Denelsbeck v. Ramirez et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
JOHN DENELSBECK, III,
Institutional ID No. 02353703
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Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 5:24-CV-145-BV
JEREMY DELACRUZ,
Defendant.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Proceeding prose and informa pauperis, Plaintiff John Denelsbeck III filed this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his constitutional rights while
incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) Price Daniel Unit.
Dkt. No. 1. The undersigned completed screening of this case and dismissed all claims
with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A)(b), except for an
excessive-force claim against Lieutenant Jeremy Delacruz in his individual capacity.
Dkt. No. 21. The Court ordered Delacruz to answer or otherwise plead to that claim.
Dkt. No. 22. Delacruz moved to dismiss, asserting qualified immunity. Dkt. No. 24. 	For
the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that the United States District Judge
GRANT the motion and dismiss Denelsbeck's remaining claim with prejudice.
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1. 	Denelsbeck alleges that Delacruz used excessive force when applying
handcuffs too tightly.
On April 23, 2024, benveen 10:00 and 10:30 p.m., Denelsbeck,s cellmate was
caught doing drugs. Dkt. No. 1 at 5. 1 An officer awakened Denelsbeck and directed him
and his cellmate to leave the cell so that the officer could search it. Id. 	Denelsbeck's
cellmate snatched drug paraphernalia from a shelf and refused to surrender it, which
prompted the officer to call two ranking officers-Lieutenant Delacruz and Sargeant
Wo1tman-for assistance. Id. at 6. Outside the cell, Delacruz strip-searched Denelsbeck
and his cellmate, which prompted Denelsbeck to question why he was being strip-
searched. Id. 	Delacruz responded by threatening to assign Denelsbeck to G4 custody. 2
Id. 	Denelsbeck stated that he would file a grievance based on Delacruz's conduct and
raised his hand toward his cellmate, arguing that the cellmate was the person causing the
issue. Id 	Delacruz warned Denelsbeck that "the next time you speak, your hands better
be behind you or else." Id. 	Denelsbeck got dressed and complied with being handcuffed.
Id. 	But Denelsbeck complained that the handcuffs were too tight, to which allegedly
Delacruz responded, Hoh well." Id.
Delacmz escorted Denelsbeck to an administrative-segregation cell with a wet
floor and told Denelsbeck to turn around and insert his hands through the food slot so that
Delacruz could remove the handcuffs. Id. at 7. Denelsbeck claims that he tried to
1 Page citations to Denelsbeck's complaint refer to the electronic number assigned by the Comt's
electronic filing system.
2 Although unclear from Denelsbeck's filing, G4 custody appears to be a classification with more intense
supervision.
2
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comply, but he was unable to do so because of his large stature. Id. 	Delacruz believed
Denelsbeck was refusing to comply, so he instructed Wmtman to initiate the use-of-force
protocol and videotape the incident. 3 Id. 	Delacruz then stated, "[i]f needed, we will use
chemical agents to make the inmate comply." Id. 	Denelsbeck does not indicate that
chemical agents were ever used. See id. 	Stilt there was a struggle in removing the
handcuffs, which Denelsbeck attributes to his large stature, the wet floor, and the
restraints being reversed. Id. 	Wortman was able to successfully remove the handcuffs
after several minutes. Id.
Denelsbeck says that he tried to show Delacruz his injuries, but Delacruz "refused
to documenC them and told an "unknown officer to shut off the camera." Id. at 8.
Denelsbeck alleges that the excessive force used in applying the handcuffs left him with
permanent scarring on both wrists, causes him ongoing pain, and requires that he wear a
wrist brace on his right hand. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 3; 13 at 3.
2. 	Delacruz asserts qualified immunity and moves to dismiss.
Delacruz asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity and moves to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(6)(6). Dkt. No. 24. First, Delacruz contends
that Denelsbeck has not alleged a viable excessive-force claim. Id. at 3. He argues that
even if the Court accepts Denelsbeck's asse1tion that he suffered more than de minimis
injuries, other factors show that there can be no finding that Delacruz violated a clearly
3 As the Comi previously noted, despite Denelsbeck's contention that there is a video of the incident,
TDCJ submitted an affidavit with the authenticated records stating that it does not have any use of force
records relating to this incident. See Dkt. No. 21 at 3 n.3.
