Derrick Hooker v. Lhoist North America of Texas, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
D ERRICK H OOKER ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-00287-P
L HOIST N ORTH A MERICA
OF T EXAS, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Lhoist North America of Texas, LLC’s
(“Lhoist”) 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment. 	ECF 	No. 	49. 	Having
considered the briefing and evidence of record, the Court concludes the
Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Lhoist is a subsidiary of a Belgium-based company engaged in the
production and sale of lime products. ECF No. 53 at 1. It operates nine
terminals in Texas, where it mixes and distributes lime, and employs
hundreds of semi-truck drivers to transport its products throughout the
state. ECF No. 53 at 2.
Plaintiff Derrick Hooker (“Hooker”), who is Black, was interviewed
and hired by his Fleer Supervisor, Jesse Ruiz (“Ruiz”). ECF No. 50 at 2.
Lhoist extended Hooker an employment offer as a truck driver in August
2020. ECF No. 50 at 2. Lhoist assigned him to its McKinney, Texas,
terminal. ECF No. 50 at 3. Ruiz was his supervisor during the entirety
of his employment. ECF No. 50 at 3. As a truck driver, Hooker did not
have a set schedule. ECF No. 50 at 3. Instead, his shifts typically started
at 4:30 a.m. and ended when there was no product left to deliver that
day. ECF No. 50 at 3.
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Before the first delivery of the day, pre-shift inspections are required.
ECF No. 50 at 3. Lhoist spot checks to ensure these inspections are done
by placing pre-trip cards on delivery trucks. ECF No. 50 at 3. 	The
drivers are expected to locate it during their inspection of the truck and
to report finding the card to Lhoist. ECF No. 50 at 3. On March 2, 2021,
Hooker received a written warning for failing to complete a pre-trip
inspection of his truck. ECF No. 53 at 16. This was his only written
disciplinary action. ECF No. 50 at 3.
Throughout his employment, Hooker alleged that Ruiz, Warren
Jones (“Jones”), and two fellow drivers, Nick and Daniel, discriminated
against him. However, Hooker never heard any of them make rude,
offensive, or derogatory remarks about Hooker’s race. ECF No. 50 at 4.
Hooker asserted that Jones discriminated against him because he
would make Hooker wash his trailer, even if it was freezing cold outside,
and asked him to wash a white co-worker’s truck. ECF No. 50 at 5.
Hooker was on the clock and receiving pay on these occasions. ECF No.
50 at 5. On another occasion, Hooker alleges that Jones asked him to get
into another truck and deliver the last load of the day after he had
washed his truck, even though Hooker believed that other drivers were
heading back to the terminal. ECF No. 50 at 5. Ruiz and Jones both
stated that no other drivers were headed back. ECF No. 53 at 4. Hooker
does not recall any other discriminatory actions taken by Jones. ECF
No. 	50 	at 	5. 	Hooker 	identified 	the 	above 	incident 	as 	Ruiz’s 	one
discriminatory act. ECF No. 50 at 5.
Last load deliveries were given out on a “first-come, first-serve basis.”
ECF No. 53 at 3. They allow drivers to work more hours and make more
money. ECF No. 50 at 5. Hooker alleges that white drivers would avoid
delivering the last load of the day, and Black employees delivered these
disproportionately. ECF No. 50 at 6. Hooker alleges that the last load
deliveries were undesirable because he would have to deal with traffic,
get back late, and in the winter, it was colder and darker in the
afternoons and evenings. ECF No. 50 at 6.
During 	his 	employment, 	Hooker 	made 	complaints 	about
discrimination to Ruiz, Jones, and Jesse Morris, a white member of
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management. ECF No. 50 at 8. However, he did not complain to anyone
in Human Resources about discrimination. ECF No. 50 at 8. He first
complained 	of 	discriminatory 	treatment 	six 	months 	into 	his
employment. ECF No. 50 at 8. Each complaint was oral. ECF No. 50 at
8.
Hooker was employed with Lhoist until he resigned on May 19, 2022.
ECF No. 53 at 6. He worked a notice period of two weeks, working his
last day on June 3, 2022. allow drivers to work more hours and make
more money. ECF No. 50 at 9. Hooker started his own trucking
company, 	forming 	his 	own 	limited 	liability 	company 	before 	his
resignation. ECF No. 50 at 9.
Hooker sued Lhoist for racial discrimination and retaliation under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, initiating this action on
August 7, 2024. ECF No. 1. Hooker filed a First Amended Complaint on
March 21, 2025, which is the live complaint in this case. ECF No. 27.
After discovery, Lhoist moved for Summary Judgment on all claims on
December 2, 2025. The Court now considers that motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV . P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence
presented would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of
the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43
(1986). A fact is “material” if it would affect a case’s outcome. Id. at 248.
Generally, the “substantive law will identify which facts are material,”
and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
counted.” Id.
In assessing whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court
views 	evidence 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	nonmovant.
Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Servs., LLC, 64 F.4th 597, 600 (5th Cir.
