Mack v. Walker et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
CARLTON W. MACK,
Institutional ID No. 02384519
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Plaintiff,
V. 	No. S:24-CV-250-BV
OFFICER WALKER, et al.,
Defendants.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED ST ATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Proceeding prose and informa pauperis, Plaintiff Carlton W. Mack filed this
civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that during his incarceration at the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) John Montford Unit, Defendants violated
his right to privacy, verbally harassed him, retaliated against him, discriminated against
him, and violated the First Amendment. 	Dkt. No. 6. 1 Because Mack has failed to plead
sufficient facts showing Defendants violated his constitutional rights, the undersigned
recommends to the United States District Judge that all Mack's claims be dismissed
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 191S(e)(2)(B) and 191SA(b).
1. 	This case was referred for preliminary screening.
The United States District Judge transferred this case to the undersigned
magistrate judge for further proceedings, including preliminary screening under §§ 191 S
1 The Comt recognizes Mack's amended complaint as the operative pleading. Dkt. No. 6.
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and 191 SA. Dkt. No. 10. TDCJ refused to comply with a request for authenticated
records, and the undersigned screened Mack's claims based solely on his complaint and
responses to a timely returned questionnaire pursuant to Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886,
892-93 (5th Cir. 1976). Dkt. Nos. 24, 25; see also Dkt. Nos. 12, 14. Not all parties have
consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, so these findings, conclusions, and
recommendation are entered in accordance with the transfer order.
2. 	Mack claims that multiple defendants violated his civil rights.
Mack's claims stem from incidents that he alleges occurred while he as housed at
the Montford Unit. See generally Dkt. No. 6. He sues: (1) Correctional Officer Walker;
(2) Correctional Officer Brittany Duncan; (3) Sargeant Kobe Gutierrez; (4) Sargeant
Godlove Tse; ( 5) Investigator A. Ballard; ( 6) Major Clayton Straughan; and (7) other
Montford Unit "officials," medical staff, and COs. Dkt. No. 6 at 1, 3, 6. 2
Mack asserts that Major Clayton Straughan oversees the Montford Unit's camera
system. Dkt. Nos. 6 at 8; 25 at 2. 	Mack claims that a former Montford employee who
now works at the Formby Unit informed Mack that a compromising video of him in the
shower exists, and Mack believes the video have been created by Straughan. Dkt. Nos. 6
at 8; 25 at 2, 4 (alleging that "[t]he camera system is connected to Major Straughan's
computer and phone that he's always watching" (cleaned up)). Mack alleges that
Assistant Warden David Reed Jr. also watched the video, as well as other videos. Dkt.
No. 25 at 2, 4 (claiming Straughan and Reed sit in Straughan's office "with the lights off
2 Page citations to Mack's pleadings refer to the electronic page number assigned by the Court's
electronic filing system.
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replaying videos and watching the cameras"). Mack also claims that Straughan and Reed
watch while Mack and others are strip-searched. Id. at 2; Dkt. No. 6 at 8-9. But Mack
also maintains that because Straughan "can't watch the cameras of men in the state of
undress[,] [h]e's lurking on the trusty camp" and waits for men to shower. Dkt. No. 6 at
8-9. Mack says that on one occasion, Straughan watched Mack shower in person. Id.;
Dkt. No. 25 at 4-5.
Mack contents that "maintenance inmate workers" spread the compromising video
of Mack. Dkt. No. 25 at 2. Mack claims that many correctional officers-including
Officers Walker and Duncan-verbally harassed Mack on account of the video, which
humiliated him. Dkt. Nos. 6 at 4; 25 at 1. Mack grieved Duncan's conduct, and Duncan
allegedly retaliated. Dkt. No. 25 at 1. Specifically, Duncan "and her co-workers set it up
for an inmate ... to assault [Mack] with bodily fluids[,] urine[,] and feces from a bottle."
Dkt. No. 6 at 6. Mack contends that he was picking up food trays with Correctional
Officer John Doe, and when Doe opened the slot, an inmate threw the substances on
Mack, while Doe moved away unhit. Dkt. No. 25 at 2.