3
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established right related to application of the handcuffs, Id. at 2-5. Delacmz asserts that
Denelsbeck acknowledges that "he was ordered out of his cell due to a legitimate search
for contraband" and that Denelsbeck's cellmate was actively refusing to turn over
contraband. Id at 4. Delacruz further notes that immediately before he was handcuffed,
Denelsbeck raised his hand and continued to question Delacruz's authority. Id. 	Thus,
Delacruz maintains that Denelsbeck cannot show that the "force used in restraining him
was disproportionate" given the circumstances, and it was reasonable for Delacruz to
prioritize "diffusing the situation and escorting [Denelsbeck] to administrative
segregation ... over testing and possibly adjusting the tightness of [the] cuffs." Id. at 5.
He contends that this is especially true "given the short distance to be travelled and the
fact that the cuffs would be removed within a few minutes." Id. 	Accordingly, Delacruz
argues that, even accepting Denelsbeck's factual allegations as true, the "use of handcuffs
to restore discipline was done in good faith and with a reasonable perception that
[Denelsbeck] would pose a threat if not handcuffed." Id Delacruz posits that even if
Denelsbeck has stated a constitutional violation, Denelsbeck fails to overcome the
defense of qualified immunity because Delacruz acted reasonably in light of clearly
established law. Id. at 2-3, 5-6.
Denelsbeck did not file a response to the motion, and the time to do so has now
expired.
4
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3, 	Standards of review
Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell At!. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd.,
647 F.3d 248,252 (5th Cir. 2011). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). When considering 12(b)(6) motions, courts must accept well-pleaded facts as
true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Johnson v. Johnson,
385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002)). A court need only determine whether
the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim; it does not evaluate whether the
plaintiff is ultimately likely to prevail. See U.S. ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004). "The court may dismiss a claim when it is
clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle
him to relief." Jones v. Greninger, 188 F .3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Fee v.
Herndon, 800 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990)). "The court's review is limited to the
complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the
motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint." Lone
Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383,387 (5th Cir. 2010).
5
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Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary
functions from civil liability to the extent "their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A defendant "is entitled to qualified immunity at the motion-
to-dismiss stage unless the plaintiffl] ha[s] alleged facts sufficient to plausibly show that
(1) the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right
was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct." Harmon v. City of
Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at
232). "A court may resolve the qualified immunity question at either step, so if a right
was not clearly established, a court need not determine whether there was a constitutional
violation." Hincapie v. Texas Tech Univ., No. 5:23-CV-045-H, 2024 WL 1054650, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2024) (Hendrix, J.). "The plaintiff bears the burden of negating
qualified immunity, but all inferences are drawn in his favor." Brown v. Callahan,
623 F.3d 249,253 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Ultimately, "[q]ualified immunity
'provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law."' Est. of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City ofN. Richland Hills, 406 F .3d
375, 380 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
"The clearly established inquiry is demanding, especially in claims for excessive
force." Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1167 (citing Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th
Cir. 2019)). There are two ways a plaintiff can show that a right was clearly established.
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Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 726 (5th Cir, 2021). 	First, he can show a case or
body of relevant law where an official was held to have violated the Constitution under
similar circumstances. Id. 	"This approach does not require a case directly on point, but
existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate." Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The plaintiff must identify "controlling authority-or a
robust consensus of persuasive authority" that clearly defines "the right in question with a
high degree of particularity.'' Smith v. Davis, 507 F. App'x 359,361 (5th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2011)).
Alternatively, in rare cases "the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct is
sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances."
Batyukova, 994 F.3d at 726 (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64
(2018)); Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 9 (2020) ("Confronted with the particularly
egregious facts of this case, any reasonable officer should have realized that [the
plaintiffs] conditions of confinement offended the Constitution.''),
4. 	Although Denelsbeck alleges sufficient facts to state a claim, he fails to show
that Delacruz's actions violated clearly established law.
The undersigned previously determined that because Denelsbeck alleged that he
suffered more than de minimis injuries and he was compliant in submitting to handcuffs,
screening was not the appropriate stage to dismiss Denelsbeck's excessive-force claim.
Dkt. No. 21 at 11-13. But Delacruz asserts that Denelsbeck has not adequately stated an
excessive-force claim, so the Court first considers that argument.
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A. Denelsbeck alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for excessive force
based on Delacruz's tight application of the handcuffs.
Denelsbeck claims that Delacruz used excessive force when applying the
handcuffs. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 3; 13 at 1. The use of excessive force against a prisoner may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1992). To establish that a prison official used
excessive force, a plaintiff must show that the defendant unnecessarily and wantonly
inflicted pain. 	Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1986).
