Watson v. Ragle Inc

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
BRETT M. WATSON, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-667-P
§
RAGLE INCORPORATED 	§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Pending before the Court is Defendant Ragle Incorporated (“Defendant”)’s Rule 12(b)(6)
Partial Motion to Dismiss (“Motion to Dismiss”) [doc. 41], filed December 1, 2025. 	Having
carefully 	considered 	the 	Motion, 	response, 	and 	reply, 	the 	Court 	RECOMMENDS 	that
Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Brett Watson (“Plaintiff”) filed his Third Amended
Complaint, which is the live pleading before the Court. (See Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint
(“Pl.’s Third Am. Compl.”) at 30.)1 Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from January 25, 2021,
until his termination on June 11, 2025. (Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 76.) Based on this employment
and eventual termination, Plaintiff is asserting claims against Defendant for (1) ERISA § 510
Interference, (2) ADA Retaliation, (3) ADA Interactive Process Failure, (4) Wrongful Termination
under Texas’s Sabine Pilot Doctrine, (5) Defamation and Defamation Per Se, (6) Fraudulent
Reporting to Government Agencies, (7) Invasion of Privacy, (8) Breach of Agreement/Promissory
1 The page numbers referenced are the PDF page numbers (1-200), not the page numbers listed by Plaintiff
or the page numbers generated by CMECF because the page numbers listed by Plaintiff and those generated by
CMECF begin to renumber after page 31.
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Estoppel, and (9) Negligent Supervision and Retention. (Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 21-25.) In its
Motion to Dismiss, Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims except for those brought
under ERISA. 	(See Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) Partial Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support
(“Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss”) at 2-12.) 	The Court will address each of Defendant’s arguments in
turn.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” 	This rule must be interpreted in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets
forth the requirements for pleading a claim for relief in federal court. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Rule 8(a) calls for “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (holding that Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard
applies to most civil actions). 	The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded, non-conclusory
allegations in the complaint and liberally construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
The plaintiff must, however, plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid
dismissal. See Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). Indeed, the plaintiff
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, .
. . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Id. at 555 (citations omitted). The Court need not credit bare conclusory allegations or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. Instead, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Generally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on only the complaint and its proper
attachments. A court is permitted, however, to rely on documents incorporated into the complaint
by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities,
Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Counts II and III: ADA Retaliation and Interactive Process Failure2
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA
should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Def.’s Mot.
to Dismiss at 2.) Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged that he has received
a notice of his right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Id.
at 2.)
“Before a plaintiff may file suit in federal court under either Title VII or the ADA, the
plaintiff must first exhaust [his] administrative remedies.” Jennings v. Towers Watson, 11 F.4th
335, 342 (5th Cir. 2021). To exhaust under the ADA, “a plaintiff must file a timely charge with
the EEOC and then receive a notice of the right to sue.” Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th
333, 337 (5th Cir. 2021) (Title VII case); see also Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789
(5th Cir. 1996) (the “ADA incorporates by reference the procedures applicable to actions under
Title VII”). “Failure to comply with the ADA’s exhaustion requirements is grounds for dismissal.”
Robles v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 131 F. Supp. 3d 616, 632 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (citing
Dao, 96 F.3d at 789.)
2 Plaintiff alleges ADA retaliation and ADA interactive process failure as two separate causes of action.
However, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss challenges the claims under the same legal framework, so the Court will
analyze these claims together.
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In his response, Plaintiff appears to concede that he has not yet received any right to sue
notice from the EEOC. (See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp.”)
at 2.) (stating that “the EEOC Dallas District Office closed its inquiry without providing Plaintiff
the required Form 5 (Charge of Discrimination) to formally initiate proceedings”).) Since Plaintiff
has not exhausted his administrative remedies, he may not commence this civil action on these
claims. See Ernst, 1 F.4th at 337. Thus, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the ADA. 	Consequently, the Court
RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims
under the ADA and that such claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
B. Count IV: Wrongful termination under Texas’s Sabine Pilot doctrine
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for wrongful termination
under Texas’s Sabine Pilot doctrine because Plaintiff never refused to perform an illegal act
ordered by Defendant. (Def.’s Mot to Dismiss at 4.) The Sabine Pilot doctrine “covers only the
discharge of an employee for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.”
Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985); see Tex. Dep’t Hum. Serv. v.
Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1995). Plaintiff concedes that his wrongful termination claim
fails because he was never ordered and, therefore, never refused to perform an illegal act. (Pl.’s
Resp. at 4. (stating that Plaintiff “was not directly ordered to commit a criminal act” and that
“Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of Count IV”).) Thus, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES
that dismissal of Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim is proper. 	See Sabine Pilot Serv., 687
S.W.2d at 735. Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination and that such claim be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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C. Count V: Defamation
Defendant also argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claim because
“[s]tatements 	made 	to 	the 	Texas 	Workforce 	Commission 	(“TWC”) 	in 	connection 	with
unemployment compensation proceedings are absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis for
liability under a defamation cause of action.” 	(Def.’s Mot to Dismiss at 11.) 	To succeed on a
defamation claim, the plaintiff must prove that “(1) the defendant published a false statement; (2)
that defamed the plaintiff; (3) with the requisite degree of fault regarding the truth of the statement
. . . and (4) damages (unless the statement constitutes defamation per se).” D Magazine Partners,
L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tex. 2017). 	If the statement does not constitute
defamation per se—that is, it is not so obviously harmful that general damages may be presumed—
then the plaintiff must prove economic damages. 	See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 594 (Tex.
2015). Further, any statements made to the TWC in connection with unemployment compensation
proceedings are privileged and “may not be the basis for an action for defamation of character.”
Tex. Lab. Code § 301.074.
Here, even liberally construing Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has failed
to state a claim for defamation. Plaintiff alleges that that Defendant defamed him by “(a) reporting
‘voluntary resignation’ to [the] TWC while internal documents show ‘No Call/No Show’
termination; (b) falsely claiming Plaintiff ‘did nothing mid-May to June’ [to the TWC] despite
timestamped TRAXOVO development and EQ Billings imports[.]” (Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at
23.) These statements cannot be the basis of defamation claims because the statements were made
to the TWC in connection with unemployment compensation proceedings. See Tex. Lab. Code §
301.074.
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Plaintiff attempts to save his defamation claim 	by arguing that “[t]he ‘voluntary
resignation’ statement was also communicated to third parties [in addition to the TWC].” (Pl.’s
Resp. at 4.) Specifically, he argues that “Plaintiff’s prospective employers who contact Defendant
for employment verification would receive the same false characterization” that Plaintiff
voluntarily resigned. (Id.) However, informing prospective employers that Plaintiff voluntarily
resigned cannot support a defamation claim because that statement is not “reasonably capable of
a defamatory meaning.” See Musser v. Smith Protective Services, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex.
1987). 	Logically, informing a potential employer that a Plaintiff voluntarily resigned does not
“tend[] to injure [his] reputation and thereby expose [him] to public hatred, contempt or ridicule,
or financial injury or to impeach [his] honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.” Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code § 73.001. Consequently, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has failed
to state a defamation claim. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at to Plaintiff’s defamation claim be GRANTED and that such claims be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
D. Count VI: Fraud
Plaintiff also argues that the statements made to the TWC in his defamation claim, namely
that “Plaintiff ‘voluntarily resigned’ and ‘did nothing’ during the disputed period[,]” also constitute
fraud. (Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 23.) Defendant counter that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
for fraud because Plaintiff has not alleged “facts showing that [Defendant] made a material
misrepresentation to Plaintiff, intended Plaintiff to rely on it, and that Plaintiff actually and
justifiably relied on it to his detriment.” (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 13.)
“To establish fraud, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant made a false, material
representation; (2) the defendant knew the representation was false or made it recklessly as a
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positive assertion without any knowledge of its truth; (3) the defendant intended to induce the
plaintiff to act upon the representation; and (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation,
which caused the plaintiff injury.” Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d
471, 496 (Tex. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s fraud claim fails for two primary reasons. First, Plaintiff does not allege
that “defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act upon the representation[s].” 	Id. 	Instead,
Plaintiff alleges Defendant intended to induce the TWC, not Plaintiff, to act upon the alleged
misrepresentation. (See Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 23-24.) Second, Plaintiff does not allege that
“plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation[.]” See Barrow-Shaver Res. Co., 590 S.W.3d at
496. Again, Plaintiff alleges that the TWC, not Plaintiff, relied on the allegedly false statements.
(See Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 23-24.) Thus, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim for fraud. Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s
Motions to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim for fraud and that such claim be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
E. Count VII: Intrusion Upon Seclusion
In his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges a claim for intrusion upon
seclusion. (Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 24.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant invaded
his home by making two unwarranted visits that caused him emotional distress. (Pl.’s Third Am.
