Curlett v. USA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
P HILLIP J AY CURLETT ,
Movant,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-1253-P
(No. 4:23-cr-0283-P)
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion of Phillip Jay Curlett under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence by a person in
federal custody. The Court, having considered the motion, the response,
the reply, the record, and applicable authorities, concludes that the
motion must be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On October 12, 2023, Movant was named in a one-count indictment
charging him with conspiracy to commit sex trafficking through force,
fraud, and coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). CR ECF No. 30.
Movant and his counsel signed a written plea agreement pursuant to
FED. R. CRIM . P. 11(c)(1)(C) with waiver of appeal. CR EC No. 37. The
plea agreement reflected that: Movant was subject to imprisonment for
life; the parties agreed that an appropriate term of imprisonment would
be no more than 360 months; the government would not bring any
additional charges against Movant based on the conduct underlying and
related to the plea; the plea was freely and voluntarily made and not the
result of force, threats, or promises; there had been no guarantees or
promises from anyone as to what sentence the Court would impose;
Movant waived his right to appeal or otherwise challenge his sentence
except in certain limited circumstances; and, Movant had thoroughly
reviewed all legal and factual aspects of his case with counsel and was
fully satisfied with counsel’s legal representation. Id. They also signed
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a 	factual 	resume, 	which 	set 	forth 	that 	Movant 	faced 	a 	term 	of
imprisonment of life, the elements of the offense (including that Movant
had entered into an agreement to commit the crime of sex trafficking by
means of force, threats of force, fraud or coercion), and the stipulated
facts establishing that Movant had committed the offense. CR ECF No.
38.
On October 30, 2023, Movant appeared for arraignment and testified
under oath in open court that: he understood the charge against him
(which was read aloud); he understood the essential elements of the
charge (which were also read aloud); he committed all of the essential
elements; he had discussed the charge with counsel and was fully
satisfied with the representation provided to him; he signed the plea
agreement; he understood it before he signed it; he read and understood
the waiver of right to appeal and discussed it with counsel before signing
the plea agreement; he voluntarily and of his own free will entered into
the plea agreement; other than the written plea agreement, no one had
made any promise or assurance to him of any kind to induce him to enter
a plea of guilty; no one had attempted to force him to enter the plea; he
understood he faced a 	term of imprisonment of 	life but that the
government had agreed that a sentence of no more than 360 months
would be appropriate; he understood that the Court would have to accept
the agreement as to the length of the sentence; and, he had read and
understood the factual resume before signing it and all the facts stated
in it were true and correct. CR ECF No. 68.
The probation officer prepared the presentence report (“PSR”), which
reflected that, after treating the conspiracy count as multiple counts,
Movant’s base offense level was 34. CR ECF No. 43, ¶¶ 36, 37, 43. He
received 	a 	two-level 	adjustment 	for 	his 	role 	as 	organizer, 	leader,
manager, or supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 40, 46. After applying the relevant
enhancements and reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the PSR
concluded that Movant’s total offense level was 35. Id. ¶ 56. His criminal
history category was VI, id. ¶ 141, which included convictions for assault
causing bodily injury to a family member, aggravated promotion of
prostitution, domestic assault and battery in the presence of a minor,
and domestic abuse-prior pattern of physical abuse. Id. ¶¶ 95–97, 102,
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104. His guideline imprisonment range was 292 to 365 months. Id.
¶ 141. 	The PSR noted that Movant benefitted greatly from the plea
agreement because the government had agreed not to pursue charges
related to Movant’s 	conduct relating to 	eight additional identified
victims. Id. ¶ 144.
The Court sentenced Movant to a term of imprisonment of 360
months in accordance with the agreement of the parties that the
sentence would not exceed that amount. CR ECF No. 55. Movant
appealed, CR ECF No. 56, despite having waived the right to do so. CR
ECF No. 37, ¶ 13. Counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Movant filed a
response. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
concurred with counsel that the case presented no nonfrivolous issues
and dismissed the appeal. United States v. Curlett, No. 24-10142, 2024
WL 4039748 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2024).
GROUNDS OF THE MOTION
Movant asserts two grounds in support of his motion, alleging that
his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. ECF No. 1 at 4–5.1
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. § 2255
After conviction and exhaustion, or waiver, of any right to appeal,
courts are entitled to presume that a defendant stands fairly and finally
convicted. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982); United
States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231–32 (5th Cir. 1991). A defendant can
challenge his conviction or sentence after it is presumed final on issues
of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude only and may not raise an
issue for the first time on collateral review without showing both cause
for his procedural default and “actual prejudice” resulting from the
errors. Shaid, 937 F.2d at 232.
1 The page references to the motion are to “Page __ of 14” reflected at the
top right portion of the document on the Court’s electronic filing system.