In addition, Mack avers that Defendants discriminated. 	Dkt. Nos. 6 at 3; 25 at 3,
5-6. Finally, Mack alleges that Ballard violated his First Amendment rights by "failing
to file [his] grievances." Dkt. No. 25 at 6. 	Mack seeks monetary damages for the alleged
constitutional violations. Dkt. No. 6 at 4.
3. 	A plaintiff must state a claim on which relief can be granted.
A court must dismiss a complaint filed informa pauperis by a prisoner against a
government entity or employee if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or
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malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
(2017); see also § 191 SA(b) (applying section to any suit by a prisoner against certain
governmental entities, regardless of whether the prisoner is proceeding in Jonna
pauper is). An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either fact or law.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in
law if it embraces indisputably meritless legal theories. See id. at 327. It lacks an
arguable basis in fact if it rests on clearly fanciful or baseless factual contentions. Id. at
328; see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1992).
When analyzing a prisoner's complaint, the court may consider reliable evidence
such as the plaintiffs allegations, responses to a questionnaire, and authenticated prison
records. See Reny v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504,507 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that responses
to a questionnaire are incorporated into the plaintiffs pleadings); Banuelos v.
McFarland, 41 F.3d 232,234 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that courts may dismiss prisoners'
informa pauperis claims as frivolous based on "medical and other prison records if they
are adequately identified or authenticated" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts
should accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and should not credit conclusory
allegations or assertions that merely restate the legal elements of a claim. Chhim v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467,469 (5th Cir. 2016). Although prose pleadings are held
to less stringent standards than those prepared by lmvyers, plaintiffs must still plead
factual allegations "that raise the right to relief above the speculative level." Id.; see also
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Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (reiterating that
conclusory allegations will not suffice).
4. 	Analysis
A. Mack cannot state a claim against Defendants based on alleged verbal
harassment.
Verbal harassment or abusive language, no matter how repugnant or
unprofessional, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Bender v. Brumley, l F.3d
271,274 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Mere allegations of verbal abuse do not present actionable
claims under§ 1983."); Jane Doe 5 v. City of Haltom City, 106 F. App'x 906,908 (5th
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) ("Verbal sexual harassment does not violate a detainee or
inmate's constitutional rights .... "); Robertson v. Plano City of Tex., 70 F.3d 21, 24 (5th
Cir. 1995) ("[M]ere threatening language and gestures of a custodial office[r] do not,
even if true, amount to constitutional violations." (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Thus, Mack's claim that Defendants made inappropriate comments about his
sexual orientation, used sexual epithets, homophobic slurs, or otherwise engaged in
name-calling cannot survive screening. See Dkt. No. 6 at 4, 6 (describing alleged terms
Defendants used, including "faggot," "sissy," "snitch," and "down low brother").
In some cases, an officer's labeling of a prisoner as a "snitch" or other terms can
rise to the level ofa constitutional violation. See, e.g., Schreane v. Beemon, 575 F. App'x
486,492 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Those cases, however, evaluate a prisoner's claim
based on whether the officer violated the Eighth Amendment's duty-to-protect "by
exposing a prisoner to physical assault through [the] labeling." Id. 	Here, Mack
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complains about the verbal comments, but he pleads no facts indicating the comments
subjected him to a substantial risk of serious harm. See Dkt. No. 6 at 4, 6 (listing a slew
of dates on which officers called him derogatory terms but including no allegation that it
resulted actual or potential harm); Dkt. No. 25 at 3, 5 (describing comments but making
no allegation of harm from other inmates or officers); White v. Fox, 470 F. App'x 214,
220 (5th Cir. 2012) ("To establish a failure-to-protect claim, a prisoner must show that he
was 'incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection."' (quoting Neals
v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995)).
In sum, any claim against Defendants based on verbal harassment should be
dismissed.
B. Mack's claims based on Straughan's and Reed's alleged voyeurism should
be dismissed.