Compl. at 24.) In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim fails because there
was no expectation of privacy under the circumstances, the visit was not highly offensive, and
Plaintiff consented to the visit. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 8-9.)
There are two elements for a claim for intrusion upon seclusion: “(1) an intentional
intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon another’s solitude, seclusion, or private affairs or
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concerns, which (2) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Valensuela v. Aquino, 853
S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993).
As to the first element, “Texas courts have held that ‘intrusion upon private affairs’
typically requires either a trespass or an attempt to discover or perceive private information.” Amin
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 66 F.4th 568, 577 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Clayton v. Wisener, 190
S.W.3d 685, 696 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005)). 	As to the second element, an intrusion is highly
offensive when it would cause outrage or “mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities.” Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973). 	Of note, Texas
courts, including the Texas Supreme Court, regularly rely on the “Second Restatement of Torts . .
. to establish [and inform] its common law in this area[.]” Amin, 66 F.4th at 576 (stating that “the
“Texas Supreme Court in Valensuela adopted the Restatement without evident narrowing”); see
also Valensuela, 853 S.W.2d at 513.
Here, Plaintiff’s intrusion upon seclusion claim fails to state a claim because the facts
alleged, even if they amount to an intentional intrusion, are not so highly offensive that they would
cause outrage or “mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”
Billings, 489 S.W.2d at 859. As relevant to this claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant sent two
employees to Plaintiff’s home on June 10, 2025, and sent William Rather (“supervisor”),
Plaintiff’s direct manager, to Plaintiff’s home on June 11, 2025. (Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 16.)
Both visits were in connection with Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant. (See id.) In essence,
Plaintiff claims that these visits were highly offensive because they were unannounced, calculated
to intimidate, and the second visit was in the presence of his daughter. In addition, he alleges the
visits were highly offensive because he was falsely accused of not showing up to work and not
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calling first. (See Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 24.)3 Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant forced
their way into his home on any of these occasions. (See id.)
As an initial matter, calculated to intimidate is a conclusory allegation that the court need
not, and will not, credit. 	See Guidry, 954 F.2d at 281. 	As to Plaintiffs remaining allegations,
“there is no liability for knocking at [a] plaintiff’s door, or calling him [on the] telephone on one
occasion or even two or three[.]” See Dickson v. Am. Red Cross Nat’l. Headquarters, No. CIV.A.
3:95-CV-2391P, 1997 WL 118415, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 1997) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652B cmts. c & d (1977)). Further, the facts as alleged by Plaintiff are on all
fours with the Restatement’s illustration of what is not sufficient to be highly offensive to a
reasonable person. 	See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. d, illust. 8 (1977) (“A, a
landlord, calls upon B, his tenant, at nine o’clock on Sunday morning, to demand payment of the
rent, although he knows that B is not ready to pay it and that B objects to such a visit on Sunday.
B is seriously annoyed. This is not an invasion of B’s privacy.”). Thus, the Court FINDS and
CONCLUDES 	that 	Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	for 	intrusion 	upon 	seclusion.
Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED
as to Plaintiff’s claim for intrusion upon seclusion and that such claim be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
F. Count VIII: Promissory Estoppel
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for promissory estoppel.
(Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 8-9.) Plaintiff’s claim is premised on Plaintiff’s supervisor allegedly
promising that Plaintiff could work remotely for the remainder of the week, without pay, before
firing him the same day. (See Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 24-25.) Defendant argues that the alleged
3 The Court also notes that Plaintiff mentions the Defendant “weaponized Plaintiff's disability disclosure,”
however, the Court cannot ascertain what that means.
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promise does not overcome Texas’s employment-at-will doctrine and that “Plaintiff does not
allege substantial, detrimental reliance beyond ordinary job expectations.” (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss
at 8-9.)
Promissory estoppel requires proof of “(1) a promise, (2) foreseeability of reliance thereon
by the promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promise to his detriment.” English v. Fischer,
660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983). 	The “[r]eliance on the promise must be reasonable and
justified.” Gilmartin v. KVTV-Channel 13, 985 S.W.2d 553, 558 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998,
no pet.) (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 436 (Tex. 1997)). 	If the
promisee would have taken the same action in absence of the promise, then there is no detrimental
reliance. 	English, 660 S.W.2d at 524. When Texas’s at-will employment doctrine applies,
“reliance on a supposed promise of continued employment is unjustified.” 	Allied Vista, Inc. v.
