Rivera v. Fiesta Mart, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
ZULMARY RIVERA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-00487-P
F IESTA M ART , LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF
No. 20. Having considered the relevant docket entries, applicable law,
and relevant facts, the Court hereby ORDERS that the Motion is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On June 23, 2023, Plaintiff went to shop at Defendant Fiesta Mart’s
store in Arlington, TX, where she suffered a fall. As Plaintiff walked
towards the cash registers, she fell on a puddle of water approximately
the size of a plate which allegedly caused her injuries. It is undisputed
that she slipped on a puddle of water that caused her to fall.
Accordingly, Plaintiff brought suit in state court before Defendant
removed the case to this court. Plaintiff brings a claim of premises
liability 	and 	asks 	for 	damages 	based 	on 	her 	resulting 	injuries.
Defendant then moved for summary judgment. That Motion is now ripe
for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and “is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV . P. 56(a). A dispute is
“genuine” if the evidence presented would allow a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
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Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43 (1986). And a fact is “material” when it might
affect the outcome of a case. Hobby Distillers Ass’n v. Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, 740 F. Supp. 3d 509, 517 (N.D. Tex.
2024). When determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,
the 	Court 	views 	the 	evidence 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the
nonmovant. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 709 F.3d 1170,
1173 (5th Cir. 2013). In conducting its evaluation, the Court may rely on
any admissible evidence of record but need only consider materials cited
by the parties. FED. R. CIV . P. 56(c)(1)–(3).
But, “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift
through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition
to summary judgment.” Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909,
915–16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). The party
against granting 	summary 	judgment must identify 	particular and
specific evidence in the record and articulate the precise way that the
evidence supports denying summary judgment. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19
F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994).
Unsubstantiated 	assertions 	are 	not 	competent 	summary 	judgment
evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff fails to assert facts showing any reasonable dispute that
Defendant was on notice of the water spillage. That alone is enough to
grant summary judgment.
To prevail on a premises liability claim, “a plaintiff must prove four
elements: ‘(1) Actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the
premises 	by 	the 	owner/operator; 	(2) 	That 	the 	condition 	posed 	an
unreasonable risk of harm; (3) That the owner/operator did not exercise
reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) That the
owner/operator’s 	failure 	to 	use 	such 	care 	proximately 	caused 	the
plaintiff’s injuries.’” Seigler v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LLC, 30 F.4th 472,
479 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968
S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998)). The duty to take “reasonable care”
mentioned in factor three is “a duty to make safe or warn against any
concealed, unreasonably dangerous conditions of which the landowner
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is, or reasonably should be, aware of.” Turner v. Samsung SDS Am., Inc.,
No. 3:18-CV-02503-E at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2020) (citing Austin v.
Kroger, 465 S.W. 3d 193, 203) (Tex. 2015)). Liability accordingly does not
extend to conditions which the owner did not have actual or constructive
notice of. But if the condition was not reasonably discoverable then the
owner did not have constructive notice.
For a condition to be reasonably discoverable, courts consider “(1) the
proximity of employees to the condition, (2) the conspicuousness of the
condition, and (3) the length of time it existed.” Yerian v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Tex., LLC, No. 6:18-cv-00087, 2020 WL 1430384, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 23, 2020) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates, 186 S.W.3d 566,
567–68 (Tex. 2006)); Shirley v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., No. 17-
20298, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 2017). Proximity must be paired with a
sufficient 	amount 	of 	time 	having 	elapsed 	for 	the 	condition 	to 	be
discovered. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex.
2002).
Here, Plaintiff has made no assertion as to when the liquid fell on
the floor. Plaintiff has also asserted no evidence that Defendant caused
the condition or actually had notice of the condition, outside of baseless
assertions that, for instance, a nearby employee would or should have
been tasked with monitoring the floor. Nevertheless, the main problem
for Plaintiff is that there is no evidence of how long the water was on the
floor. So there is no evidence to credibly assert it was there long enough
to be reasonable discoverable and impute constructive notice onto the
Defendant. And there is no evidence that any employee of Defendant
actually noticed the spillage. Accordingly, without the temporal element
met, 	any 	facts 	about 	an 	employee’s 	proximity 	to 	the 	spill 	or
responsibility to oversee that area of the store is rendered moot.
In short, because Defendant had no actual or constructive notice of
the water, Plaintiff’s premises liability claim fails as a matter of law
because the condition was not reasonably discoverable.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has carried its burden to show that Plaintiff has no
evidence of one or more elements of its claim and has shown that it is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment. 	The 	case 	is 	hereby
DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED this 8th day of April 2026.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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