the 30th Judicial
District Court of Wichita County, Texas. As a result, Dizon’s suit is against McKnight in his
official capacity.
“Official-capacity suits are not ‘against the official personally, for the real party in interest
is the entity.’” Diaz v. Cantu, 123 F.4th 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 166, (1985)). “For purposes of state sovereign immunity, the relevant question is whether
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‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’” Id. (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
663, (1974)).
Texas district courts are “arms of the state,” and therefore their judges are entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Diaz, 123 F.4th at 745. Dizon alleges Judge McKnight violated
his constitutional rights. ECF No. 9 at 1. However, Dizon neither pleaded nor directed the Court
to authority showing that the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cox v. Texas, 354 F. App’x 901, 903 (5th Cir. 2009). The
Supreme Court has expressly held that § 1983 does not abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 n.7 (1979) (“section 1983 does not
explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the
States[.]”); Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp., 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Section 1981
contains no congressional waiver of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).
Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment bars Dizon’s claims against Judge McKnight in his
official capacity because the State of Texas has not consented to suit, and Congress has not
abrogated the state’s immunity. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Dizon’s claims against
Judge McKnight to the extent he sues in his official capacity, without prejudice.
B. 	Judicial immunity bars Dizon’s claims against Judge McKnight.
Even if sovereign immunity did not apply, because Judge McKnight enjoys judicial
immunity from civil actions for any judicial act over which the 30th Judicial District Court has
jurisdiction, dismissal is proper. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335,
351 (1871)). Repeatedly, federal courts have found that judges are absolutely immune from claims
for damages arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions. Ramirez v.
Abdal Khallaq, 4:17-cv-093-Y, 2019 WL 764420, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2019); Morgan v. City
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of Fort Worth, Tex., 4:13-cv-004-Y, 2013 WL 3196580, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2013); see
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1988) & Stump, 435 U.S.
at 360); see also Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994).
A plaintiff can overcome absolute judicial immunity only if he shows that the alleged
actions were nonjudicial in nature or that the actions were taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284. Section 1983 also provides absolute
judicial immunity to judicial officers against claims for injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
None of Dizon’s claims relate to nonjudicial acts by Judge McKnight nor actions that he
took in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284.
Because the pleadings show that Judge McKnight’s actions in the state case were within his
capacity as a district judge, he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from Dizon’s claims in this
case. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 (“District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and
original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive,
appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other
court, tribunal, or administrative body.”); see also Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75
(Tex. 2000) (“A Texas district court . . . is a court of general jurisdiction” and “all claims are
presumed to fall within the jurisdiction of the district court unless the Legislature or Congress has
provided that they must be heard elsewhere.”).
Dizon’s accusations do not defeat Judge McKnight’s judicial immunity. Accordingly, the
Court should dismiss Dizon’s claims. See Devabhaktuni v. Godbey, No. 3:19-cv-2215-K, 2019
WL 5068557, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2019) (adopting the findings of the magistrate judge,
recommending dismissal of claims barred by judicial immunity).
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C. 	There is no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 242.
Even if sovereign and judicial immunities did not apply, Dizon’s claim under 18 U.S.C. §
242 is improper. The law does not provide Dizon with a private right of action to pursue civil
liability for violation of criminal statutes, as private citizens generally have “no standing to institute
a federal criminal prosecution and no power to enforce a criminal statute.” Gill v. Texas, 153 F.
App’x 261, 262 (5th Cir. 2005). Dizon explicitly bring claims under 18 U.S.C. § 242, a criminal
statute. ECF No. 9 at 2. Dizon cannot assert such a violation of the criminal provisions of the
United States Code as a claim for civil liability. Pinedo v. City of Dall., Tex., No. 3:14-cv-0958-
D, 2015 WL 221085, n.3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2015); Gill, 153 F. App’x at 262. To the extent Dizon
claims violations of federal criminal statutes, he does not state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, and the Court should dismiss his claim. See Armbrister v. McFarland, No. 3:18-cv-1211-
B-BH, 2018 WL 6004310, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018), rec. adopted, No. 3:18-cv-1211-B-
BH, 2018 WL 5994992 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2018) (finding that “courts ‘have repeatedly held that
violations of criminal statutes . . . do not give rise to a private right of action’ and dismissed such
claims with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6).”) (quoting Leeds v. Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective
Servs., No. 3:14-cv-3578-N-BK, 2015 WL 4736567, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2015)).
D. 	Dismissal is appropriate because the Court lacks jurisdiction to review state
court decisions on an appellate basis.
Dizon prays that this Court enter judgment against Judge McKnight and grant him a federal
jury trial in his case now pending in state court. ECF No. 9 at 5. To the extent that Dizon objects
to Judge McKnight’s judgment, Dizon’s “recourse [is] with the state appellate courts and thereafter
the United States Supreme Court on application for a writ of certiorari, not by a complaint to the
federal district court.” Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1994). Dizon claims
that this Court is a “Higher Court” under Section 41.001(4) of the Texas Civil Practice and
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Remedies Code. ECF No. 7. But this is incorrect. First, this United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas is established under federal law, not a Texas state court organized under
the laws of Texas such as the 30th Judicial District Court where Dizon’s case is pending. Second,
the cited provision of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code defines “economic damages” and does
not address jurisdiction of this Court or any state court. “[F]ederal district courts, as courts of
original jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state
courts.” Union Planters Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004). “[S]tripped
to essentials, [Dizon’s claim] is an attack on the judgment of the state district court,” and therefore
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate. Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 318. Because Dizon has stated
no facts that support this Court’s jurisdiction over his pending state court case, the Court should
dismiss Dizon’s complaint without prejudice.
E. 	The dismissal should be without leave to amend.
Dizon does not plead any basis upon which the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
his Amended Complaint. He already has filed his Complaint, response to the show cause order,
and the Amended Complaint, and each filing contains several pages stating the facts of his case.
See ECF Nos. 1, 7, 9. Nevertheless, Dizon has not stated facts to establish any basis for this Court’s
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Dizon has pleaded his best case and that further
amendment of the Amended Complaint to address the deficiencies noted above would be futile.
Therefore, the Court’s dismissal should be without leave to amend.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Dizon has not established a basis upon which this Court may exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over his complaint. Sua sponte dismissal is mandatory. Carver, 18 F.4th at 497 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)). Additionally, sovereign and judicial immunities bar Dizon’s claims.
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Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief Judge O’Connor DISMISS Dizon’s
claim under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and DISMISS his constitutional claims without prejudice.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties
in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions,
and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with
a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). To be specific, an objection
must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis
for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates
by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file
specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except
upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the
time to file objections to 14 days).
SIGNED on March 5, 2026.
______________________________________
Hal R. Ray, Jr.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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