Prison officials, when confronted with prison disturbances, must balance the need
to maintain and restore discipline with a prisonees right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, so "the core judicial inquiry is ... whether force was applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm."
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. "In determining whether the use of force was wanton and
unnecessary," a court may consider: (1) the extent of the prisoner's injury; (2) the need
for the use of force; (3) "the relationship between that need and the amount of force
used"; (4) "the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials"; and (5) "any
efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." Id. (quoting Whitley, 475
U.S. at 321). "The amount of force [used] ... must be judged by the context in which
that force is deployed." Ikerdv. Blair, 101 F.3d 430,434 (5th Cir. 1996). In the prison
context, officials often work under circumstances where they "may [need] ... to act
quickly and decisively." 	Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993).
8
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Denelsbeck does not directly accuse Delacruz ofdeliberately applying the
restraints too tightly, but the facts alleged support that inference. Cf Hughes v. Adams, 3
F.3d 437, * 1 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs claim should not have
been dismissed as frivolous because, "[w]hile he did not use the words malicious or
sadistict he alleged that the officers retaliated against him and used excessive force when
they kicked and beat him). First, Denelsbeck alleges that he sustained permanent and
serious injuries. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 7; 13 at 3. The seriousness ofan injury can suggest that
the force used was excessive. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 2 ("[T]he extent of injury suffered
by an inmate is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether the use of
force is wanton and unnecessary."). Second, Denelsbeck alleges facts that could
plausibly demonstrate that Delacruz used force to punish or retaliate instead ofto restore
or maintain order.
Denelsbeck says that he complied with Delacruz's orders throughout the events,
including during the strip-search and handcuffing, despite verbally questioning the
decisions being made. Dkt. No. 1 at 6-8. Because Denelsbeck was compliant, force may
not have been necessary. Further, when Denelsbeck asked why he was being handcuffed,
Delacruz purportedly responded with, "'cause I can." Id. at 6. And Denelsbeck alleges
that Delacruz applied the cuffs only after Denelsbeck threatened to grieve Delacruz's
conduct. Id. Finally, after Denelsbeck complained that the restraints were too tight,
Delacruz made no effort to inspect the issue, responding "oh well" before transporting
Denelsbeck to administrative segregation. Id.
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Taking these facts together, Denelsbeck has plausibly alleged that Delacruz
applied the cuffs maliciously, thereby sufficiently stating an excessive-force claim.
B. Denelsbeck fails to show that Delacn1z acted um·easonably in light of
clearly established law.
Plausibly pleading that Delacruz used excessive force is not enough to defeat a
qualified-immunity defense. Denelsbeck must also demonstrate that, at the time of the
incident, the law was "clearly established" that Delacruz's use of force was excessive.
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204(2001) ("The inquiries for qualified immunity and
excessive force remain distinct, even after Graham."). "A clearly established right is one
that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what
he is doing violates that righC' Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Individual liability thus turns on the
objective legal reasonableness of the defendant's actions assessed in light of clearly
established law at the time of the alleged violation. Hunter v. BJJ)(ll1t, 502 U.S. 224, 228
(1991); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).
"The dispositive question is whether the violative nature ofparticular conduct is
clearly established/' and the specificity requirement is important in the excessive-force
conte xt. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
Harmon, F.4th at 1167. An official is entitled to qualified immunity "unless existing
precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue," Harmon, 16 F .4th at 1166
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kise/av. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018)),
or the officer's conduct was obviously unconstitutional. Batyukova, 994 FJd at 726
(quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64).
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed courts "not to define clearly established law
at a high level of generality," because "doing so avoids the crucial question whether the
official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced." Plumhoff
v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742).
The Fifth Circuit recognizes that using restraints for punitive purposes violates the
Constitution. See Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)
( citing Fulford v. King, 692 F .2d 11, 14-15 (5th Cir. 1982) to explain that using restrains
is a rational security measure and cannot be considered cruel and unusual punishment
·\mless great discomfort is occasioned deliberately as punishment or mindlessly, with
indifference to the prisoner's humanity"). But for qualified immunity, it is "irrelevant"
whether a defendant acted with intent to injure "as long as their conduct was objectively
reasonable." Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F .2d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1990); see also
Thmnpson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447,457 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that "qualified
immunity turns only upon the
objective reasonableness of the defendanfs acts," so a
"defendant's subjective state of mind has no bearing on whether" he "is entitled to
qualified immunity"); Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1448 (providing that whether defendant was
immune from excessive-force claim turned on whether his conduct was objectively
reasonable, not whether he acted maliciously and sadistically). Therefore, even if
Delacruz applied the restraints for punitive purposes, he is entitled to qualified immunity
if his conduct was objectively reasonable in light of then-existing precedent.