Mack asserts two claims related to the alleged voyeurism. First, he alleges that
Straughan and Reed watched the cameras while Mack was strip searched and while he
showered and that Straughan watched Mack shower in person. 	Dkt. Nos. 6 at 6, 8; 25 at
2, 4. Mack also contends that "maintenance inmate workers" spread a compromising
video ofMack in the shower, which Mack believes was obtained from Straughan, though
he pleads no specific facts in support of this assumption. Dkt. Nos. 6 at 8; 25 at 2, 4. The
Court construes Mack's allegations as claims for violation of privacy and sexual
harassment.
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Right to Privacy
Inmates "have a minimal right to bodily privacy," particularly when weighed
against the legitimate security needs of a prison. 	Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App'x 375,
380 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir.
2002)); see Oliver, 276 F.3d at 744-45 (describing prisoner's privacy right as "minimal,
at best," under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments). Mack "could claim a privacy
right under either the Fourth Amendment (applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment) or the Court's substantive due process doctrine." Oliver, 276 F.3d at 744.
But under either, he does not have a viable claim.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a court must first determine "whether the activity
intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy in such a significant way to make the
activity a search." Ordaz v. Martin, No. 93-4170, I 993 WL 373830, at *4 (5th Cir. Sep.
15, 1993) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Ifthere has been
a search, then a court considers "whether the governmental intrusion was unreasonable
given the particular facts of the case." Id. (citation omitted)
For substantive due process claims, the Fifth Circuit has relied on the Turner
factors to evaluate the balance between the prisoner's minimal privacy right and a
prison's security needs:
(I) whether there is a "valid, rational connection between the prison
regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it,"
(2) "whether there are alternative means of justifying that right that remain
open to prison inmates," (3) "the impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources generally," and (4) "whether the absence of
ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation."
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Garrett, 560 F. App'x at 380 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)); see
Oliver, 276 F.3d at 745 (applying the Turner factors in evaluating prisoner's privacy
claim under substantive due process clause). 	Weighing these factors, the Fifth Circuit
has held "that constant surveillance, even cross-sex surveillance, of prisoners is
constitutional because it is reasonably related to the penological interest of maintaining
security." Garrett, 560 F. App'x at 380 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Bathrooms and showers could serve as harbors for inmate-on-inmate violence and
sexual assaults." Oliver, 276 F.3d at 746. "[C]onstant visual monitoring" ensures the
safety of inmates and staff (id.); "doing away with security cameras in the bathroom
and dressing areas could require the prison to increase staffing," among other
consequences. Garrett, 560 F. App'x at 380.
Mack generally complains that Straughan and Reed's ability to watch camera
footage and Straughan's viewing of Mack in the shower are invasions of privacy and are
not related to "a safety or security issue." Dkt. No. 25 at 4. But Mack has no expectation
of privacy in the community spaces of the prison such that he could state a Fourth
Amendment claim. See Garrett, 560 F. App'x at 380 (rejecting plaintiffs contention that
cameras in restrooms, showers, and dressing areas violated the Fourth Amendment);
Ordaz, 1993 WL 373830, at *4-5 (concluding "prisoner has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the 'curtilage' surrounding his prison cell" and therefore could not state Fourth
Amendment claim based on guards "linger[ing] unnecessarily in front of his prison cell"
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to watch him in lewd act). 	So, he cannot establish a Fourth Amendment claim. See
Ordaz, 1993 WL 373830, at *4-5.
Moreover, Mack pleads no facts showing that Straughan and Reed's monitoring of
the cameras or Straughan's in-person monitoring are for some purpose other than
security. Ce1tainly, Mack implies that Straughan and Reed are viewing the video footage
or watching Mack in the shower for their own gratification. See Dkt. No. 25 at 4. But
Mack provides no facts in support of that belief apart from his own inferences.
Regarding the video footage, he merely asserts that Straughan and Reed's "replaying and
watching the cameras" in the dark shows they have "ulterior motives." Id. 	As to
Straughan's presence at the shower, he purportedly stared at a naked Mack while asking,
"Is it cleaned in here?" and then concluding, "Fairly clean." Dkt. No. 6 at 8.