2023). The Court may rely on any evidence of record but need only
consider those materials cited by the parties. FED. R. CIV . P. 56(c)(1)–(3);
see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting
summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
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interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). But the
Court need not mine the record for evidence supporting the nonmovant;
the burden falls on the moving party to simply show a lack of evidence
supporting the nonmovant’s case. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393,
404–05 (5th Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
Lhoist seeks summary judgment on Hooker’s race discrimination and
retaliation claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
A. Section 1981 Race Discrimination Claims
Lhoist argues that Hooker cannot establish a prima facie case of race
discrimination. Specifically, it contends that Hooker cannot show that
he suffered an actionable adverse employment action or that he was
treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside his
protected class.
A § 1981 race discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence
is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Melvin v. Barr Roofing Co., 806 F.
App'x 301, 305 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Rogers v. Pearland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 827 F.3d 403, 408 (5th Cir. 2016)). Under McDonnell Douglas, a
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.
Rogers, 827 F.3d at 408. If the plaintiff does so, the burden of production
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged action. Id. “If the employer satisfies this
burden, the presumption of discrimination drops out of the picture, and
the employee must offer some evidence that” the employer's reason was
pretextual, 	or 	that 	the 	plaintiff's 	protected 	characteristic 	was 	a
“motivating factor” for the alleged discrimination. Id. (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
To establish a prima facie case, Hooker must show that he (1) is a
member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position sought; (3)
suffered 	an 	adverse 	employment 	action; 	and 	(4) 	was 	replaced 	by
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someone outside his protected class or was treated less favorably than
similarly situated employees outside his class. Haire v. Bd. of Sup’rs of
La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2013).
The first element is undisputed. Hooker is a Black man and thus a
member of a protected class. The remaining elements are contested.
Hooker 	identifies 	five 	alleged 	adverse 	employment 	actions: 	(1)
targeting for harassment and discipline; (2) making him work longer
hours; (3) disproportionately assigning him the last load of the day; (4)
holding him to harsher and more stringent standards; and (5) ignoring
his complaints about race discrimination.1
Each of these alleged adverse actions is not actionable under § 1981.
See Hamilton v. Dall. Cty., 79 F.4th 494, 505 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining
that Title VII does not permit liability for de minimis workplace trifles);
Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 3d 652, 665 (N.D. Tex.
2023) (requiring more than a de minimis harm). A plaintiff must show
some harm affecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354 (2024). In other words,
the challenged action must meaningfully alter the terms of employment
and injure the employee. Fleming v. Methodist Healthcare Sys. Of San
Antonio, Ltd. L.L.P., No. SA-21-CV01234-XR, 2024 WL 1055120, at *12
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2021).
To be actionable, Hooker must show that the actions created a
disadvantageous change in an employment term or condition. He has
“not established an essential element of [a] prima facie case because [he
was] not subject to more than a de minimis adverse employment action.”
See Sambrano 707 F. Supp. 3d at 665. Each alleged employment action
did not alter the terms or conditions of his employment. He presents no
evidence that he worked fewer hours or was unable to do an aspect of
1Hooker also contends that he was subjected to a hostile work environment.
However, he raises this for the first time in his Response to Lhoist’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Thus, it is untimely. Further, even if it was addressed, it
is not meritorious. Lhoist mentions constructive discharge as an argument put
forth by Hooker. ECF No. 50 at 18. However, as this was not raised by Hooker
until his Response to Lhoist’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court does
not address the arguments for the same reasons.
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his job. See id. Hooker, therefore, fails to show he suffered an adverse
employment action and to establish a prima facie case as to racial
discrimination.
B. Section 1981 Retaliation Claims
Lhoist 	also 	contends 	Hooker 	did 	not 	participate 	in 	protective
activities and was not subjected to an adverse employment action.
Retaliation claims under § 1981 are also analyzed under McDonnell
Douglas. See Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 319 (5th
Cir. 2004). To establish a prima facie case, Gooden must show that (1)
he engaged in protected activity; (2) he was subjected to an adverse
employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action. See id.
Hooker alleges that the same adverse employment actions above in
his retaliation claim. Hooker has alleged that he complained verbally to
management 	about 	“Lhoist’s 	disparate 	treatment 	towards 	Black
drivers.” ECF No. 53 at 15. He alleges that he first complained in
February 2021 and continued to “complain repeatedly.” ECF No. 53 at
15. 	However, 	regardless 	of 	whether 	these 	complaints 	constitute
protected activity, Hooker fails to establish an adverse employment
action.
As mentioned above, each of the alleged adverse actions is not
actionable under § 1981. Hamilton, 79 F.4th at 505; Sambrano, 707 F.
Supp. 3d at 665. Hooker must show some harm affecting an identifiable
term or condition of his employment. Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 354. He has
failed to do so for the same reasons above. Hooker, therefore, fails to
establish an adverse employment action and a prima facie case as to
retaliation.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court concludes that Lhoist’s Motion for
Summary Judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED. Accordingly,
Hooker’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 25th day of March 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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