The Fifth Circuit has addressed excessive-force claims based on tight handcuffing
mostly in cases involving non-prisoners. In Heitschmidt v. City ofHouston, for example,
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the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a non-prisoner's Fourth
Amendment excessive-force claim based on qualified immunity. 	161 F.3d 834, 839-40
(5th Cir. 1998). 4 There, law-enforcement officers placed the plaintiff-who was not the
subject of the investigation-in handcuffs for more than four hours while officers
executed a search warrant at his residence. 	Id. at 835-36. The plaintiff complained about
tightness of the cuffs and requested that they be loosened, but that request, along with his
request to use the restroom, was denied. Id. 	He alleged that he suffered serious and
permanent injury to his wrists. Id. 	After finding that he stated a plausible claim of
unreasonable seizure, the Fifth Circuit determined that his pleadings were "sufficient to
create that possibility [that he could demonstrate that the use of force in handcuffing was
excessive]." Id. at 840. The court further found that, based on the length of detention,
the secured premises, and the officers' refusal to loosen the handcuffs or to allow the
plaintiff to use the restroom, it could not '~say ... that the officers' conduct was
objectively reasonable as a matter oflaw." Id. at 839. Thus, a dismissal based on
qualified immunity was premature. Id. at 840.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on an
excessive-force claim where the severity of the alleged injuries supported a finding of
excessive force. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
4 While Heitschmidt and other cases were analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, the analysis is similar
under the Eighth Amendment. See Baughman v. Bowman, No. 6:20-CV-560, 2024 WL 1248135, at *S
(E.D. Tex. Feb, 7, 2024) ("[A] claim concerning excessive force is analyzed in the same fashion whether
raised under the Foutth or Eighth Amendment." (citing Ikerd, l 0 I F .3d at 434 n,9)), R. & R. adopted by
2024 WL 1251497 (E.D. Tex, Mar. 22, 2024), aff'd, No. 24-40286, 2025 WL 2237364 (5th Cir. Aug. 6,
2025); Pesina v. Cooper, No. H-09-2316, 2010 WL 43000 I, at *5 (S,D, Tex. Feb. 4, 20 I0) (same).
12
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curiam). There, the plaintiff was allegedly speeding when an officer stopped her. Id. at
161-62. What should have been a routine traffic stop escalated when, after the plaintiff
declined to get out of the car as directed, the officer broke her window, dragged her out
of the vehicle, and threw her against the vehicle before placing her in tight handcuffs. Id.
The next day, a medical provider observed contusions on her wrists, along with bruising
and cuts. Id. at 168. The plaintiff claimed that she suffered long-term nerve damage to
her hands and fingers that required four surgeries, injections, and missed days of work.
Id. According to the Fifth Circuit, the alleged injuries were not of the "minor, incidental"
variety and were instead sufficiently egregious to preclude qualified immunity under
then-established law that required officers to temper any use of force during an arrest to
the severity of the alleged crime, whether the suspect posed a threat to officer safety, and
whether the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to flee. Id.
These cases establish that officers' use of force in applying handcuffs must be
tempered to the circumstances. That is, "[f]acts matter in excessive force claims.''
Templeton v. Jarmillo, 28 F.4th 618, 623 (5th Cir. 2022). Where the use of handcuffs is
warranted and limited, the Fifth Circuit has found dismissal appropriate. For example,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an excessive-force claim where a prisoner
alleged that, while he was escorted from his work assignment to prison, his handcuffs
were placed so tightly that they caused permanent injury. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d
1235, 1243-44 (5th Cir. 1989). The district courfs grant of summary judgment was
appropriate there because, even considering the permanent injury, the plaintiff "never
allege[d] that great pain was caused deliberately by the officers or that this kind of
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handcuff was not customarily used on prisoners.'' Id. at 1244. In another example, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed that a plaintiffs failure to allege malice in the officer's application
of too-tight cuffs prevented the plaintiff from stating an actionable claim. Glenn v. City
of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307,314 (5th Cir. 2001). The court explained that the plaintiffs "sole
contention [was] that the officer put the handcuffs on her too tightly, causing her right
wrist to swell." Id. And more recently, the Fifth Circuit agreed that a non-prisoner
failed to state an excessive-force claim because "[t]ight handcuffing alone, even where a
detainee sustains minor injuries, does not present an excessive force claim.'' Templeton,
28 F .4th at 622–623 ( observing that the plaintiff "experienced pain in his shoulder from
tight handcuffing that occurred over a matter of minutes”). While these cases relate to
stating a claim, they are instructive for qualified-immunity purposes because they show
that that the limited use of handcuffs to move a prisoner or detaineeeven if those cuffs
are too tight-does not violate the Constitution.