These allegations are insufficient to show that the monitoring is for a non-
penological purpose. See Garrett, 560 F. App'x at 380-81 (affirming "magistrate judge's
s finding that [prisoner's] conclusory allegation of a privacy claim is indisputably
meritless," where prisoner alleged that placement of cameras violated right to privacy);
Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting prisoner's claim
that female officers' observation of male inmate strip searches or presence during
showers violated his privacy rights where there was no evidence that presence resulted in
"an inappropriate amount of contact"); Greenup v. LeBlanc, No. 18-1659, 2019 WL
4940281, at *5-6 (W.D. La. Mar. 6, 2019) (recommending dismissal at screening of
prisoner's claim that windows in showers permitted guards to view prisoners' genitals
violated his right to privacy because the windows "manifestly stem[med] from measures
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designed to enhance the legitimate penological interests of safety and security"), R. & R.
adopted by 2019 WL 4957920 (W.D. La. Oct. 7, 2019).
In any event, Mack's allegations are internally inconsistent, as he contends that
"Straughan can't watch the cameras of men in the state of undress," so he lurks at the
trusty camp and waits for inmates to enter the shower. Dkt. No. 6 at 8. Because Mack
alleges both that Straughan is viewing naked inmates on the cameras and that he cannot
do so, the Court need not accept Mack's allegations as true. 	Mora v. Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr., 469 F. App'x 295,299 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
As for his claim about the compromising video, Mack has similarly failed to allege
sufficient facts. 	Mack asserts that a maintenance worker told him there was a
compromising video of him. Dkt. No. 25 at 4. Mack assumes that Straughan is
responsible for the compromising video because he "monitor[s] the camera system." Id.
However, Mack pleads no actual/acts connecting the recording to Straughan; Mack
merely assumes Straughan is responsible because he monitors the cameras. See Dkt.
Nos. 6 at 8; 25 at 4; see also Dkt. No. 25 at 2 (alleging "maintenance inmate workers
[were] spreading" the compromising video), 5 (stating that Sgts. Gutierrez and Tse had a
"hand held media player 'white in color' [and] show[ ed] a video of [Mack] in the
shower").
If true, the undersigned can surmise no legitimate penological interest for
Straughan recording and sharing the compromising video. Cf Moore v. Foley, No. 18-
3449, 2021 WL 2416971, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2021) (dismissing prisoner's claim
that TDCJ defendants violated his rights by recording him while naked, where prisoner
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did "not alleged that any naked image of him captured by [d]efendants was used or
distributed by [d]efendants or a third party"). But Mack has not advanced sufficient facts
to conclude that Straughan is responsible for the purported recording or sharing-a
necessary element of a§ 1983 claim. 	Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir.
1983).
In sum, the undersigned recommends that the district judge dismiss Mack's
privacy claims.
Sexual Harassment
As discussed above, the case law is clear that verbal sexual harassment does not
amount to a constitutional violation. E.g., Jane Doe 5, 106 F. App'x at 908. However,
when the alleged sexual harassment takes forms other than verbal-but without physical
contact-case law is less clear. The undersigned could not locate a Fifth Circuit decision
setting forth the standard for evaluating non-verbal, non-physical sexual harassment
claims. 	Cf Howard-Barrows v. City of Haltom City, I 06 F. App'x 912, 914 (5th Cir.
2004) (per curiam) (assuming detainee "ha[d] alleged a constitutional violation arising
out of the [jail's] video system's misuse" but rejecting claim on other grounds). But even
if Mack can potentially state a claim under the Eighth Amendment based on Straughan's
and Reed's purported viewing and/or recording of him and other inmates naked, the
undersigned concludes he has failed to state sufficient facts for almost the same reasons
his privacy claim fails.
To state an Eight Amendment claim based on sexual harassment or abuse, a
prisoner must establish both objective and subjective elements. E.g., Ricks v. Shover,
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891 F.3d 468,474 (3d Cir. 2018); Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997).
Subjectively, Mack has not pleaded sufficient facts showing that Straughan or Reed acted
without a legitimate penological purpose, nor has Mack demonstrated they had a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. See Ricks, 891 F.3d at 474 (explaining that within
context of a claim for sexual abuse or harassment with physical contact, prisoner must
show that subjectively, the defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,
which may be inferred when there is no penological purpose for the conduct). Moreover,
Mack has not established that Straughan was personally involved in the recording and
disseminating of the compromising video. Thus, even if Mack can maintain an Eighth
Amendment sexual harassment claim based on the viewing or recording of Mack naked,
the undersigned concludes his claim cannot survive screening.