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Section 2255 does not offer recourse to all who suffer trial errors. It
is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and other narrow
injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if
condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice. United States v.
Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981). In other words,
a writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 345 (1974); United States v.
Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996). Further, if issues “are raised
and considered on direct appeal, a defendant is thereafter precluded
from urging the same issues in a later collateral attack.” Moore v. United
States, 598 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Buckelew v. United
States, 575 F.2d 515, 517–18 (5th Cir. 1978)).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant
must 	show 	that 	(1) 	counsel’s 	performance 	fell 	below 	an 	objective
standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability
that, 	but 	for 	counsel’s 	unprofessional 	errors, 	the 	result 	of 	the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). “[A] court need not determine whether
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; see also United States v. Stewart, 207 F.3d
750, 751 (5th Cir. 2000). “The likelihood of a different result must be
substantial, not just conceivable,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
112 	(2011), 	and 	a 	movant 	must 	prove 	that 	counsel’s 	errors 	“so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
686). Judicial scrutiny of this type of claim must be highly deferential
and 	the 	defendant must overcome 	a 	strong 	presumption 	that his
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Simply making conclusory
allegations of deficient performance and prejudice is not sufficient to
meet the Strickland test. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir.
2000).
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ANALYSIS
In his first ground, Movant alleges that his plea was not knowing
and voluntary because counsel (1) promised him that he would receive
a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment if he pleaded guilty and (2) failed
to advise him that “persuasive precedent” supported a base offense level
of 14 rather than 34. ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 2 at 6. In support of his
allegations, he has submitted a wholly conclusory declaration. ECF No.
5.
Any contention that Movant’s plea (including the appeal waiver) was
not knowing and voluntary is wholly belied by the record. Movant’s plea
agreement, CR ECF No. 37, and factual resume, CR ECF No. 38, are
entitled to a presumption of regularity and carry great evidentiary
weight. United States v. Abreo, 30 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1994). His solemn
declarations in open court, admitting among other things that he
understood the penalties he faced, that his plea was knowing and
voluntary, that no one had promised him anything to induce him to
plead guilty, and that he was fully satisfied with counsel, carry a strong
presumption of verity. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
Movant has not produced any independent indicia of the likely merit of
any of his allegations to refute his sworn testimony and is not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing.2 United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106,
1110 (5th Cir. 1998). Movant has not shown that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsels’ alleged errors, he would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985). His own ipse dixit is insufficient to meet this burden.
See Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017).
In support of his first and second grounds, Movant argues that his
base offense level should have been 14 instead of 34, relying on United
States v. Wei Lin, 841 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016). Movant is mistaken.
Unlike Wei Lin, the facts of this case reflect that Movant’s indictment,
the plea agreement, the factual resume, and the judgment specifically
referred to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1), CR ECF No. 30, 37, 38, &
55, and that he stipulated that he used force and threats of force to cause
2 As stated, the motion is supported only by the conclusory declaration.
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his victims to engage in commercial sex at his direction. CR ECF No. 38
at 3. As the government points out, Movant’s case is more like United
States v. Sims, 957 F.3d 362 (3d Cir. 2020), and United States v. Carter,
960 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2020). ECF No. 10 at 13. As noted at sentencing,
Movant 	admitted 	to 	sex 	trafficking 	eleven 	different 	females 	and
breaking the jaw of one. Another victim described him as beating her so
badly that she was left in a pool of her own blood, unsure if she would
wake up in the morning. CR ECF No. 69 at 10. This is not a case where
a lower base offense level would have been appropriate much less
required.
Movant has not shown that counsel gave him any “misadvice,” ECF
No. 2 at 12, much less that counsel provided ineffective assistance in any
respect. 	The 	declaration 	that 	counsel 	“disregarded 	every 	piece 	of
exculpatory evidence [he] provided to her and dismissed each potential
ground for suppression or viable trial defense” is wholly conclusory and
unsupported by any independent evidence. ECF No. 5 at 2. In fact,
Movant 	never 	describes 	what 	evidence 	or 	legal 	arguments 	he 	is
referencing. The evidence against Movant was overwhelming and he
faced a life sentence. Movant has not shown that counsel failed to make
any 	“solid, 	meritorious 	arguments 	based 	on 	directly 	controlling
precedent” that would have changed the outcome. United States v.
Owens, 94 F.4th 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2024). Counsel did not render
ineffective assistance in failing to raise meritless objections. Clark v.
Collins, 19 F.3d 959, 966 (5th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 581,
585 n.6 (5th Cir. 1990).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, Movant’s motion is DENIED.
Further, for the reasons discussed herein, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2553(c), a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 12th day of February 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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