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that Delacruz's conduct in applying
handcuffs for a short period to move a prisoner from one location to another within the
prison complex was objectively reasonable, even if those handcuffs were too-tightly
applied. Unlike the claims in Heitschmidt and Deville, Denelsbeck's own allegations
show the restraints were applied for a brief period-several minutes versus hours
before they were removed upon his arrival in administrative segregation. See Dkt. No. 1
at 6-7; see Templeton, 28 F.4th at 623 (affirming conclusion that officer was entitled to
qualified immunity in part because the short time in which plaintiff wore tight handcuffs
placed case outside clearly established law).
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Further, the handcuffs were applied during transport from one location to another
within the prison-an inherently reasonable use of force. Cf Jackson, 864 F.2d at 1244
("The use of shackles and handcuffs are restraints commonly used on inmates, even those
of a preferred status."). Indeed, one factor considered in Heitschmidt was that police had
secured the premises, leaving "no justification for requiring [the plaintiff] to remain
painfully restrained." 161 F.3d at 840. But here, Denelsbeck's own account provides
that, even though he was being physically cooperative-Le., noncombative-he was
verbally questioning Delacruz and raised his hand toward his cellmate, who was refusing
to turn over contraband. Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6. Denelsbeck identifies no case-and the
undersigned has found none-in which a prison official was held to have used excessive
force by applying handcuffs too tightly during transport under similar circumstances.
Moreover, other than allegations related to the degree of his injury and the officer's
apparent indifference to his pain, Denelsbeck does not allege that he was handled
particularly roughly or that Delacruz used uncommon tactics during the handcuffing. See
Heitschmidt, 161 FJd at 839-40; Deville, 567 F.3d at 168-69; cf Robles v. Ciarletta,
797 F. App'x 821, 828 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (holding that Deville did not preclude
qualified immunity defense because "[t]he Deville decision involved a minor traffic
offense and a much greater degree of force").
Though Denelsbeck alleges more than de minimis injuries, the facts he presents
are not sufficiently analogous to the facts in Heitschmidt or Deville. Further, Jackson,
Glenn, and Templeton suggest that Delacruz's conduct was objectively reasonable. See
Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63 ("It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing
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precedent. The precedent must be clear enough that eve1y reasonable official would
interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply." (emphasis added)).
Denelsbeck's allegations fail to demonstrate that his right was "sufficiently definite
[such] that any reasonable official in [Delacruz's] shoes would have understood he was
violating it." Plumhojf, 572 U.S. at 779.
In sum, even accepting that Denelsbeck has stated a claim and assuming Delacruz
had impure motive, existing precedent does not support the finding that Delacruz's
actions were objectively unreasonable. Moreover, the conduct here-handcuffing a
prisoner and escorting him away from an escalating situation-does not appear obviously
unlawful. See, e.g., Jones v. Taylor, No. 2:14-CV-428, 2015 WL 5793721, at *10 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. I, 2015) (dismissing prisoner's excessive force claim based on tight
handcuffing at summary judgment in part because, even accepting that he suffered a
serious injury, the handcuffs were used to escort him to the infirmary and the restraints
were only on for five to ten minutes), aff'd, 683 F. App'x 299 (5th Cir. 2017); see Joseph
ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 337 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that ''[t]he
standard for obviousness is sky high" in the "rare obvious case for which no similar case
is needed"). 	Given that the qualified immunity analysis turns on whether a defendant's
conduct was objectively reasonable, Delacruz is entitled to qualified immunity, and
Denelsbeck's remaining claim should be dismissed. See Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d
795, 804 (5th Cir. 2017) ("[A]n officer is only denied qualified immunity if his or her
actions are objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.").
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S. 	Recommendation
For the reasons explained above, the undersigned recommends that the United
States District Judge GRANT Delacruz's motion to dismiss and DISMISS Denelsbeck's
claim for excessive force with prejudice.
6. 	Right to object
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all
parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within
fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) (2016); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b ). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding, conclusion,
or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge's Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. 	An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to
file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the
district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
Dated: Febrnary J1__, 2026.
AMANMAMY'BURCH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
17
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