C. Mack's claim that Defendants retaliated is devoid of sufficient factual
support to survive screening.
A plaintiff must demonstrate the following to establish an actionable claim for
retaliation: "(!) the existence of a specific constitutional right; (2) the defendant's intent
to retaliate for the exercise of that right; (3) a retaliatory adverse act; and (4) causation."
Freeman v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 369 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2004). 	Conclusory
allegations, including a prisoner's personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation, are
insufficient to support a claim for retaliation. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322,325 (5th
Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Instead, "[t]he inmate must produce direct evidence of
motivation or, the more probable scenario, allege a chronology of events from which
retaliation may plausibly be inferred."' Haddix v. Kerss, 203 F. App'x 551, 554 (5th Cir.
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2006) (per curiam) (quoting Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995)). In
evaluating such claims, the Fifth Circuit has cautioned that "prisoners' claims of
retaliation are regarded with skepticism" and should be "carefully scrutinized by the
courts." Ade/eke v. Fleckenstein, 385 F. App'x 386,387 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Mack alleges that Officer Duncan and others retaliated after Mack filed a
grievance against Duncan. Dkt. Nos. 6 at 6; 25 at 1. The filing ofa non-frivolous
grievance can be a constitutionally protected activity. Brown v. Taylor, 911 F.3d 235,
245 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); see also Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 312 (5th
Cir. 2019) (noting that the "First Amendment protects a detainee from retaliation for
filing grievances" and applying the four-factor retaliation test). Mack has therefore
satisfied the first element.
However, his retaliation claim fails on the remaining elements. Mack says that he
filed a grievance against officers on April 27, and on April 28, 2024, an inmate dashed
him with fluids. 	Dkt. Nos. 6 at 6; 6-1 at 14. Although this might plausibly allege a
chronology of events from which Duncan's intent could be inferred, Mack pleads no facts
connecting Duncan-or any other officer-with the alleged retaliatory act. Mack
contends that Duncan recruited the inmate, via John Doe and other officers, to retaliate.
See Dkt. Nos. 6 at 6; 25 at 1-2. But this allegation is not supported by anything other
than his personal belief. Dkt. Nos. 6 at 6; 25 at 1-2. Further, Mack does not supply a
basis for concluding the other Defendants, including John Doe, acted with retaliatory
intent. Dkt. Nos. 6 at 6; 25 at 1-2. Mack's conclusory allegations fall short of
establishing the requisite intent. 	Cf Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F .3d 242, 253-54 (5th Cir.
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2019) (holding that prisoner sufficiently established intent and causation where, unlike
here, the defendant who was the subject of the grievances "committed the allegedly
retaliatory acts").
Moreover, Mack has not shown that the alleged retaliatory act-an inmate dashing
him-would not have occurred but for the allegedly retaliatory motive. Mack explains
that "Doe had [him] go on the wings to pickup [food] trays with him," and when Doe
opened the food slot, an inmate threw liquids on him. Dkt. No. 25 at 2. 	Mack imputes a
nefarious motive because Doe moved away from the slot to avoid being dashed. Id. 	But
these allegations alone do not show that the inmate would not have dashed Mack but for
Defendants' alleged retaliation.
Because Mack has not pleaded sufficient facts establishing each of the four
elements of retaliation, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss his claim.
D. Mack has not shown that any Defendant discriminated.
"Inmates have the constitutional right [under the Equal Protection Clause] to be
free from racial discrimination." Bentley v. Beck, 625 F.2d 70, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam). To successfully establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff"must prove
purposeful discrimination resulting in a discriminatory effect among persons similarly
situated." Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 566 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
"Discriminatory purpose in an equal protection context implies that the decisionmaker
selected a particular course of action at least in part because of, and not simply in spite of,
the adverse impact it would have on an identifiable group." 	Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d
577,580 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Bare suspicion or belief that an
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officer acted with discriminatory purpose, without any supporting facts, is not sufficient
to allege a viable claim for race-based discrimination. See Al-Ra 'id v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28,
32 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that "conclusory allegations of malice are insufficient to
maintain" an equal protection claim based on racial discrimination).