Holt, 987 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). 	“The long-
standing rule in Texas provides for employment at will, terminable at any time by either party,
with or without cause, absent an express agreement to the contrary.” 	Fed. Express Corp. v.
Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing detrimental reliance. 	As the
communications incorporated into the Third Amended Complaint establish, Plaintiff continuing to
do his job was not dependent upon his supervisor’s promise that Plaintiff could work from home.
Instead, Plaintiff continued to do his job because it was his job and he believed in what he was
doing. 	(See Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 38 (“I’m getting my final push for the work dashboard
done”), 44 (“I believe in what I’m doing I’m still finalizing the . . . dashboard”), 56 (“I haven’t
quit or abandoned anything. I’ve been heads-down working on the automation and reporting
platform because I believe it’ll make a big impact for Ragle”).) He felt so strongly about doing
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his job and finishing his work that he took personal days to do the work and, once he ran out of
personal days, was working unpaid. 	(Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 41(“still working on my big
project for Ragle. Use all my PTO”), 56 (“I’m finishing [the big project] this week—unpaid, since
I’m out of PTO—and that’s totally fine with me.”), 60 (“I’m taking PTO today to finalize a fleet
intelligence platform I’ve been developing for the company . . . If I’m out of PTO I need to utilize
one more [] unpaid day”).) If his supervisor had not promised that Plaintiff could continue remote
work for the remainder of the week, Plaintiff would still have continued to work on deliverables.
If his supervisor had said nothing, Plaintiff would have worked on the deliverables, as he was
planning to do. 	Since Plaintiff’s continuing to work was not dependent on the promise that he
could work remotely, Plaintiff did not detrimentally rely upon his supervisor’s promise. 	See
English, 660 S.W.2d at 524. Regardless, the default in Texas is at will employment and “reliance
on a supposed promise of continued employment is unjustified.” Allied Vista, 987 S.W.3d at 142.
Consequently, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled a claim
for promissory estoppel. Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s claim for promissory estoppel be GRANTED and that such claim be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
G. Count IX: Negligent Supervision
Plaintiff’s last claim is for negligent supervision. 	Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant failed to supervise his direct supervisor. (Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. at 25.) In its Motion
to Dismiss, Defendant argues that “negligent retention and supervision claims are ordinarily
limited to preventing physical harm to third parties” and Plaintiff has not alleged physical harm.
(Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 11-12.) In Texas, under the theory of negligent hiring or supervision,
“the duty of the employer or contractee extends only to prevent the employee or independent
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contractor from causing physical harm to a third party.” 	Verinakis v. Med. Profiles, Inc., 987
S.W.2d 90, 98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (citing Restatement 2d of
Torts § 315) (emphasis added)); see also Sibley v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 998 S.W.2d
399, 403 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.); Jackson v. NAACP Houston Branch, No. 14-15-
00507-CV, 2016 WL 4922453, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 15, 2016, pet.
denied).
In this case, Plaintiff has only pled economic and emotional damages. (Pl.’s Third Am.
Compl. at 27.) As previously noted, physical damages are required to support a claim for negligent
supervision. Verinakis, 987 S.W.2d at 98. Consequently, because Plaintiff fails to plead physical
damages supporting his negligent supervision claim, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that
Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible negligent supervision claim. 	Therefore, the Court
RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Rule
12(b)(6) Partial Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. The Court further RECOMMENDS that
Counts II and III be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Counts IV through IX be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.4
4 If a court determines that dismissal of a claim is appropriate, it should be with prejudice if amending the
claim would be futile or “the plaintiff has alleged his best case.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir.
1999); see Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir.2003). Here, The Court finds that
Plaintiff has plead his best case because this is Plaintiff’s fourth complaint and the Court has already given Plaintiff
numerous opportunities to amend his complaint to plead his best case prior to considering Defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific
written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the party has
been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). 	Failure to file, by the date stated above, a specific written objection to a proposed
factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest
injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending time to file objections to 14 days).
ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until February
24, 2026, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed
findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed,
and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days
of the filing date of the objections.
SIGNED February 10, 2026.
___________________________________
JEFFREY L. CURETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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