Here, the acts Mack calls discriminatory do not rise to the level of constitutional
violations. First, he claims that numerous officers, including COs Walker and Duncan, as
well as Sgts. Gutierrez and Tse, discriminated over a one-year span by doing the
following:
(I) "[S]ingle[ d] [him] out to inflict[] slander on [him,] a black straight man;
(2) Made derogatory comments;
(3) "[D]eprived [him] of[his] off date," requiring him to work;
(4) "[M]ade [him] sign papers."
Dkt. No. 25 at 3, 5 (cleaned up). Mack personally believes Defendants acted because of
his race, but he pleads no facts suppotting that belief. See id. at 3 ("Being black they
singled me out for their deprivation of my constitutional rights, civil rights, with actual
malice."). His allegations also fail to show that he was treated differently than similarly
situated inmates. See Smith v. Hebert, 533 F. App'x 479,481 (5th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (affirming summary judgment on prisoner's equal protection claim in part
because he had not established he "was intentionally treated differently from any
similarly situated prisoner" (citing Vil!. of Willowbrook v. O/ech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000)).
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Mack also asserts a discrimination claim against Ballard, but it is conclusory. 	He
contends that Ballard discriminated by refusing "to file[] [his] grievances and instead
tak[ing] them to Major Straughan and Asst. Warden Reed Jr. to do whatever with; she
doesn't investigate." Dkt. No. 25 at 3 (cleaned up). 	Like his claim against the officers,
Mack advances no more than a personal belief that Ballard acted because of Mack's race,
and he has not shown that inmates similarly situated were treated differently. See id. at 6.
Mack's bare suspicion that Defendants treated him differently because of his race
is insufficient to sustain an equal protection claim. Therefore, the undersigned
recommends the district judge dismiss Mack's claims.
E. Mack's claim that Ballard unlawfully handled and investigated his
grievances fails.
Mack alleges that Ballard's refusal to process and investigate his grievances
violated the First Amendment. Dkt. Nos. 6 at 3; 25 at 6. However, Mack acknowledges
that Ballard transferred the grievances to Straughan and Reed "to do whatever with."
Dkt. No. 25 at 3. Thus, the Court understands Mack as complaining about Ballard's
investigation and resolution of his grievances-not that she destroyed or otherwise
prevented Mack from filing them.
"Prisoners do not have a federally protected liberty interest in having
these grievances resolved to their satisfaction, and an alleged § 1983 due process
violation for failure to investigate grievances is indisputably meritless." Hill v. Walker,
718 F. App'x 243,250 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation
omitted). Because Ballard's alleged failure to adequately investigate Mack's grievances
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is not a viable basis for relief, the district judge should dismiss Mack's claim against
Ballard.
However, even if Mack's allegations implicate a First Amendment right to petition
the government for redress of grievances, his claim appears baseless. Despite Mack
having an opportunity to clarify or expound on the basis for his First Amendment claim,
he provided no well-pleaded facts-only legal conclusions. Dkt. No. 25 at 6-7.
Moreover, Mack "is currently exercising his right to petition the government for redress
of grievances through this lawsuit." Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541,555 (7th Cir.
2009). Without facts showing he was unable to redress a specific grievance and without
a showing of harm, Mack cannot state a claim. See id.; Delaney v. Ackal, No. 09-1643,
2009 WL 5195935, at *7 (W.D. La. Dec. 30, 2009) ("When the claim underlying the
administrative grievance involves a constitutional right, the prisoner's right to petition the
government for redress is the right of access to the courts, which is not compromised by
the prison's failure to comply with appropriate grievance procedures." (citing Flick v.
Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)).
5. 	Recommendation
For the reasons explained above, the undersigned recommends that the United
States District Judge dismiss with prejudice all Mack's claims in accordance with
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A.
6. 	Right to object
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all
parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
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findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within
fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) (2016); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding, conclusion,
or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge' s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to
file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the
district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 79 FJd 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
Dated: December ~ 	' 2025.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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